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# LIFE OF NAPOLEON.

BY BARON JOMINI,

General-in-Chief and Aid-de-Camp to the Emperor of Russia.

"Je fus ambitieux; tout homme l'est, sans doute;  
Mais jamais roi, pontife, ou chef, ou citoyen,  
Ne conçut un projet aussi grand que le mien."

VOLTAIRE, *Mahomet*.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

WITH NOTES,

BY H. W. HALLECK, LL.D.,

Major-General United States Army;  
Author of "Elements of Military Art and Science;" "International Law,  
and the Laws of War," etc., etc.

IN TWO VOLUMES.—WITH AN ATLAS.

VOL. I.

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## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

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The following translation was made during a seven-months voyage from New York to California, in 1846. It was undertaken partly as a military study, and partly as an occupation during a long and tedious voyage round Cape Horn. After being completed, the manuscript was laid aside for more than sixteen years, and nearly forgotten.

The present war has called attention to military books, and especially to the works of Jomini. No English translation of his "Life of Napoleon" has ever been published, and it is very difficult to procure a copy in French. Under these circumstances, and to supply a public want, this translation is given to the press, a military friend having kindly offered to supervise the publication, the professional duties of the translator not permitting him to give it the proper personal attention.

During the publication of the fourth volume of the original work, the author's manuscript of the twenty-second chapter was lost, and a very brief narrative of the campaign of 1815 was substituted. The manuscript was afterwards found, and published in another and more elaborate form. The substance of this second publication is incorporated in the translation, the spirit and character of the original chapter being preserved.

With this exception, the translation is almost literal, only a few paragraphs being slightly condensed. These relate to subjects which at the present time are of very little interest. The translator is solely responsible for the Notes, those of the author being nearly all embodied in the text.

Jomini's original maps and plans being deemed too expensive for republication, those of A. K. Johnston's Atlas (which are mostly compiled from Jomini) are substituted.

H. W. H.

Washington, April, 1863.





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SKETCH  
OF THE  
Life and Writings  
OF  
GENERAL JOMINI.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

*General Anthony Henry Jomini* was born in the small village of Payerne, Canton of Vaud, Switzerland, on the 6th of March, 1779. His family was of Italian origin, but had for several centuries resided in the Canton of Vaud. Young Jomini received the usual education of young men of his class in Switzerland, and having a desire to enter the military career, steps were taken to place him in the military school of the Prince of Würtemberg, at Monthéliard; that school being transferred to Stuttgart, Jomini, at the age of seventeen, was placed in a banking-house in Paris. In 1798 he was appointed aide-de-camp to Keller, who had distinguished himself in the affair of Ostend. Keller having been superseded by Repond, Jomini lost his position for a time, but was soon afterwards employed by the new appointee, and remained for some time in the employ of the Helvetic minister. After serving in the office of the Secretary of War, with the rank of captain, he was promoted, in 1799, to the grade of chief of battalion.

After the peace of Lunéville, in 1801, Jomini returned to Paris to seek military employment, but receiving very little encouragement, he accepted a position in a commercial house. In 1805 Ney gave him a situation on his staff, with the promise of appointing him an aide-de-camp, which promise was afterwards redeemed. He served with Ney in the campaigns of Ulm, Jena, Eylau, and Spain, and was promoted to the rank of chief of Ney's staff, for services in the field. In these campaigns he acquired a brilliant reputation as a staff officer, and as a strat-

egist; but the reputation thus acquired, as is almost invariably the case, created jealousies, and made for the Swiss officer numerous enemies, at the head of whom was Berthier, the Major-General and Chief-of-Staff of the Imperial Army.

After the capitulation of Dupont at Baylen, in 1808, Napoleon determined to direct in person the military operations in Spain, and ordered Ney to join him with the sixth *corps d'armée*. Colonel Jomini made preparations to accompany Ney in this new field; but the indiscreet admirers of his chief-of-staff had incited the jealousy of the Marshal's wife by reporting that Jomini had planned or advised Ney's most successful operations. This feeling made his position, for a time, anything but agreeable; nevertheless he served through the campaign, and was sent by Ney to Napoleon, at Vienna, to explain the Marshal's objections to serve under Soult. After the battle of Wagram, he returned with Napoleon to Paris, where they met Ney. The latter was immediately ordered to return to his command, and Jomini was about to accompany him, when he found that Colonel Béchét had been selected by Ney in his place as chief-of-staff, Jomini being assigned to duty in the general staff under Major-General Berthier. Rather than serve under the Prince of Neuchatel, who had always been his enemy, Jomini tendered his resignation, intending to enter the service of the Emperor of Russia. But Napoleon refused to accept it, and placed him on special duty, in Paris, to enable him to write his history of the campaigns in Italy. The progress of his investigations, however, was much impeded in 1811, by Colonel Muriel, Chief of the Dépôt of Archives, who would not permit him to examine any paper without a special requisition and order, designating the particular paper to be inspected.

Meeting the Emperor one Sunday, Napoleon made inquiries in regard to his progress in writing the history of the Italian campaigns. Jomini explained his embarrassments, and was ordered to report in person the next day. He repaired to the palace at the hour appointed, and met the Mameluke Roustan passing from the apartment of the Empress to that of Napoleon, announcing the birth of the Prince Imperial. Jomini immediately withdrew; but the Emperor sent for him and reprimanded him for not keeping his engagement. Jomini excused himself by saying that, under the peculiar circumstances, he had supposed his Majesty would be too much engaged to receive him. Napoleon's reply was characteristic: "Your conclusion was not logical. If the Empress had continued to suffer, the case would have been different; but as she was safely delivered, the best thing I could do was to let her repose, and



attend to my own business." At this interview Napoleon spoke of Berthier's dislike to him, and asked the cause of this ill-feeling. Jomini replied that he had done everything possible to conciliate the major-general, even offering to dedicate to him his "Treatise on Grand Operations"; that Berthier consented to accept a simple dedication, but *no letter of dedication*. "He showed bad taste," said Napoleon; "you would have done better to dedicate it to me; I should have been pleased to accept it." Jomini replied that he could not venture to take such a liberty.

When the war of 1812 broke out between France and Russia, Jomini, not wishing to fight against the Emperor Alexander, who had previously offered him a high position in the Russian army, but which Napoleon would not permit him to accept, asked the pacific position of governor of a province, and was assigned to the governorship of Wilna. He was afterwards sent to replace General Barbanègre in the government of Smolensk, and rendered most valuable assistance to Napoleon in the retreat from Moscow, especially in the passage of the Beresina, at which place he was ordered to select, in conjunction with General Eblé, the points for placing the bridges.

He suffered terribly in this retreat, and several times very nearly perished. When almost on the point of death, he met General Guilleminot, the chief-of-staff of the Viceroy of Italy, who presented him to Eugene as an officer at his service. Eugene received him kindly, but with the significant remark: "What, my poor general, can I do with *you*, when I can do nothing with *myself*?" On his arrival at Stettin, he received orders to join the Emperor at Paris, to assist in the organization of a new army. General Nègre, of the artillery, was the only other officer who received the honor of such an order. Jomini obeyed, but, on his arrival at Paris, his health was such as to confine him for three months to his bed.

He rejoined the army on the day of the battle of Lutzen, and was appointed by Napoleon chief of Ney's staff. He reported to the Marshal, at Leipsic, on the 4th of May. The meeting was embarrassing to both, as neither had asked or expected the appointment. But their old relations were soon renewed, and Jomini distinguished himself at the battle of Bautzen, by the judicious advice which he gave to move on the enemy's right instead of the left, an opinion subsequently confirmed by the receipt of orders from the Emperor, which had been miscarried. Ney, grateful for the services of Jomini, recommended his promotion to the grade of general of division; but the old hatred of Berthier prevented this and, instead of rewarding him for services rendered, the Prince of Neuchâtel charged him with incapacity.

ity and ordered him in arrest! This was a little too much for the proud spirit of Jomini, and he resolved to no longer serve under an ungrateful flag. He therefore left the French army, and repaired to the head-quarters of the Emperor of Russia, and was received into his service.

The desertion of Jomini from the service of France caused much comment and discussion. His friends defended this act as perfectly justifiable. They said that, in the *first* place, not being a Frenchman, or a French subject, he was under no obligations of patriotism to France. He was simply a soldier of fortune, whose offers of service had been accepted, and that this obligation continued only so long as the two parties agreed. The service itself was not obligatory, nor the term of the engagement for life; that there could, from the nature of the case, have been no implied understanding, between the parties, of such a character. They said further, that when General Jomini tendered his resignation, and asked to retire from the French service, all obligations on his part ceased, and that subsequently he must be considered as an impressed foreigner, who had a right to desert on the first opportunity. The Emperor having refused to accept his resignation, he remained an unwilling servant, until the ill-treatment of Berthier compelled him, from a sense of self-respect, to desert. That his leaving at the time and in the manner he did was in every respect justifiable, and, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, entirely unavoidable.

His enemies contended that, having once entered the French service, he had no right to leave it without the consent of the government, and that, so long as that consent was refused, he was bound to continue in service. That his leaving at the time and under the circumstances of the case constituted a real military desertion. Some, moreover, at the time, went so far as to charge him with virtual treason, alleging that he took to the enemy important documentary and parole information.

At this distance of time, and after a full examination of the evidence and arguments on both sides, it is not easy to agree entirely with either party. To hold that an officer who voluntarily enters a foreign service is bound to remain in that service against his will and for life, is very unreasonable. On the contrary, it is equally unreasonable to contend that he may leave at any moment he pleases; for instance, to leave the field of battle, and join the ranks of the enemy. If Jomini, after the campaign in Spain, had insisted upon his resignation, and had declined any other voluntary duty in the French service, no one could have blamed him for leaving it on the first favorable opportunity. On the contrary, after Napoleon had refused to accept his resignation,



he continued in the willing performance of the duties of his office. Moreover, he accepted promotion to a higher grade and a most confidential trust. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that, if anything can ever justify an act like that of General Jomini, in 1813, it was excused by the refusal of his promotion, so earnestly solicited by Marshal Ney, for gallant and meritorious services at the battle of Bautzen, and by Berthier's unjust treatment, and especially by the disgrace of arrest and trial on unfounded charges.)

On joining the service of the Allies, the conduct of Jomini was in every respect honorable, and proved that he fully appreciated the embarrassments of his position. When asked by the King of Prussia certain questions in regard to the position and numbers of the French troops, he politely declined to answer. The Emperor of Russia, who was present, justified his refusal, and openly approved his delicate sense of honor in regard to the service which he had just left.

The absurd charge that Jomini conveyed to the Allies the plans of the Emperor was forever put to rest by Napoleon himself, in his "Autographic Memoirs," dictated at St. Helena. In commenting upon the "History of the Campaign in Saxony," where this accusation was repeated, he remarked: "The author of this book is wrong in charging General Jomini with having conveyed to the Allies the secret of the operations of the campaign, and the situation of Ney's corps. That officer did not know the Emperor's plan; the order of general movement, which was always sent to each of the marshals, was not communicated to him, and he did not know what it was. The Emperor never accused him of the crime which is here imputed to him. He did not desert his flag, like some others. He had great injustice to complain of, and was blinded by an honorable sentiment. He was not a Frenchman, and there was no love of country to retain him."

During the remainder of the campaign of 1813, General Jomini rendered most valuable service to the Emperor of Russia, by his opinions in regard to military operations. On reaching the banks of the Rhine, he advised against the invasion of France, and in favor of a treaty of peace, honorable to both parties; but Teutonic exaltation at that time would be satisfied with nothing less than the conquest and partition of France. Jomini entered France with the Emperor of Russia, but, on his urgent solicitations, was permitted to return to Switzerland, and was of great service to his native country in saving it, through the influence of Russia, from the intended conquest and subjugation of Austria.

After the occupation of Paris by the Allies, and the restoration of Louis XVIII., General Jomini repaired to Vienna in a politico-military capacity, as a Russian officer, and as a representative of his native Canton of Vaud. In these negotiations he greatly exerted himself to secure the liberties of his native country from the rapacity of Austrian diplomacy. It was fortunate for Switzerland at this period that Jomini, and several other distinguished Swiss, held high positions in the Russian army, and in the councils of the Emperor, who used his power and influence to protect their country.

In 1815 he returned to Paris, with the Emperor Alexander, where he so warmly opposed the execution of Marshal Ney, that it was proposed to strike his name from the list of Russian generals. This act of the Allies is a lasting disgrace to their character and cause; and the course pursued by Jomini on that occasion constitutes one of the most praiseworthy incidents of his history.

After the peace, Jomini accompanied the Emperor to Russia, and was promoted to the rank of a general-in-chief—that is, a general eligible to the command of an army—a rank next to that of marshal in the Russian service, which no one can there hold who has not gained a battle. Thus, Prince Gortschakoff, notwithstanding his brilliant defense of the Crimea, could not be made a marshal, because he had won no battle. Jomini successively received the grand crosses of St. Anne, St. Waldimir, and St. Alexander; assisted the Emperor at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1818, and at the Congress of Verona, in 1823; was made president of a committee for organizing the Military Academy; and was afterwards charged with preparing plans for fortifying and defending the frontiers of the empire. On the accession of Nicholas to the throne, he received many proofs of the confidence of the new Emperor, was appointed aide-de-camp general, and charged with directing the military education of the imperial heir. His health, much broken by his sufferings on the Beresina, was too delicate to withstand the rigors of the climate of St. Petersburg, and he had permission to spend much of his time in Paris and in the south of Europe.

Jomini has two sons and three daughters. His eldest son was *aide-de-camp* to Marshal Paskewitz, and afterwards left the service to reside at Payerne. The second is first Counsellor of State in the Department of Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg. His eldest daughter is married in Russia, to a nephew of the Princess Orloff; the second, to a superior officer of the French corps of Engineers; and the third, to a proprietor on the Loire.



## NOTICE OF HIS WRITINGS.

To the foregoing sketch of Jomini's life we will add a brief notice of his published works.

After studying the principal authors on the military art, and comparing their views with those developed by the campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon, Jomini made a scientific analysis of the principles which seemed to lie at the foundation of military operations, which resulted, in 1803, in the preparation of a work entitled a "Treatise on Grand Tactics," in which was set forth his views, with abundant illustrations, from the campaigns of Frederick and of the French Revolution. On reflection, he decided that such a work would not succeed, and in a fit of dejection he burned the manuscript. Adopting a new plan for the enunciation of his views, he drew up his "*Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires*" ("Treatise on Grand Military Operations"), the first two volumes of which were published in 1804. The fifth volume, including the wars of the French Revolution, was published in 1806, before the third and fourth volumes, in order to incite the interest of the readers, by a recital of recent operations. The other volumes were completed in 1810. The second edition was published in Paris, between 1811 and 1816, in eight volumes. A third edition appeared in 1818, in three volumes, the author having suppressed the first six campaigns of the Revolution, in order to include them in his "History of the Wars of the Revolution," which he was then preparing. The fourth edition of this work appeared in 1857, in three volumes, with an atlas.

This is considered by military critics the most important of all his works, as it embodies the main principles of the military art, with numerous illustrations drawn from the campaigns of the great captains of different ages. All succeeding military writers have borne testimony to the great ability displayed in this work.

In 1811 Jomini began the publication of his "*Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution*" ("Critical and Military History of the Wars of the Revolution"), in fifteen volumes, with four atlases, containing in all 39 plates. This was a work of immense labor, and in some respects it formed the basis of most histories of the same period which have followed since its publication. The analysis of campaigns and battles, and the critical discussion of plans and military operations, render it of great value to military readers. Its character is scientific, rather than literary or historical, and, notwithstanding the great ability

displayed in it, with general readers it is not popular. The narrative is clear, and the style perspicuous, but the minute details of scientific discussions render it somewhat tedious as an historical work. The publication was not completed till 1824.

In 1827 Jomini published his "Life of Napoleon," under the title of "*Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoléon, racontée par lui-même au tribunal de César, d'Alexandre et de Frédéric*," in four volumes, with an atlas of 36 plates. Although published anonymously, the military character of the work plainly indicated its author. It is said that Jomini originally intended to make it a more complete history of the Wars of the Empire, as a continuation of his "History of the Revolution." He was deterred from this by several reasons. In the first place, his position as an old officer of the French army, and as aide-de-camp to the Emperor of Russia, rendered it embarrassing to appear as a public critic of the political and military acts of Napoleon. At least, these criticisms, whether favorable or unfavorable, would be likely to involve him in controversies. In the second place, he could not then have access to official documents, necessary for a full and elaborate history of Napoleon's wars. An anonymous publication would enable him to avoid personal controversies, and to exercise more freedom in the discussion of these great political events.

The other works of Jomini are his "*Tableau Analytique*," published in 1830; his "*Précis de l'Art de la Guerre*," published in 1837; and his treatise "*Sur la Formation des Troupes pour le Combat*," published in 1856. His translations, with valuable notes, of Lloyd and Tempelhoff's "History of the Seven Years' War," and the Archduke Charles' "Principles of Strategy," are standard works among military readers. In addition to these works, Jomini has published a number of pamphlets on polemical subjects, and reviews of the military and historical writings of his contemporaries. In all of these minor publications, he has exhibited great military knowledge, as well as accurate military criticism.

As a military historian, Jomini has no equal; at least, not among the writers who preceded him. And the best of those who have followed him do not hesitate to acknowledge him as their model and prototype.

(The commentaries of Cæsar are of no great military value,) for the art of war was then in its infancy, and strategy was very little understood, even by those who are now looked back upon as good generals. In military operations, as in everything else, strong common sense pointed out the same plans of operation as would have been decided upon after the most elaborate scien-



tific discussion. Science tests and approves what genius originates and suggests.

The old military historians, Josephus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius, Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, Plutarch, Arrian, Machiavelli, Montluc, Brantôme, Rohan, Montecuculli, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Condé, Feuquières, Santa Cruz, Puységur, and Frederick, described the events of the wars without understanding or attempting to point out the strategic relations of the several movements of the contending armies. Even Guibert, Ménil-Durand, Lloyd, Tempelhoff, Warnery, La Roche Aymon, Bülow, and Dumas discussed the military operations which they described in their relation to tactical movements rather than strategic combinations.

The dictations of Napoleon at St. Helena, *chefs-d'oeuvre* in their way, are mere fragmentary discussions of historical events, grand in conception, but imperfect in execution. They are valuable studies for experienced generals, but not easily understood by military students, and a mere dead letter to common readers. Napoleon, in criticising Jomini's works, spoke of him in the most complimentary terms; and Jomini, in writing of Napoleon, always held him up as a model of a great captain. On questions of military science they were fully agreed. While Jomini stated his military problems in scientific language, Napoleon solved them by practical experience.

Since the earlier writings of Jomini first appeared, a very large number of military works have been published, some of them technical books of professional instruction, and others of an historical character.

In the first class we may mention Xylander, Wagner, Decker, Hoyer, Valentini, the Archduke Charles, Müller, Bismarck, Bouteurlin, Okouneff, Clausewitz, Muffling, Rogniat, Gay de Vernon, Jacquinet de Presle, Rocquancourt, Ternay, Dufour, Augoyat, Bardin, Chambray, Bugeaud, Lallemand, Barre Duparcq, Fallot, Paixhans, Chassaloup, Jacobi, Piobert, Scharnhorst, Thiroux, Choumara, Birago, Bousmard, Carnot, Douglas, Haillot, Carrion-Nisas, Ravichio de Peretsdorf, Macaulay, Noizet, Jebb, Laisné, Zastrow, Mahan, Saint-Paul, Mangin, Maurice de Sellon, etc.

In the second class may be mentioned Dumas, Soult, Suchet, Saint-Cyr, Beauvais, Pelet, Koch, Vaudoncourt, Foy, Napier, Regnier, Marmont, Lamarque, Bellune, Charras, Thiers, Belmas, Kausler, Chambray, Savary, Ségur, Fain, Siborne, Jones, etc.

Nearly all recent military writers and historians have discussed or criticised the theories and principles set forth in the



works of Jomini. It must not, however, be inferred that all, or even a majority of these writers, clearly understood the questions which they discussed, or the principals of the art which they criticised.

Again, Jomini has experienced in his political career much of the fickleness of popular opinion and popular judgment. In his native country he was, at one time, the object of unmeasured abuse, and, at another, of unbounded praise. In France, for some years after he went over to the Russian service, his name was only mentioned with contempt. Afterwards, he was not only honored by the French government, but courted by the literary and military *savants* of the French metropolis; and the French army, proud of his record of its glorious achievements, claim him as having belonged to its ranks.

Few men of this century have a more wide-spread or well-earned reputation. His works are read and admired by the soldiers of every country on the continent of Europe, and probably no other author is as much read and studied in the British and American armies.

General Jomini is now about eighty-four years of age, but appears much younger than he really is. At least, such was his condition when the translator saw him in Paris, two or three years since.

We will close this biographical sketch of the Life and Writings of General Jomini with a characteristic anecdote, which will serve to show his remarkable knowledge of military strategy, or what the French call *strategic intuition*. Having been summoned to the imperial head-quarters, at Mayence, at the beginning of the campaign of Jena, Napoleon said to him: "I am delighted that the first work which demonstrates the true principles of war has appeared in my reign. No work like yours is taught in our military schools. We are going to fight the Prussians. I have called you near me, because you have written on the campaigns of Frederick the Great, because you know his army, and have studied the theatre of the war." Jomini asked for four days to get his horses and equipages from the head-quarters of Marshal Ney, and added that he would join his Majesty at Bamberg. "Why at Bamberg?" said the Emperor. "Who told you that I am going to Bamberg?" "The map of Germany, sire." "There are a hundred roads on that map," said Napoleon. "Yes, sire; but it is probable that your Majesty will make against the left of the Prussians the same maneuver which was made at Donawerth against the right of Mack, and by St. Bernard against the right of Melas." "Very well," said Napo-

leon; "go to Bamberg, but don't say a word about it; no one should know that I am going to Bamberg."

The foregoing biographical and bibliographical sketch is compiled from Major Lecomte's "Life and Writings of General Jomini," *Le Spectateur Militaire*, Liv. 126, December 15th, 1861, and biographical dictionaries.





*LIFE*

*OF*

*NAPOLEON*



## PROLOGUE.

Long had the Elysian Fields resounded with the memorable events which marked the beginning of the nineteenth century. The shades of Pitt and Thugut, of Kléber, Moreau, Nelson, Lannes, and the many other heroes slain in battle, had already carried there a thousand different versions of the combinations to which were attributed so many victories and so many defeats. The illustrious inhabitants of these mysterious regions were waiting, with impatience, the arrival of the extraordinary man who had been the principal mover in these events, and who alone could explain them.

Already the news of his exile to St. Helena, and of the barbarous treatment he received there, gives warning of his approaching end. Already homicidal Fate seizes her scissors \* \* \*, inexorable Atropos cannot suffer so noble a victim to escape. Finally, the fifth of May, 1821, the clear sky of Elysium is suddenly covered with clouds; the angry waves of Acheron, lashed by the unchained winds, give notice of some extraordinary apparition. All, with a common sentiment of interest and curiosity, hasten to the shore. Soon the skiff of the sad and silent Charon is seen approaching; it carries the shade of Napoleon the \* \* \*. All press forward to see him; Alexander, Cæsar, Frederick, are in the first rank, and they alone have the right of interrogating him. To the usual felicitations succeed the most weighty questions. *Alexander*, who from the



mountains of Macedonia penetrated into India and returned victorious, is astonished at the retreat from Moscow, and seeks to know the cause. *Caesar*, who died invincible, asks an explanation of the disasters of Leipsic and Waterloo. *Frederick*, so great in reverses, and so measured in his enterprises, wishes an explanation of the prompt destruction of his monarchy, and of its brilliant resurrection in 1813.

Surrounded by this noble Areopagus, Napoleon replies as follows:—

## CHAPTER I.

### FROM THE BIRTH OF NAPOLEON TO HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.

**Plan of the Work**—Napoleon's Birth and Parentage—Character and Education—His first Appointment to the Army—France before the Revolution—Summary of the Events of the Revolution—Events of the 17th, 20th, and 23d of June, 1789—Grand Coalition against France—Russia and Poland—War with Austria—The Prussians invade Champagne—The Republic proclaimed—Retreat of the Prussians—Invasion of Belgium—Death of Louis XVI.—War with Spain, Holland, and England—Dumouriez driven from Belgium—He treats with the Austrians—Committee of Public Safety—Sieges of Mayence and Valenciennes—Fall of the Girondists, May 31st—England heads the Coalition—Affairs of Poland—The Ottoman Porte—Situation of France—Energy of the Convention—Carnot appointed to the Committee of Public Safety—Decree for a *levée en masse*—Revolutionary Government—Reign of Terror—Faults of the Allies—They are driven from France—Death of Marie Antoinette—Political Results of the Revolution—Napoleon appointed Chief-of-battalion—His Republican Opinions—Siege of Toulon—He is made General of Artillery—Conquest of Belgium, Holland, and the left Bank of the Rhine—Naval Battle of Quessant—Insurrection in Poland—Fall of Robespierre—Peace with Russia and Spain—Fate of the Royal Family—Napoleon employed at Paris—New Insurrections—The Quiberon Expedition—Constitution of the Year III.—Affair of the 13th Vendémiaire—Military Operations of 1795—Napoleon's Marriage to Josephine—His Plan for the Invasion of Italy—Appointed General-in-chief of the Army of Italy.

**PLAN OF THE WORK.**—I will not attempt a complete picture of the important and complicated events of my reign; this immense work cannot probably be undertaken till after the great personages who took part, either for or against me, have published their memoirs, developed their views, and explained their actions; it must, therefore, be left to posterity,—to some faithful disciple of the severe Clio. But I will now give an outline of my most prominent actions, of my political views, of my military combinations,—in a word, present myself such as I really

was. From this it may be seen how much I have been disfigured by the passions and party spirit of my contemporaries.\*

NAPOLEON'S BIRTH, ETC.—I was born on the 15th of August, 1769, at Ajaccio, in Corsica; my parents were noble,—fortuitous circumstance, to which I attach no importance. *"A captain who renders his country illustrious, and by his own merit rebuilds the throne of Charlemagne, has no need of noble ancestry."* The patrician family from which I sprung included in its number the Gonfalonier Buonaparte of St. Nicholas, who governed the Republic of Florence towards the middle of the thirteenth century.

CHARACTER AND EDUCATION.—My career has been so astonishing that my admirers have thought to find something extraordinary even in my infancy. They are mistaken. My early life indicated nothing at all remarkable. At ten years of age I was admitted to the school at Brienne, and afterwards to that of Paris. My early education was what is usually given in the military schools of France.†

I succeeded in whatever I undertook, because I wished to do so. My will was strong, and my character decided; this has given me an advantage over all others. The nature of the will depends upon the genius of the individual; it is not every one that can be master of himself. If there has sometimes been an appearance of irresolution in my actions, it did not proceed from any indecision of character, but it was because my strong imagination presented to me, with the rapidity of lightning, all the various phases of the subject. At school I applied myself to studies that I thought might be most useful to me, particularly to history and mathematics; the former develops genius, and the latter regulates its action. My intellectual faculties expanded without much effort; my conception was quick and lively, my memory strong, my judgment cool and decided. I thought quicker than others, so that I had always time for reflection. In this consisted my depth. My mind was too active to be amused with the ordinary diversions of youth. But I did not, as some have asserted, entirely avoid these juvenile recreations, though I generally found something else to interest me.

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\*The author here acknowledges that he has copied several pages from the pretended manuscript from St. Helena. It is no plagiarism, but an avowed imitation of the original.

†It is worthy of remark that Wellington, who was born in the same year with Napoleon, received his military education at the military school of Angers in France, about the same time that Napoleon was a pupil at Paris.



This disposition often left me to the solitude of my own thoughts, and at length grew into a habit, which continued through all the vicissitudes of my life.

**FIRST APPOINTMENT TO THE ARMY.**—Being destined to the military service, I received the commission of lieutenant of artillery four years before the Revolution. I have never received any title with so much interest as I did this. It was then the height of my ambition to wear, at some future day, two *épaulettes à bouillons*, and a general of artillery appeared to me the *ne plus ultra* of human greatness. But if I was not ambitious of power, I was already avaricious of renown; for I conceived the idea of writing a history of the war sustained by Corsica for her independence. I proposed this to Paoli, asking him for the necessary information. Probably a historian of eighteen years of age did not inspire him with much confidence, and he paid no attention to the proposition. My mortification at this result was soon indemnified by my promotion to the captaincy of a company. This was in 1789. When the Revolution broke out, my sphere of action seemed to enlarge. It would be superfluous to speak here of the impression first made on me by this great catastrophe; but for the better understanding of the course I afterwards pursued, it may not be amiss to give a simple summary of the events which preceded my promotion to the command of the army of Italy.

**FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION.**—No reign ever commenced under such happy auspices as that of the virtuous Louis XVI. Ten years after the ridiculous war of 1756-63, France, by means of her alliances with Austria, Piedmont, Naples, and Spain, held the balance of power on the Continent, entirely controlled the Mediterranean, and disputed with the English the supremacy of the ocean. And everything seemed to promise that, profiting by these close alliances with the half of Europe, she would soon obtain the first rank upon the seas. Her only rival here was England. The alarm has been sounded throughout Europe against my ambition; but my relative power was never so formidable as that of Louis XVI. I occupied more territory, it is true, but this occupation was a hostile one, since it was contested by the half of Europe, and even by a part of the people I had conquered; whereas, under Louis XVI., these same people were voluntarily the allies of France.

**COUP D'OEIL OF THE REVOLUTION.**—The glorious war in America was the first result of this happy position of France; and most probably we should have broken the maritime sceptre of

England, had it not been for the unskillfulness of our octogenarian prime-minister (Maurepas), who knew better how to make puns and madrigals on naval battles than to direct affairs of state. But, in spite of our faults, England lost her fine American provinces, and was on the point of also losing the Antilles. Unfortunately, this war produced results which no one could anticipate. It occasioned debts, and to pay these, it was necessary to include as taxable property the immense wealth of the *noblesse* and clergy. The ministry dared to advise this, but the clergy and nobility refused to submit. Thus, by their own egotism, these noted defenders of the altar and the throne sapped the foundation of that throne for which they pretended so much devotion. M. Vergennes died at this time, and his successors permitted the English party to get the better of us in Holland, and lost all the advantages of our connection with Austria, by rejecting the projects of Joseph II., and inducing him to form an alliance with Russia. These two errors destroyed all the influence which we had acquired in Europe, through the policy of Choiseul, and the feeble ministry made itself despicable both at home and abroad. The financial embarrassments growing worse, it was thought necessary to have recourse to the *States-general*. Here were opposed the aristocratic classes, who were blinded by their privileges, and a *tiers-état* who asked the abolition, or at least a modification, of these privileges. From the clash of these interests, which ought to have been avoided, sprung the Revolution. Feudal rights could not be sustained against a *tiers-état* as rich and enlightened as that of France, at the close of the eighteenth century. For twenty years the Revolution had existed in all minds; in the magistracy, in the nobility, in the army; even in the court itself. The government had become the target for all wounded vanities and petty ambitions; some opposed to it the aristocratic pride of the Fronde; others, the democratic pretensions of the *Niveleurs*. But had it been in wise and able hands, this effervescence of heads could never have effected a revolution. The political horizon of France was covered with inflammable materials, which should have been carefully guarded from the slightest incendiary spark; government, on the contrary, itself applied the match. It brought together the opposing parties, and provoked them to a contest. It mortified the *noblesse*, irritated the people, disputed with the magistrates, humiliated the army, and, to cap the climax of folly, ordered the troops to allow themselves to be maltreated by the populace!

When great public interests are at stake, and a revolution



becomes inevitable, a skillful chief should place himself at its head, sacrifice his own life, rather than suffer it to pass certain limits. Revolutions spring from opinions of interests. When interests founded on justice and reason are properly satisfied, opinions become calm of themselves (if we except religious opinions). But such were not the measures pursued by the ministry of Louis XVI. Opposed by the magistrates and the nobility, it fell into the hands of Necker, who, to form a party for himself, doubled the representative power of the *tiers-état*. This measure was a good one, but the mode of executing it dangerous. The court divided itself into two parties, forming two governments; the one for Necker and reform, and the other opposing both. States-general, assembled with the duplication of the *tiers-état*, and vote *per capita* in a single assembly, could not fail to produce the most fatal results.

DECISIVE EVENTS OF JUNE 17, 20, AND 23, 1789.—The three orders were to vote separately; the *tiers-état* insisted upon their all voting together and by head, because, being now the most numerous body, this would give them a decided advantage over the others. The *noblesse* and clergy refused, the *tiers-état* constituted themselves, on the seventeenth of June, the *National Assembly*. Their place of sitting was closed against them on the twentieth; they assembled in the *Jeu-de-Paume*, or Tennis Court, and took an oath not to separate until they had given a constitution to France. This was the turning-point of the Revolution. The King should have dissolved this body, which had now constituted itself the government, in violation of all the laws of the kingdom. If anything could have prevented the Revolution, it was this measure, executed with firmness, and accompanied with just and necessary reforms. His design was a good one, but he had not the courage to execute it.

On the twenty-third, Louis XVI. goes in person to the Assembly, declares it illegal, and, while making some concessions, orders the deputies to dissolve. The King withdraws, but the deputies do not obey him. The grand-master of ceremonies summons them to leave the chamber. Mirabeau declares that they will leave only when driven out at the point of the bayonet. Instead of forcing obedience, the King permits them to remain, and even orders the clergy and nobility to join them. To Necker, who advised this measure, must be attributed all the evils resulting from it. Many absurd things have been said about the influence of "philosophers and philosophy" in producing the Revolution. If Louis XVI. had taken Mirabeau at his word, it is probable that the States-general had gone home, like their prede-



cessors, and all the Voltaires in the world could not have changed the face of France. But the Revolution was consummated the moment the throne trusted itself in the hands of an Assembly ruled by ambitious demagogues. Mirabeau, Sièyes, and the leaders of the Assembly, escaping the punishment due to state criminals, had only to demolish, stone after stone, the monarchical edifice; for them there was no retreat; they must conquer or die, and they conquered the more easily, as they undertook everything in the name of the government whose authority they had usurped, and by the hands of a mob which they had armed in all the forms of legality.

Too much importance has been attributed, by those who mistake the effect for the cause, to the action of the people in this Revolution. A revolution is soon consummated; it continues but a few days. The mass of the people gradually adopt its measures in proportion as the factions are crowned with success, and menaces from abroad render desperate the situation of the insurrectionary leaders, and force them to unchain the furies of demagogism. *If I had been a minister of Louis XVI., the Revolution would have terminated on the twenty-third of June, 1789. With the same hand that overthrew the enemies of the throne, I would have restored right and justice to the nation.*

Victorious in the events of the seventeenth and the twenty-third of June, the chiefs of the *tiers-état* had little difficulty in effecting the victory of July fourteenth. They were supported by a powerful army of National Guards, and, in a short time, by the troops of the line. Thus far, no great evil had been produced; on the contrary, the substitution of a national government, in the place of a system of court-favoritism, might have effected much good. But, unfortunately, the popular leaders now attempted to consolidate their own power, by reducing the royal authority to a mere shadow. This was the great fault which overthrew the state-edifice. There was more reason in attacking the prerogatives of the clergy and *noblesse*. The classes resisted, but were overthrown by the mass of the people; in this struggle they lost much that really belonged to them, but instead of trusting to time for a restoration of just rights, they imprudently called in foreign aid, and thus denationalized their cause.

It being rumored that the Court was collecting some of its faithful regiments at Versailles, the revolutionary leaders, fearing that the King might escape their power, determined to remove him to Paris, and place him in a situation dependent on the populace. To secure this object, the insurrections of the fifth

and sixth of October were incited. Lafayette, at the head of 20,000 National Guards, repaired to Versailles, and the disgraceful excesses committed in the palace cast a stigma upon the character of the Revolution. The King was escorted from Versailles to the Tuileries, by Lafayette, who was there directed to guard his person; for the French guards belonged to the factions, and the body-guards were discharged, so that his guard was reduced to a single regiment of Swiss.

The members of the Assembly, for the better attainment of their object, forbade any interference of the crown in the discussions upon the constitution, limiting it to the simple power of *Veto*. This unfortunate word was borrowed from the Polish Diets, and it is astonishing that the legislators of France had derived so little wisdom from the lessons of history. The *Veto* power was different in the two cases, but it led to the same result—the subjugation of the crown to the tyranny of factions. During all these discussions, the good King, Louis XVI., remained at the Tuileries, a passive spectator of events—more like a criminal than a sovereign. Persuaded by the solicitations of the *émigrés* to join the foreign coalition, he fled from Paris, in April, 1791; but, with his queen and children, was arrested at Varennes; Bouillé offered to rescue him, but the vacillating monarch preferred being led back captive to Paris; he returned to the Tuileries a prisoner, his royal authority being previously suspended. His departure was an error, and his return a calamity.

Having taken the first false step, the Assembly continued to wander further and further from the path of wise legislation. It formed the Jacobin clubs, and allowed their continuance after they were evidently dangerous to public tranquillity. When these took the helm of government, the throne was lost. With great disinterestedness, the Assembly declared its members ineligible to a reëlection. This abnegation was worthy of Spartans, but was the height of folly. If eight hundred of the most influential men of France were disfranchised from exercising all public functions, their successors could be found only in the lowest ranks. Against the formal attacks of the new Legislative Assembly upon the throne were arrayed the coalition and Coblenz; the one to maintain the throne, and the other to profit by its ruin. France was invaded. The revolutionary leaders responded by the cry of vengeance and death.

GRAND COALITION AGAINST FRANCE.—The origin of the grand coalition against France is still somewhat doubtful, though it is supposed to have begun in the conferences of the Em-



peror Leopold and the Count d'Artois, at Mantua. At first it was thought best to resort to an intervention of the princes allied to the royal family; that is, of Spain, Sardinia, and Austria. The Emperor Leopold proposed a Congress of Nations; but the Assembly, influenced by patriotic pride, or perhaps yielding to a mere temporary effervescence, declared any Frenchman, who should consent to submit the laws of France to the decision of a foreign Congress, to be a traitor to his country. It was afterwards proposed to place Gustavus III., King of Sweden, at the head of the coalition, because, having received assistance from Louis XV. to rescue him from the usurped power of the Senate of Stockholm, he would be the most suitable person to render the same disinterested service to Louis XVI. But Gustavus having been assassinated, Frederick William of Prussia, for some unaccountable reason, was placed at the head of the league. It would be difficult to explain why this monarch should wish to interfere in the internal affairs of France. England, of course, was enchanted at the embarrassment of her neighbor, for the greater the internal difficulties of France, the greater the advantages which she could derive from them. Russia, also, rejoiced at this state of affairs, for it left her at liberty to pursue her aggrandizements in other quarters. She expressed a lively interest in the success of the league, but took good care not to appear in the affairs of the west till she had consummated the partition in Poland.

**RUSSIA AND POLAND.**—Towards that partition Catharine\* now directed all her policy. The reformers in Poland acted upon principles the reverse of those in Paris. Instead of weakening the power of the throne, which was proclaimed, on the third of May, 1791, hereditary in the House of Saxony, they endeavored to give it that importance which alone could effect its preservation. Those very powers who opposed France for weakening the influence of the crown attacked Poland for endeavoring to increase it; a contradiction that proves interest to have been the basis of all their actions. Some of the factious nobility,

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\*Catharine II., Empress of Russia, was born at Stettin, in 1729. Her father was a Russian field-marshal. She was married in 1745, to Peter, the nephew of the Empress Elizabeth, whose successor he became in 1761. Peter III. soon became estranged from his wife, on account of her infamous conduct, but Catharine consoled herself with a variety of lovers. A conspiracy, headed by one of her favorites, Orloff, resulted in the death of Peter in prison. Catharine continued to reign till 1792, when she died of apoplexy. "With all the weakness of her sex, and with a love of pleasure carried to licentiousness, she combined the firmness and talent becoming a powerful sovereign. She favored distinguished authors, and affected great partiality for the French philosophers."



under pretense of securing the public liberty, formed a league, at Targowitz, and implored the intervention of Catharine; guaranteeing the constitution of 1775, she marched an army into Poland for the ostensible purpose of sustaining the constitution, but in reality to get possession of the important places of the kingdom. The Poles solicited the assistance of Prussia, and Frederick William marched his troops to Thorn and Posen, in order to get these places into his own possession. The wisdom of the confederates of Targowitz may well rival that of the councillors of Louis XVI.!

**WAR WITH AUSTRIA.**—The National Assembly, certain of a general preparation to invade France, determined to take the initiative. It had many friends in Belgium, where the Austrian yoke had created insurrection, under Joseph II. Explanations were demanded of Austria for her great armaments, but she replied only by menaces. Dumouriez, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, returned these menaces by a declaration of war, and the invasion of the Netherlands; but our armies were betrayed, and defeated by a handful of Germans under Beaulieu, in April, 1792.

**THE PRUSSIANS INVADE CHAMPAGNE.**—Three months after this, the Duke of Brunswick, at the head of 60,000 Prussians, and 10,000 *émigrés*, and preceded by a proclamation, threatening with fire and sword all who should oppose him, set out from Coblenz, and entered Champagne by Thionville. To facilitate the march of this army, the ministers of Louis XVI. had stripped this frontier of its garrisons, and scattered our soldiers upon the Rhine and the Scheldt. Mallet-Dupan was the agent of the Court for arranging with the enemy the march of the allied armies, and Bertrand de Moleville, then Minister of the Navy, has had the assurance to boast of it; a fact not to be forgotten in history.

**THE REPUBLIC PROCLAIMED.**—The allied armies advanced to the gates of Verdun, and entered that town without opposition. But the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick produced results very different from what was expected; in Paris it was answered by the terrible insurrection of August tenth; the throne was destroyed; the provisional council established; the King shut up in the Temple; the Republic proclaimed, and a national convention convoked to form a charter. The Jacobins elect to this new Assembly their most violent partisans: placed between the armies of Europe and the scaffold, these demagogues plunge deeper and deeper into anarchy; they remove all restraints from the populace, and utterly destroy all social order.

**RETREAT OF THE PRUSSIANS.**—But, on the other hand, a noble love of country inflames all generous hearts. Indignant at the menaces of a handful of Prussians, 60,000 volunteers rush to Champagne, whither the provisional executive council sends Dumouriez with the army of Sedan, Kellerman with that of Metz, and Beurnonville with that of the North. These forces concentrate in the defile of Argonne, which now becomes the Thermopylæ of France. The Prussians, in attempting to turn us, are themselves divided, and forced to retreat without scarcely drawing a sword. Custine, departing from Landau, takes possession of Mayence in their rear, and advances upon the Lahn, threatening to destroy the only bridge, that of Coblenz, and thus cut off their retreat. This success saves Lille, whose heroic citizens have bravely sustained a most terrible bombardment.

**INVASION OF BELGIUM.**—Dumouriez, having thus rid himself of the Prussians, instead of descending the Meuse with his 60,000 men, and cutting off the Austrians in the Netherlands, deliberately advances from Verdun to Valenciennes to attack their line of retreat. Clairfayt and Beaulieu effect their escape, by no other miracle than the stupidity of Dumouriez. Our armies are no less successful in the Alps; Savoy, and the Comté of Nice, are conquered after a semblance of assistance on the part of the Piedmontese. Of all our operations, the ill-directed expedition against the Island of Sardinia is the only failure.

**DEATH OF LOUIS XVI.**—The victories of Valmy and Jemmapes, and the conquest of Belgium, completely turned the heads of the Jacobins; the fatal act of the twenty-first of January was consummated. By destroying a virtuous but feeble King, they thought to shake off forever the yoke of monarchy, as if the royal victim could have no successors. His death was not only a crime, but a great error; the very terms of the constitution forbade his execution; and, even had he deserved capital punishment, our political and maritime relations with Spain should have caused his life to be spared. But the factious Assembly was incapable of taking any common-sense view of the diplomatic relations of the country.

**WAR WITH SPAIN, HOLLAND, AND ENGLAND.**—The execution of Louis XVI. could not fail to shatter the very foundations of our political relations. France, recently so brilliantly allied, is put under the ban of all Europe. The Court of Spain, which has heretofore avoided all interference in the war against us, now joins it with the indignant cry of vengeance. Naples and Holland follow her example. The blind demagogues of the Gironde, in their noisy vociferations against the tyrants of



Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid, pretend that they can easily overcome them, *since England, the natural friend of freedom, will lend her assistance to the free people of France!* Pitt answers these absurdities by congratulating England, in full Parliament, on the prosperity and greatness that his country is to derive from the internal embarrassments of France! He takes no part in the first campaign of 1792; remains a passive spectator of the tenth of August and the twenty-first of January, and allows the throne to be destroyed, and the unfortunate monarch to be executed; he waits for the quarrel to take a political turn, which very soon occurs. The French having invaded the states of Sardinia and Belgium, and having proclaimed the freedom of the Scheldt, England feigns to join the coalition, merely to guaranty the treaty of Utrecht and as the ally of Holland; but she has lost nothing by this delay, and she soon becomes the head of the war.

**DUMOURIEZ DRIVEN FROM BELGIUM.**—At the beginning of 1793 affairs take a different turn; Dumouriez leaves the Austrians on the Roër, near Juliers, when within ten leagues of the Rhine, and commits the still more ridiculous fault of invading Holland, with these forces still on his right and on his communications; he dreams of establishing a republic or a kingdom in the Netherlands, by means of which he can return to Paris, and dictate laws to the Jacobins. He imagines that England and Prussia, intimate allies of the House of Orange, will permit the expulsion of the Stadtholder; that he can create his Batavia, in spite of the reigning sovereign, in spite of France, and even in spite of the coalition! This project forcibly reminds one of the Tales of the Thousand-and-one Nights. Many think the project a mere invention of Dumouriez after his emigration, and that the threatened invasion of Holland was made by order of the council to support the negotiation of Maret, and to induce England to formally recognize the French Republic. Be this as it may, Dumouriez is soon punished for the wild scheme. The Austrians fall upon his right towards Aix-la-Chapelle and Liège; he returns in haste to fight the battle of Nerwinde; his army reach Valenciennes in great disorder; his expeditionary corps is exceedingly fortunate in escaping to Antwerp, even at the sacrifice of the garrisons left to guard his chimerical conquests.

**TREATS WITH AUSTRIANS.**—Invectives are thundered against him from the tribune of the Convention. To save himself, he treats with the Prince of Cobourg, and threatens to return to Paris at the head of his army. The four deputies, and the Minister Beurnonville, sent to investigate his affairs, are ar-



rested and turned over to the Austrians. His soldiers refuse to obey him, and even attempt to place their general in arrest; they fire upon his escort, and drive him into the Scheldt near Condé, where he joins Cobourg. Exposed to the hatred of both parties, he afterwards retired to London, and published his military plans, which have become an object of ridicule for all posterity. Dumouriez was, nevertheless, a man of resource and considerable talent.

**COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.**—The occasion of danger to France is seized upon by the Jacobin chiefs to establish a Committee of Public Safety, and to invest it with dictatorial power. Robespierre and Danton are the leaders of this new movement.

**ALLIES LAY SIEGE TO MAYENCE AND VALENCIENNES.**—While the events just related were taking place on the Meuse, the King of Prussia crossed the Rhine with strong reinforcements, gave battle to Custine, and laid seige to Mayence, which is heroically defended by Kléber, Meunier, and Aubert Dubayet. The Duke of York and the Prince of Coburg, profiting by the flight of Dumouriez, besieged Condé. Dampierre, in attempting to succor it, is defeated and slain. The Allies force the camp of Famars, and lay siege to Valenciennes. At the South, the Spaniards under Riccardos invade Roussillon, and the Sardinians enter Savoy; the interior is equally disturbed; the immense military requisitions become the pretext for a formidable insurrection in La Vendée, and 60,000 royalists in arms collect at Nantes and Angers.

**FALL OF THE GIRONDISTS.**—Danger rather exasperates than frightens the Jacobins. In their eyes moderation becomes treason, and the Girondists, whose brilliant Utopian theories overturned the throne, are treated as royalists. On the thirty-first of May the Convention is decimated, and those eloquent declaimers, who have been mistaken for statesmen, expiate upon the scaffold the crime of having been too sincerely attached to vain theories, Robespierre, Danton, Marat, and the populace think themselves the masters of France; but France does not acknowledge their dictation.

**ENGLAND HEADS THE COALITION.**—During these violent and frantic operations of the Jacobins, England pursues, with firm and measured steps, the path marked out by her profound policy. Not satisfied with having Russia, Spain, and Holland as her allies, and forcing, with the squadrons of Catharine, Sweden and Denmark to renounce their neutral rights, she sweeps

the Mediterranean with the squadrons of Charles IV., and takes into her pay the troops of all powers which will barter their soldiers for money; thus using the spoils stripped from the Nabobs of Mysore, to make flow rivers of European blood! This same government, that the foolish Brissot declared some months before, as the surest support of the French constitution, and that Dumouriez wished to make the arbiter of order in France, had become the head of the coalition against us. Its emissaries were everywhere preaching crusades against France, with as much fervor as the inspired monks of the middle ages. On the fourteenth of July, at the camp of Mayence, Lord Beauchamp and Luchesini signed a treaty of close alliance between England and Prussia; a treaty of subsidy had already, in April, been negotiated by Lord Elgin with Hesse, for eight thousand men. Lord Yarmouth negotiated a new treaty with Hesse-Cassel on the twenty-third of August, for four thousand men, another with Hesse-Darmstadt on the fifth of October, for three thousand men, and soon afterwards a fourth, with the Grand-duke of Baden. Lord Grenville had concluded a still more important treaty, on the twenty-fifth of April, with the Count de Front, the Sardinian minister, by which Sardinia, for the annual payment of five millions, agreed to keep a standing army of fifty thousand men; on the thirtieth of August the same English minister formed a treaty of an alliance with the Court of Austria; Lord St. Helens concluded one with Godoy, Duke of Alcudia, and minister of Spain, on the twenty-fifth of May; Lord Auckland with the Stadtholder, and Chevalier Hamilton with Naples, on the twelfth of July. If we add to these treaties the intrigues of Hervey at Leghorn, of Drake at Genoa, of Hayles at Copenhagen, and of Fitzgerald in Switzerland, we may form some conception of the astonishing activity of the English diplomatic corps, the sophistry of the French government since 1790, and the incalculable danger to which a nation is exposed when its foreign interests are intrusted to a tumultuous assembly. Thus England, holding all the threads of this immense web, managed the affairs of Europe to suit her own will, gave and took away provinces, and even directed the military operations of the other powers by her accredited agents at the different headquarters. To this skillful preparation the Convention opposed its formidable energy, and the ridiculous decree of September seventh, proclaiming Pitt the enemy of the human race!

**AFFAIRS OF POLAND.**—We will now direct our attention to the affairs of Poland. Kaminieck, the last and principal stronghold of the Polish patriots, was surrendered to the Russians, on



the second of May, with two hundred pieces of cannon. The southern provinces then gave in their submission, and twelve thousand men swore allegiance to Catharine. This event, and the dispersion of the rest of the army, left no chance for successful resistance. Taking advantage of the factions of the Polish Diet to punish Poland for the domination of the Jagellons at Moscow, and the threats made during her recent war in Turkey, Catharine prevented the reëstablishment of a rival power on her borders by a second partition of the country. While we regret the fate of this brave and patriotic people, we cannot fail to admire the perseverance with which the Czarina pursued her objects, and the skill with which she profited by the dissensions of the Poles to increase her own power and territory.

OF THE OTTOMAN PORTE.—The Ottoman Porte, through the influence of the coalition and the *émigrés*, had hesitated, at the close of 1792, to recognize the French Republic. Semonville was sent as ambassador to endeavor to restore our friendly relations with that ancient ally. To reach his destination, it was necessary for this minister to go by Venice, crossing Switzerland and the Valteline. Maret was sent at the same time to the Court of Naples, to treat for the liberty of Marié Antoinette, and her retention as a hostage of peace. These two diplomatic agents took the road to Coire together; but the government of the Grisons, influenced by the Salis and the Court of Austria, arrested them on Lake Maggiore, and, in violation of the law of nations, delivered them to the imperialists, who cast them into the prisons of Mantua, for no other reason than their attachment to republican doctrines. The Barbary powers, influenced by the example of the Grand Seigneur and the instigations of the English, refused to have any relations with the new Republic.

SITUATION OF FRANCE.—If the political situation of France at this moment seems desperate, her military affairs are no less discouraging. From the Alps to the Pyrenees, from the Rhine to the ocean, from the Rhone to the banks of the Loire, the tri-colored flag is driven back before the numerous but ill-directed hosts of its enemies. Beauharnais, directed to raise the siege of Mayence, arrives too late to prevent its surrender. Custine refuses to risk a battle to save Valenciennes, because his army is composed of recruits. These generals, accused of a want of energy, are led to the scaffold.\* But their execution

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\*Viscount Alexander Beauharnais, born in 1760, at Martinique, served with distinction as major in the French forces under Rochambeau, which aided the United States in their Revolutionary War. At the breaking out



does not prevent Mayence and Valenciennes from falling before the combined attacks of Austria, Prussia, England, and Holland. Bellegarde surrenders to the Spanish; La Vendée is on fire, and sixty thousand victorious royalists threaten the Convention in its own bloody halls. Opposition to the demagogues of the Convention arms Bordeaux, Lyons, Marseilles, and Caen. The Austro-Sardinian forces cross the Alps and offer aid to these insurgents. The rest of France, instead of sustaining the Convention, seems ready to throw off its yoke. The army, everywhere inferior to the enemy in numbers, without discipline, and commanded by unskillful chiefs, is upon the point of dissolution; and, as a climax to our misfortunes, our colonies are lost. No government was ever in a more frightful position; never was a nation nearer the brink of ruin.

**ENERGY OF THE CONVENTION.**—But while every human probability seemed to indicate the speedy fall of France, the energy and rage of the Convention increased with every new defeat and every new danger; and the recent partition of Poland, by showing to the French what might be the fate of their own country, produced a still more miraculous effect than the Brunswick proclamation during the preceding campaign. The horrible atrocities of the Reign of Terror, the fear of seeing France humiliated and dismembered, and the powerful motives of patriotism, honor, and independence, all combined to produce the immense results of this campaign. The character of the war was entirely changed. The rights of the *noblesse*, the counter-revolution, and the royal prerogative were no longer the motives of the coalition; nor were the rights of the *tiers-état* the moving power with the republicans. The kings saw anarchy overthrowing all their thrones; the Jacobins saw safety only in anarchy; the

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of the French Revolution, he was chosen a member of the National Assembly, of which he was for some time President. In 1793 he was general of the army of the Rhine, and afterwards Minister of War. His restoration to military command led to his death. He was the first husband of Josephine Tascher de la Pagerie, who was afterwards Empress of the French. The Marquis Francis de Beauharnais, elder brother of the general, sided with the Bourbons, and joined the army of Condé to fight against the armies of the Republic. He was recalled from banishment by Napoleon, who made him senator, and afterwards ambassador to Spain. He died at Paris, in 1819.

Count Adam Philip Custine was born at Metz, in 1740. He served in the Seven Years' War, and afterwards in America, aiding us in our Revolutionary War. He held several important commands in the earlier wars of the French Revolution, but was guillotined under the false charge of treason.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

former trembled at the fate of Louis XVI.; the latter, at the retributive justice of the blood of their slaughtered victims; the sovereigns saw the revolutionary axe suspended over their heads, like the sword of Damocles; the chiefs of the Mountain could see no escape from the scaffold, but in the ruins with which they covered the soil of France.

The long siege and bombardment of Valenciennes seemed to depress the energy of the Allies, while it animated the courage of the French. Four months had elapsed since the flight of Dumouriez, and still the republican soil, left defenseless by his defection, was scarcely touched. If the overthrow of one of the frontier barriers cost so much toil, when could the Allies expect to reach Paris! The influence of these fortified places, in retarding the operations of the enemy, was well understood by military men, like Carnot, Prieur, Dubois-Crancé, and even those who were unacquainted with the principles of the military art derived hope from reading the numerous memoirs deposited in the archives of the War Office, on the great efforts which the taking of Lille and Landrecies had cost Eugene and Marlborough. The Allies had now no commander like these great captains, but the French nation, more vigorous than when under the domination of a weak king, only wanted time to display its superior means of defense. Thus, by a mixture of energy, national honor, and the desire of self-preservation, the most intelligent members of the Convention retained some hope of success, and they resolved, either to save themselves with the Republic, or to be buried beneath its ruins. Nevertheless, the fall of the first two frontier barriers, the evacuation of the Camp of Cæsar, and the approach of the Austrians to the gates of Saint-Quentin soon proved to them that danger was more imminent than was at first supposed. Barrère declared that unless Paris should a second time strike the enemy before Cambray, the country would be lost! Danton carried a decree of death against any soldier who should desert his flag. To avoid the chances of defeat at the new election, and to perpetuate their own power, the Jacobins obtained the suspension of the charter, and established a revolutionary government in its place.

**CARNOT A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.**—Seeing the necessity of having, at this crisis, the services of men familiar with military affairs, they added, on the fourteenth of August, Carnot and Prieur to the Committee of Public Safety. On the same day the Convention, on Barrère's motion, made the following proclamation to the French people,—a singular compound of bad language and powerful thought:—



"To arms, Frenchmen! at the moment when a people of friends and brothers are locked in each other's embraces, the despots of Europe violate your property and lay waste your frontiers. To arms! To arms!! To arms!!! Liberty calls for the aid of all who have just now sworn to defend her. A second time, tyrants and slaves trample upon the soil of a sovereign people. The first time, one half of their sacrilegious armies here found a tomb; now, let them all perish; let their bones whiten on our plains; let them serve as trophies on battlefields made fertile with their blood. To arms, Frenchmen! cover yourselves with glory the most resplendent, in defending that adored liberty whose first tranquil days will scatter over you, and the generations of your descendants, the germs of wealth and prosperity."

But these proclamations and decrees produced very little effect. Danger daily increased; civil war assumed a more sinister aspect; the authority of the Convention was recognized in scarcely a third of France, and even this portion was exhausted by its former efforts. The leaders, in their despair, resorted to the most frightful system of terror.

**DECREE FOR A LEVEE-EN-MASSÉ.**—On the twenty-third of August Barrère ascended the tribune, and proposed the decree of a *levée-en-masse* of the whole French people. This he said, was the only means that could save the country; having eloquently addressed the Convention on the insufficiency of ordinary measures, in a time of such great danger, he presented the decree in the following words:—

"Until the enemies of the Republic be driven from the territory of France, every citizen shall be in permanent requisition for military service. The young men will march to the battlefield; the married men will forge arms, and transport military munitions; the women will make tents and clothes for the soldiers, and attend the sick in hospitals; the hands of children will be employed in making lint for the wounded; and the aged, imitating the example of ancient virtue, will cause themselves to be carried into the public places to animate the courage of the warriors, to inculcate hatred to kings, and the unity of the Republic. Let the national edifices be converted into barracks, the public squares into work-shops, the cellars into manufactories of saltpetre; let the artillery and musketry be used exclusively against the enemy; the fowling-pieces, swords, and pikes will suffice for the service of the interior; let the saddle-horses be furnished for cavalry, the draught-horses for the artillery and provision trains. No man can be replaced in the service for



which he is required. Daily will the artist labor at the public work-shops, and the citizen do duty at the head-quarters of his district; every public functionary will be at his post. The Committee of Public Safety will prepare all things for defense, and place at the disposal of the Minister of War the sum of thirty millions. The levy shall be general, and the organized battalion of each district will inscribe on its banner:—*The French people in arms against tyrants.*"

**REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.**—The decree was voted with universal acclamation. Five days afterwards the constitution of the twenty-fourth of June was suspended, and the Revolutionary Government established in its stead. At this crisis arrived the news of the surrender of Toulon to the English and Spaniards. The loss of a place of such vast importance in a maritime, military, and political view, commanding the communications of the royalists of the Rhone, and serving as a base of operations for the allied armies, caused the greatest alarm.

**SYSTEM OF TERROR.**—But the revolutionary energy increases with national disasters. The commune of Paris, directed by Chaumette and instigated by the leaders of the Committee, demands a revolutionary army and twelve revolutionary tribunals with full powers. Barrère proposes these measures in the name of the Committee of Public Safety; and Danton moves that the sum of a hundred millions be placed at the disposal of the Minister of War. These motions are passed into laws, and they announce to the French people that the only means of escaping the revolutionary axe is to fly to the frontiers. Honor can be found only beneath the military uniform, and safety from the guillotine only in the battle-field. Fear of the revolutionary army increases the national forces, and it is now less difficult to procure soldiers than to find generals capable of commanding them. But good fortune supplies the place of skill; and the Allies favor us by adopting the most ill-concerted measures.

**FAULTS OF THE ALLIES.**—No sooner are they masters of Valenciennes and Mayence, than they adopt the most eccentric lines of operations. The English under the Duke of York march against Dunkirk; the Austrians under the Prince of Cobourg besiege Quesnoy and Mauberge; the Prussians attack Landau and cover Kaiserslautern; the Austrians under Wurmser force the lines of Wissembourg, take Fort Louis, and threaten Strasbourg.

**DRIVEN FROM THE FRENCH TERRITORY.**—Inspired

by the genius of Carnot,\* the Committee directs Houchard to concentrate the army of the North, cut off the English from Furnes, and drive them into the sea. He defeats them at Hondschote, saves Dunkirk, and then overthrows the Dutch at Menin. But he does not drive the enemy into the sea, as directed in his instructions; he is therefore condemned to death for having gained only half a victory and for having attacked in front, when he could have easily reached the enemy's communications. His army under Jourdan marches to the assistance of Mauberge. Cobourg is besieging this place with forty thousand men, and Clairfayt covers it with twenty-five thousand more; the army of observation is cut off and defeated at Watignies, two leagues from the besieging army, which retires in great haste. A part of the victorious army under Hoche flies to the rescue of Landau. It is at first repulsed by the formidable position of the Duke of Brunswick at Kaiserslautern, but Hoche skillfully defiles through the valley of Annweiler against the right of the Austrians, defeating them at Wertheim, Reichskoffen, and Geiersberg, then forming a junction with the left of Pichegru. The Allies are thrown back upon Mannheim; and the French forces, by their skillful maneuvers, gain a merited success. Kellerman has reduced Lyons and driven the Sardinians back into Piedmont; Dugommier, with one division of the army of Nice, and forty thousand National Guards, has retaken Toulon; Kléber, Marceau, and Canclaux have, by the greatest efforts, subdued La Vendée, where French blood, shed by French hands, was flowing in great torrents.

**DEATH OF MARIE ANTOINETTE.**—But the glory of these victories was tarnished by the crimes of the Jacobins, who did not hesitate to imbue their hands in the blood of the beautiful queen of Louis XVI. Marie Antoinette, from being an Austrian

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\*"The royalists and their foreign allies have never been able to forgive Carnot's signal military exploits during the war of the French Revolution; and affected to confound him with Robespierre, as if he had been the accomplice of that monster in the Reign of Terror. Situated as Carnot then was, he had but one alternative: either to continue in the Committee of Public Safety, coöperating with men he abhorred, and lending his name to their worst deeds, while he was fain to close his eyes upon their details, or to leave the direction of the tremendous war which France was then waging for her existence, in the hands of men so utterly unfit to conduct the machine for an instant, that immediate conquest, in its worst shape, must have been the consequence of his desertion. There may be many an honest man who would have preferred death to any place in Robespierre's committee, but it is fair to state that in all probability Carnot saved his country by persevering in the management of the war."—*Edinburgh Review*.



by birth, and the daughter of Maria Theresa, was charged with having plotted the coalition against France, but even this excuse was unnecessary to Fouquier Tainville and the other tigers of the revolutionary tribunal, for sending her to the scaffold.

**POLITICAL RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION.**—France, in spite of her victories, was exhausting the elements of her strength against her natural allies; for, in addition to England, she found herself at war with Russia, Austria, Prussia, the German Empire, Holland, Italy, and Spain; with the United States of America alone was she at peace. Her old allies, Austria and Spain, were now by the side of England at the head of her most violent enemies. In the meantime the spirit of liberty and equality was destroying her colonial possessions. (At Saint Domingo the most horrible anarchy prevailed.) The partisans of emancipation, enrolling themselves under the English flag, stirred up the mortal hatred of castes, and the populace, maddened by the burning passions of African blood and southern sun, committed horrors even surpassing the ferocious conquerors of the Caribbean Islands.

**NAPOLEON APPOINTED CHEF-DE-BATAILLON.**—Thanks to the numerous levies, and the consequently rapid promotion, I was proposed, in 1792, as a commandant of the battalion of National Volunteers for the Sardinian expedition. I accepted the appointment. They laughed at me for this in the artillery, but I pursued my own course, regardless of their sneers; and on my return from the expedition I rejoined the artillery, with the rank of superior officer. I was then twenty-four years of age.

**HIS REPUBLICAN NOTIONS.**—Much has been said about my republicanism at this period of my career. It is not strange that a young man, at his entrance into public life, should espouse the maxims which he has learned to admire in the Greeks and Romans. At that time I was sincerely a republican; experience has since changed my opinions. But I have always preserved the idea that strength in the authority of a government may be easily united with the most liberal principles in its administration.

**SIEGE OF TOULON.**—Previous to the siege of Toulon my life was inactive and insignificant. I was then chief-of-battalion, and served as second in command of the artillery, and in that capacity had some influence upon the results of the siege. In August, 1793, when treason surrendered Toulon and our fleet to the Allies, the white flag was floating over Lyons; civil war was raging in Languedoc and Provence; a victorious Spanish army had crossed the Pyrenees and inundated Roussillon; and a Piedmontese army had crossed the Alps and was at the gates of Cham-



béry and Antibes. If thirty thousand Sardinians, Neapolitans, Spaniards, and English had united at Toulon, with the twelve thousand "*fédérés*," this combined army of the forty thousand men could have been marched upon Lyons, connecting its right with the Piedmontese, and its left with the Spanish forces. But the Allies in taking Toulon did not appreciate the value of their conquest. Six weeks had been spent by the French in collecting forces and material for the siege; and on the fifteenth of October a council of war was formed at Ollioules with Gasparin, a member of the Convention, for President. A plan of attack, drawn up by the celebrated d'Arçon for the Committee of Fortifications, was read to the council. I objected to the plan and proposed another more simple. It was probable that the Allies would not abandon twelve thousand men in Toulon, if we could get possession of the two forts which commanded the outer extremity of the entrance to the roadstead. As soon as the communication between the English fleet and the garrison should be cut off, the latter would be obliged to evacuate the place, or become prisoners of war. If this plan had been adopted sooner, it would have been of easy execution, but the enemy had now had time to construct Fort Mulgrave. However, in spite of this unfavorable circumstance, my plan prevailed; and instead of applying ourselves to the destruction of a French town, we effected in one month the desired object. On the eighteenth of December we entered Toulon, but could save only one half of the squadron; the other half, the arsenal, and ship-yards being burnt by the implacable enemies of our glory and prosperity.

#### GENERAL OF ARTILLERY IN THE ARMY OF ITALY.

—By this capture we had done good service to our country.\* I was appointed general of brigade, and sent, in the beginning of 1794, to the army of Italy, to command the artillery.† The general-in-chief of this army, Dumerbion, was aged and without genius; his chief-of-staff was intelligent, but of mediocre talent.

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\*For the details of the siege of Toulon, the reader is referred to the first volume of Napoleon's "*Memoirs*," dictated at St. Helena, and to the report of the engineer Marescot, published in Mr. Pathy's valuable work on sieges.

†The first two months of 1794 were employed by Napoleon in fortifying the coast of the Mediterranean. The military reader will find the general remarks on coast defense, in the first volume of Napoleon's "*Memoirs*," well worth reading. Napoleon had no doubts of the capability of forts, when properly constructed, to secure harbors from all attacks by sea. The works built by him effectually prevented any further maritime attacks by the English on this coast. These works, built more than half a century ago, are, of course, somewhat dilapidated at the present time.

The operations in the maritime Alps were therefore planned without skill. I proposed a plan for turning the famous position of Saorgio; it succeeded perfectly. I then proposed another for uniting the army of the Alps and that of Italy at Coni, which would have secured to us Piedmont and an easy advance to the Po. But the project was rejected by the staff of the other army, as it required the two armies to be united under a single general. Moreover, the approbation of the Committee of Public Safety, which wished to direct the war from Paris, as the Aulic Council did from Vienna,—would have been necessary for this movement. I made amends for the rejection of this project, by pushing forward the army of Italy as far as Savona, and to the gates of Ceva. This relieved Genoa, which place was now threatened by the Allies. Winter and imperative orders arrested our progress.

**CONQUEST OF BELGIUM, HOLLAND, AND LEFT BANK OF RHINE.**—While we were thus wasting our time in the Alps, three hundred thousand French troops inundated Belgium and the Palatinate, defeated the Allies at Turcoing, at Fleurus, at Kaiserslautern, on the Ourthe, and on the Roër; drove the English, the Dutch, the Austrians, and the Prussians behind the Rhine, took Brussels, Antwerp, and Maestricht; passed the Waal, and the Meuse on the ice; and entered Amsterdam, Cologne, and Coblenz in triumph. Two other armies under Dugommier, Perignon, and Moncey, after gaining two brilliant victories at Figueras and Saint-Martial, invaded Catalonia and Biscay. And an army of one hundred thousand men succeeded, at last, in putting down the royalists of Brittany and La Vendée.

**NAVAL BATTLE OF OUESSANT.**—But these successes of the French upon land were accompanied by corresponding misfortunes on the sea. France was in great want of provisions, and a large convoy was expected from America, at Brest; a fleet of twenty-five ships of the line was sent out to facilitate its entrance into port; Admiral Howe, with an equal number of vessels, offered battle. Villaret-Joyeuse was persuaded by Jean Bon-Saint-Andrée to receive battle with his inexperienced officers, and sailors ill-disposed towards the Republic. They fought with heroic courage, but without skill. The discipline, coolness, experience, and tactics of the English triumphed over the ill-directed valor of the French. Seven of our vessels were captured or sunk; and this defeat produced the same paralyzing influence upon our naval force on the ocean as the burning of Toulon had done upon our fleet in the Mediterranean. (Everything seemed now to presage the loss of our colonies;) Martinique was surrendered to the English through the perfidy of Behague; Saint Domingo



had for two years been a prey to servile insurrections, massacres, and incendiarism. Thus, the loss of our naval power was fatal to our colonies, and the loss of the colonies reacted upon the navy by depriving it of the great nursery for sailors,—a merchant marine. At the very outset of the war the naval superiority of England was rendered certain. One would have imagined from our present unskillfulness upon the sea, that many, many centuries had elapsed since the war of 1780, which resulted in the independence of America.

**INSURRECTION IN POLAND.**—During these events in France, the attention of the North was fixed by a drama, less bloody, but not less interesting, than our own. Our success had revived the national spirit of the Poles; they demanded the treaty of Stanislaus, and with his guards at their head broke out in open insurrection. The Russians were driven from Warsaw, Wilna, and the greater part of the invaded provinces. Kosciusko, appointed generalissimo, succeeded in uniting sixty thousand men for the defense of his country, but was obliged to fight against three different armies. Suwarrow, the conqueror of the Turks, was sent by Catharine to subjugate the Poles; the King of Prussia marched against Warsaw, but was soon forced to raise the siege, and fall back upon Wartha: Kosciusko, menaced by the Russian army of Fersen, marched to give him battle; but, deserted by fortune, he was defeated and made a prisoner.\* Other brave Poles

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\*Kosciusko, descended from an ancient family in Lithuania, was born in 1756. He was educated in the military school at Warsaw, and afterwards sent to France to study drawing and the military art. On his return he was made captain, but was soon obliged to leave Poland again, in consequence of an unhappy passion for the daughter of Sosnowski. He came to America and soon distinguished himself, under Washington, in the Revolutionary War. He returned to Poland again in 1786, and in 1789 was appointed a major-general. In the campaign of 1792 he distinguished himself against the Russians at Zielence and Dublenka, and at the latter place, under cover of slight field-works, with only four thousand men, repulsed three successive attacks of eighteen thousand Russians. On the submission of Stanislaus to Catharine, he was obliged to leave Poland; but returned again in the revolution of 1794, and was made generalissimo with unlimited powers. Defeated at the battle of Maczleowice, he fell covered with wounds, and was thrown into a state prison. He was released by Paul I., and afterwards visited France, England, and America (1797). When Napoleon formed the plan of restoring Poland to its place among nations, he proposed to Kosciusko to again take part in the struggle; but the latter declined the offer, being prevented "less by ill-health than by having given his word to Paul I. never to serve against the Russians." In 1816 he settled at Saleure, where he died, October 16th, 1817, from injuries received in a fall with his horse from a precipice. The



succeeded him, but there was neither unity nor energy in their administration. Suwarrow, after two victories over the Polish army, marched upon Warsaw, and carried Praga by assault; the remainder of the Polish army was dissolved, and the definitive partition of Poland crowned one of the most important enterprises of modern policy,—an enterprise reflecting glory upon the genius of Catharine, but disgrace upon the cabinets which coöperated with her.

**FALL OF ROBESPIERRE.**—Although the Jacobins had de-throned the tyrant Robespierre, and condemned him and his violent sectaries, Saint-Just, Couthon, and Lebas, to the guillotine, France was still the theatre of the most horrible anarchy; one half of the people were in arms against the other half. The Committee of Public Safety lost all its efficiency and usefulness, by being made subject to a monthly change of members. In consequence of these absurd measures, Carnot left the direction of the War Department, and the whole interior was soon distorted by the false light of this *magic-lantern of representation*.

**PEACE WITH PRUSSIA AND SPAIN.**—But the triumph of the moderate party, notwithstanding the instability of its administration, produced a beneficial change in our foreign policy. The *exposé*, full of wisdom, of Boissy d'Anglas at the tribune of the Convention, marked the return to ideas more moderate, wise, and just; the treaties of Bâle with Prussia and Spain were the result of this change of policy. Frederick William, seeing that he could gain more in Poland than in France, withdrew from the coalition; and the cabinet of Madrid, having declared war merely to avenge the death of Louis XVI., yielded to more wise views of national policy; Spain had imprudently become an accomplice in promoting the English supremacy, from which she had still more to fear than from us.

**FATE OF THE ROYAL FAMILY.**—This general return to moderation acted favorably upon the destinies of the royal family. The Dauphin, called Louis XVII., languished in the dungeon of the Temple, and died of a cruel malady, but his sister, the Duchess d'Angoulême, the only one of the royal family that had not fled from France, was now exchanged with Austria for our arrested ambassadors, and for the deputies given up by Dumouriez. Louis XVIII. lived in retirement at Verona; the Count d'Artois, his brother, had gone to England, where he was now preparing an

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women of Poland went into mourning for his loss. His body was removed in 1818, to Cracow, and a monument erected to his memory.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

expedition to make a descent upon the provinces of the West, where his partisans were in arms to receive him. The three sons of the Duke of Orleans received from the Directory passports for America; the eldest of these, the Duke de Chartres,\* who had distinguished himself under Dumouriez, had been living a wandering life in Switzerland under an assumed name; the other two had been detained in Fort Saint-Jean, at Marseilles.

**NAPOLÉON ATTACHED TO THE ARMY OF LA VENDEE.**—Such was the general state of affairs at the beginning of 1795, when Aubry's famous reorganization of the army left me without employment. I was attached to the staff of the infantry generals serving in La Vendée, but I declined the appointment and repaired to Paris. I was here employed in the bureau of military operations, and charged with drawing up instructions to repair the faults of Kellerman in the Apennines.

**NEW INSURRECTION IN PARIS.**—After the conquest of Holland, the armies had remained for six months inactive behind the Rhine. But the removal of danger did not restore quiet to the interior. The Jacobins, in order to regain the influence which they had lost by the fall of Robespierre, armed the faubourgs against the Convention, invaded its halls, and threatened to burn Paris. The majority of the inhabitants declared for the Convention, and rescued the deputies from the hands of these

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\*After the execution of his father, the Duke de Chartres assumed the title of Duke of Orleans, which he retained till 1830, when he became Louis Philippe I., King of the French. His two brothers mentioned in the text were the Duke of Montpensier and Count Beaujolais, the former of whom died in 1807, and the latter about the same time, while on a voyage between Malta and Sicily. When exiled from France, soon after the commencement of the Revolution, Louis Philippe retired to Switzerland and became a professor in a school at Riehenau. He refused to take up arms against his country, and for some time served as an aid-de-camp to General Montesquieu under the assumed name of Corby. He then repaired to the North of Europe, and traveled extensively in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Lapland, and Finland. September 24, 1796, he sailed from Hamburg for the United States, and arrived in Philadelphia after a passage of twenty-seven days. He was here joined by his two brothers, who had been released from prison in Marseilles. After traveling through a great portion of the United States, they left New Orleans for Havana in the winter of 1798, and then returned to Europe. He lived some time with his two brothers, at Twickenham in England. In 1800 he married the Princess Amelia, daughter of the King of Sicily. He returned to Paris after the restoration and took his seat in the Chamber of Peers, but manifested such liberal sentiments as to render himself obnoxious to the administration. On the abdication of Charles X., after the memorable events of July, he was proclaimed King of the French.



cut-throats. Pichegru took the command of the troops and disarmed the revolted faubourgs.

**THE QUIBERON EXPEDITION.**—This defeat became the signal for partial reactions in the South. The royalists deemed that the moment had arrived for them to strike a decisive blow; all the emigrant corps in the English pay united for a descent upon the Presqu'île of Quiberon; Count d'Artois placed himself at their head. Hoche, liberated from the chains of Robespierre, and full of energy and activity, took command of the Republican forces. The several detachments of the enemy were driven back into the sea, or forced, after a long butchery, to surrender. The proconsuls of the Convention ordered the remainder to be shot, and among these victims perished two hundred of the *élite* of the old French navy.

**CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR III.**—The monstrous governments of the provisional committees could not long endure. A new charter was drawn up by a commission of the Convention headed by Sièyes. This *doctrinaire* imagined that with a proper balance of powers, the state might be governed by popular elections. His constitution of the year III. established a legislative Council of Five Hundred, and a Council of Ancients, as a chamber of revision. One-third of these councils were to be removed each year; and the executive power, confided to a Directory of five members and made completely subordinate to the legislative power, was to be renewed every five years by an annual change of one of its members. This was preferable to the Revolutionary Government, though not less dangerous in its application. It was nevertheless seized, as the last plank of safety, by a nation tired and exhausted by the horrors of the Revolution. The army and a large majority of the Departments accepted the constitution; but the Convention, fearing a defeat at the popular elections, decreed that *two-thirds* of the present members should form a part of the new legislature, and that the relatives of the *émigrés* should be excluded from exercising the legislative functions. This produced a violent opposition in the Sections; and, incited by royalist agents, acting in concert with the Count d'Artois in La Vendée, thirty of the forty-eight Sections rejected the decrees and the deputies, and an armed coalition was formed between the royalists and the National Guards of the insurrectionary districts.

**AFFAIR OF THE 13 VENDEMAIRE.**—The Convention resolved to employ force to execute its decrees; and the Sections determined to compel the dissolution of the Convention. I was



then occupied with our foreign wars, and took but little interest in those party squabbles. If Austria had not had an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men at the gates of Strasbourg, and the English forty vessels before Brest, I might perhaps have sided with the Sections; but when a foreign enemy is invading the country it is the duty of every good citizen to sustain the existing government. I was appointed under Barras to command the armed forces against the Parisians. The interest of France was my law. I sent for the artillery from Meudon and collected a force of five thousand men and forty pieces of cannon, a force unnecessarily strong for the suppression of an *émeute*, had not the mob been sustained by cannon and a well-armed National Guard. On the thirteenth of Vendémiaire (October fourth) the *sectionaries* marched against the Convention. One of their columns debouching from Rue St.-Honoré was fired upon, and it fled to the steps of the church of Saint-Roché. The street was so narrow that I could use but one of my cannon, but with this one I soon dispersed the mob. All was over in half an hour. The column that debouched by the Pont Royal was equally unsuccessful. The affair, so small in itself and which cost only two hundred men on either side, led to important consequences by preventing the Revolution from retrograding. In gratitude for my services the victorious party made me general of division. I now burned to enter the field in my new rank, but the Convention retained me in the capital in spite of my wishes.\*

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\*The following is the Duchess d'Abrantès' description of Napoleon's personal appearance. "At this period of his life he was decidedly ugly; he afterwards underwent a total change. I do not speak of the illusive charm which his glory spread around him, but I mean to say that a gradual physical change took place in him in the space of seven years. His emaciated thinness was converted into a fullness of face, and his complexion, which had been yellow, and apparently unhealthy, became clear and comparatively fresh; his features, which were angular and sharp, became round and filled out. As to his smile, it was always agreeable. The mode of dressing his hair, which had such a droll appearance, as we see it in the prints of the passage of the bridge of Arcole, was then comparatively simple; for the young men of fashion, whom he used to rail at so loudly, at that time wore their hair very long. He was very careless of his personal appearance, and his hair, which was ill-combed and ill-powdered, gave him the look of a sloven. His little hands, too, underwent a great metamorphosis. When I first saw him, they were thin, long, and dark; but he was subsequently vain of their beauty, and with good reason. In short, when I recollect Napoleon at the commencement of 1794, with a shabby round hat drawn over his forehead, and his ill-powdered hair hanging over the collar of his gray great-coat, which afterwards became as celebrated as the white plume of Henry IV., without gloves, because he used to say they were a useless luxury, with boots ill-made and ill-blackened

**MILITARY OPERATIONS OF 1795.**—This detention vexed me the more as our forces were experiencing reverses on the Rhine, through the incapacity or treason of Pichegru. The excesses of the Revolution had disgusted the conqueror of Holland, and he now entered into a correspondence with the *émigrés*. He had been intrusted by the Committee with the supreme command. Jourdan crossed the Rhine at Düsseldorf, and, advancing to the Mayne, laid siege to Mayence; Pichegru, who commanded ten divisions on the upper Rhine, crossed at Mannheim with only two of these divisions, and advanced to Heidelberg, between the two Austrian armies of Wurmser and Clairfayt; they were defeated and driven back upon Mannheim, quite fortunate in not being taken prisoners. Clairfayt, being thus enabled to unite considerable forces, turned the left flank of the Jourdan, and forced him to repossess the Rhine at Neuweid. The Austrians afterwards debouched from Mayence against the other three divisions, forming the left of Pichegru, forced their entrenchments, and drove them back upon the lines of Weissembourg. Jourdan had no other alternative than to fall back upon the Handsruck and form a junction with the army of the Rhine; but this had already retreated to Landau. It was thought that these faulty operations of this army were due to treason, rather than the want of capacity in its general; perhaps both of these causes existed. In Italy our arms were more fortunate; there Schérer, at the head of a portion of the conquerors of the Pyrenees, executed the project which I had drawn up at Paris, in the bureau of military operations. The result was a signal victory at Loano, which put us in possession of the line of the Apennines as far as Savona, and of the sources of the Bormida; but our generals

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—with his thinness and sallow complexion—in fine, when I recollect him at that time, and think what he was afterwards, I do not recognize the same man in the two pictures.”

Much ridiculous nonsense has been written about Napoleon's destitute condition at this period of his life. There is not the slightest probability that he encountered any more inconvenience for the want of money than most young men without fortunes. Besides other small resources, he had the pay of a brigadier-general, which, notwithstanding the depreciation of the currency, must have been sufficient for a man of his prudent habits and simple tastes. We know that at this time he voluntarily supported his brother Louis, and paid his expenses at a provincial military school. Alison says, “that so low were the fortunes of the future Emperor, at this period, that he was frequently indebted to his friends for a meal, which he could not afford to purchase himself.” But on the very next page this historian says, “Above a hundred families, during the dreadful famine which followed the suppression of the revolt of the Sections, in the winter of 1795-6, were saved from death by his beneficence.”



knew not how to profit by this success. The new Directory had just been installed. To the necessity of having some member capable of directing military operations, Carnot\* owed his re-appointment. Barras† was elected by intrigue, and Rewbel‡ by would-be politicians; the other members§ were chosen at random. It is a little surprising that Sièyes, the author of this new system, should have been passed over in silence.

**NAPOLEON'S MARRIAGE TO JOSEPHINE.**—I was impatient to see the new government organized so that I could be spared from Paris. While waiting here in inactivity, I became acquainted with the widow Beauharnais and married her. Many absurd stories have been told about my first acquaintance with Josephine; the facts are these: After the disarming of the Sections, she sent her son Eugene, then fifteen years of age, to reclaim the sword of General Beauharnais. This interesting youth shed tears on receiving from my hand the sword of his unfortunate father; the scene affected me, and I went to speak of it to his

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\*Carnot was born in Burgundy in 1753. Early exhibiting an uncommon taste for mathematics and military science, he was appointed an officer of engineers. In 1791 he was appointed deputy to the Constituent Assembly. While a member of the Directory, he turned his attention wholly to military affairs, and, in the words of Napoleon, "organized victory." Barras afterwards succeeded in effecting his overthrow and banishment. He was recalled by Napoleon after the eighteenth Brumaire, and made, for a time, Minister of War. He was a firm Republican, and both spoke and voted against Napoleon's elevation to power, but being honest and consistent in his course, his conduct gave no offense. Napoleon did not estimate his talents as high as some others, but he had the highest regard for his character, and on various occasions assigned to him very important duties. In 1815 he was made a Count of the Empire, and a peer. He died in 1823. He left several scientific and professional works which have some merit.—*Thiers*; *Napoleon's "Mémoires."*

†Barras was born in Provence, in 1755. He was of a noble family. He entered the army at the age of twenty, and served in India. He spent his estate in dissipation, and in the Revolution became the most violent of demagogues. As Director, he was guilty of everything that was base and cruel. After the elevation of Napoleon, by the affair of eighteenth Brumaire, he retired to his estate, and lived in obscurity; he died in 1829.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

‡Rewbel was born at Colmar, in 1746. He was a lawyer of eminence, and a man of honesty and integrity. His talents as a politician were not great, but he proved himself a useful member of the Directory.—*Thiers*; *Napoleon's "Mémoires."*

§These were Laréveillère and Letourneur. The former was a native of Angers, and the latter of Normandy. Both are described by Thiers and Napoleon as honest, well-meaning men, but of ordinary capacity. Letourneur was an officer of engineers.



mother; and became fascinated by the attracting graces which all acknowledged that she possessed.\*

**PLAN FOR THE INVASION OF ITALY.**—I had occasion to see Carnot and speak with him about my old project on Piedmont; which had been rejected in 1794, and also of the plan of invading Italy, which I had drawn up for Schérer. In examining the merits of these projects Carnot had an opportunity to judge of the character of their author. Being exceedingly anxious to obtain the command of an active army, I used every effort to gain the confidence of the government. I laid before the Directors and ministers the following summary of our foreign relations and the effects to be produced by my projected Italian campaign:

Austria, England, the German Empire, Sardinia, Russia, the King of Naples, and the Pope were all leagued against us. Prussia and Spain had treated some months before at Bâle, but their position was equivocal, and their present strict neutrality might be of short duration. Sweden and Denmark had rejected the pretensions of the cabinet of London, and maintained with much energy the true principles of maritime law. The definitive partition of Poland had blotted it from the book of nations. The Ottoman Port took no part in European affairs. Portugal, the tributary of England, had at first joined in the expedition of Toulon and the war with Spain in the Pyrenees, but since the treaty of Bâle she had sought to withdraw from a coalition where she could gain nothing but defeats. Our superb colony of Saint Domingo was in a blaze, Martinique had fallen into the hands

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\*Alison, to whose distorted vision no act of Napoleon can appear otherwise than criminal, represents his marriage to Josephine to have been founded upon motives of ambition. The charge is so grossly false, and, from the circumstances of the case, so perfectly absurd, as to be hardly worth refuting. No one, unless animated by feelings of the strongest animosity and violent prejudice, could ever think of repeating it. If ever there was a marriage made from pure feelings of love and affection, uninfluenced on either side by considerations of wealth or ambition, it was the union of Napoleon and Josephine. Alison here repeats indirectly a slander first found in the British and Bourbon presses of the lamest character, and afterwards promoted to a place in the no less abusive writings of Scott and Lockhart. The substance of these slanders is, that Barras, with his usual volatility, became tired of his mistress, and embraced an opportunity of disposing of her in marriage to Bonaparte. The latter, to secure the influence of Barras, consented to the arrangement, and received the command of the army of Italy as the dowry of the bride! Such stories repeated at this time do far more injury to their authors than to the memories of Napoleon and Josephine. It may be worthy of remark in this place, that at the time of Napoleon's marriage Barras was the enemy, rather than the friend, of Bonaparte. (*vide the proofs in Notes to Lee's "Napoleon."*)

of the English; our maritime force had been destroyed by the battle of Ouessant, the loss of Toulon, emigration, and the troubles of La Vendée. In India we had lost Pondicherry, our last hold in the East; and we had only our old ally, Tippoos-Saib, Sultan of Mysore, the formidable adversary of the English power. We had on our hands, at the same time, a continental and a maritime war. Perhaps Austria, satisfied with the valuable acquisitions which she had made in Poland, might soon have followed the example of Russia and made peace with us, had not matter foreign from the original cause of dispute been introduced. A great state is always unwilling to relinquish any of its provinces. The recent vote of the Convention for a definitive reunion of Belgium and France, and the ill-success of Pichegru, both combined to render the Cabinet of Vienna less disposed for peace. The state of our affairs on the Rhine was not such as to authorize us to hope for decisive victories in that direction; nor would a war in the German Empire be likely to force Austria to yield to our terms. The most direct means, therefore, of reaching that power was through the states of Lombardy. Under such circumstances the invasion of Italy would be the preferable military operation; especially as it would enable us to humble the smaller princes of Italy who had leagued against us, and would at the same time relieve the Court of Turin, which seemed inclined to treat with us for a separate peace, from the dictation of Austria.

**APPOINTED GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.**—This very simple plan was approved by the Directory, and I was charged with its execution, with the rank of General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy. It was arranged that I should maneuver by my right to descend by Montferrat upon Lombardy, and direct all my efforts against the Austrians, in order to detach Piedmont from their alliance. The armies of Germany, being reorganized, were to resume the offensive by the end of April, and to attempt the passage of the Rhine. Jourdan commanded seventy thousand men on the Lower Rhine, and Moreau about the same number in Alsace; the former was to invest Mayence, with thirty thousand men, and advance into Franconia with the other forty thousand; the latter was to cover Mannheim and penetrate into Swabia. These forces were afterwards to unite in the heart of Bavaria. In the meantime I was to detach Piedmont from the coalition, or to dethrone the King of Sardinia, should he refuse to make peace, and then to advance upon the Adige. In fine, the instructions given to me by the Directory were mere copies of those which I had drawn up for the Committee some months

before, and whose execution had been so unskillfully attempted by Schérer.\*

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\*For a detailed account of the events of the Revolution, so briefly described in this chapter, the reader is referred to Thiers' "History," a work of great ability and impartiality. The great military work of General Jomini, on the Wars of the Revolution, in fifteen volumes, is unsurpassed by any other history of this period. It has served as the basis of Thiers' military criticisms, and is probably the best military history ever written. Alison's work is written with the most virulent prejudice, and exhibits an utter disregard of fact and historical truth.



## CHAPTER II.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY TO THE  
PEACE OF TOLENTINO.

Napoleon takes Command of the Army of Italy—State of Affairs in Italy—Napoleon's Plan of Operations—Position and Plan of the Allies—Beaulieu compromises his Left at Genoa—His Centre pierced—Napoleon attacks the Piedmontese—Operations against the Austrians resumed—Double Combat of Dego—Operations against Colli—Napoleon's Proclamation to his Soldiers—The King of Sardinia sues for Peace—Armistice of Cherasco—Napoleon marches against Beaulieu—Passage of the Po at Placentia—Armistice with the Dukes of Parma and Modena—Battle of Fombio—March upon the Adda—Bridge of Lodi—Napoleon enters Milan—The Directory proposes to divide Napoleon's Army; his Resignation—His Address to the Army—Revolt in Lombardy—Definitive Peace with Piedmont—Position of Beaulieu on the Mincio—Passage of the Mincio—Difficult Position of Napoleon on the Adige—Situation and Policy of Venice—Criticisms on Napoleon's Operations—Investment of Mantua—Armistice with Naples—Demonstrations against the Pope—Armistice of Foglino—Troubles in the Imperial Fiefs, etc.—Occupation of Leghorn—Siege of Mantua—Austrians endeavor to save that Place—Approach of Wurmser from the Rhine—Battles of Lonato and Castiglione—Quasdanowich surprised at Gavardo—Attack upon Napoleon's Head-quarters—Second Battle of Castiglione—Second Passage of the Mincio—Wurmser's Retreat into the Tyrol—Close Alliance between France and Spain—Wurmser resumes the offensive on the Brenta—Objections to this Operation—The Armies in Germany—Battles of Mori, Roveredo, and Caltano—March from Trent to the Gorges of the Brenta—Affair of Bassano—Wurmser marches upon Mantua—Affairs at San-Georgio—Position of the Army about Mantua—New Republics formed—Political State of the Rest of Italy—Discussions with Rome—Definitive Peace with Naples—Affairs of Piedmont—Negotiations with Genoa—New Troubles in the Fiefs—Affairs of Corsica—The English occupy Porto-Ferraio—They evacuate Corsica—Situation of the Armies on the Adige—Alvinci succors Mantua with a new Army—Vaubois thrown back on Rivoli—Affair of the

Brenta—Passage of the Adige at Ronco—Battle of Arcole—Vaubois driven back from Rivoli—Wurmser besieged at Mantua—Reverses of the French in Germany—Descent upon Ireland—Useless Diplomacy—Reinforcements from the Rhine—New efforts of Alvinzi to save Wurmser—Joubert driven back on Rivoli—Battle of Rivoli—Provera marches on Mantua—Close of the Campaign—Capitulation of Wurmser at Mantua—Expedition into Romana.

NAPOLEON TAKES COMMAND OF THE ARMY.—I left Paris to take command of my army about the middle of March. The reinforcements which it had received from the Pyrenees, after the peace of Bâle, had been half destroyed, as much by the campaign of Schérer as by the maladies resulting from a rigorous winter, and the horrible privations to which they had been subjected, amid the arid rocks of Liguria. It counted sixty thousand men, but a third of this number was required to guard Toulon, Antibes, Nice, and the Col-de-Tende, so that its active force did not exceed forty thousand combatants, destitute of everything, except good will. I was now about to put them to the test: for three years they had been fighting in Italy, only because they were at war, but without any military object, and as if merely to satisfy their consciences. This ridiculous manner of carrying on war did not suit me. I wished to captivate general attention by some great achievement, and this I thought myself capable of accomplishing.

STATE OF ITALY.—At the risk of repetition, I will describe, briefly, the situation of the peninsula which I was about to invade. Divided, since the fall of the Roman Empire, into twenty small rival states, jealous of each other, *Italy* existed only on the map. The good Victor Amadeus III. was King of Piedmont; the marriage of his two daughters to the brothers of Louis XVI., heirs to the throne, attached him, as much as his position, to the House of Bourbon. English subsidies, fear of our doctrines, and his family relations had precipitated him into the coalition; but the Austrian influence was generally unpopular at Turin, and the minister, Damian de Priocca, although attached to the cabinet of Vienna, only wanted a good opportunity to withdraw from a contest where it was evident nothing could be gained. What, indeed, could the King of Sardinia hope if the coalition should succeed? Could he ask French provinces for the princes of his own family? On the contrary, if the coalition should be overthrown, would it not expose him to lose his states? As Spain, yielding to the irresistible force of national interests, had connected herself with us, it was to be expected that Piedmont would follow her example, as soon as it could be done with security.



The Committee of Public Safety and the Directory had already made two attempts to disengage this power from its alliances; the latter especially, made through the intermediation of the King of Spain, had staggered the monarch, and caused the convocation of a council in which was discussed the question of a separate peace. The Marquis of Silva, a distinguished soldier, had endeavored to draw the council into our favor, by the strongest reasons of civil and military policy. But the King and the minister, Damian de Priocca, adhered to the alliance with the cabinet of Vienna, rather through fear of our doctrines than from any real attachment to the House of Austria. The Marquis d'Albarey described the dangers of the throne with so much warmth that he carried his point over his eloquent adversary. English gold was not without its weight in the balance, for they did not fail to remark that the English subsidies were worth more than all that could possibly be hoped from France.

The House of Austria reigned over Lombardy. A prince of that family governed Tuscany. It was allied to the Duke of Modena, whose only heir had married the Archduke Ferdinand. A granddaughter\* of Maria Theresa, sister of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette, occupied the throne of Naples, by the side of the weak and inefficient Ferdinand IV. Her Austrian origin, and the outrage committed on the Queen of France, had exasperated Queen Caroline against everything French. The minister, Acton, born at Besançon, of an Irish family, and ex-officer of the French navy, partook of this hatred on account of some personal misunderstanding which had occurred when he was in the French service. Nothing is more deplorable than to see personal resentment opposing itself to the good of the state; but, unfortunately, nothing is more frequent. Influenced by Queen Caroline and his minister, the King of Naples, who had taken a feeble part in the coalition by sending three thousand men to Toulon, in 1793, and withdrawing them after the evacuation of that place, decided, after much hesitation, to send a strong contingent to the Austro-Sardinian army; a tardy resolution, somewhat difficult to reconcile with previous events, and, indeed, incomprehensible, after the peace which had just been concluded with Spain and Tuscany.

The venerable septagenarian, Pius VI., wore the tiara, and occupied the chair of St. Peter. Our religious dissensions, and the destruction of the Catholic Church in France, had made him an enemy more formidable by his spiritual arms than by the miserable battalions which he could send against us.

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\*Evidently a misprint for "daughter," although it is "*petite-fille*" in the original French edition.



The republics of Venice and Genoa, after having disputed for several centuries the commerce of the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, and the Levant; after having fought the memorable naval battles at Caristo, the Dardanelles, Cagliari, and Sapiensa, were now content to carry on a little coast trade under shelter of their neutrality. The first of these, inclosed in the talons of Austria, and having as much to fear from her protection as from our democratic doctrines, ardently desired the continuance of peace. It had just given the strongest proof of this desire by complying with the wishes of the Directory, intimated on the first of March, to order Louis XVIII. from the Venetian territory. This prince had retired to Verona, and published from there, on the death of the Dauphin, a manifesto declaring his accession to the throne of his ancestors. This act of legitimacy, very innocent in itself, had excited the animosity of the Directory. It was much better for France that this prince should remain in the insignificant republic of Venice than to be a refugee in England, or present with the army of the *émigrés*. Since France could not banish him from the European continent, it was best to place him either at Venice or Naples. But the Directory judged otherwise, and knowing the connections which he kept up with the committee of royalists in France, and consulting only its animosity, it demanded of the senate of Venice the same base act for which Louis XV. had been so justly blamed; that of expelling the Pretender from his states.

The procurator Pesaro, an energetic magistrate, worthy of presiding over a better people, alone resisted the mandate. It was carried, however, by an immense majority; and the Republic flattered itself that, by an act of causeless submission, it would secure itself from all danger. Louis, therefore, receiving orders to quit the Venetian states, left for the army of Condé, and afterwards went to Mittau, where Russia, for a time, gave him an asylum more secure than that of Venice. On leaving Venice, he charged the Russian ambassador, Mordwinoff, to erase the names of the Bourbons from the Golden Book of the Republic, and to reclaim the armor of Henry IV., which it had formerly received as a testimony of the affection of that great king. This act, dictated by fear, was no proof of the real sentiments of the Venetian government towards us, but it gave us to understand what we might exact from Venice if victory should ever conduct us to her gates.

The Republic of Genoa, enclosed, as it were, within the theatre of war, had seen its port violated by the English, in 1793,

and its territory, near Oneille, overrun by the columns which, in retaliation, I had directed, in 1794, to turn Saorgio.

These two oligarchies feared the principles which we were propagating, but the mass of the people, especially at Genoa, were much attached to France on account of the great commercial relations between the two countries.

Austria had tried to stir up all the little states of Italy against us; she had endeavored to assemble their deputies at Milan for the purpose of forming an Italian League, over which she might gradually assume a patronage and influence still more powerful than what she then exercised over the Germanic Confederation; but the Italian princes, aware of this design, had declined to act upon the question, and limited themselves to furnishing Austria with assistance in men, money, and munitions. Tuscany alone, although governed by an archduke, had reestablished relations of friendship with the French Republic, by treating with us immediately after the peace of Bâle.

It will be remembered that General Schérer had gained at Loano, the second of November, a victory over the Austrian army of General Devins; this was a brilliant achievement, due in part to my instructions, and in part to Masséna, but from which they were unable to draw any advantages.

NAPOLÉON'S PLAN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.—I arrived at Nice on the twenty-seventh of March. Our recently victorious army was now in a precarious position; perched on the summit of the Apennines from Savona to Ormea, it was too scattered, and its line of communications with France, extending along the shore between the enemy's line and the sea, was everywhere too much exposed. There are two main routes from Nice into Italy; the one which turns to the north by Saorgio, and crosses the great chain of the Alps at Col-de-Tende, is the great road from Turin to Coni; the other, placed on that part of the Apennines which inclines abruptly towards the Gulf of Genoa, runs along the shore, and, between the waves and perpendicular rocks, is sometimes barely wide enough for the passage of a small carriage; this road leads to Genoa, and is called *La Corniche*. The debouch from the coast of Genoa into Montferrat is by the great road of the Bochetta, which runs from Genoa to Alexandria. Between the two mountains, the Col-de-Tende and the Col-de-la-Bochetta, which form the great communications between the south of France and Italy, is a third route, that from Oneille to Ceva by Garesio; it is good for artillery. Other more narrow and difficult roads run from Loano and Savona to Dego, from Savona



to Sassello, and from Voltri to Campofreddo. As the army had been in possession of Col-de-Tende ever since my operations in 1794, it might have descended on Coni, and acted in concert with that of the Alps; but they still persisted in keeping it between Tende and Savona, on the arid rocks of Liguria, where it was impossible to provision it by sea, and where almost everything must be obtained from Genoa.

This disposition of localities had caused a repartition of the army. The division of Maquart, three thousand men, guarded the Col-de-Tende. The division of Serrurier,\* five thousand men, occupied the road from Garessio and Ceva. Those of Augereau,† Masséna,‡ and Laharpe,§ thirty-four thousand men in all, were

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\*Serrurier (Count Jean Mathieu-Philibert), born in 1742, at Laon, was educated for the military service, and obtained the grade of lieutenant in 1755. He was a major at the commencement of the Revolution. Napoleon raised him to the highest military and civil ranks, making him marshal in 1804, and a senator. He voted for the Provisional Government in 1814, but declared for Napoleon on his return from Elba. He died in 1819. Napoleon thus describes his character: "Personally he was brave to intrepidity, but as a general he was not fortunate. He had less enthusiasm than Masséna or Augereau, but he far surpassed them both in the modesty of his character, the wisdom of his opinions, and the safety of his intercourse."—*Biographie Universelle*.

†Augereau was the son of a poor fruiterer of one of the faubourgs of Paris. He was born in 1757. He entered the Neapolitan service at an early age; but, seeing no prospect of promotion, he retired in disgust and taught fencing at Naples. He was banished thence in 1792 with the rest of his countrymen. He afterwards served as a volunteer in the army of Italy; he distinguished himself in 1794 as general-of-brigade of the army of the Pyrenees, and was general-of-division of the army of Italy in 1796. At the day of Castiglione he won many laurels, and afterwards derived his ducal title from that place. "That day," said Napoleon at St. Helena, "was the most brilliant of Augereau's life; nor did I ever forget it." He was made Marshal of France in 1804. In 1814 he was one of the first to desert the Emperor, but on his return from Elba in 1815 he again offered his services, but Napoleon refused him as a traitor. Napoleon says that he always maintained good order and discipline in his army, and on the field of battle fought with great intrepidity, but that from defective judgment or want of education he was unfit for a separate command. In politics he was a wild anarchist, and his opinions merited no respect. He died in 1816, leaving a great but tarnished reputation.—*Biographie Universelle*.

‡Masséna (André), born at Nice, in 1758. His parents were in moderate circumstances, but sufficiently well off to give him a good education. He entered the army at seventeen, and served as non-commissioned officer till 1786, when he retired from the army and married a woman of property. On the breaking out of the Revolution, he again entered the army as an officer. His promotion was now rapid, and in 1793 he became general-of-division. Napoleon made him Duke of Rivoli and afterwards Prince of Essling. He was made marshal in 1804. He was ever faithful to Napoleon.



stationed in the environs of Loano, Finale, and Savona.\* The latter division pushed its advance guard on Voltri as much to hold Genoa in check as to secure our communications with what the soldiers termed the *nursing mother*. The administrative headquarters had remained for convenience at Nice, for the last four years; my first care was to remove with it to Albenga, by the difficult road of La Corniche, under the fire of the English fleets. This was sufficient to announce to the army that I was about to occupy myself with its wants and its glory. It was literally an army of Spartans:—In spite of the utter misery to which it had been reduced, it breathed only love of country and military glory. Naked feet and clothes in tatters, far from discouraging our braves, only excited their hilarity.

My plan was simple: I asked of the Senate of Genoa, in reparation for the outrage committed in their port on the frigate

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He died in 1817, less from disease than through chagrin at the conduct of royalists after the second restoration. Napoleon thus describes his character: "He was of a robust frame, indefatigable, night and day on horseback among rocks and in the mountains. In mountain warfare he was particularly expert. He was of decided character and of intrepid courage, full of ambition and self-love. His distinctive characteristic was obstinacy; he was never discouraged. But he neglected discipline, was inattentive to administrative service, and was therefore not beloved by his troops. His dispositions for attack were not skillful, and his conversation was uninteresting: But at the first sound of the cannon, in showers of bullets and in the midst of danger, his intellect acquired its proper force and clearness."

§Laharpe (Amédée-Emmanuel), born in Pays-de-Vaud, in 1754. He was a man of fortune and received a good education. In early life he served in the army of Holland, but afterwards returned to his home in Switzerland. He was afterwards stripped of his fortune and exiled to France. He entered the French army in 1792, was made general-of-brigade in 1793, and general-of-division in 1795. He was killed at Codogno, in 1796. He was a brave soldier, an able general, of generous feelings, and of unsullied character.

\*Thiers thus describes the principal generals under Napoleon's command at this period: "Masséna, a young Nissard of uncultivated mind, but precise and luminous amid dangers, and of indomitable perseverance: Augereau, formerly a fencing-master, whom great bravery and skill in managing the soldiers had raised to the highest rank: Laharpe, an expatriated Swiss, combining information with courage: Serrurier, formerly a major, methodical and brave: lastly, Berthier, whom his activity, his attention to details, his geographical acquirements, and his faculty of measuring with the eye the extent of a piece of ground or the numerical force of a column, eminently qualified for a useful and convenient chief-of-staff."

*La Modeste*,\* that they should give us passage through that city and the Bochetta, promising that on this condition I would remove forever the war from their frontiers, and secure to them the alliance and protection of the French Republic. If the Senate accepted this offer, I would debouch by Genoa to overthrow the extreme left of the Austrians, throw them back upon Alexandria, take in reverse all the defenses of Piedmont, thus detach her from the imperial alliance, rally upon myself the little army of Kellerman,† and pursue the isolated forces of Beaulieu into

\*The frigate *La Modeste* had anchored in the port of Genoa, and was moored against the quay. On the fifteenth of October, 1793, three English ships and two frigates anchored in port: an English seventy-four moored alongside of the *Modeste*. The master civilly requested the officer on the quarter-deck of the frigate to remove a boat which was in the way of the maneuvers of the English ship, which was readily done by the French. Half an hour after the English captain requested the commander of the *Modeste* to hoist the white flag, saying that he did not know what the tri-colored flag was. The French officer answered this insult as honor dictated; but the English had three platforms prepared, which they threw on the ship, and boarded her, at the same time commencing a brisk fire of musketry from the tops and deck; the crew of the *Modeste* were unprepared for any attack; part of them threw themselves into the water; the English pursued the fugitives with their boats, killing and wounding them. The rage of the people of Genoa was unbounded.—*Montholon*, Vol. I.

†Kellerman (François-Christophe) was born in Strasbourg, in 1735. He entered the Confians Legion in 1752, and served in it during the first campaigns of the Seven Years' War. He passed through all the grades up to the rank of *maréchal-de-camp*, which he attained in 1785. He served under Dumouriez in 1792, and distinguished himself at the celebrated cannonade of Valmy. He next served under Custine, and on the arrest of this officer, Kellerman was also called to the bar of the Convention. But he was more fortunate than his chief; in May, 1795, he was promoted to the command of the army of the Alps and of Italy; he was soon recalled on charges of inefficiency and detained some thirteen months, after which he was restored to his former command. During the campaign of 1796, his army formed the reserve in the Alps. None of his military operations in Italy or in the Alps gave satisfaction, and he was removed from his command and directed to organize the *gendarmerie* in the interior. After the eighteenth of Brumaire, Napoleon made him senator, and, in 1804, Marshal of France, and conferred on him the title of Duke of Valmy. He held under Napoleon several important civil offices; during the campaign against Prussia he organized provisional regiments at Mayence, in 1808 he commanded the army of reserve in Spain, and in 1813 he collected all the reserves of the army at Metz. His fame may be said to have begun and ended at Valmy; as general-in-chief of an army, he exhibited no great ability. He died in 1820 at the advanced age of 85.

After copying a brief notice of Kellerman from the *Encyclopedia Americana*, M. Herbert, the translator of Thiers' "Consulate and Empire," adds: "He was the *real winner* of the battle of Marengo, changing it, by a single charge of cavalry, from a rout to a victory. For this Napoleon



the Tyrol. But if they rejected the offer, they would undoubtedly attempt to make a merit of it with the Allies, who would endeavor, by extending their left, to cut us off at the Bochetta. This movement would place the mass of the enemy's forces at the two extremes, at Ceva and Genoa, and expose to our attacks an isolated and detached centre.

**POSITIONS AND PLANS OF THE ALLIES.**—The Allies had replaced Devins by Beaulieu, an old man almost eighty, noted for his courage and enterprise, but whose genius had never been brilliant. The reinforcements drawn from Lombardy, and levies made in the states of the King of Sardinia, had made up the complement of his army, and amply repaired the breaches of the preceding campaign. Moreover, the Neapolitan contingent would raise the number to eighty thousand men.

The Allies flattered themselves that, with the aid of such enterprises as the British fleets and the Corsican division might make upon the Riviera di Ponente,\* they would avenge the affair of Loano, and drive us from Liguria. Happily for us, their forces were ill distributed. More than twenty-five thousand Sardinians, under the Prince of Corignan, were so weakened by being scattered over all the heights of the Alps, from Mont Blanc to the Argentière, as to be completely held in check by the little army of the Alps under General Kellerman. The army of Beaulieu and of Colli, from forty-eight to fifty thousand strong, was

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never forgave him." And afterwards he [Napoleon] did not recompense Kellerman [for his services at Marengo]. No other officer of his distinction but was made Marshal of France far earlier than he." It would be difficult to crowd a greater number of errors within the same limits. François-Christophe Kellerman was *not* at the battle of Marengo, and unless his *absence* both from the army and from Italy could have exerted a most magical influence, it would be difficult to determine how he was the *real winner* of the victory of Marengo. With respect to Napoleon's influence in preventing his promotion, it may be sufficient to remark that Kellerman was general-in-chief of an army when Napoleon was a mere subaltern. He held several important commands under Napoleon, but never served under him in the field. But for the services which he had rendered France previous to the opening of Napoleon's military career, the latter loaded him with honors. He was created marshal among the very *first* that were made; was one of the very *first* appointed to the Senate under Napoleon's Consulate; afterwards made Duke of Valmy, and both himself and family were the objects of Napoleon's kindest regards during his whole life. The Marengo Kellerman will be spoken of in connection with that battle.

\*The states of Genoa, on the gulf, were divided into three parts, called *rivieras*: the Riviera di Ponente, the Riviera di Genoa, and the Riviera di Levante.



scattered from Coni, and the foot of Col-de-Tende, to the Bochetta, towards Genoa. The general-in-chief himself had just marched, with the left, upon Voltaggio and Ovada. The centre was encamped at Sassello, and the Piedmontese, who formed the right, were at Ceva. Simple common sense dictated that this spider-web should be pierced by the centre. I made my dispositions accordingly; they were wise, and fortune wonderfully assisted their execution.

**BEAULIEU COMPROMISES HIS LEFT AT GENOA.**—Beaulieu, urged on by the Aulic Council, had determined to take the offensive; and, either informed of my project upon Genoa, or designing himself to get possession of that city, to enter into communication with Nelson and Jervis, who were in these waters with an English squadron, he resolved to move his forces upon that place. The idea was good in itself; and he could have executed it more certainly, and have forced us into a precipitate retreat, had he operated in mass by Ceva against our left. But Beaulieu, who never comprehended a stratagem, resolved, on the contrary, to march directly upon Genoa, with the third of his army, while the remainder annoyed us in front. As early as the 10th of April he himself descended the Apennines, by the Bochetta, at the head of his left wing. I allowed him to drive our little advanced guard from Voltri, while I collected my forces against his centre, which had advanced from Sassello upon Montenotte. Three redoubts covered this important spur of the Apennines, which here slope down to Savona. Argenteau assailed these works at the head of ten thousand picked men; he had already taken two of them, and was attacking the most important with great impetuosity, when the commandant, Colonel Rampon, administered to its garrison, the 32d demi-brigade, the celebrated oath to bury themselves in its ruins rather than to surrender. He, in fact, maintained himself there all day, in spite of numerous assaults, which cost the enemy dear; and he was finally reinforced in the night by the whole division of Laharpe, which bivouacked in rear. The divisions of Masséna and Augereau prepare to disengage it.\*

**HIS CENTRE IS PIERCED.**—On the 12th Argenteau, who

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\*In this defense Rampon had only 1200 men, with which he repelled a force nearly ten times as numerous. If the fort had been taken, the army of Napoleon had been cut in two, and "the fate of the campaign, and of the world, might have been changed." Fortifications, though small and unimportant in themselves, if judiciously placed and properly defended, may have a decided influence upon the active operations of an army in the field.

commanded the centre, was attacked in front and rear by superior forces. He was beaten and thrown back upon Dego. This first success was the more important, as it disconcerted the enemy; but, in order to gather the full fruits of it, we were obliged to redouble our activity. My whole army was already beyond the Apennines; of the four divisions which composed it, those of Laharpe, Masséna, and Augereau marched with me; Serrurier was left at Garesio, to check the Piedmontese.

**NAPOLEON'S ATTACK UPON THE PIEDMONTESE.**—I determined to turn upon these last, in order to effect their entire separation from Beaulieu, and to push them vigorously. The mass of their forces, under the orders of Colli, still held the camp of Ceva, and General Provera, posted in an intermediate position between Colli and Argenteau, occupied the heights of Cosseria. I marched against him at the head of the divisions of Masséna and Augereau, leaving Laharpe to observe Beaulieu. On the 13th Augereau carried the gorges of Millesimo, and Provera, beaten and cut to pieces on all sides, was forced to take refuge in the ruins of the château of Cosseria. All attempts of the Piedmontese to rescue him having failed, he surrendered on the morning of the 14th, with the fifteen hundred grenadiers under his command.

**OPERATIONS RESUMED—THE DOUBLE COMBAT OF DEGO.**—I was, however, obliged to suspend my march against the Piedmontese, for the Austrians, alarmed at the defeat of Montebotte, now sought to concentrate on Dego. But they did it unskillfully; Beaulieu, leaving Genoa and the coast, hastened to Aquis, and sent a part of his left directly across the mountains to join the remains of Argenteau's forces near Sassello. I was not disposed to permit this; after having established Augereau in front of the Piedmontese, I conducted the divisions of Laharpe and Masséna on Dego, and attacked it with vigor. The troops of Argenteau fought bravely, but we were too strong for them; so that they were finally obliged to give up the contest, and retire in disorder on Aquis, leaving twenty pieces of cannon and many prisoners in our hands. Scarcely had we finished with Argenteau, when a new Austrian corps gave us battle on the same ground. It was the corps of General Wukassowich, who was hastening from Voltri by Sassello, with the intention of rallying on Argenteau, whom he supposed to be still near Dego. The brave Illyrian, surprised at finding our troops in the place of those which he expected to join, instantly formed his plan, like a man of activity and courage: far from thinking of retreat, he fell upon the guards of the redoubts of Magliani, carried the work, and drove back the



frightened garrison upon Dego. Our troops thought only of pursuing the flying enemy in the direction of Spigno, and had no expectation of being thus attacked on their right and rear. This attack was followed by a moment of disorder, of which Wukasowich boldly took advantage; but his five battalions were insufficient to retrieve the fortunes of the enemy. Masséna succeeded, by means of his reserve, in rallying the fugitives and bringing them back to the fight; the division of Laharpe, burning to avenge this momentary reverse, fell in turn upon the enemy, who, being charged by the mass of my forces, was easily overthrown; the shattered remains of his forces considered themselves particularly fortunate in being able to join the *débris* of Argenteau at Aquis.\*

OPERATIONS AGAINST COLLI.—Having thus disposed of the Austrians, I again turned upon the Piedmontese with the divisions of Augereau, Masséna, and Serrurier. I established Laharpe at San Benedetto, to protect my right and hold Beaulieu in check. Colli, pressed in front by superior forces, and threatened on his left by the movement of Augereau, who descended the left bank of the Tanaro, was forced to evacuate the camp of Ceva; notwithstanding a momentary success, at the combat of St. Michael, he was driven behind the Cursaglia and the Elero. I closely pursued and defeated him at Vico, near Mondovi, and drove him behind the Stura as far as Carmagnole. On the twenty-sixth my three divisions united at Alba. One decisive battle would now put me in possession of Turin, from which we were only ten leagues. Nevertheless, the situation of the enemy was far from desperate: it was not, as has been pretended by the poetical Botfa, a small river; a brave but conquered army; one place tenable and the other dismantled, forming the barriers of Piedmont; it was the fine position of the Stura, flanked on the right by the important fortress of Coni, on the left by Cherasco, which was secure from a *coup-de-main*, where Colli might have reinforced his army by twenty thousand men, now scattered in the adjacent valleys, and by an equal number from the wrecks of Beaulieu's forces. The Allies might have repaired their fortunes by two days of vigor, activity, and resolution; at all events, there was the formidable place of Turin at hand, to receive, in case of reverse, a beaten army, and to that place Austria could certainly have sent assistance. We feared that they would

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\*"In this action Napoleon was particularly struck by the gallantry of a chief-of-battalion, whom he made a colonel on the spot, and who ever after was the companion of his glory. His name was *Lannes*, afterwards Duke of Montebello, and one of the most heroic marshals of the Empire."



pursue this course, the more because Turin could easily brave any means of attack that we possessed, and greatly embarrass us by a prolonged resistance. At this crisis, I sought to incite my army to new victories, to restore its discipline, and strike terror in the hearts of our enemies.

**NAPOLEON'S PROCLAMATION TO HIS SOLDIERS.**—The following proclamation was designed to accomplish this triple object:

"Soldiers!—In fifteen days you have gained six victories, taken twenty-one colors, fifty pieces of cannon, many strong places, conquered the richest part of Piedmont; you have taken fifteen thousand prisoners, killed or wounded ten thousand men. Destitute of everything, you have supplied all; you have gained battles without cannon, crossed rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked often without bread; republican phalanxes alone are capable of actions so extraordinary!

"The two armies which just now attacked you with audacity, are flying before you; perverse men, who rejoiced at the idea of victory to your enemies, are confounded and trembling. But, soldiers, I will not deceive you; you have done nothing, since much remains to be done. Neither Turin nor Milan are yours: your enemies still trample on the ashes of the conquerors of the Tarquins.

"You were destitute of everything at the beginning of the campaign; you are now abundantly provided. The magazines taken from your enemies are numerous. The siege artillery has arrived. Your country expects great things of you. You will justify these expectations; you all burn to spread afar the glory of the French people, to humble the haughty kings who thought to put you in chains, and to dictate a glorious peace, which shall indemnify your country for all the sacrifices she has made. When you return to the bosoms of your families, you will say with pride: *I was of the conquering army of Italy.*

"Friends, I promise you this conquest; but there is one condition which you must swear to fulfill:—it is to respect the people whose fetters you burst asunder; it is to repress all pillage made by wicked men incited on by our enemies. Should you not do this, instead of being the liberators of nations, you would be their scourge. The French people would disown you; your victories, your courage, the blood of your brothers slain in combat, all would be lost, and above all, honor and glory. For myself and the generals who have your confidence, we would blush to command an army that knows no law but force. But,

invested with the national authority, I will compel the small number of heartless men to respect the laws of humanity and honor which they trample under foot; I will not permit brigands to soil your laurels.

"People of Italy! the French army comes to break your fetters; the French people are the friends of the people everywhere. Come with confidence to our colors; your religion, your property, your customs, shall be religiously respected. We make war like generous enemies; we war only against tyrants who oppress you."

To give greater weight to these measures, the Piedmontese democrats organized at Alba a committee for distributing addresses among the people of Piedmont and Lombardy, threatening some and encouraging others.

KING OF SARDINIA SUES FOR PEACE.—The result exceeded my hopes; the capital was overwhelmed with confusion and terror. The court, regretting its adhesion to the coalition, felt that our impetuous approach threatened it with the most serious danger, by stirring up the numerous partisans of a democratic revolution in Turin and the other cities of Piedmont. It viewed this danger through the medium of fear. Although Beaulieu had marched from Aquis to Nizza to join Colli, it thought itself lost beyond hope, and determined to surrender to our mercy; an *aide-de-camp* came on the part of the King, to ask for peace. This was agreeable news to me; for, in truth, I was somewhat uneasy respecting the course of events at Turin. But I knew the King had hesitated how to act upon the propositions made by France through the mediation of Spain, in the preceding year, and I felt authorized in believing that our presence would increase the credit of our partisans. The same question, again considered on the approach of our victorious phalanxes, was warmly opposed by the Marquis of Albarey and the minister, but Cardinal Costa, the Archbishop of Turin, carried the majority of votes, and decided the King for peace. It is worthy of notice, that the vote of an archbishop accomplished what the military and political arguments of the Marquis of Silva were unable to effect.

This precipitate step of the Court of Turin not only flattered my vanity and ambition, but it extricated me from real difficulty. My success had been brilliant, but the pillage inseparable from the total want of magazines had given offense to the Piedmontese peasants, and relaxed the reins of discipline in my army. If the King, withdrawing from the Alps a part of the troops of Prince Corignan, had shown himself firm at Turin, as did his ancestor, Victor Amadeus, in 1706; and if the Austrians, re-



inforced by their garrisons in Lombardy, had seconded his efforts, I might have been driven back upon the sea, and placed in a situation exceedingly critical. Even supposing that I had maintained my position in Piedmont, arrested by the fortresses of Turin, Alexandria, and Valentia, which I was not in a situation to besiege, it would have been impossible for me to advance another step; and the enemy's forces, increased to one hundred thousand men by reinforcements from the Rhine, would have driven me from Italy. But the impetuosity of my march, and my proclamations, striking terror everywhere, gave success to the party which favored peace.

I considered every consequence that could result from this measure of the King of Sardinia; the distance which now separated me from Mantua and the Adige seemed but a step easily taken. Peace with Piedmont decided everything. If I alone had conquered the two armies united, what could Beaulieu, deprived of his allies, hope to effect against me, when I was reinforced by a part of Kellerman's army of the Alps? The fate of Italy was no longer doubtful; I already contemplated with satisfaction this beautiful country subjected to my laws. I no longer regarded myself as an ordinary general, but as a man called to influence the destinies of Europe; I discovered the immensity of the part prepared for me by Fortune; I already lived in history.

**ARMISTICE OF CHERASCO.**—I was not authorized, however, to treat for peace, and it was necessary to refer the conclusion of the affair to Paris; but not to suffer my prey to escape, I enchaind it by an armistice, which might be regarded as a preliminary treaty; this established us in the heart of Piedmont, by giving us possession of the fortresses of Coni, Alexandria, and Ceva. The King agreed to withdraw from the coalition, and sent the Count of Revel to Paris, to settle the definite conditions of the treaty. Impatient to accelerate this important matter, I gave the Count of St. Marsan, the King's envoy near me, to understand, that so far from desiring to overthrow thrones and altars, we would protect them if they would cease their hostility to France; in a word, that he would gain more by an alliance with us than by his devotion to the Court of Vienna. Unfortunately, their minds were not ripe for such overtures.

I had already done more in fifteen days than the old army of Italy in four campaigns; but my hopes were not yet realized. To rescue this classic country from the Germans, to give the lie to the old proverb, that Italy was the tomb of the French:—this was a task worthy of me. I hesitated the less to undertake it as the armistice exposed to our attacks the isolated army



of Beaulieu, which had already proved too feeble to arrest me in Lombardy, notwithstanding the reinforcements it had found there.

**NAPOLÉON MARCHES AGAINST BEAULIEU.**—The next day, after the signature of the treaty, I marched my four divisions upon Alexandria. Beaulieu had already repassed the Po at the bridge of Valencia, which he had destroyed. The mass of the Austrian forces took position at Valeggio, on the Agogna, and pushed forward detachments upon the Sesia, and the left of the Ticino.

**PASSAGE OF THE PO AT PLACENTIA.**—Wishing to deceive Beaulieu respecting my intentions, I had inserted in the armistice a clause which allowed me to cross the Po, with my troops, in the environs of Valencia. This stratagem succeeded to perfection. Beaulieu, thinking me foolish enough to attack him in front on the Ticino, when I could act with greater advantage on his rear, directed his whole attention upon the space between the Agogna and Valencia. In order to confirm his error, I pushed forward a detachment upon Salò, making a feint to pass the Po at Cambio. Under cover of these demonstrations, the army turned to the right, and rapidly descended the river. To accelerate this march I myself conducted the advanced guard. We arrived at Placentia on the 7th of May, closely followed by our divisions in echelons. I felt the importance of hastening the enterprise, in order not to allow the enemy time to prevent it. But the Po, which is a river as wide and deep as the Rhine, is a barrier difficult to overcome. We had no means of constructing a bridge, and were obliged to content ourselves with the means of embarkation which we found at Placentia and its environs. Lannes,\* chief-of-brigade, crossed in the first boats with the advanced guard. The Austrians had only two squadrons on the other side, and these were easily overthrown. The passage was now continued without interruption, but very slowly. If I had had a good pontoon equipage, the fate of the enemy's army had been

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\*Lannes (Jean) was born at Lectoure, France, in 1769. He received a good education in the college of his native city, and was intended for the bar or the church; but his father having lost his property by becoming security for a friend, young Lannes began the trade of a dyer. On the first requisition of 1792 he was sent to the army of the Pyrenees, with the rank of sergeant-major. This changed his career. After the peace of Bâle, in 1795, he returned to his home with the rank of chief-of-brigade; but at the opening of the campaign of 1796 he joined Napoleon as a volunteer. His life now became a continual scene of actions the most brilliant, which won for him the love of his general, the gratitude of his country, and the admiration of the world.

sealed; but the necessity of passing the river by successive embarkations saved it. This enterprise, though, for the above reason, it did not entirely succeed, was not one of the least remarkable circumstances of my first campaign.

#### ARMISTICE WITH DUKES OF PARMA AND MODENA.

—This passage lasted two days; but I profited by the delay to conclude an armistice with Parma, by which the Duke purchased his neutrality at the price of ten\* millions of francs, munitions and horses for the artillery and cavalry, provisions for the army, and, what was of greater value, a good number of *chefs-d'œuvre* of painting and sculpture, selected from his galleries.† The Duke of Mo-

\*This is probably a misprint for *two*, the actual amount of the contribution levied.

†An immense amount of ink has been wasted by English writers in defamation of Napoleon for the course pursued towards the Duke of Parma. It will be sufficient to remember that this prince had repeatedly rejected offers of peace made by France, and was now to be punished as a vanquished foe. Under the circumstances, this punishment was not severe. The Spanish ambassador, whose offer of mediation had been rejected by Parma, confessed that the French had been very moderate. Alison, following Scott and Lockhart, says "It is impossible to condemn too strongly" these forced contributions from the galleries of the arts. His reasoning is not founded on fact. In the first place, very few of the master-pieces taken from Italy were in their original places, or in the possession of their original owners. We need hardly mention the Apollo Belvidere the Dying Gladiator, the Venus, the Laocoön; the Bronze Horses, first carried from Corinth to Constantinople, thence to Venice, etc. In the second place, they were as safe, and certainly as accessible, in the public galleries of the Louvre, as scattered through the palaces of the petty princes of Italy. In the third place, works of art which, by private individuals, are made commodities of bargain and sale, and transported according to their caprice or interest, could hardly suffer indignity by being made the subjects of treaty stipulations. As for their being taken as exotics where they would not be rightly appreciated or understood, as asserted by Alison, it is needless to refute so absurd a reason. Alison quotes Napoleon's words at St. Helena as a *confession* of guilt. By following Alison's reference, it will be found that Napoleon's remarks are wholly in *justification* of the course he pursued!

Lee, in his "Life of Napoleon," deems these forced contributions not only justifiable by the laws of war, but as highly creditable to Bonaparte. "This measure," says he, "lent a grace and refinement to his warfare, which, reflecting lustre on the French arms, harmonized the rudeness of military fame with the softer glories of taste and imagination. The homage of other conquerors for the master-pieces of art had been shown by seizing with avidity, or leaving with indifference, such specimens as the chance of war placed within their reach. The arm of victory had transferred from Corinth to Constantinople, and thence to Venice, the famous horses of bronze. In later times, Frederick

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dena had fled to Venice, but the regency which he had instituted hastened to conclude an armistice with me on the same conditions as Parma. These conditions were rather hard, especially on the Duke of Parma, whose quality of Infante of Spain seemed to entitle him to a better treatment. But he had turned a deaf ear to all the overtures made to him, even after my victories of Montenotte. We now punished him for his attachment to our enemies.

**BATTLE OF FOMBIO.**—Beaulieu, receiving intelligence of my passage at Placentia, maneuvered to oppose it. This octogenarian general, instead of falling with vigor on that part of my forces which had already crossed the river, took only half-way measures, which were entirely insufficient to accomplish his object. He rested his left on the Adda without abandoning the Ticino, on which he rested his right. On the eighth of May, General Liptay, who commanded his left, established himself at Fombio opposite my advanced guard. I supposed that Beaulieu was advancing with his *corps de bataille*. It was therefore necessary to attack Liptay immediately, to avoid having at once on my hands the great mass of the enemy's forces. I gave the order to General Lannes, who executed it with that vigor and impetuosity which has since so illustrated his glorious career. Liptay was defeated, separated from Beaulieu, and thrown back on Pizzighettone. On the very night following this affair, Beaulieu arrived on the ground where his lieutenant had just been defeated, and attacked the division of Laharpe at Codogno. The advanced posts were surprised, and the *generale* beaten at Codogno: in the confusion which followed, General Laharpe\* was

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the Great, though twice in military possession of Dresden, left untouched, and almost unnoticed, the objects collected in the royal gallery. The livelier sympathy of Bonaparte for the efforts of genius rendered it impossible for him to desecrate or neglect its creations. What had hitherto been subjects of military rapine, princely exchange, selfish display, or private acquisition, he elevated into considerations of national compact, and means of public relief and refinement, receiving, as compensation for territory which he might have occupied, and treasure which he could have exacted, a small selection of Italian paintings. This proceeding, which evinced equal respect for talent and humanity, and opened a higher sphere of glory for the arts, made the magic of Correggio's pencil turn aside from his country the ravages of war."

\*Laharpe was an officer of distinguished bravery and much beloved by his troops. "It was remarked," says Hazlitt, "that during the action of Fombio, on the evening preceding his death, he had appeared absent and dejected, giving no orders, seemingly deprived of his usual faculties, and overwhelmed by some fatal presentiment." The whole army mourned his loss.



killed by some of his own troops, but not before the Austrians had been compelled to retire. Beaulieu, not satisfied with having divided up his army, now so scattered his own corps between the Po and the Adda that he had only three battalions of disposable troops. Seeing himself in presence of superior numbers, he thought to concentrate his whole army on Lodi, where the Adda was crossed by a bridge. His right, which was still at Pavia, had to gain Cassano. This he could not have accomplished, had it not been for the unfortunate delay in the passage at Placentia, caused by the want of a proper pontoon equipage.

**MARCH UPON THE ADDA.**—Although the road to Milan was now open to my troops, the possession of this important city could not be otherwise than precarious, so long as the enemy maintained himself behind the Adda.\* It was necessary, therefore, first to drive him to a greater distance. I marched on Lodi with my grenadiers and the divisions of Masséna and Augereau. One division was left before Pizzighettone to mask this place and cover my right. Ignorant that the enemy had already withdrawn the forces on the Ticino to the main body in rear of the Adda, I directed Serrurier to march on Pavia to secure my left.

**THE BRIDGE OF LODI.**—We arrived at Lodi on the tenth. Leaving General Sebottendorf with ten thousand men to defend the Adda, Beaulieu had already retired to Crema with the main body of his forces. The enemy had secured the bridge of Lodi, which was over one hundred yards in length, by twenty pieces of cannon placed at the extremity. The occasion furnished an opportunity for stamping by some bold stroke the character of my individual actions, and I did not let it escape. The affair might be attended with the loss of a few hundred men, but even should I be defeated, it could not have the least influence upon the result of the campaign. We easily routed a battalion and some squadrons of the enemy from Lodi, and pursued them so closely as to prevent their destroying the bridge. I immediately formed my grenadiers in close column and threw them upon the bridge. But, assailed by a murderous storm of grape, they were staggered for a moment, when my generals threw themselves at the head of the column, and carried it by their examples. At the same time a number of the soldiers let themselves down from the bridge upon an island, where they were less exposed to the

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\*"Allison says, "on the tenth Napoleon marched towards Milan, but, before arriving at that city, he required to pass the Adda." This betrays great ignorance of the theater of war. Napoleon was already on the same side of the river as Milan, but he turned his back upon that city, in order to drive the enemy beyond the Mincio.

fire of the enemy, and, finding the second arm of the river fordable, they deployed as tirailleurs to turn the Austrian line. The main body of the grenadiers now charged across the bridge, overthrew everything that opposed its passage, captured the batteries, and scattered the battalions of the enemy. Sebottendorf retreated on Crema with a loss of fifteen cannon and two thousand men. This was merely an affair of a rear guard, but still it was a brilliant one.\*

**NAPOLEON ENTERS MILAN.**—The immediate consequences of the combat of Lodi were the occupation of Pizzighettone, and the retreat of Beaulieu upon the Mincio. I pursued him no further. For the past month my troops had been incessantly in motion, and they now required repose. Moreover my presence was necessary at Milan. I therefore established the division of Serrurier at Cremona and with the remainder of the army took the road to the capital, where I made my triumphal entrance on the fifteenth of May. A deputation, headed by the respectable Melzi, came to meet me at Lodi, and I was received by a numerous National Guard dressed in Lombard colors, and commanded by the Duke Serbelloni, lining the streets quite to my quarters. Joy seemed universal; and France herself could not have paid me higher honors even by voting me a triumph.

For the security of our conquests it was essential to establish the republican system there, and to connect these countries with France by common principles and common interests. In other words, the ancient *régime* was to be destroyed and equality substituted in its place, for that is the entering wedge of revolution. I myself was not tainted with the doctrines of our propagandism, but as they made us enemies of the few, I thought also to make with them friends of the multitude. But the Italian nobility were so much less removed from the people than in most other states that it was not impossible to reconcile them to political equality. I feared the clergy and their retainers, and, foreseeing resistance from this quarter, I resolved either to conciliate them by concessions or to crush them by military power, but without any insurrections of the people.

**PROJECT FOR DIVIDING THE ARMY; NAPOLEON'S RESIGNATION.**—On hearing that I had marched upon Milan,

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\*Historians, ignorant of the military art, have sought to magnify the importance of this affair of Lodi. As a mere trial of skill and personal bravery, it was one of which Napoleon and his soldiers may well have been proud, but as a piece of generalship it does not deserve to be mentioned with the days of Arcole. It had no strategic relations with the campaign, and merely served to encourage the French soldiers and give them confidence in the individual bravery of their general.



the Directory transmitted an order to divide my army into two parts, giving the command of that in Italy to Kellerman, to observe the Austrians on the Mincio, while I, with twenty-five thousand men forming the army of the South, was to march upon Rome and Naples. This division of the forces, just as we were about to encounter the vast resources of the House of Austria, was the height of absurdity. I refused to submit to it, and, to save the army from certain destruction, tendered my resignation. But while waiting for the action of the Directory upon my letter, I determined to drive Beaulieu into the Tyrol.

ADDRESS TO THE ARMY.—Calling upon my troops for new enterprises, I addressed to them the following proclamation, which is too intimately connected with the history of the times to be omitted here:

“Soldiers! you have descended like a torrent from the summit of the Apennines; you have overthrown and dispersed everything that opposed your progress. Piedmont, delivered from Austrian tyranny, has yielded to its natural inclination for peace and for a French alliance: Milan is yours, and the republican standards wave over the whole of Lombardy. The Dukes of Parma and Modena owe their political existence to your generosity. The army which menaced you with so much pride no longer finds a barrier to protect itself against your arms. The Po, the Ticino, and the Adda have not checked your progress a single day; these boasted bulwarks of Italy have been crossed as rapidly as the Apennines. Such a career of success has carried joy into the bosom of your country; fêtes in honor of your victories have been ordered by the national representatives in all the communes of the Republic; there, your parents, your wives, your sisters, your lovers, rejoice at your success, and glory in their connection with you.

“Yes, soldiers! you have, indeed, done much;—but much still remains to be done. Shall posterity say that we knew how to conquer, but not how to profit by a victory? Shall it be said that we found a Capua in Lombardy? I already see you run to arms; for you, days of repose are but days lost to glory and to honor! Let us march! We have yet enemies to conquer, laurels to gather, injuries to revenge! Those who sharpened the poignards of civil war in France, who basely assassinated our ministers, burnt our vessels at Toulon,—let them tremble; for the hour of vengeance has struck!

“But the people of all nations may rest in peace; we are the friends of every people, and especially of the descendants of Bru-



tus, Scipio, and the other great men whom we have for models. To restore the capital, to replace there with honor the statues of heroes who have rendered it immortal; to rouse the Romans from centuries of slavery—such will be the fruit of our victories; they will form an era in history; to you will belong the immortal glory of having changed the face of the most beautiful part of Europe.

“The French people, free, and respected by the whole world, will give to Europe a glorious peace; which will indemnify her for all the sacrifices she has made for the last six years; then you will return to your homes, and your fellow-citizens will say of each of you in passing, *He was of the army of Italy.*”

I well understood the men with whom I had to deal. I knew that eloquent words would excite unbounded enthusiasm in the ardent minds of the French soldiers. I knew that they would produce at Rome and Naples the same effect as they had already produced at Turin, animating the courage and heroism of my men, while they petrified my adversaries with fear.

Before beginning new exploits promised to my soldiers, I attended to the interior administration of Lombardy. The citadel of Milan, from its proximity to the city, had not only a powerful influence on that city, but, so long as it remained in the hands of the enemy, rendered our position in Lombardy more or less dependent upon the success of our arms in the field; I therefore determined upon its reduction. Before leaving Milan for Lodi, I caused the material for this siege to be prepared at Alexandria and Tortona, and to be immediately directed upon Lombardy.

**REVOLT IN LOMBARDY.**—My triumphal reception in the capital gave me good reasons to think that the Italians would really second my operations. I had caused the churches and the property of the nobility to be carefully respected, and I therefore had a right to expect some gratitude from these two privileged classes. But I soon learned that my moderation had calmed neither their fears nor their hatred. The very day that I left Milan to march against the Austrians the tocsin was sounded in rear of my army. The peasantry of the country, excited to fanaticism by their priests, rushed to arms, seized upon Pavia, and the citadel in which I had left a garrison. The least hesitation on my part might have caused a general insurrection. I instantly turned about, and, with three hundred horse and a battalion of grenadiers, marched in all haste to Pavia, which had now become the head-quarters of the rebellion. Having in vain summoned them, through the Archbishop of Milan, to return to order, and to give up the guilty, our grenadiers forced the gates and entered

the city, which was now given up to pillage. Here clemency to the insurgents would have been criminal towards my army. It is sometimes necessary to shed a little blood in order to prevent a greater effusion; to have pardoned these perfidious wretches, who had seized the poignard, even before the sounds of their acclamations had died away, would have exposed my brave soldiers to the horrors of new Sicilian Vespers.\* I caused the municipality to be shot, and order was restored. In the meantime the army had continued its march against the Austrians on the Mincio.

**DEFINITIVE PEACE WITH PIEDMONT.**—I had just learned that a definitive peace had been signed at Paris on the fifteenth of May, with the King of Sardinia. The latter had engaged to leave us in possession of Alexandria and Tortona during the war, to raze Susa, La Brunetta, and Exiles, and also to establish a line of posts by Mont Cenis and L'Argentière. I wished to connect this prince to the Republic by the ties of inter-

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\*Under the reign of Charles of Anjou over Naples and Sicily, a project for the expulsion of the French was formed between Giovanni di Procida, a noble of Salerno, Pope Nicholas III., King Peter of Aragon, and Palæologus, Emperor of Constantinople. To favor this project, an insurrection was incited among the Sicilians. March 30th, 1282, at the hour of vespers, on Easter Monday, the inhabitants of Palermo flew to arms, and fell upon the French, who were all massacred. Women and children were not spared, and even the Sicilian women with child by Frenchmen were murdered. Messina and other towns followed the example of Palermo. This massacre is called the *Sicilian Vespers*.

To prevent a repetition of these horrible massacres, Napoleon resorted to the severe but decisive measures mentioned in the text, and for which he has been so much censured by the English historians. Alison compares the conduct of the inhabitants of Pavia to that of the French peasantry in 1814, when Napoleon called upon every citizen to take up arms in defense of his country. The cases are essentially different. Pavia had already submitted to the French, and exhibited for them every mark of friendship. While treating them in this way they drew the poignard of the assassin. But the French peasantry rose in open war to repel the invaders of their country—the right and duty of every people. There is not the slightest justification for their cold-blooded execution by the Allies. The inhabitants of Pavia undoubtedly deserved severe punishment, but this did not entirely justify the pillage of the city. "Pavia," said Napoleon, at St. Helena, "is the only place I ever gave up to pillage. I had promised the soldiers twenty-four hours; but at the end of three, I could bear it no longer, and put an end to it. Policy and morality are equally opposed to the system." Thiers says, that being scarcely a thousand men, the French, in the short time allowed them, could do no great mischief in so large a city as Pavia. The houses of two illustrious votaries of science, Volta and Spallanzani, were purposely spared from plunder—an example honorable to both parties.



est and alliance, so as to strengthen our hold in Italy and enable us to act with more vigor against the Austrians. But it was difficult to induce Victor Emmanuel to desert his ancient allies so abruptly, and we, therefore, were obliged to satisfy ourselves with removing him from the list of our opponents, leaving the rest to the action of time.

In less than one month I had turned the line of the Alps, gained three battles, detached Piedmont from the coalition, taken twelve thousand prisoners, opened a direct communication with France by Savoy, and obtained possession of a fortified base for future operations; but all this was only the introduction to still greater victories.

**POSITION OF BEAULIEU ON THE MINCIO.**—After the defeat of Lodi, Beaulieu did not venture to halt either behind the Oglio or the Chiesa. The strong line of the Mincio, however, flanked as it was on the left by the fortress of Mantua, and on the right by Lake Garda and the Tyrol mountains, seemed to him a sufficient barrier for his protection, and he there established his army, its left at Goito, its centre at Valleggio, and its right at Peschiera, a small place belonging to the Venetians. As the wings were supported by fortifications, it would not have been prudent to direct the attack upon them; I therefore resolved to force the centre at Valleggio, and, in order to induce the enemy to draw off his forces from this point, I at the same time made a demonstration upon Peschiera, threatening his line of communication with Austria by the Tyrol.

**PASSAGE OF THE MINCIO.**—On the thirtieth of May, I arrived at Borghetto with the main body of my forces. The enemy's advanced guard on the left of the Mincio was repulsed, and driven across the bridge of Borghetto, one arch of which they destroyed. I ordered its immediate repair, but, being exposed to the fire of the enemy, the work necessarily advanced slowly. The grenadiers became impatient and some fifty of them threw themselves into the Mincio, and, holding their fire-arms over their heads, began to wade with the water up to their shoulders. Fearing a repetition of the affair of Lodi, the enemy retreated towards the Tyrol, giving us an uninterrupted passage of the river. I followed him with the division of Serrurier on Villafranca, and Augereau directed his division by Castel Nuovo to turn Peschiera, while Masséna remained at the bridge of Borghetto. Beaulieu still endeavored to remain firm upon the heights between Villafranca and Valleggio; but, upon learning the movement of Augereau's division on Peschiera, he thought that I purposed cutting him off from the Tyrol, and in conse-



quence retired beyond the Adige, ascending the right bank of that river, by Dolce, as far as Caliano. A part of his left, ascending the Mincio, suddenly appeared at my head-quarters, where I had only a feeble guard. I had merely time to save myself by the gardens and to rejoin the troops of Masséna, who soon swept away the enemy, in turn very much astonished at the sudden appearance of our forces. The remainder of this wing detached at Goito entered into Mantua, whose garrison was now increased to more than thirteen thousand men.

**INVESTMENT OF MANTUA.**—However great my desire to pursue the fragments of Beaulieu's army, I did not deem it safe to do so, for I was not sufficiently strong to enter into the heart of the Austrian States, while our other armies still remained beyond the Rhine. I had run over, rather than conquered Italy, and the possession of Mantua alone could consolidate our establishment here.

**DIFFICULT POSITION ON THE ADIGE.**—Although nothing had thus far been able to arrest my victorious march and the expulsion of Beaulieu from Lombardy, nevertheless all might yet change; the enemy's forces seemed to increase in proportion as mine diminished. I had swept over this vast basin of the Po, which separates the Apennines from the Maritime and Tyrolese Alps, more rapidly even than I had hoped, and now my impetuous arrival on the Adige presented a crowd of new combinations. The petty princes of Italy, dazzled by the brilliancy of our achievements, had subscribed to armistices most flattering to us; but the King of Sardinia and the Dukes of Modena and Placentia had not, in laying down their arms, become our friends. The people of Lombardy were far from unanimous in our favor; the Court of Rome was stirring up rebellion in our rear; and Naples might second these operations by thrusting forward its army upon Ancona or Siena. Corsica was in possession of the English, who were stirring up discord on the continent; and, although Tuscany had signed a treaty with us at Paris in 1795, it was to be feared that the cabinet of St. James might throw ten thousand men into Leghorn to rally in our rear this imposing mass of enemies. I had only forty-five thousand combatants; Mantua had a garrison of over twelve thousand Austrians; Beaulieu and the Tyrolese had thirty thousand men in the valley of the Adige, and thirty thousand on the march from the Rhine upon Innspruck to form a junction with the others.

**SITUATION AND POLICY OF VENICE.**—To this picture, which is far from being overdrawn, it must be added that Venice alone could incline the balance against us. She had granted

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a military road to the Austrians from the Tyrol to Milan, and in pursuing our enemy we had encroached upon her territory; of this she had no right to complain; but in seizing and arming the arsenal of Peschiera and the fortress of Verona, and in making requisitions upon her provinces for the support of our army, and in propagating sentiments of independence, we had necessarily given offense to the Venetian government. This was no fault of mine; circumstances forced it upon me; I had no other means to support my army, and self-defense rendered necessary the occupation of the posts which I had seized.

If Venice had really wished to preserve her neutrality, she ought, as soon as Beaulieu had retired behind the Po, to have formed a cordon of twenty thousand men on the Mincio, abandoning the right bank to the operations of the belligerents, and declaring war upon the first who should trespass upon the remainder of her territory. Pesaro proposed this, and urged the Senate to form an armed neutrality. But this ancient queen of the Adriatic, and *entrepôt* of the East, that in the League of Cambray had singly braved all Europe, and in the wars of Charles VIII., Louis XII., and Francis I. had held the balance of power in Italy, for the last two centuries had been buried in a lethargic sleep. Its maritime power had been on the decline ever since the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, and its land power since the surrender of the Morea to the Turks by the peace of Passarowitz. The population of the Republic was three millions, and its revenues some thirty millions; its land forces consisted of seven regiments of infantry and six of cavalry, amounting to twelve thousand men; the people of the mainland were, like the Swiss, organized as militia; but, unlike the soldiers of Alviana, these miserable troops could be compared with no others than those of the Pope. The Republic trusted mainly for its security to foreign mercenaries whom its wealth enabled it to keep in pay. Its fleet consisted of fourteen ships-of-the-line, and six of the second class lying at Corfu and Venice; and from the superb arsenal and ship-yard of the latter place ten other vessels could have been immediately prepared and armed. But if, instead of this navy, which had been prepared against the Turks, Venice had now possessed a good army, events might have assumed a very different aspect. This proud oligarchy, which once thought to honor Henry IV. by inscribing his name upon the Golden Book of its nobles, was fallen into decay. It feared our democracy not less than our bayonets, and had equal dread of Austria, whose eagle was already enclosing it in his talons. It vainly hoped to save the vessel of state by allowing it to



drift at will, between two dangerous rocks—a course utterly absurd in such times of great peril.

Although this enemy was not very dangerous in itself, yet as an auxiliary to a strong Austrian army, and as a place of refuge for an English squadron, it was of much greater consideration, and I felt considerable anxiety respecting the part Venice would take. The Senate rejected the noble proposition of Pesaro, and, by resolutions characteristic of its unworthy spirit, appointed two proconsuls, Foscarini and Sanfermo, with full powers to govern the provinces on the mainland, and to maintain relations of friendship with the two belligerents. The disgraceful surrender of Verona, two days afterwards, proved the wisdom of the Senate in the choice of its agents!

**CRITICISMS ON NAPOLEON'S OPERATIONS.**—Some eloquent writers have blamed me for not having masked Mantua and pursued Beaulieu into the Tyrol. If I have ever merited blame, it is not for having been too circumspect. I have already mentioned the dangers we encountered on our arrival upon the Adige—viz.: eighty thousand Austrians and Tyrolese, including the garrison of Mantua and the corps approaching from the Rhine; the Pope and his influence; Naples, as yet undecided, but capable of bringing thirty thousand men to the attack; the English—Corsican division, threatening to debark in Tuscany; the King of Sardinia, dissatisfied with a peace precipitately signed; Venice, still discussing the question of peace and war; such were the obstacles I had to encounter, with a force of less than fifty thousand combatants. It is somewhat amusing that my critics, in spite of all this, would have me rush into the heart of the Austrian monarchy. Charles XII., with all his rashness, would never have attempted such foolhardiness. I adopted the only suitable course, that of imposing on our enemies, and confirming our doubtful allies, by assuming the attitude and language of a conqueror. This required much activity and decision of character, and no one ever exhibited these qualities in a higher degree than I did on that occasion.

**INVESTMENT OF MANTUA.**—I directed all my attention upon Mantua, convinced that its fall alone could render my army available, and enable me to assail Austria without danger from the south of Italy. Our siege artillery being still employed against the citadel of Milan, we merely made an investment of the place. To do this effectually, it was necessary to be master of the whole course of the Adige. The fortress of Verona was the key to the river, and the base of any system of operations upon this line. The Austrians had, either by permission or by



force, obtained possession of Crema and Peschiera, two places which, like Verona, belonged to the Venetians. As an offset to this, I summoned Verona, and the feeble Foscari, making use of his full powers, surrendered up the place on the first of June. This precious acquisition secured to us three fine bridges across the Adige; and the bastioned work, and two strong castles perched on the last heights of the Tyrol, hermetically closed the valley on the left of the river. While waiting for artillery necessary for the siege of Mantua, I closed the debouches from the fortress, so that eight thousand men could secure its investment; while Serrurier was charged with this operation, Augereau remained as a corps of observation on the lower Adige towards Legnago.

ARMISTICE WITH NAPLES.—Fortunately for us at this crisis, our political horizon began to clear up. Ferdinand IV., of Naples, wearied with a war which was bringing him large pecuniary losses without any real advantages, and induced by the example of the King of Sardinia, and the solicitations of the King of Spain, now asked to treat, and sent for this purpose Prince Belmonte-Pignatelli to my head-quarters. He arrived just after the defeat of Beaulieu, in the plains of the Mincio. I granted him an armistice, on condition that the Neapolitan contingent immediately withdrew from the Austrian army, and returned home. The details of the treaty were to be settled at Paris, between the Directory and the Neapolitan minister. These negotiations, for reasons of which I am ignorant, were protracted for more than six months. The peace was, nevertheless, very important to us, for our embarrassments would have been very great had this prince, whose states could furnish and support fifty thousand troops, continued to act against us. The geographical position of his kingdom enabled him to attack us with advantage; in the same country, and under less favorable circumstances, Hannibal had made war for ten years against the Roman Empire; but, fortunately for us, Naples now produces no Hannibals.

DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE POPE.—After the treaties of peace with the kings of Sardinia and Naples, our only enemy in Italy was the Pope. With Naples against us, I had opposed any attack being made upon Rome, but now a single column might be sent against Ancona with perfect safety. I therefore determined, during the blockade and siege of Mantua, to humble the majesty of the Tiara before that of the Republic. The division of Augereau passed the Po at Borgoforti, and marched upon Bologna, where I arrived on the 19th of June. With a population of only sixty thousand, this city contained

more learned men than any other city in Italy. Had the remainder of the peninsula possessed the same intelligence and energy of character as the citizens of Bologna, Italy would have become, ere this, a very respectable power. I promised its Senate the independence, territory, and consideration of which it had been stripped by the Pope. The whole city seemed intoxicated with joy. In fifteen days it organized a National Guard of three thousand men, who were often of great use to us. Ferrara, also, gave in its submission without the least opposition.

**ARMISTICE OF FOLIGNO.**—While these things were occurring at Bologna and Ferrara, a second column left Placentia, and entered Tuscany: The Court of Rome was in the utmost consternation at these demonstrations. It solicited an armistice, which was granted, the 24th of June, on condition that it yielded to us the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and received a garrison in the citadel of Ancona. This peace was of vital importance to France, but I made it in violation of the orders of the Directory, who never calculated either distance or obstacles, but expected, at the same moment, to revolutionize Rome, Naples, and Florence; and, with seven or eight battalions, to conquer all Italy. What it now directed me to undertake, with only fifty thousand men, itself attempted, three years after, with one hundred and twenty thousand men, and ended in the loss of all our Italian possessions. Having terminated the affair with the Pope, Augereau was directed to return to the Adige, after first having punished the inhabitants of Lugo and its environs, who, at the instigation of the priests, had taken arms against us, to the number of three or four thousand.

**TROUBLES IN THE IMPERIAL FIEFS.**—Troubles also occurred, at this time, in the Imperial Fiefs, and in the states of Genoa. Bandits organized between Alexandria, Novi, and the Bochetta, and, joined by Austrian prisoners who had effected their escape, attacked and massacred our soldiers. I directed Faypoult to demand satisfaction for these things, and to cause the Marquis of Girola, who was suspected of being the agent of this mischief, to be driven from Genoa. Arquata had now become the focus of the revolt, and Lannes was sent there, with a few battalions, to destroy the rebels and sack the place.

**OCCUPATION OF LEGHORN.**—The presence of our troops in Tuscany gave me an opportunity to execute the Directory's orders for the occupation of Leghorn. It was executed with so much rapidity and secrecy, that fifty loaded vessels were surprised in the port. And even had this prize escaped us, we



should still have made a rich capture in the goods of English merchants. As Tuscany had strictly preserved her neutrality, nothing but extreme necessity could justify so high-handed a measure. As this port, directly opposite Corsica, and occupied by ten thousand British troops, could readily become a *point d'appui* to the English, and enable them to stir up a revolt in our rear, and to cut off our communications, self-security required these severe and decided measures. I garrisoned Leghorn with my own troops; but I treated the Grand Duke with all the respect due to his noble character and to his rank as a prince of the House of Austria and heir of the good Leopold.\*

These expeditions much strengthened our influence in the interior of the country; and the fall of the castle of Milan, on the twenty-ninth of June, confirmed the wavering Lombards in our favor.

**SIEGE OF MANTUA.**—The capture of several fortified towns, in these expeditions, and the reduction of Milan, had furnished us with a sufficient park of artillery to undertake the siege of Mantua, and I therefore directed my entire attention to that object. The trenches were opened on the eighteenth of July. Serrurier's division, ten thousand strong, was charged with the works of the siege. The remainder of the army constituted the corps of observation between the Adige and Lake Garda. Augereau, with eight thousand men, formed the right at Legnago; Masséna, with fifteen thousand, constituted the centre at Rivoli and Verona; General Sauret, with four thousand, formed the left at Salò; while the reserve, of six thousand, was posted between the right and centre. These dispositions enabled me, by interior concentric movements, to bring the whole of my troops to bear upon either side of the Mincio, according as the enemy should develop his forces. His numbers had been too much increased to expect him to longer remain inactive.

**EFFORTS OF AUSTRIA TO SAVE MANTUA.**—The Cabinet of Vienna, justly alarmed at my progress, resolved to put a stop to it, by sending against me a new army and a new general. Marshal Wurmser left Manheim with twenty thousand men of the *élite*, and superseded Beaulieu. The Austrian combined

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\*The view taken of this affair by Alison is entirely erroneous. The neutral power, being unable to protect itself from the operations of the English at Leghorn, Napoleon was perfectly justifiable in the course he pursued. Such is the law of war. The Grand Duke took no offense at the occupation of the French. His minister, Moutfredini, acknowledged that the English had been more masters of the port than the Grand Duke himself.



army, assembled at Trent the last of July, amounted to sixty thousand combatants. This superiority of numbers seemed to insure victory, and my adversaries began to triumph at my approaching overthrow. Their calculations seemed well formed, but the result proved that they had left out the relative value of the two commanders-in-chief—an important item in the estimate.

APPROACH OF WURMSER FROM THE RHINE.—Wurmser debouched from the Tyrol the last of July. Quasdanowich carried twenty-five thousand by the right of Lake Garda on Salò and Brescia; while the marshal, with the remaining thirty-three thousand, descended the Adige in three columns. I learned at the same time, that Sauret had been thrown back upon Desenzano, and Masséna expelled from Rivoli. This information, discouraging as it might seem to one less familiar with the science of war, gave me the strongest hopes of success. The enemy, by dividing his forces, gave me an opportunity to penetrate between the two parts of his army, and beat them separately. But the success of this depended upon the utmost promptness; the slightest hesitation on my part would have given Wurmser an opportunity to unite with Quasdanowich on the Mincio. I left everything in order to prevent this reunion. I raised the siege of Mantua, leaving one hundred and forty cannon in the trenches; and I soon had to rejoice that I had taken this measure in spite of the prejudices which existed against it. A general of artillery might make it as much a point of honor to preserve his battery as his flag; but the point of honor for a general-in-chief is success. A council of war was assembled to discuss this measure. In all armies there are some generals intelligent, but timid; others brave, but uneducated; the truly valuable are those who unite these two qualities. In this council there was the usual difference of opinion; Kilmaine and the more discreet advised against the project; but, Augereau, animated by a noble ardor which he never after exhibited, declared that he would not rest till he had given battle with at least his own division. Encouraged by this, I determined to risk everything for success, and accordingly gave orders to attack the Austrian column, which had just taken Brescia. The divisions of Masséna and Augereau, with a reserve, on the evening of the thirtieth, united between Peschiera and Goito. One half of the division of Serrurier on the left of the Mincio rejoined Augereau, and the other half passed the Oglio at Marcaria.

BATTLES OF LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE.—The next day I passed the Mincio to attack Quasdanowich. The enemy was repulsed from Lonato, Brescia, and Salò. I established my

army on the Chiesa, and Quasdanowich fell back upon Gavardo. The faults of the Austrians could have been repaired by Wurmser, on the thirty-first of July, after the taking of the Montebaldo, had he passed the Mincio under Peschiera to reach Lonato. He then would have effected a junction with Quasdanowich, and have forced me to regain, in all haste, the Ticino or Placentia; after this, he could easily have made a victorious entry into Mantua. But the Austrians never knew the value of time. They devised wise projects, and then failed by wrong calculations of time and distance. Wurmser, instead of joining Quasdanowich, went first to make a triumphal procession at Mantua, and crossed the Mincio at Goito, as late as the evening of the second of August, on his way to Castiglione. This gave me full time to defeat his lieutenant, and drive him from Ponte San Marco, Lonato, and Brescia.

But I could not cut him up very much, on account of the mountains of Gavardo, which favored his retreat. I hoped to take my revenge on Wurmser himself. The third of August, Augereau carried his division and the reserve on Castiglione; Masséna directed his division on Lonato, and at the same time, to induce Quasdanowich to continue his retreat, I ordered General Gueux to defile on Salò and threaten his communications with the Tyrol. The operations of this day were somewhat singular, but, on the whole, favorable to us. I had thought to direct my attack upon Wurmser, but, on the contrary, it fell upon the left of Quasdanowich, who was trying to renew his junction by Lonato. For this purpose he had resumed the offensive, and, as usual, in several columns. That of the Prince of Reuss had to descend by Salò; Ocskay marched from Gavardo direct upon Lonato; Ott on Desenzano. General Ocskay attacked the advanced guard of Masséna and caused him some loss. My arrival with the main portion of the division restored the equilibrium. We carried Lonato, and lively pursued the retreating enemy. Happily for them, the Prince of Reuss, who had reached Salò before Gueux, finding no one there, fell back upon the road taken by Ocskay, and assisted in rallying his men. But this fortuitous accident worked wonderfully in our favor the next day. Quasdanowich resumed his first position at Gavardo with all his columns, except some detachments which had lost their way, and remained in the mountains near Lonato. The same day Augereau attacked and defeated the advanced guard of Wurmser, at Castiglione.

QUASDANOWICH SURPRISED AT GAVARDO.—I had yet gained only a partial success, but this had strengthened my central position and afforded means to renew my operations. I reserved my strongest efforts for Wurmser, who was advancing



by Gurdizzolo on Castiglione. But, as his march was slow, and as I had still to wait for Serrurier from Marcaria, I resolved to employ the day of the fourth in more completely routing Quasdanowich. General Despinoy, reinforced at Brescia with three thousand men from the army of the Alps, received orders to advance by Sant-Ozetto on Gavardo. St. Hilaire was detached from Masséna to assist Gueux, who was to remove from Salo on Gavardo. The effect of these attacks surpassed my most sanguine hopes; the Austrians, hearing that the Prince of Reuss had found no one at Salo the night before, thought themselves secure on this side, and directed all their attention upon the road to Lonato. Favored by this circumstance and by the nature of the ground, Gueux and St. Hilaire got in the rear of the enemy without being perceived. Assailed thus unexpectedly in reverse, the Austrians retreated by the road of the Val-Sabbia upon Riva. This movement relieved me for the time from all attacks of this corps.

**ATTACK UPON NAPOLEON'S HEAD-QUARTERS.**—But if fortune had greatly favored my operations at this important juncture, it had also exposed me to great personal danger at my head-quarters. I had remained at Lonato, with only one thousand two hundred men, after the departure of the division of Masséna. Suddenly the city was surrounded by a corps of the enemy, who summoned me to surrender. Fortunately, I preserved my presence of mind, and determined to substitute audacity for strength. I made so many threats to the enemy's general that he immediately laid down his arms and surrendered with his two thousand men and four cannon. This was the advanced guard of Quasdanowich, which, in making a reconnoissance for forming a junction with Wurmser, had crossed the columns of St. Hilaire and Sauret. This occurred at the very instant that my troops surprised the enemy at Gavardo; but the results were different in the two cases: the first was the capture of the attacking force without loss; the other the retreat of twelve or fifteen thousand Austrians from a most important position.

**SECOND BATTLE OF CASTIGLIONE.**—The first success of these operations was to be decided on the fifth of August. Wurmser, still wedded to the system of detachments, had sent one in the direction of the lower Po and left another to blockade Peschiera. With the remaining twenty-five thousand men he took post between Solferino and Medolano. The divisions of Masséna and Angereau, and the reserve which I had united at Castiglione, together formed a force equal to that of the enemy. The arrival of the division of Serrurier inclined the balance in our



favor. In order to give time for this last division to debouch by Gurdizzolo on the enemy's rear, and reach the field of battle, I at first merely sought to preserve my line without giving any decided character to the affair. As soon as the troops of Serrurier came in sight near Cavriana, I seriously engaged my right and center. His left being outflanked and on the point of being driven back upon Lake Garda, Wurmser deemed it best to order a prompt retreat, and to repass the Mincio, leaving in my hands twenty pieces of artillery.\*

**SECOND PASSAGE OF THE MINCIO.**—A junction with Quasdarowich was the only thing Wurmser wanted to establish himself firmly on the Mincio and to maintain his communications with Mantua. In order to prevent these results I resolved to attack the enemy again the next day, notwithstanding the barrier which separated us. While the main body of my army checked the Austrians on the Mincio towards Valeggio, Masséna crossed this river at Peschiera, and fell upon the enemy's right wing opposite this place.

**WURMSER'S RETREAT INTO THE TYROL.**—The entrenchments which the enemy had just commenced were soon carried and his troops put to flight. Wurmser, seeing his right wing forced and his communications with the Tyrol threatened, abandoned the Mincio and retreated up the Adige as far as Alla. He left in Mantua a garrison of fifteen thousand fresh troops. We pursued him to the Tyrol, and by the twelfth of August regained possession of all the posts on Lake Garda, which we had lost by the offensive movement of Wurmser. The division of Serrurier resumed the operations of Mantua, but, having lost all our siege artillery, we could only maintain the blockade. Wurmser had now resumed his position in the Tyrol with a loss of ten or twelve thousand men and fifty cannon. The theatre of his defeat was the same as that where Prince Eugene had so well succeeded over Vendôme in the celebrated campaign of 1705. If the operations in the two cases be compared, it will be found that I maneuvered much more skillfully than the general of Louis XIV. Although he had Mantua on his side, while it was against me, he operated so unskillfully as to lose his footing on the Adige and the Mincio, and to allow Prince Eugene to turn

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\*It has been said that during these extraordinary six days Napoleon never once took off his boots, nor lay down upon a bed. He was almost constantly on horseback; and Thiers says that he killed five horses with fatigue. He would not intrust any one with the execution of his orders, he was determined to see everything, to verify everything, to animate all by his presence.

his left by transporting his infantry in boats across Lake Garda on Gavardo; this movement required not less than six days, and in half that time I should have destroyed an army attempting such an enterprise in my presence.

**CLOSE ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN.**—France now began to gather the fruits of these victories. The government of Spain was not satisfied with a mere treaty of peace with us. Seeing the danger to which Spain would be exposed if England should triumph upon the seas, they desired to preserve our colonial and maritime power as a safeguard for other nations. Should we fall, it was evident that Spain could no longer support her colonies or maritime influence, but would become, like Portugal, a mere tributary to proud Albion. Animated by these wise and politic sentiments, the Cabinet of Madrid was willing to forget the natural sentiments caused by the Revolution, and form with France a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. A treaty containing nearly all the clauses of the celebrated family compact was signed at San-Ildefonso on the nineteenth of August, 1796. This event contributed to our advantage in many respects, particularly in its influence upon the conduct of the Sardinian and Neapolitan governments.

**WURMSER RENEWS THE OFFENSIVE UPON THE BRENTA.**—No sooner had the Austrians entered the Tyrol than they received reinforcements sufficient to again outnumber us. Under these circumstances it was not to be expected that they would suffer us to quietly continue the siege of Mantua. Wurmser had received positive orders to relieve that place, and he now thought to accomplish this object by simple maneuvers. Davidovich was to cover the Tyrol with twenty thousand men scattered from the environs of Feldkirch to Roveredo, while Wurmser himself, with the remaining twenty-six thousand, should descend the valley of the Brenta to debouch on Porto Legnago and the rear of my army.

**FAULTS OF THE PLAN.**—The Austrian general, supposing my views as narrow as his own, judged that the only course I could pursue would be to fall back behind the Mincio, and that he would in this way liberate Mantua, by the single effect of his combinations. But I was not a man to be intimidated by vain demonstrations; and I could have outgeneraled him, even if his unfortunate blunders had not immediately placed him in my power. My good fortune rendered no great efforts on my part necessary. Having received a reinforcement of six thousand men, at the moment the enemy began his false maneuver by the



left, I resolved to penetrate into the heart of the Tyrol, and effect a junction with the army of the Rhine, conformably to the proposition I had made to the Directory, after the peace with Piedmont.

**THE ARMIES IN GERMANY.**—Emboldened by my victories, and the success of the armies of the Rhine and of Sambret-Meuse, at the opening of the campaign, the Directory had renewed the plan of 1703, in which Louis XIV. and the Elector of Bavaria had failed. This of the Directory was still more difficult than that of Louis XIV., for then Bavaria was closely allied with France, and the French army, not, as now, foolishly scattered from the Danube to Bamberg, was seconded by the valiant Charles Theodore and his brave troops, and opposed only by Prince Eugene of Savoy and Marlborough, the German armies acting merely as auxiliaries; the operations of Louis XIV. were, therefore, more excusable than those proposed in 1796.

In order to execute this plan of the Directory, Jourdan advances from Düsseldorf and Neuwied, on the Lahn, so as to draw the enemy on the lower Rhine; he gains two victories at Altenkirchen. The Archduke hastens to meet him, and forces Jourdan to fall back, at the moment when my victories induce the Cabinet of Vienna to withdraw Wurmser from the upper Rhine, and to send him into Italy. Moreau, being now opposed only by the corps of Starray, passes the Rhine at Kehl, on the twenty-fourth of June, and on the twenty-eighth beats the Austrian general at Renchen. The Archduke returns in all haste from the lower Rhine, gives battle on the sixth of July at Ettlingen, is turned by the left, and forced to continue his retreat to the Danube; he again attacks Moreau at Neresheim, but, his line being too much extended, he is defeated, and crosses the Danube, at Donawert, on the thirteenth of August. During this interval, Jourdan, favored by the success of Moreau and the departure of the Archduke, has again advanced upon Frankfort, and, leaving General Moreau to observe Mayence, with twenty-five thousand men, has continued his march up the Main by Schweinfurth and Bamberg. This direction was too eccentric, and it soon became necessary for him to fall back by Nuremberg, towards Amberg, in hopes of forming a junction with the army of the Rhine. This last army, after the battle of Neresheim, advanced on Ulm and Munich. It now had to extend its left, to form a junction with Jourdan, and to throw, by its right, a strong detachment on Innspruck. To require a single army to pursue two objects, so far separated, was the height of absurdity; for, after these two eccentric detachments, Moreau had hardly a skeleton of an army. If Jourdan



had fallen back from Aschaffenburg upon Donawert, and Moreau had carried his forces, *en masse*, upon the Lech, between Augsburg and the mountains, we might have swept the Tyrol in concert, and all three have united on the Inn. But there was no concert of action; the Archduke Charles fell upon the isolated army of Jourdan, and defeated it, on the twenty-third of August, at Amberg, and, on the second of September, at Wurtzburg; and Moreau, whose right was already near Bregentz and Leutkirch, compromised by the retreat of the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse, instead of penetrating the Tyrol, was compelled to seek safety in retreat.

#### COMBATS OF MORI, ROVEREDO, AND CALIANO.—

I was still ignorant of Jourdan's defeat, and Wurmser's movement on Bassano, when I advanced against him in the valley of the Adige. I directed on Roveredo the divisions of Augereau and Masséna, which were now posted at Verona and Rivoli; these were to be joined on their march by the division of Vaubois, debouching from Salò by the west shore of Lake Garda. These forces could hardly fail to defeat the single corps of Davidowich, which was guarding the Tyrol, and scattered in many detachments. On the fourth of September Wukassowich, who commanded his advanced guard, was driven from Mori by the maneuvers of Vaubois and Masséna, and compelled to fall back, first upon Roveredo, and afterwards upon Caliano, where he united with the main body of the corps. Davidowich himself, assailed by superior numbers at Caliano, was forced by my brave soldiers to yield this formidable pass. Seeing that nothing could withstand our impetuous attacks, the enemy sought safety in flight, leaving in our hands twenty-five cannon and two thousand prisoners. Davidowich having rallied his forces behind the Lavis, as it was important to remove the enemy from the vicinity of Trent, I ordered him to be attacked by Vaubois. The Austrians attempted in vain to defend the passage of the Lavis, and were driven upon Salurn and Neumark.

**MARCH FROM TRENT BY THE GORGES OF THE BRENTA.**—I now learned, for the first time, of the movement of Wurmser, on the Brenta. So far from being intimidated by this, I derived the strongest hope of a decisive victory. *An army, separated into two parts, whose centre I cut, overthrow its right, and turn its isolated left!!! What better could I desire?*

The occupation of Trent was so much the more important as it opened to us the head of the valley of the Brenta, and exposed

the rear of Wurmser. I took care not to let so fine an opportunity escape me. Instead of attempting to form a junction at Innspruck with the right of Moreau (from whom I had received no intelligence), I determined to profit by the enemy's false movement, and prevent his destroying the remainder of our troops before Mantua. On the sixth, I directed Masséna and Augereau by Levico, in the valley of the Brenta, in order to mask this movement and check Davidowich; Vaubois remained on the Lavis. On the morning of the seventh the advanced guard of Augereau encountered at Primolan a detachment of three battalions of the enemy, closing the passages of the gorges of the Brenta. After a pretty close contest, this detachment, driven from Primolan and Fort Covolo, and outstripped by a regiment of dragoons which closed the defile, was surrounded and forced to surrender. We advanced as far as Cismona.

**AFFAIR OF BASSANO.**—Wurmser had already reached Bassano; but seeing that, instead of trembling for my own communications, I had marched to cut off his, he was at a loss whether to advance or recede. Of all parts he chose the worst possible—that of waiting the event at Bassano. His army was established on the heights in front of the city, with the advanced guard at Solagna and Campo-Lungo. At seven o'clock on the morning of the eighth, we attacked this advanced guard, and drove it back in disorder on Bassano, and carried the town by force. The enemy knew not which way to turn; Wurmser, with the left of his *corps-de-bataille*, retired on Fonteniva, where he passed the Brenta, and marched upon Vicenza. Quasdanowich, with the right, being unable to reach the Brenta, directed his course toward Friouli. In this affair we captured two thousand prisoners, thirty cannon, and an immense train.

**WURMSER MARCHES UPON MANTUA.**—Wurmser now had remaining only fourteen thousand men, entirely disorganized, and scattered through a country whose communications were all in our hands; under such circumstances, I hoped to compel him to surrender; I therefore maneuvered to close all the outlets. Augereau marched on Padua; Masséna on Vicenza; and General Sahuguet, who commanded the division of Serrurier, received orders to take advantage by the difficult topography of the country between Legnago and Mantua, to prevent Wurmser from approaching that place. My measures seemed well taken; but a fault of Sahuguet prevented me from obtaining complete success. Wurmser had gone from Vicenza to Legnago; not imagining that my troops, after the great fatigue they had endured,



could possibly make other forced marches, he thought it safe to allow his troops to repose at Legnago during the day of the tenth. This delay ought to have been fatal to him; Masséna had passed the Adige at Ronco, on the evening of the tenth, after encountering the greatest difficulties for want of a suitable equipage.\* He succeeded at last in putting himself in a position where he could cut off the Austrians from the road to Nogara. This advanced guard set off on the morning of the eleventh; but, deceived by a guide, instead of going directly to Sanguinetto, where it could have easily anticipated the enemy's column, it was conducted to Cerea. It there encountered the advanced guard of Wurmser, who had begun his march on the morning of the eleventh, after having first left a garrison of seventeen hundred men at Legnago. The Austrians being the most numerous, our troops were repelled with loss, and Wurmser succeeded in marching his column without further obstacle on Nogara. I was somewhat vexed at this check, but still was satisfied that Wurmser could not escape; I knew that Sahuguet was at Castellaro, with the most positive orders to destroy the bridges of the Molinella, and by this means arrest the progress of the enemy. Unfortunately, he forgot the bridge of Villa-Impenta; Wurmser took advantage of this last means of escape from the certain ruin I had prepared for him, and shut himself up in Mantua. I never pardoned Sahuguet for so gross a fault, which deprived me of all the fruits of the victory of Bassano. The garrison of Legnago, blockaded on the left bank of the Adige by the division of Augereau, and on the right by a brigade of Masséna, capitulated on the twelfth.

**AFFAIRS AT SAN-GEORGIO.**—Wurmser had flattered himself that he would raise the siege of Mantua at the head of twenty-six thousand men; he was now driven with twelve thousand vanquished troops to seek refuge there, and he himself to submit to a siege. At first he encamped his troops between San-Georgio and the citadel. This position would enable them to act offensively against our besieging army, and to make sorties for provisions. I therefore determined to force them to enter within the walls of the town, from which they could not easily, on account of the topography of the environs, debouch against us. The main body of my forces was therefore directed on Mantua. Some partial advantages gained over Sahuguet and Masséna on the thirteenth and fourteenth inspired them with a fatal

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\*This is the second important operation of Napoleon that failed for want of good bridge-equipage. Placentia was the first.



security. A general sortie being made by all the garrison on the fifteenth, I attacked them with all my forces: on the right Sahuquet was posted at La Favorite; on the left, the division of Augereau marched from Governolo by Castellaro, on San-Georgio; on the centre, Masséna took a covered position near Due-Castelli. Wurmser, seeing himself assailed on the two wings, supported them with strong detachments from the centre; seeing this part weakened, I suddenly threw forward the division of Masséna, which, meeting no serious resistance, penetrated as far as San-Georgio, and carried that place at the point of the bayonet. This cut off the retreat of the Austrian right, which now sought safety by penetrating in the direction of the citadel. Wurmser, having lost two or three thousand men, shut himself up within the walls of the place.

**POSITION OF THE ARMY ABOUT MANTUA.**—Entrusting the blockade of Mantua to General Kilmaine,\* who had under his orders the old division of Serrurier, eight thousand strong, I placed the rest of my army in observation before the Tyrol; it would have been useless and imprudent for me to penetrate into this region after Jourdan had fallen back under the cannon of Düsseldorf, and Moreau under those of Kehl; this useless invasion would have allowed Wurmser to escape. I then stationed Masséna, with ten thousand men, at Bassano; Augereau, with nine thousand, at Verona; while Vaubois, with ten thousand, remained on the Lavis. Add to these my reserve of cavalry, and it will be seen that my available force did not exceed forty thousand combatants.

The presence of a small army in Mantua ought to augment the trophies we hoped to gain from this conquest; but the reverses which our arms had encountered on the Rhine gave us good grounds to fear that the Austrians might reinforce their

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\*Kilmaine (Charles Jennings) was born in Dublin, of a noble family. He emigrated to France with his father, when very young, and entered the army at the age of fifteen. He was exceedingly fond of military studies, and early distinguished himself for his knowledge of the military art. He came to America with M. de Baron as lieutenant, and served in our Revolutionary War. He saw much service in the earlier wars of the French Revolution, and received rapid promotion. He greatly distinguished himself in the campaign of 1796. He died in 1799. Napoleon thus describes his character: "He was an excellent cavalry officer, possessing coolness and *coup-d'œil*, and was well suited to command on parties of observation, and all such delicate commissions as required discernment, sagacity, and presence of mind. In the campaign of Italy he rendered important services to the army, of which, but for his ill-health, he would have been one of the principal generals."

army in the Tyrol and the Friouli, and renew their efforts to deliver it. In that case, the presence of Wurmser with twenty thousand men in our rear might become an object of much solicitude. As a climax to our ill-luck, my army encountered the autumnal fevers of the marshes about Mantua; and the southern horizon of Italy began to be overcast.

**NEW REPUBLICS FORMED.**—Convinced, however, that Austria would not immediately trouble me, I gave all the month of October to the interior organization of Italy. The threatening invasion of Wurmser had again revived the hopes of Rome, and they no longer troubled themselves with executing the conditions of the armistice of Bologna. To disembarass ourselves of this power, it was necessary in turn to negotiate and threaten. Ercole III., Duke of Modena, had fled to Venice with his treasures. This last descendant of the house of Este\* belied his name in every respect. He was a man of breeding and taste, but a sordid avarice obscured all his faculties. The Archduke Ferdinand was his heir, and this of itself was enough to make him our enemy. The regency instituted in his absence was hostile to us, and I, therefore, determined to destroy it; the people of Reggio were on our side, and required no stimulus to revolt. We occupied without obstacle the fortified place of Modena, and our troops effected a revolution there.

I felt the necessity of creating a new state in Italy; but my plans for the regeneration of that country were not yet matured. Nothing is more difficult than to unite ten states of separate interests into one. The simple question of choosing the capital would excite local feelings and interests. For the time, it would have been sufficient for my purpose to revive the Lombard power, in order to oppose an antique Italian glory to the House of Austria. But to speak of a kingdom, or even a duchy, to the Rewels and Barras, had been to compromise me without any advantage; these gentlemen wished to republicanize everything.

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\*This was one of the most illustrious families of Italy, and traced its origin to those petty princes who governed Tuscany in the time of the Carolingians (tenth century). In the contests of Guelfs and Ghibellines the Marquises of Este became leaders of the Guelf party, and acquired the territories of Ferrara and Modena. The house was afterwards celebrated for its magnificent patronage of distinguished men, and several of its dukes acquired the reputation of statesmen and warriors. Alfonso I. and his wife, Lucretia Borgia, both occupy a prominent position in the history of the sixteenth century. Ercole III., the last Duke of Modena, Reggio, and Mirandola, married his only daughter, Maria Beatrice, to the Archduke Ferdinand. The House of Este was definitely deprived of its sovereignty by the treaty of Campo-Formio, October 17th, 1797.



I therefore laid the basis of several provisional republics,—the Cisalpine, the Cispadane, and Transpadane. They were democracies, for it would then have been imprudent to speak to my soldiers about founding aristocracies; but I succeeded in preserving something of *préséance* to the nobility and clergy, in order to conciliate these classes. Bologna and Ferrara formed a Transpadane Republic, Modena and Reggio united formed the Cispadane. It was best to give them this organization for the present, because it suited the contracted notions of the plebeians of these cities, and facilitated the arrangements necessary to secure peace. Milan gradually adopted the idea of a general regeneration in Italy. The fear of being given up to Austria on a treaty of peace cooled the Lombards, and, in fact, I did not wish to compromise too seriously the people of these provinces; it was enough to sow the seed, in order to gather the fruit after the war. It was sufficient for me that Lombardy should organize some paid legions, which, with the National Guards of the republics of the Po, would preserve order in the interior, and render available a part of the garrisons which I had left there.

**POLITICAL STATE OF THE REST OF ITALY.**—These measures were the more prudent as the affairs of the remainder of Italy presented an aspect not very encouraging. The negotiations with Naples were still under discussion, and the policy of Piedmont uncertain. Victor Amadeus might remember the influence which his ancestor had acquired, by declaring, in 1705, against Louis XIV., when his armies were on the Adige against those of Prince Eugene. The same motives now existed, and, the circumstances being the same, he might hope to obtain like results. The environs of Genoa were far from quiet, and the Senate, beset, it is said, by the solicitations of Faypoult, had some hand in the troubles of the Imperial Fiefs. The Pope, recovered from his terror, no longer thought of peace. Venice, by declaring against the new republics, could give a dangerous turn to the war. Fearing to arouse the Lion of St. Mark, I sought, in concert with the Directory, by propositions skillfully offered, to attach to us the old republic, whose slightest effort, in the critical situation of affairs, was capable of inclining the balance on the side of our enemies. Who knew but the present Doge, in imitation of the Morosini, Dandolo, and Alvianis, might put himself at the head of twenty thousand men and assist the Imperialists in expelling from Italy that handful of men who had just excited so many conflicting interests? Would not such an act have decided the fate of Mantua, encouraged the King of Naples, and also the King of Sardinia, whose country, covered



with a triple line of posts, was ill-disposed towards us? To determine the vacillating Senate to throw itself boldly into the arms of France, by painting to it in turn the dangers to which it was exposed on the one side by propagandism and on the other by the ambition of Austria; and, in case of refusal, to quiet it with promises and to prolong its lethargy by protestations of friendship, till it could be overthrown by a popular revolution; such were the means to which I resorted in order to accomplish my objects. But the result did not answer to my first hopes. In vain did the Minister Lallement exhaust all the arguments of diplomacy; neither the proposition of a quadruple alliance with the Porte, Spain, and Naples, nor the fear of the encroachments of its redoubtable neighbors, nor the dependence of Austria and England, could break the impassable policy of a body already struck with paralysis in all its parts. Trusting in its own weakness, it required all the entreaties of such men as Pesaro to induce the Senate to order a levy of Slavonic soldiers, and the armament of a flotilla for the defense of its lagoons; measures of interior security of which no foreign power had a right to complain, but which in the present state of affairs caused us much anxiety. The coincidence of these armaments with the refusal of the Pope to sign the treaty of peace, and the arrival at Rome of the Marquis del Vasto, charged by the King of Naples to form an offensive and defensive alliance between the two states, caused me to think that I should soon have to contend with an Italian league, unless the Directory hastened its negotiations with Naples. I urged it to make peace with that power at any price, as it was the only means of forcing the rest of the Peninsula to terms.

DISCUSSIONS WITH ROME.—Pius VI continually protested his love of peace, but he partook too much of the hatred which the cardinals and secretary of state had vowed against our democratic principles, to willingly close the negotiations with the severe conditions which I had imposed upon him; he prolonged them, in hopes of finding, sooner or later, an occasion for breaking them off with *éclat*. The first success of Wurmser, and the momentary raising of the blockade of Mantua, revived the hopes of the pontifical government; it confided in these temporary successes so much as to charge the prelate Iagreca to endeavor to retake Ferrara, and succeed, under different pretexts, in eluding the articles of the armistice. It had been specified that no ecclesiastic should be sent to treat definitively of peace; but, in violation of this clause, the prelates Petrarchi and Vangelisti had been sent to Paris. Such a want of faith on the part of

Rome was calculated to destroy all confidence, and the French government, refusing to recognize these two agents, ordered them to quit Paris in twenty-four hours. The nuncios and legates of Ancona and Romana conducted themselves as declared enemies of the French army. Finally, the Holy See was negotiating a close alliance with the Cabinet of Vienna and asking of its officers for the papal troops. Informed of these malevolent dispositions, I was preparing to put an end to them, when the operations of the imperial armies forced me to dissemble my resentment and to turn my whole attention to the Adige. The Pope, after the dismissal of his agents, sought to renew negotiations at Florence. The prelate Galleppi, the Dominican Soldati, and the Chevalier d'Azzara, the Spanish ambassador who had just been mediator in the ill-observed armistice, presented themselves to the commissioners Salicetti and Garreau, but it was impossible to come to an understanding. These last required the Pope to withdraw and declare null the bulls published against France since the Revolution; that he should close his ports to the English, and make reparation for the murder of Basseville.\* Carrying their inflexibility to the last degree, they presented to his plenipotentiaries a treaty in sixty-four articles, declaring that it must be adopted or rejected as it was, as they were not authorized to enter into any discussion. This method of treating, wholly unprecedented even in the revolutionary diplomacy of 1793, produced an injurious effect. Galleppi returned to Rome. So powerfully had the success of the Austrians operated upon all minds that the pontifical government, thinking the deliverance of Italy near at hand, not only rejected the propositions submitted to it, but suddenly passed to hostile preparations; the armistice was disregarded; the money sent to pay the contributions was recalled, and new amounts raised in all the states of the Church. The novenas, prayers, processions, bulls—in a word, all that could influence the hatred of an ignorant and superstitious multitude was put in operation in order to increase the recruits of the papal army. But these means, so powerful in the fifteenth century, had now lost their magic; the mass of the people limited themselves to the offer of vows and prayers for the success of so just a war! Some of the princes, through fear of losing their privileges, were

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\*In 1793 a popular commotion was caused in Rome by the display which some young French artists made of the tri-colored flag; the carriage of Basseville, the French envoy, was attacked in the street, his house was broken into, by the mob, and he himself, unarmed and unresisting, was cruelly assassinated. He was thrust through the abdomen with a bayonet, and dragged through the street, holding his bowels in his hands.



compelled to join in the preparations. The Constable Colonna raised a regiment of infantry, the Prince Gustiniani offered one of cavalry. But these were not sufficient to form an army; indeed, they could hardly raise eight thousand men; but they flattered themselves that Naples would raise thirty thousand.

In the meantime Chevalier d'Azzara, interposing the mediation of Spain, succeeded in retarding the explosion, and, in these trying circumstances, rendered us eminent services. The French envoy, Cacault, on his side, contributed, by his impassable countenance, to avoid an open rupture, which at this epoch might have had for us the most fatal results.

**DEFINITIVE PEACE WITH NAPLES.**—These troubles were at last happily dissipated by the definitive treaty signed at Paris, the tenth of October, between the French Republic and the Court of the Two Sicilies. The conditions were very mild, compared with those imposed upon the Pope and Piedmont. This moderation was due, without doubt, to the great distance of the kingdom of Naples, the difficulty of carrying on war against it, and to the urgency of getting rid of an enemy whose army alone exceeded my own. If we had continued hostilities, the Neapolitans could have sustained Rome, and, in concert with the English division of Corsica, advanced upon the Po with forty thousand men, rendering the conquest of Italy still doubtful. But, after the treaty, they would no longer trouble themselves about Lombardy; Rome would be left to its own troops; the English would not alone attempt anything in Tuscany, and nothing would interfere in the ulterior military operations against Austria. The Directory, yielding at last to my solicitations, supported by Carnot, abated its pretensions, in order to facilitate the treaty. The Court of Naples merely engaged to remain neutral, to ferret out the authors of the crime of 1793, to promise to France a reciprocal treaty of commerce, to recognize the Batavian republic, and to renew with it ancient relations.

**AFFAIRS OF PIEDMONT.**—If the definitive peace concluded with Ferdinand, on the tenth of October, rid us of a troublesome neighbor, the death of the King of Sardinia, about the middle of the same month, seemed likely to produce a vexatious change in the policy of the Court of Turin. The new king, Charles Emmanuel, had declared for peace, and had favorably received the propositions of alliance made by Poussielgue, but he had put in a condition that they should cede to him Lombardy, and the Directory had obstinately refused every arrangement of this nature. It was therefore to be feared that this prince, desirous of signalling his accession to the throne, would seek to restore the



lustre of his power by acquisitions equal to the provinces lost by his predecessors, in this war. The refusal of France, leaving him no hope of obtaining indemnities in that quarter, he would naturally join the coalition as soon as there was any hope of his recovering his lost provinces. This resolution seemed so much the more probable, as the lesser powers usually range themselves on the strongest side, especially where fear is united with the manifest interest of the state. This uncertainty of our relations with Piedmont made me strongly sensible of the necessity of making sure of Genoa. If Piedmont should change her policy, we would then have neither a base of operations nor a line of retreat; the possession of Genoa would procure both. I was not now in a situation to obtain this by force, and, moreover, we had no motives for hostile measures with that power.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENOA.—The first success of our arms had closed the port of Genoa against English vessels, in reprisal for hostilities committed by them, in 1793, against French ships. The Senate refused, for a long time, to recognize the Count de Girola, the envoy of the Emperor, under the pretext that he had excited insurrection in the Imperial Fiefs. The Genoese people were well-disposed towards France, on account of the intimate commercial relations between the two countries, and the Senate had given such proofs of its moderation as ought to have satisfied us; but this was not sufficient for my safety, or the ambition of the Directory; we wished Liguria to make decidedly common cause with France. The presence of the English minister, Drake, the reports he circulated respecting the designs of the English upon the rear of our army, the seizure of the frigate *La Modeste*, and other offenses, of which Genoa was not guilty, seemed plausible grounds of complaint. Thinking it best to assume an imperious tone, I dispatched, at the moment when embarrassments of all kinds were troubling me on the Adige, an *aide-de-camp* to the Doge, with a list of grievances, for which I asked reparation; threatening, in case of refusal, to march on Genoa. But the moment was not propitious. Faypoult demonstrated that an untimely explosion might spoil all; besides, the news that the Directory were treating at Paris, with the republic, turned aside the blow; and, waiting for a proper time for the execution of my designs, I exacted new sums of money. On the ninth of October a treaty, stipulating the payment of four millions, the shutting of the port to the English, free passage to our troops and convoys destined for the armies of Italy, transformed Genoa into a French place-of-arms.

TROUBLES IN THE FIEFS.—The peasants of the Imperial

Fiefs, instigated, as some say, by the agents of Faypoult, and, according to others, by Count Girola, opposed this treaty, and organized new insurrections. The Fiefs of St. Marguerita, situated advantageously in the valley of the Scriva, was the focus of the revolt. They had assembled there escaped prisoners of war and deserters, for the purpose of afterwards sending them to the Tyrol, by Sestri di Levante. There was a depot of arms and munitions, which they drew in secret from Genoa. Wurmser, informed of their movements, wished an officer should be charged with their direction; but, again, on this occasion, he was anticipated. The French sent some movable columns into the Fiefs, scattered the assemblage, took hostages, and got possession of the arms. With the exception of the Barbets, who disturbed the passage of the Apennines, all the north of Italy was tranquil, thanks to the presence of the little army of Kellerman.

**AFFAIRS OF CORSICA.**—The possession of Corsica became daily more difficult and onerous to the English. The declaration of war by Spain rendered their situation in the Mediterranean perilous, and exposed this colony to the attack of two powers well provided with the means of making descents; moreover, they had much to fear from the inhabitants, the major part of whom remained sincerely attached to France. Even the Paolists, deceived by England, had already committed many acts of hostility against the viceroy.

**ENGLISH OCCUPATION OF PORTO-FERRAJO.**—Lord Elliot, convinced that it was not the interest of Great Britain to preserve, by force of arms, a station where the population was so irritable, had been for some time preparing to evacuate the island. Hearing of the occupation of Leghorn by the French troops, and the preparations made at Toulon for an expedition, he felt the urgency of the English occupying Porto-Ferrajo. This maritime, military, and commercial station, for England, united almost all the advantages, without the inconveniences, of Corsica. The Tuscan commandant was therefore summoned on the tenth of July; and in retaliation for our occupation of Leghorn, he permitted the English to occupy the forts in conjunction with the troops of the Grand Duke.

**EVACUATION OF CORSICA.**—Elliot soon had reason to congratulate himself on this arrangement. The discontent of the Corsicans continued to increase; the glory reflected upon them by my victories, and the reception of the Corsican patriots in France, contrasted too strongly with the treatment received by their compatriots from the English, to say nothing of the old national hatred, not to incite all the inhabitants to throw off their



yoke. The number of these patriot refugees at Marseilles and Leghorn increased daily, and the intelligence they maintained with those who at first ranged themselves under the banners of England, announced that the moment of insurrection had come. An order of evacuation from the admiralty to the governor prevented an actual outbreak.

In the meantime I myself was endeavoring to lend assistance to my compatriots; I charged General Gentili to make at Leghorn secret preparations for an expedition. On the other hand, the government had directed at Toulon the preparation for an armament necessary for this enterprise; the Spanish squadron of Langara, leaving Carthagená with twenty-five vessels, seemed certain of success. As soon as Gentili got wind of the dispositions of the English for a retreat, he embarked General Casalta with a small detachment of troops-of-the-line, and some armed refugees. This officer, braving the enemy's cruisers, and combating the elements, arrived, in spite of every obstacle, in Corsica, on the nineteenth of October. The next day he was joined by a considerable number of patriots, with whose assistance he attacked Bastia. Master of the heights commanding the city, and protected by the inhabitants, he summoned the garrison of the fort to surrender; the English reached their vessels, but their rear guard, composed in part of the regiment of Dillon, lost several prisoners. Saint Florent and Ajaccio were soon surrendered, and in a few days the island returned to the empire of which it formed a part.

**SITUATION OF THE ARMIES ON THE ADIGE.**—These political revolutions, armistices, and interior expeditions filled up the interval between the combat of San-Georgio and the battle of Arcole. The main body of the French army remained during these two months about Mantua, and in observation on the Brenta and the Adige. Epidemic fevers had filled my hospitals, and diminished considerably the number of combatants; reinforcements arrived too slowly to enable me to make any advance. The Austrians, on the contrary, made vast preparations for a new trial of arms.

**ALVINZI COMES TO SUCCOR MANTUA.**—By the middle of October, the forces of Davidowich's corps were increased to near twenty thousand men. The corps of Quasdanowich, which after the defeat of Bassano had retired to Gorizia, was also increased to about twenty-five thousand men. The permanent organization of the Croats into regiments had produced a part of these forces, and the rest had been drawn from the northern Tyrol after the retreat of the armies of the Rhine, or had been re-



cruited in the interior. General Alvinzi, appointed commander-in-chief of all these forces, repaired to the corps of Quasdanowich and took the offensive, directing himself by Bassano on Verona, where he hoped to effect a junction with Davidowich, who had received orders to descend the Adige. My position was extremely difficult; I could not advance to meet Alvinzi without leaving Verona, and consequently enabling Davidowich to drive back Vaubois, to unite with Wurmser under Mantua, and thus establish on my rear an army superior in number to all the forces which I could collect. On the other hand, I could not concentrate the mass of my forces on Royeredo without leaving open to Alvinzi the road to Mantua, which, in an inverse sense, would effect the same results. Nor could I well concentrate on Verona, for the communications between Alvinzi and Davidowich would then be reestablished by the valley of the Brenta. It was almost as necessary for me to prevent the junction of these two generals, as the union of one of them with Wurmser. I therefore was obliged to adopt a middle course.

VAUBOIS DRIVEN BACK ON RIVOLI.—Vaubois was too inferior in numbers to effectually defend the access to Trent. By making him take the offensive, I thought to intimidate Davidowich: I was deceived. The second of November Vaubois obtained some advantages at St. Michael, in the valley of the Adige; but turned himself on the right by the valley of the Lavis, he was obliged to fight in retreat the next day, in order to reach Caliano. Davidowich entered Trent on the fourth. The same day the army of Alvinzi arrived at Citadella and Bassano. At the approach of the enemy, Masséna fell back by Vicenza to Montebello. The communication between the two parts of the enemy's army now seemed certain; but as in changing their general the Austrians had not changed their system of strategy, they still continued to act separately. Davidowich marched on Caliano, and Alvinzi prepared to attack Verona, by Vicenza. I determined to repeat, from right to left, the maneuver which, from left to right, had succeeded so well against Wurmser; that is, I determined to defeat Alvinzi and drive him behind the Piave, and then ascend the Brenta to assail the rear of Davidowich.

AFFAIRS OF THE BRENTA.—I advanced towards the Brenta with Augereau and Masséna; I already found the enemy on this side of the river. On the sixth Masséna attacked, at Carmignano, the left of Alvinzi, which was commanded by Provera. His right, under the orders of Quasdanowich, was attacked the same day at Lenova by Augereau. We obtained only a partial success. Provera repassed the Brenta and Quasdanowich

approached Bassano without our having been able to seriously injure them. The enemy was stronger and better prepared to receive us than I had expected. On the other hand, I learned that he was closely pressing Vaubois in the valley of the Adige. It was necessary to renounce my projects, for I felt the importance of calling to me Vaubois and Kilmaine. On the seventh, I took the road to Verona. Alvinzi followed me and arrived on the eleventh at Villa-Nova. Vaubois, attacked at Caliano, sustained a hard fight. On the sixth and seventh he maintained his position; but, fearing to be turned by the right, he retired on the night of the seventh and eighth to Corona. I hastened with all speed to this division, harangued the 39th and 85th, which had failed at Caliano, and threatened to inscribe on their flags that they were no longer worthy to be of the army of Italy. They swore to conquer or die.

**COMBAT OF CALDIERO.**—In the meantime I was closely pressed; and I determined to fall again on the army of Alvinzi. On the eleventh I left Verona, with Masséna and Augereau, and the next day attacked the enemy in position at Caldiero. A violent northeast hailstorm in the face of our soldiers, and the strong position of the enemy, rendered our efforts utterly useless; we were repelled with loss.

**PASSAGE OF THE ADIGE AT RONCO.**—I returned to Verona in a critical condition; my forces were everywhere too weak. Fortune seemed decidedly against us. But I had heretofore profited by her favor; I now wished to prove to the world that I could conquer with fortune against me. Any other general would have repassed the Mincio, and lost Italy. But my future hopes would have died with the loss of my conquests. It was necessary to risk all for all. I resolved to pass the Adige below the left of Alvinzi, in order to threaten his rear. This was a hazardous course; but it was the only one that left me any chance of success. Alvinzi, in advancing upon Verona by the route of Caldiero, had, on his right, impracticable mountains; on his left the Adige; and in front, a strongly fortified town. The ground which he occupied was thus inclosed on three sides, and offered no other outlet than the defile of Villa-Nova. In crossing to Ronco I approached this outlet, and forced the enemy to fight with his line faced to the rear, in order to open to himself a passage; finally, I placed my inferior army in marshy ground, where the enemy could give battle upon three dikes, and where I had all the advantage of the defensive, joined to the individual superiority of my soldiers.

**BATTLE OF ARCOLE.**—I withdrew General Kilmaine from



the blockade of Mantua, with two thousand men, and confided to him the defense of Verona, which place it was indispensable for us to maintain, in order to close the passage of the valley of the Adige to Alvinzi, and prevent him from joining Davidowich. With the divisions of Masséna and Augereau, and the reserve of cavalry, in all about twenty thousand men, I left Verona on the fourteenth for Ronco, where I threw a bridge across the Adige. Some have thought that I ought to have crossed at Albaredo, in order to avoid the Alpon, its marches, and the defile of Arcole. It is true I should, in this way, have more easily gained Villa-Nova, but I was not strong enough to recklessly throw myself upon the only route of Alvinzi; I could merely threaten it, without quitting the support of the Adige; and at the same time, it was necessary for me to maintain my connection with Verona and the division of Vaubois. The movement by Albaredo was too long to accomplish this triple object, and it was by far too dangerous to give battle on the Alpon, at Villa-Nova, with my front to the rear, in order to face Verona. I therefore passed the Adige at Ronco, on the fifteenth of November. The ground which separates it from the Alpon was entirely inundated: over this there were only three dikes. Masséna took the one on the left, which runs nearly parallel to the Adige, as far as Porcil. Augereau took the centre dike, leading to the bridge of Arcole, over the Alpon. A brigade of Croats, detached as flankers from the left, defended this last point. These troops made the best use of the advantages of ground to repel the attacks of Augereau. This circumstance, which I could not foresee, was near becoming fatal: the resistance of the Croats gave Alvinzi time to hasten to their assistance. The Austrian general, fearing that his retreat might be cut off, sent Provera, with six battalions, against Masséna, to Porcil, and, with the main body of his army, fell back upon San-Bonifacio. This unforeseen opposition at Arcole did not prevent me from persevering with my project. If I could not reach Villa-Nova by the left bank of the Alpon. I could act by Porcil more directly on Alvinzi's line of retreat; but it was necessary to be master of the village and defile of Arcole, in order to secure my right, and to avoid being taken myself in this *cul-de-sac*. I again tried to carry the bridge. The greater part of my generals had been wounded in leading on their men. I now threw myself at the head of my grenadiers; but it was all useless. Possibility had limits even for my troops. The head of the column was broken, and most vigorously repulsed. In the midst of this disorder I was thrown from the dike into the morass, and ran imminent risk of being made prisoner: Belliard

charged with a company of grenadiers and rescued me. Towards evening the Austrians abandoned Arcole, at the approach of a brigade which I had thrown across the Adige, by the ferry of Albaredo, and which advanced by ascending the left of the Alpon. But it was now too late, and I did not wish to run the risk of passing the night with my troops crowded together in the morass, and exposed to the enemy's army, which was now deployed between San-Bonifacio and San-Stefano. Moreover, it was possible that Vaubois might be driven to Bussalingo, and, in that case, it would be necessary for me to make a forced march in the night, on the Mincio, in order to join him at Mantua; but this I could not possibly accomplish without taking the precaution of repassing to the right of the Adige, in the daytime. This I did leaving on the left bank troops merely sufficient to guard the bridge.

It was now too late to act upon the rear of Alvinzi; but I had, at least, succeeded in removing him from Verona. This circumstance only postponed my defeat, unless I could throw him completely back upon the Brenta. This it was necessary to effect at any sacrifice. Certain that Vaubois had not been molested, on the fifteenth, by Davidowich, we repassed to the left of the Adige on the morning of the sixteenth. The Austrians having occupied Albaredo, Arcole, and Porcil, now advanced against our bridge; we drove them back. Masséna entered Porcil, and, throwing back one of his brigades on the centre, cut off, on the dike, a column of fifteen hundred men. Augereau again advanced upon Arcole; here the operations of the previous evening were repeated, and we sustained considerable loss, without being able to carry the bridge. At night we recrossed the Adige, for the same reason as on the previous day.

But all this ill success did not discourage me. Davidowich had attacked the Corona on the sixteenth, and got possession of Rivoli. Vaubois had retired in good order on Bussalingo and Castel-Novo. It was now very important for me to force Alvinzi to retire beyond Villa-Nova, so as to open a direct communication with Verona, for the assistance of Vaubois. The third time I renewed the attack; and I would have renewed it ten times more, if I had not succeeded. I felt that the preservation of Italy was necessary for my political existence. I preferred dying at the head of my army, to commencing a retreat which I knew would destroy all the fruits of my preceding exploits. On the seventeenth, at the break of day, my troops again took the road to the bridge. Fortune seemed decidedly opposed to me. At the moment of effecting the passage one of the boats of the bridge



sunk. This unfortunate accident would have deprived me of all chance of success had not the address and zeal of my pontoniers extricated me from the difficulty. When the bridge was repaired, my army crossed the river and again drove back the enemy to Porcil and Arcole. But as this was no longer the principal point of attack, I now limited myself to sending General Robert against it with a demi-brigade of Massena's division. Massena himself moved with the other demi-brigade against Porcil. The rest of the division remained in reserve near the bridge. If the enemy should profit by his superiority over Robert, I was ready to make him repent it. Augereau's division had orders to throw a bridge over the Alpon near its mouth, in order to act against the left of the Austrians and take Arcole in reverse.

The Austrians, being reinforced at Arcole, took the offensive, routed General Robert, and pursued him quite to the bridge. This was just what I wished, for it was important to cut up the enemy's forces as much as possible before attempting the passage of the Alpon. Their deep column, proud of a first success, encountered the main body of Massena's division, at the same time that the troops I had concealed in the reeds fell upon the flank of the column, cutting off three thousand men and driving the remainder back in disorder upon Arcole. This was the decisive moment. The division of Augereau, having at last succeeded in constructing its bridge, crossed the stream and came up in front of the left wing of the Austrians, which rested its left on a morass. I had expected to turn this obstacle by means of eight hundred men from Legnago; but as they had not yet made their appearance, I thought to impose on my enemies by making a feint against the flank. I therefore ordered an officer to gain the point of the Austrian wing with twenty horsemen and some buglers. This *ruse* produced its effect. The Austrian infantry lost that *aplomb* which they preserved till then. Augereau profited by this to force it back, and the opportune appearance of the small garrison of Legnago in rear of the enemy, precipitated his retreat towards San-Bonifacio. The division of Massena then debouched by Arcole and St. Gregorio. Alvinzi, who had not been able to arrest us upon ground the most favorable for the defensive, did not attempt to risk a battle in an open country with an army already reduced to about fifteen thousand combatants. On the eighteenth he retired to Montebello.\* I had lost almost as many men as the enemy; I had not

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\*In speaking of this movement, Alison says: "It was so apparent to all the Austrian army that this retreat was the result of a secret under-

defeated him, but I had gained the means of turning against Davidowich.

**VAUBOIS DRIVEN FROM RIVOLI.**—This general, who for eight days had amused himself before the entrenchments of the Carona, had at last attacked Vaubois on the sixteenth. He gained no great advantage on the first day, but on the second Vaubois, threatened to be turned by the right, evacuated his position, and fell back behind the Mincio, crossing the river at Peschiera. On the eighteenth Davidowich advanced to Castel-Novo, and I now resolved to make him pay dearly for his slight success. I sent my reserve of cavalry in pursuit of Alvinzi, and with the main body of my infantry fell back from Villa-Nova to Verona and made a triumphal entry into that city by the gate of Venice, three days after having left it mysteriously by the gate of Milan. The inhabitants, and my soldiers, astonished at maneuvers which they could not comprehend, regarded me with equal admiration. Masséna recrossed the Adige at Verona and marched upon Villa-Franca, where he expected to meet Vaubois, who had again crossed the Mincio at Borghetta. These two divisions were to attack Davidowich in front, while Augereau marched from Verona by the mountains on Dolce in order to cut off his retreat. Davidowich barely escaped a complete overthrow by hastening to regain Roveredo; his rear guard was much cut up. Alvinzi, on his side, seeing that he was pursued by cavalry only, returned to Villa-Nova. But I had now finished with Davidowich, and was preparing to debouch anew by Verona on the left of the Adige. Alvinzi, being isolated, did not venture to take the field, but fell back behind the Brenta.

**WURMSER BESIEGED IN MANTUA.**—During these stirring events upon the Adige, Wurmser had remained quietly in Mantua. Alvinzi, at the beginning of his operations, had calculated that he could not arrive before Mantua till the twenty-

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standing with the French general, and with a view to the negotiation which was now pending, that they openly and loudly expressed their indignation. One colonel broke his sword in pieces, and declared he would no longer serve under a commander whose conduct brought disgrace on his troops. Certain it is that Alvinzi, during this dreadful strife at Arcole, had neither exhibited the capacity nor the spirit of a general worthy to combat with Napoleon." The object of these remarks is evidently to diminish the glory acquired by Napoleon in this victory. Never was a battle harder fought by the Austrians, and to attribute Alvinzi's retreat, after seventy-two hours' fighting, to a secret understanding with Napoleon, is too absurd to merit comment. Alison's account of this battle is wholly chimerical, but where errors so abound, it is hardly worth while to point out the details.



third, and had engaged Wurmser not to make a sortie till that day. But as things did not turn out exactly as the enemy had hoped, he found that Kilmaine had already returned before the place. The besiegers were therefore in a situation to repel any operations of the besieged.

**REVERSES IN GERMANY.**—These events were the more fortunate for France, as the armies in Germany had been forced to retreat to the Rhine. I have already said that the Archduke Charles had wisely resolved to throw the main body of his army on Jourdan, certain that, if he beat him at Franconia, he would force him upon Mayence, and compromise Moreau, who had advanced as far as Munich. With these dispositions he could hardly fail of success. And if, after his victory at Wurtzburg, on the third of September, he had thrown himself on the communications of Moreau, sending only some twenty thousand men in pursuit of the *débris* of Jourdan, the army of the Rhine must have been lost. Moreau, but feebly troubled, made his retreat in good order, while the Archduke was operating on the Lahn. Our armies prepared to defend Kehl and Düsseldorf; the Archduke concentrated all his means on the upper Rhine, to retake Kehl, but Moreau and Desaix most skillfully defended it till the middle of January. As a climax of contrariety, the Directory replaced Jourdan\* by Beurnonville,† a man very much inferior to his predecessor. Although reinforced by twenty thousand men from the superb troops which for two years had occupied Holland, and by twenty-five thousand who had blockaded Mayence, he remained inactive for two months, with eighty thousand men against twenty-five thousand Austrians. This inaction was the more censurable as it took place in November and December,

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\*Jean-Baptiste Jourdan was born at Limoges, France, in 1762. He entered the military service in 1778, and fought in America. He distinguished himself in the early wars of the French Revolution, and in 1793 became general-of-division, and held several important commands, but was soon after promoted by Napoleon to the office of governor of Piedmont. In 1803 he was made general-in-chief of the army of Italy, and in 1804 Marshal of France. He served in many of Napoleon's wars, and espoused his cause in the final struggle of 1815. He was an honest, upright man, and showed considerable ability as a general, but never gained a very high reputation. He died in 1826.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

†Pierre Riel de Beurnonville was born in 1752, at Champignolle. He was made general in 1792. He saw much service, but never distinguished himself as a general. Between 1791 and 1793 he is said to have been present in no less than one hundred and seventy-two engagements. Napoleon employed him principally on diplomatic services. He died in 1821.—*Biographie Moderne*.

when the affairs of Moreau and myself were the most critical; I had then just experienced my severe losses upon the Brenta, at Caliano, and at Arcole.

DESCENT UPON IRELAND.—Venice having rejected our alliance, it became necessary to adopt some plan to relieve ourselves from our critical position. I most strongly urged the Directory to send forces sufficient, not only to support myself, but to overthrow Wurmser, and attack the heart of the Austrian monarchy. The Directory, at first, sent me one division, drawn from the army of the Atlantic coast; but the troubles excited in the south, by the royalist reaction, caused a part of them to be retained in Provence, and General Rey brought to me hardly six thousand men, while they might easily have sent me twenty-five thousand, had it not been for the expedition which was sent, at this inopportune moment, against Ireland. My object now being merely to speak of what concerns myself, rather than to trace a history of the events which took place at a time when I was not at the head of affairs in France, I will not stop to investigate what was then occurring in Ireland, nor to give the details of Lord Malmesbury's negotiations at Paris. I will merely say that the Directory, meditating an expedition of twenty-five thousand men under Hoche, in order to give to four millions of Irish Catholics a point of support which might shake the English power, neglected, for this important but untimely object, to send me the reinforcements which might have been withdrawn from the coast. Nothing was more natural than to attempt this expedition to Ireland, after having made peace with Austria; but it was imprudent, with our small forces, to attempt to dictate terms at the same time at Vienna and Dublin. Hoche left Brest on the fourteenth of December, but his squadron was dispersed by storms; his isolated vessels had the good luck to escape the English and regain their ports; his soldiers, debarked at the beginning of the following campaign, went to restore victory to the banners of the armies of Sambre-et-Meuse, and, after one whole year's delay, joined the army in Italy.

There is a division of opinion respecting the degree of importance, and chance of success, of this expedition to Ireland. There is no doubt, however, that an expedition of this kind, seriously occupying England, might have prevented her from sending forces into the two Indies. Many military men have thought that the object was to maintain a long and determined contest with a nation full of energy and patriotism, rather than merely to land a few divisions; and that France had no chance of success while inferior upon the sea; that the feeble army of Hoche, after



having forced the Court of St. James to resort to the national levies, and finding itself consumed by a hundred battles, would have been obliged to sign a treaty of evacuation or to reëmbark its scattered forces. Admitting this supposition as the most probable, it follows, that instead of retaining twenty-five thousand of the *élite* of Brittany for so long a time, and turning them afterward upon the coast of Ireland, it would have been more wise to send five or six thousand of them, with skillful chiefs, to Tippoo-Saib, and the other twenty thousand to me, so as to secure the defeat of Wurmser and Alvinzi, under whose attacks I had three times been reduced to the very brink of destruction. The elements of an Irish insurrection would continue for a long time, so that there was no reason why the Directory might not adjourn its projects to a time when, freed from the continental war, it could attempt an expedition without compromising the success of its arms. In the actual state of things, it seemed more urgent to deliver India, and to dictate peace to Austria, than to excite a civil war on the banks of the Shannon.

USELESS NEGOTIATIONS.—The protracted negotiations with Malmesbury could lead to no conclusions, for England would not sanction the change of government in Belgium till the consent of Austria was obtained. Clarke was therefore sent to ask at Vienna the conclusion of an armistice, and to propose sending negotiators to Bâle or Paris. He presented himself for this purpose at my head-quarters, but the success of the Archduke in Germany had so raised the hopes and pretensions of the House of Austria, that they would not permit him to pass the outposts. An event of the highest importance, which had just occurred in the north, might also change the state of affairs on the continent. The great Catharine had, by sudden death, on the seventeenth of November, closed her long and illustrious career; her son, Paul I., succeeded her. This prince, singular in everything, might adopt a policy entirely opposite to that of his mother, either profiting by the commotions in the west to make war upon the Turks, or taking part himself in the affairs of France. In the uncertainty that then existed on these questions, the Cabinet of Vienna thought best to send the Baron de Vincent to meet Clarke. They commenced a discussion on the fourth of January, at Vicenza, on the proposition of opening negotiations, and on the necessity of first concluding an armistice for the armies of Germany and Italy. Peace presented too many subjects for discussion to be settled definitely at an outpost, and the conditions of an armistice offered in the case no less difficulties. I showed Clarke that if any communication was allowed with Mantua, all

the advantage would be on the side of Austria, for famine must soon force its surrender; but Austria insisted that the garrison should be supplied with provisions during the suspension of hostilities. Of course they could not agree. M. de Vincent, a negotiator without powers, returned to Vienna to submit the propositions of France, and his cabinet sent Clarke to the Imperial Minister near the Court of Turin. In this interval, Malmesbury, not having been able to agree to the first article of the negotiation, left Paris, under the suspicion of having been sent merely to learn the object of the preparation made at Brest for the expedition to Ireland. We therefore now had only to think, on our part, of maintaining ourselves in our present position till the arrival of reinforcements, and on the side of Austria, to redouble activity and energy to save Wurmser.

**REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE RHINE.**—The government, which undoubtedly had little hope of success in the negotiations of Clarke, convinced by my picture of the dangers of my position, and by the contest at Arcole, that I was within a hair's breadth of being driven from Italy, determined to take more decided measures: the five divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, drawn from the armies of the Rhine, and directed in mid-winter across the Alps, would increase my army to seventy-five thousand men. This grand detachment would in no way compromise the armies of Germany, which had now retired under the cannon of Strasburg and Düsseldorf, and besides had been strongly reinforced by fresh troops from Belgium and Holland. Moreover, this would remove the decisive theatre of war to the point where the enemy was most vulnerable. In waiting the realization of these fine but far-off hopes, I employed the month of December in hastening the organization of the interior of Italy, and guarding against Venice, which seemed more and more ill-disposed toward us as our dangers increased by the unfavorable changes of the war. I felt that, since I could not persuade her to join our interests, it was the wisest course to embarrass her to such a degree as to deprive her of the means of injuring us. For this purpose, and at the same time to cover the left flank and rear of my army on the side of the Valteline, I caused to be occupied the important château of Bergamo, which is perched on the last slope of the Alps toward Lombardy. Patriotic societies, established at Brescia, Bergamo, and Crema, scattered everywhere the seeds of democracy, always so flattering to the multitude. I had gone to Bologna to regulate the affairs of the two little Cispadane and Transpadane Republics, and to menace the Pope, and force him to execute the articles of the



armistice, when I learned that Alvinzi had advanced with a new army to raise the siege of Mantua.

**NEW ATTEMPT OF ALVINZI TO SAVE WURMSER.**—My work seemed as unstable as that of Penelope; its destruction seemed the natural result of the constant reinforcements sent by the cabinet of Vienna to the army in Italy, and of the as constant neglect of the French Directory to sustain my efforts. They treated me at Paris as Hannibal was treated by the Carthaginian Senate. At the end of December, Alvinzi's forces were again increased to more than forty thousand men, and it was necessary to contend a fourth time for the possession of Mantua. While waiting for the promised reinforcements from the Rhine, I learned that Alvinzi had resumed the offensive, and I therefore flew to the Adige. My army occupied the following positions: Serrurier's division before Mantua; Augereau on the Adige, from Verona to Legnago; Masséna at Verona; Joubert, with a fourth division, at the Corona and Rivoli. Each of these four divisions numbered about ten thousand men. General Rey was at Desenzano with a reserve of four thousand men. The enemy advanced at the same time upon my centre and both wings by Roveredo, by Vicenza, and by Padua. Not knowing on which of these routes the enemy had directed the main body of his forces, I determined to remain in my present position until he should develop his projects. On the twelfth of January the column which had advanced by Vicenza approached Verona, and drove back the outposts of Masséna. But the main body of this general's division having debouched by St. Michael, the enemy was repulsed with loss. This fact convinced me that this could not be the main body of Alvinzi's army.

**JOUBERT IS DRIVEN BACK ON RIVOLI.**—The next day, in the afternoon, I received the news that General Joubert, pressed in front by superior forces, and menaced on both flanks by strong columns, had been obliged in the morning to evacuate the position of the Corona, and fall back upon Rivoli, whence he expected to continue his retreat upon Castel-Novo. I had no longer any doubt of the enemy's plans. It was evident that the column of Vicenza, and that which had been directed on the lower Adige, were merely diversions made to facilitate the march of the principal corps on the valley of the Adige. It was necessary, therefore, to oppose to this corps the mass of my army. I left Verona immediately with the divisions of Masséna, leaving at that place only about two thousand men to check the column of Vicenza; I, at the same time, sent orders to Rey to move from Salò on Rivoli, where I had resolved to collect the mass of my

forces. I was convinced, from Joubert's report, that Alvinzi, following the usual foolish plan of the Austrians, and not content with weakening his forces by the detachments thrown on Verona and Legnago, had also divided those he had with him. I knew that in occupying the plateau of Rivoli, where the different paths through this mountainous country united, I should be able to act in mass against columns separated by insurmountable obstacles. Not to lose the advantages of such a position, I ordered Joubert to maintain himself at all hazards in advance of Rivoli till my arrival. I had not been deceived respecting the dispositions of Alvinzi. On leaving Bassano, this general had sent Provera with eight thousand men on Legnago, and Bajalich with five thousand on Verona, while he himself, at the head of thirty thousand men, debouched by Roveredo, on the Corona. This force was now subdivided into six columns. Three of these, forming in all twelve thousand men, attacked Joubert in front, while General Lusignan, with another of four thousand men, was to turn our left by passing the western slope of the Monte Baldo. Quasdanowich, with a fifth column of eight thousand men, was to assail our right, he moving along the road on the right of the Adige; the artillery and cavalry, as they could not be employed in the mountains, were directed to follow this last column. Finally, Wukassowich, with the sixth column of four thousand men, descended the left bank of the Adige, and moved on Chiusa. To form an idea of these absurd movements, it should be remembered that the crest of Monte Baldo cut off all communication between the column of Lusignan and those of the centre, that these were equally cut off from the column of Quasdanowich by the impracticable summits of San-Marco, and that the Adige separated Quasdanowich and Wukassowich.\* Moreover, all these columns were obliged to pass the mountains without cannon, while I, placed on the plateau of Rivoli with artillery, could receive them as they arrived in succession. It was evident that, if the slightest accident should prevent them from all arriving at the same moment, I should be sure of victory.

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\*Alison, in speaking of these dispositions of the Austrians, says: "*The plan was ably conceived, and had nearly succeeded; with a general of inferior ability to Napoleon, and troops of less resolution than his army, it unquestionably would have done so.*" How admirably qualified such a judge of strategy must be to criticize the military operations of Napoleon! In support of this absurd opinion, Alison refers to "Thiers, viii., 5, 13; Napoleon, iii., 414; Jomini, ix., 275." Now it happens that each of the three authorities here referred to condemns most unequivocally the positions of the Austrian general. In fact, there is not the slightest foundation for the opinion of Alison.



**BATTLE OF RIVOLI**—When my orders reached Joubert, near midnight, he was in full retreat; but he immediately returned to his position at Rivoli, which, very fortunately, the enemy had not had time to occupy. I arrived there after midnight; the weather was clear and beautiful, and, as the unclouded moon silvered the precipices of Monte Baldo, we could distinguish the lights of the five separate camps of the enemy. On the morning of the fourteenth I made my dispositions: the main body of Joubert's division marched on Caprino, San-Giovanni, and San-Marco, against the Austrian centre, while a demi-brigade, placed in the intrenchments in rear of Osteria, covered my right and held Quasdanowich in check. Masséna, who was rapidly advancing, received orders at the same time to debouch a demi-brigade in order to oppose Lusignan. The combat now became warm; Joubert was too weak, and his left began to fall back. Seeing this, the right, under General Vial, also retrograded; but the 14th of the line kept its place admirably at the centre, and enabled me to reestablish affairs. I hastened to the left and directed to its support the column of Masséna, which had just arrived. The enemy was repulsed, and our left established on the heights of Trombalora. But the critical moment was not yet over: my right was hotly pursued by the Austrians, who descended the heights of San-Marco. Quasdanowich had at the same time forced the intrenchments of Osteria, and his column began to descend the plateau of Rivoli. On the other side Lusignan, master of Coserman, was moving by Affi upon my rear.\*

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\*Alison says: "At this perilous moment the presence of mind of Napoleon did not forsake him. He instantly, in order to gain time, sent a flag of truce to Alvinzi, proposing a suspension of arms for half an hour, as he had some propositions to make in consequence of the arrival of a courier with dispatches from Paris. The Austrian general, ever impressed with the idea that military were to be subordinate to diplomatic operations, fell into the snare; the suspension, at the critical moment, was agreed to; and the march of the Austrians was suspended at the very moment when the soldiers, with loud shouts, were exclaiming, 'We have them! we have them!' Junot repaired to the Austrian headquarters, from whence, after a conference of an hour, he returned, as might have been expected, without having come to any accommodation; but meanwhile the critical period had passed; Napoleon had gained time to face the danger, and make the movements requisite to repel these numerous obstacles." In confirmation of this statement he refers to "Jomini, viii., 282, 283; Thiers, viii., 518; Napoleon, iii., 416." Neither of the authors referred to confirms, in any degree, this statement; indeed, their accounts of the battle preclude any possibility of its truth. It is a pure invention of a prejudiced mind, wishing to diminish the brilliancy of the victory by making it the result of petty trickery. Alison's account of this battle is unworthy of the slightest confidence. He was either incapable of understanding it, or willfully misrepresented the facts.

I was now completely surrounded, but, far from losing courage, I saw that, if I could overthrow Quasdanowich, I should have nothing to fear from Lusignan, who would advance only to his own destruction. Quasdanowich was obliged to defile by a very deep ravine enfiladed by our batteries. No sooner had the head of his column appeared upon the plateau than it was assailed on the flanks by infantry and in front by cavalry, which the intrepid Lasalle led to the charge. The enemy was broken and thrown back into the ravine. The disorder had already become great when one of our shells blew up a caisson in the middle of the ravine, which was crowded with Austrians; this produced the most frightful scene of confusion; infantry, cavalry, and artillery retreated pell-mell by Incanale. Having disposed of Quasdanowich, I directed all my efforts to sustain Vial, who was now in full retreat. The Austrians had pursued with too much imprudence. Two hundred horsemen, which I threw against them, so completely routed them that Alvinzi could rally the broken remains of the centre only behind the Tasso. This is a striking example of what marvelous effects may be produced by the smallest troop if engaged at the proper moment. My victory was decisive; but to make it still more so, I desired the destruction of Lusignan. This general, fearing no serious resistance, had established himself on Monte Pipoli in order to completely cut off my retreat. I had secured my rear by opposing to him a part of the division of Masséna, who kept up the combat till the arrival of Rey. The head of Rey's column having finally debouched by Orza on Lusignan's rear, this last general found himself surrounded at the very moment that he had thought to envelop me: his corps was completely destroyed, and he regained Monte Baldo with only a few hundred men.

PROVERA MARCHES ON MANTUA.—The very night of this battle, I learned that Provera, forcing the centre of Augereau's division, which was scattered along the Adige, had succeeded in crossing the river at Anghiari on the evening of the thirteenth, and marched toward Mantua. It was very important to prevent him from raising the siege of that place. Thinking Joubert and Rey strong enough to oppose the broken remains of Alvinzi, I immediately set off with the division of Masséna for Roverbella, where I arrived on the evening of the fifteenth. On the fourteenth Provera had reached Nogara without encountering any opposition; but Augereau, having had time to unite the main body of his division at Anghiari, had fallen upon his rear guard and cut it to pieces, and at the same time burnt the bridge over the Adige. On the fifteenth Provera arrived before Man-



tua; he thought to enter by the faubourg of San-Georgio, but finding it intrenched and occupied by us, he could open no communication with the place. Not yet despairing of being able to open a passage, he, the next day, made an attack on the side of the citadel. But I had here prepared for him an unexpected reception. On the sixteenth, at five o'clock in the morning, Provera attacked the post of La Favorita, and Wurmser that of St. Antonia. Serrurier, aided by the reinforcements which I had sent him, succeeded in defending these posts. Wurmser retired into the place, but Provera did not get off so cheaply; attacked in front by Serrurier, on the left by the garrison of St. George, on the right by a part of the division of Masséna, which I had directed against him, while the division of Augereau, debouching by Castellaro, appeared on his rear, and, finding no means of escape, he laid down his arms with the five thousand men he had left. While these events were taking place at Mantua, Joubert, on the fifteenth, moving some columns rapidly by the reverse of Monte Magnone and Monte Baldo, succeeded in turning the flanks of Alvinzi's retreating army. These centre columns, deprived of the assistance of Quasdanowich and Lusignan, with their line of retreat cut off, and hemmed in by the precipice of the Corona, were almost completely destroyed before reaching Ferrara: nearly five thousand men were taken prisoners.

**CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.**—After having finished with Provera, I moved upon the Adige. Alvinzi had lost more than half his army. The remains of his forces were marched behind the Piave, and the defense of the Tyrol entrusted to General Laudon with about eight thousand men. The Austrian rear guard was everywhere defeated. At the beginning of February my army had resumed the same position it had occupied previous to the battle of Arcole: Joubert on the Lavis, Masséna at Bassano, and Augereau at Citadella.

Such was the celebrated battle of Rivoli, in which we made twenty thousand prisoners with only thirty thousand combatants. Our legions had crowned themselves with glory, and had surpassed the so much vaunted rapidity of the legions of Cæsar. The same troops which had left Verona and fought near St. Michael on the thirteenth, had marched all night to reach Rivoli, fought there all the next day of the fourteenth in the mountains, returned to Mantua on the fifteenth, and captured Provera, who thought them defeated amid the rocks of the Corona.

**WURMSER CAPITULATES AT MANTUA.**—Mantua capitulated on the second of February; the starving garrison had

already consumed the flesh of all their horses, and large numbers had been carried away by disease. There were still remaining about thirteen thousand men under arms, who, having surrendered as prisoners of war, were conducted to Trieste to be exchanged. The number of sick was not less than seven thousand. We here found the siege artillery which we had abandoned before the battle of Castiglione, and three hundred and fifty other pieces upon the ramparts and in the arsenal.

EXPEDITION ON ROMAGNA.—While I had been engaged with Alvinzi, the Court of Rome, seduced by the instigations of my enemies, had broken the armistice made in June last, raised extraordinary armaments, and given the command of them to General Colli, who was sent for this purpose by the Cabinet of Vienna. It was now necessary to punish Rome, both as an example to others and to get rid of a troublesome enemy. For this purpose I formed a new division, giving the command of it to Victor. It reached Imola on the second of February. The campaign was neither long nor bloody. A corps of four thousand of the papal troops attempted to defend the Senio, but was overthrown with great loss. On the ninth Victor arrived at Ancona, and captured twelve hundred more prisoners. Our advance guard took possession of Notre Dame Loretto and its famous treasure. On the eighteenth we advanced to Tolentino. All was now consternation at Rome. I was master of all the states of the Church, but I did not wish to entirely destroy the power of the Pope; indeed, in the present situation of our affairs, this would not have been so easy as some have imagined. We were obliged to pursue a cautious course of conduct toward the Courts of Madrid and Naples, both of which were interested in preserving the power of the Pope; independently of this consideration, it would have been imprudent to weaken our army by detaching from it the forces requisite for garrisoning our conquests: and I was not foolish enough to commit such a fault, when about to begin a decisive campaign into the heart of Austria. I therefore wrote to Rome to propose a settlement of our differences. They were eager to send me plenipotentiaries. The negotiations were short, inasmuch as they had merely to sign such conditions as I saw fit to dictate. The peace was concluded at Tolentino on the nineteenth. The Pope confirmed the cession of Avignon, of the Comtat, of the Legations of Ferrara and Bologna, and of Romagna, and agreed to pay a contribution of thirty millions of francs. These conditions were too humiliating to the Head of the Church not to make it an irreconcilable enemy; and still not hard enough to destroy its power to injure us. I



knew this well, but it was not in my power to do otherwise; state policy then belonged to the Directory, who wished to humble the Pope and brave the thunders of the Vatican, without once reflecting upon the advantage of converting it into an ally or an instrument: and considering my present critical situation on the Adige, I deemed it best to carry out the views of the government and relieve my army of a troublesome neighborhood.\*

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\*This campaign of Napoleon is minutely described in Jomini's "Wars of the Revolution," in Thiers' "History," in Napoleon's "Memoirs," dictated at St. Helena, and in Lee's "Life of Napoleon," a work of much merit, by a young American. It is greatly to be regretted that Mr. Lee left his work incomplete.

Alison pretends to give due credit to Napoleon for the great military genius displayed in this campaign, but the praise is faint and most unwillingly and grudgingly given. The results are attributed, he thinks, in a great measure, "to the admirable character, unwearied energy, and indomitable courage of the troops which composed his army." The condition of the army at the beginning of the campaign, when Napoleon took the command of it, seems to have been forgotten. The success of the republican arms is evidently very annoying to this staunch royalist; but he takes consolation in looking forward to the events of 1814 and 1815, and closes his remarks with the reflection that *"aristocratic firmness, in the end, asserted its wonted superiority over democratic vigor; the dreams of republican equality have been forgotten, but the Austrian government remains unchanged, the French eagles have retired over the Alps, and Italy, the theatre of so much bloodshed, has finally remained to the successors of the Cæsars."*

## CHAPTER III.

FROM THE PEACE OF TOLENTINO TO THE CLOSE OF THE  
CAMPAIGN OF 1797.

Preparations for a new Campaign—The Archduke Charles takes Command of the Austrian Army—Treaty with the King of Sardinia—The Affairs of Venice—Troubles with the States of *Terra-firma*—Negotiations with Pescara—Armaments of the Senate—Napoleon resolves to attack the Archduke before he can unite his Forces—Plan of Operations—Passage of the Piave—Affair of Tarvis—The Archduke is reinforced by the Detachments sent from the Rhine—Armistice of Leoben—Operations of Joubert in the Tyrol—Veronese Vespers—Victor suppresses the Insurgents—Condition of the two Armies—Preliminaries of Leoben—Armies of the Rhine—Destruction of the Venetian Republic—Napoleon goes to Milan—Revolution of Genoa—Change of Constitution—Provisional Government appointed—The Disorders continue—Negotiations of Udina and Passeriano—English Affairs—Naval Battle of St. Vincent—Naval Tactics—Mutiny in the British Fleets—Negotiations of Lille—Internal Affairs of France—The eighteenth Fructidor—Foreign Negotiations—Resignation of Napoleon—Cobentzel negotiates on the part of Austria—Napoleon and the Directory—Peace of Campo-Formio—Conditions of this Treaty—Its Results—Revolution of La Valteline—Negotiations with Germany at Rastadt—The Passage of the Simplon asked of the Valois—The Directory fomenta a Revolution in Switzerland—Proclamation of the Vaudois—Invasion of Berné—Helvetic Constitution—Neutrality of Switzerland and Faults of the Directory—Revolution in Rome—Proclamation of the Roman Republic—Napoleon leaves Rastadt—His Reception at Paris—General Remarks.

**PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW CAMPAIGN** —The brilliant victory of Rivoli, the fall of Mantua, the evacuation of Corsica by the English, the treaties of peace with Naples and Rome, and the approach of large reinforcements, had at last completely changed the face of affairs in Italy. Having now the means of definitely securing the possession of the country, I determined to make the Emperor tremble even in his own capital. The divisions of the army of the Rhine having arrived in the course of the month



of March, I saw myself at the head of seventy-five thousand men. It required, however, about twenty thousand men to garrison the fortifications and to observe the south of Italy. With the remainder of my forces I moved forward. In order to second my operations, the Directory ordered Moreau to repass the Rhine at Kehl, and Hoche, after having reorganized the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse, to advance anew on the Main.

**ARCHDUKE CHARLES COMMANDS THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.**—The Cabinet of Vienna had adopted the same idea as ourselves about transferring the theatre of war into Italy; but not till after the taking of Kehl by the Archduke Charles and the defeat of Alvinzi at Rivoli. It was therefore the middle of January when this illustrious prince and able general set out to cross the Tyrol, with three divisions of select troops, to oppose me in Italy.\*

**TREATY WITH THE KING OF SARDINIA.**—The events which I have just narrated had rendered our position as strong, comparatively, as it had formerly been precarious and hazardous; but it must, nevertheless, be observed, that the King of Sardinia, who was not our ally, might, on the least reverse to our arms, become our enemy. I had often urged the Directory to offer him conditions sufficiently advantageous to induce him to form with us a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. I had myself taken the responsibility of signing, at Bologna, on the sixteenth

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\*The Archduke Charles (Louis de Lorraine) of Austria, son of the Emperor Leopold II.; was born at Vienna, in 1771. Already, at the age of twenty-two, he had acquired a high military reputation under the Prince of Coburg, in the campaign of 1793. In 1796 he was made field-marshal of the German Empire, and took command of the Austrian army on the Rhine. An outline of his operations in that campaign is given in the text. When sent against Napoleon, in 1797, the latter remarked to Maesfeld: "Your cabinet has sent against me three armies without generals; now it sends a general without an army!" After the campaign of 1799, the Archduke was, by intrigue, removed from the army and sent into Bohemia, in a kind of honorable exile. After the disasters of Hohenlinden and Marengo, he was recalled to favor and placed at the head of the War Department. In 1805 he opposed Masséna in Italy, but was absent from Germany at the overthrow of the Austrian monarchy on the field of Austerlitz. In the campaign of 1809 he commanded the Austrian army, and was wounded at the battle of Wagram. He was afterward made governor and captain-general of Bohemia, and retired to the country. He was the ablest of all the generals that opposed Napoleon. His many virtues and noble character endeared him even to his enemies. Napoleon always spoke of him in terms of high admiration. He ranks high as a military writer. His principles of strategy, illustrated by the campaigns of 1796 and 1799, were published in Vienna in 1813 and 1819, in seven volumes, with valuable maps and plans.—*Biographie Universelle*.

of February, a treaty with the Count of Balbo; but the Directory, jealous of its prerogatives, refused to ratify it, and the whole matter was referred to General Clarke at Turin. The arrangement was not terminated till the eighth of April, after the armistice of Leoben had rendered it unnecessary, and even then it was not ratified at Paris. Had we obtained a timely succor of ten thousand Piedmontese, my army would have been increased, by the divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, to ninety thousand men, and my rear perfectly secured as far as the Adige by the troops of our allies.

**THE AFFAIRS OF VENICE.**—Venice was the only power whose restless spirit gave us cause for apprehension; war was ravaging her states of *terra-firma*, and the people, excited against us, were only waiting for an opportunity to rise. But democratic propagandism had proselytes, both at Brescia and Bergamo. The patriots of these cities demanded to be united with Lombardy, and a revolution broke out there just as I was about to enter the Friouli. This revolution, enkindled by Adjutant-General Landrieux, was rather the work of the Directory than of myself; but, as it suited my purposes, I did not interfere with it. The reason of this was obvious: should the democrats succeed, they would reinforce my army and fight for my party; should they fail, the hostility of the oligarchy would justify me in destroying it. I was ready to adopt whatever course was best calculated to secure our hold in Italy. If I loved France, I nevertheless had not entirely forgotten my Italian origin; my heart was fixed upon regenerating a nation so interesting from its ancient reminiscences. But to obtain peaceably the cession of the Milanese by Austria, who had already yielded Belgium, it was absolutely necessary to have some equivalent to offer her for at least one of these countries. Should Venice give us cause for declaring war against her, she might possibly serve as the victim of our combinations of state policy.

**TROUBLES IN THE STATES OF TERRA-FIRMA.**—The government of Venice weighed less heavily on the lower than on the higher classes. There is no domination so absurd as for a single city to rule a whole nation, at least when that city gives the notables of the country no suitable part in the government. In this case it was not an odious oligarchy, like that of Berne or of the city of Venice; it was an aristocracy like that which existed at Rome after the right of citizenship had been given to the Latins; in a word, it was the only reasonable form of a republic. If the Senate had made a timely grant of some thirty new places of senators to the influential families of Brescia, Bergamo, Verona, Vicenza, Padua, and Treviso, we should have lost our influ-



ence over the people of the states of *terra-firma*. But, instead of scattering the impending storm by timely concessions, they opposed all changes, excited the peasants of the mountains of Salò against Brescia, and sent to their support General Fioravanti. Salò fell into the hands of the enemy, but was soon retaken by the patriots, with the aid of our soldiers and the Cisalpines. At the same time the Senate armed eight or ten thousand Sclavonians, reinforced its troops, and equipped a formidable flotilla to cover the lagunes.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH ROME.—In the present situation of our affairs, it was necessary to either attach Venice to ourselves, or else to paralyze her power. The Senate sent Pesaro to me to enter into explanations respecting the troubles of Brescia. I endeavored to prove to him that it was for the interest of Venice to frankly accept our alliance, and make certain modifications in the government; I gave him to understand that it would be useless to side with our enemies, by declaring for Austria, for, in less than a fortnight, I could drive the imperialists from the Friouli, and invade La Carinthia.

THE SENATE PREPARES FOR DEFENSE.—The Senate had decided upon its course. It hated us too much to embrace our cause; and it had too great a fear of our power and dread of Austrian influence to throw itself into the arms of Austria. Its courage was that of the poltroon: it thought to impose upon us by preparations for defense and by stoutly swearing its absolute neutrality. I was not fool enough to be duped by this neutrality, which would last so long as victory inclined on our side, but on the slightest loss in the Noric Alps, twenty thousand Venetians, with a *levée-en-masse* of peasants, would fall upon our rear, destroy our *dépôts*, and cut off our retreat. I should have felt no alarm at this state of things, if the Directory had settled the treaty with the King of Sardinia; for, in that case, the Piedmontese contingent would enable me to leave ten or twelve thousand French troops to neutralize Venice. But the Court of Turin wished to have guaranteed to it all or a part of Lombardy, and the Directory was unwilling to bind itself so as to be obliged to make this a *sine qua non* of peace with Austria. This conduct was childishness, for such a clause is always eventual: *à l'impossible nul n'est tenu*; and we had on the right bank of the Po the means of indemnity in case of need.

NAPOLÉON TAKES THE INITIATIVE AGAINST THE ARCHDUKE.—In the meantime the Archduke had repaired in person to the Piave, and was there waiting for three divisions which he expected from the Rhine by the Tyrol or the valley of

the Drave, but which were still afar off. Bernadotte and Delmas had joined my army some eight days, when the Austrian succors were still crossing Bavaria. Thus finding myself prepared for action before the enemy, I deemed it best to profit by the circumstance, and to begin the attack without waiting to settle matters with the Venetians. Victor,\* whose division still remained at Ancona superintending the execution of the treaty with the Pope, received orders to return to the Adige, where he could cover my communications. I now entered the field with the divisions of Masséna, Bernadotte, Serrurier, and Augereau (the latter being at this time commanded by General Gueyux), amounting in all to thirty-eight thousand men. I gave to Joubert the divisions of Delmas, Baraguay-d'Hilliers, and that which he himself had commanded at the battle of Rivoli; these together amounted to seventeen thousand combatants.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS.—Starting from the Mincio as a base, there were two lines of operations which could be pursued against the hereditary states of Austria: the first, to the north by the valley of the Adige, or the Tyrol; the second, to the east by the Friouli and the Carniole. These two lines formed a right angle with its vertex at Verona. As the enemy occupied both of these lines, it was impossible to confine myself exclusively to either without being exposed in flank and rear to the enemy's corps descending the other. As the Tyrol was the most favorable for defense, and led less directly into the heart of the hereditary states; and, moreover, as its narrow valleys would not permit me to develop my forces, I chose the line of the Friouli. Nevertheless, it

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\*Victor (Perrin Claude), Duke of Belluno, was born at La Manche, in 1766. He entered the army in 1781, and received his discharge in 1789. In 1792 he served as a volunteer, and was promoted to the grade of *chef-de-bataillon*. In 1793 he distinguished himself under Napoleon, at the siege of Toulon, and served under him in the campaigns of 1796-7, where he acquired a brilliant reputation, and was promoted successively to the grades of general-of-brigade and general-of-division. In 1799 his division rendered important services on several occasions. At the battle of Marengo he commanded a *corps-d'armée*, and for his gallant services on this occasion he received a Sabre of Honor. He immediately afterward passed to the Batavian army, and in 1805 was sent as ambassador to Denmark. He joined the army in Prussia in 1806, and was wounded at Jena; in 1807 he was promoted to the command of the first *corps-d'armée*, and contributed mainly to the victory of Friedland. Napoleon made him a Marshal of France on the field. After the treaty of Tilsit, he was made governor of Berlin and most of Prussia. In 1808 he commanded the first *corps-d'armée*, in Spain. He greatly distinguished himself in the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814. After the restoration of the Bourbons, he held several important offices, and continued in favor till the overthrow of their government in 1830.



was impossible to advance on Udina without being exposed in rear to an enemy debouching from the Tyrol. It was therefore preferable not to form a permanent double line of operations, but to push a strong corps upon the upper Adige to check the enemy in the Tyrol; and then to draw their corps toward the main army by the Valley of the Drave, which Nature seemed to have traced for such a movement. But the extent of these movements rendered the operation very delicate and complicated. If, however, this configuration of the country had some chances against us, it also had some in our favor; for should the enemy wish to defend the Friouli by parallel positions behind the Piave, the Tagliamento, the Isonzo, his line would then rest on the coast near his left wing, and his only line of retreat would lie in rear of the right wing. Therefore, the slightest maneuver turning this right wing would cut off his line of retreat, and drive him into the Adriatic. On these facts I based my plan of operations. The greater portion of Alvinzi's scattered forces had taken position on the Tagliamento; the corps of the Tyrol, commanded by Generals Kerpen and Laudon, was behind the Lavis and the Noss; in the centre, the brigade of Lusignan, at Feltre, kept open the communication between the two principal corps. The total of the Austrian army did not then amount to more than thirty-five thousand men, the reinforcements of the Rhine not having yet arrived; there should be added, however, to this number a few thousand Tyrolese armed for the defense of their firesides; but these fought only on their own mountains.

PASSAGE OF THE PIAVE.—My army began to move on the tenth of March. With the main body of my troops I advanced directly toward the Tagliamento. Masséna marched on Feltre in order to drive back the brigades of Lusignan, and threaten the right wing of the Archduke. Lusignan retired, ascending the Piave; on the thirteenth his rear guard was attacked and overthrown at Longaro and he himself taken prisoner. Masséna, satisfied with having thrown the Austrian brigade on Cadora, fell back on Spilimbergo and Gemona, so as to turn, nearer, the right of the Archduke and to get possession of the important route of Potéba, of which I feared the enemy might profit to retire on Villach. On the sixteenth I reached Valvasone, on the Tagliamento. The Archduke had already begun a retreat, leaving merely a rear guard on the river, which was fordable. My columns rushed into the stream, overthrew the enemy, and pursued him on the road to Palmanova. The Archduke divided his forces: he himself fell back on Goricea; one of his columns, commanded by generals Gontreuil and Bayalitsch, with a great part of the material, moved by Cividale and the valley of Natisona on Caporetto; Gen-

eral Ocskay, who commanded the brigade of Lusignan, covered the road from Villach to Chiusa-Veneta. The Isonzo, from its source to Goricea, runs between two chains of mountains almost impracticable on the side of Krainburg. Could I succeed in there inclosing the army of the Archduke, I would make it for him the Caudine Forks. For a moment I had strong hopes of doing so. Masséna, in ascending the Fella, was in position to drive Ocskay beyond the Tavis and get possession of the debouches of Isonzo on Villach. I myself maneuvered against the left flank of the Archduke, to push him into the valley of the Isonzo, the two extremities of which were in my possession. The enemy's left was covered by the city of Gradisca, which was then occupied by four battalions. On the seventeenth, Bernadotte attacked this place in front, while Serrurier, passing the Isonzo between that city and Montfalcone, took it in reverse; the garrison capitulated. I then ascended the left bank of the Isonzo with Serrurier and Bernadotte; Guyeux moved by Cividale on Caporetto. Inclining to the right by the valley of Vippach, I hoped to cut the enemy off from the road to Czernita, or to force him to plunge into the valley of the Isonzo, by Canale or Caporetto.

AFFAIR OF TARVIS.—The first object of the Archduke was to avoid any decisive battle till after the arrival of his troops from the Rhine; he therefore took good care not to wait for me to complete my movement, but fell back in all haste by Czernita and Adelsberg on Laybach. I sent Bernadotte in pursuit, and turned my own efforts against the column of Gontreuil and Bayalitsch. This, at least, could not escape me. Embarrassed by the convoy that accompanied it, and pursued by Guyeux and by Serrurier, who was ascending the Isonzo, it was also checked in front by Masséna. This general had forced the gorges of the Ponteba, occupied Tarvis, and driven Ocskay on Wurtzen. Gontreuil tried in vain to open a passage by Tarvis; and was driven into the gorges of Ober-Preth, where he and Bayalitsch were surrounded, and forced to lay down their arms. We captured nearly four thousand prisoners, twenty-five cannon, and four hundred baggage-wagons. On the twenty-eighth I united at Villach the divisions of Masséna, Guyeux, and Serrurier. Bernadotte had pursued the Archduke by Laybach; as a flank movement to our march, he pushed forward some light troops on Trieste to seize upon the resources of that flourishing city, an acquisition of value for further operations.

ARCHDUKE REINFORCED FROM THE RHINE.—The Archduke, who, from Laybach, had marched by Klagenfurth on St. Veit, was there joined by the first reinforcements from Germany. I wrote a letter from Klagenfurth to this prince, deplor-



ing the calamities of a war which could no longer be justified, and sought to incite in his noble heart a desire for peace. He replied that he had no power to make treaties, but that he had no less desire than myself to put an end to the horrors of the war.

**ARMISTICE OF LEOBEN.**—The Archduke, however, did not consider himself strong enough to give battle. At my approach he retired to Neumark, and on the thirtieth I arrived at St. Veit. On the second of April Masséna forced the gorges of Diernstein and beat the enemy's rear guard at Neumark and Hundsmark. The grenadiers which had come from the Rhine were defeated in these two rencontres. The Archduke continued his retreat on Vienna. On the fifth I arrived at Judenburg. Two days after, the Austrians, who had had time to send my letter to Vienna and receive an answer, asked an armistice for the purpose of negotiating a treaty. I consented to it with joy; my position was more brilliant than solid. I did not consider myself strong enough to attempt decisive measures against the Austrian monarchy; for the armies of the Rhine and the Sambre-et-Meuse, notwithstanding the superiority they had acquired since the departure of the Archduke, did not move from their cantonments on the left of the river, and I therefore could not, for a long time to come, hope for any assistance from them: at the moment I believed they designed to sacrifice me by leaving me alone to fight the combined armies of the enemy; and, moreover, I had much reason to fear for my communications.

**OPERATIONS OF JOUBERT IN THE TYROL.**—Joubert began with success: after having beaten Kerpen and Laudon separately, the first on the Lavis the twentieth of March, and the second at Neumark on the twenty-second, he had advanced to Brixen. Kerpen fell back on Sterzing, and Laudon into the valley of Meran. But the picture was soon changed. The Tyrolese are a warlike, independent, and religious people; the Austrian government had taken good care to convince them that we were the enemies of religion; moreover, the ravages inseparable from war had greatly exasperated them against us. At the call of Count Lehrbach they had rushed to arms. More than ten thousand of these now joined Laudon and enabled him to resume the offensive by descending on Botzen in the valley of the Adige. Joubert was strong enough to fight them, if he had wished to fall back; but, after the affair of the Tagliamento, I had sent him orders to retire on La Carinthia. Although surrounded by enemies, he thought it time to unite with me by passing through the valleys of the Rienz and the Drave. On the fifth of April he left Brixen and moved by Prunecken and Lientz on Villach: a bold march, which he executed through an insurgent country, and

without loss. The Tyrol being now evacuated by us as far as Trent, Kerpen marched by Rattenberg and the valley of the Salza on Muhrau in order to form a junction with the Archduke. Laudon, reinforced by the Tyrolese militia, descended the Adige, overthrew the feeble detachments which covered it, and moved toward the *terra-firma* of Venice, where all was in fermentation.

VERONESE VESPERS.—The Senate, exasperated by the events at Brescia, which I have already mentioned, thought only of vengeance. The approach of Laudon was the signal for a general insurrection of the peasantry, whom the oligarchists, and more especially the priests, had incited against us. A repetition of the Sicilian Vespers took place at Verona; all Frenchmen found in the city were massacred. General Balland, who commanded there, retired into the castle, with three thousand men. He was there besieged, on one side by Laudon, and on the other by the insurgents and a corps of Slavonians, commanded by General Fioravanti, whom the Senate had sent from Venice. But when Laudon heard of the armistice of Judenburg, he returned into the Tyrol.

VICTOR REDUCES THE INSURGENTS.—The Venetians, abandoned to themselves, were unable to resist a corps of about fifteen thousand men which General Victor had collected, by uniting his division and the several garrisons of the posts in Lombardy, under the orders of Kilmaine. Fioravanti surrendered, and the insurgents were all dispersed.

CONDITION OF THE TWO ARMIES.—In the meantime I was ardently endeavoring to conclude a treaty of peace. Independently of the above-mentioned events, which gave me just apprehensions for my communications, I saw with uneasiness that the fate of the war was to be decided under the walls of Vienna, by a battle, where the chances would not be in our favor. It is true that the junction of Joubert and Bernadotte had again given me an army of fifty thousand combatants; but the armies of the Rhine were still inactive one hundred and fifty leagues in my rear; the Archduke, sustained by the *levée-en-masse* of Hungarians, and the volunteers which the danger of the capital could not fail to rally to his aid, would still be able to oppose me with superior forces.

PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN.—I had a greater reason for not wishing again to jeopardize my reputation, as, at this juncture, the glory of making a general peace would be greater than that of a triumphal entry into the capital of the Emperor. I determined to negotiate for peace, and in this I was fully seconded by the Cabinet of Vienna. The precipitation with which it en-



tered into these negotiations plainly showed the fear with which I had inspired it. I took advantage of this fear to dictate terms. On the eighteenth of April the preliminaries were signed at Leoben, where I had established my head-quarters.

**ARMIES OF THE RHINE.**—At this very time Hoche passed the Rhine at Neuwied, at the head of a superb and well-organized army. After a series of victories over the inferior army of Werneck, he entered Frankfort on the twenty-third of April. Moreau passed the Rhine at Kehl, with the same success, and Starray, unable to arrest his progress, was driven back to Rastadt. Had these two passages been executed a month sooner, they would have given a decisive turn to the war, by carrying one hundred and twenty thousand men on the Inn; which would have secured to the Republic a still more advantageous peace, and, perhaps, have saved Venice.

**DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE.**—I now evacuated the hereditary states, and marched my army into the Venetian territory. This movement had the air of being made as a mark of good feeling toward the Emperor; but, in fact, I was anxious to secure my communications. The hostile proceedings of the Senate of Venice, much as they had annoyed me previous to the armistice, now were truly fortunate for me. At Leoben I had promised Austria indemnity for the loss of Belgium and Lombardy; but I should have been at a loss for the means of doing this had not the hostility of the Venetians furnished an occasion for making a conquest of a part of their states. On the sixteenth of May my troops occupied Venice, through the assistance of a democratic revolution, instigated by Villetard, the secretary of legation. The oligarchic government was dissolved. The Venetian patriots flattered themselves that I would permit them to establish a democratic government. But it was now too late; their fate was subordinate to the progress of the negotiations for a definitive peace. I had at first hoped to preserve the republic by selecting indemnities in the Friouli; but the turn of the negotiations did not permit it. At most I hoped it would be merely a loan to Austria, and that, on the first opening of hostilities, we could obtain its restitution. If this be weighed in the balance of severe justice, it can not be denied that the Venetians were sacrificed. But the scales of Themis are not the usual tests of national policy. Venice had rejected our alliance; her hatred of us had not been disguised; to the intrigues of Brescia she had responded by a horrible insurrection: war was declared; and the conquest was legitimate.

If the question had been merely to occupy the states of *terrafirma*, the war had been declared and ended in a single day; but

the situation of Venice, surrounded as she was by water, secured her from our attacks. Two hundred armed boats or galleys and numerous frigates prevented our approach. It was necessary to proceed with caution lest we might cause Venice to throw herself into the arms of the English, and make of this place a port impregnable in the hands of the Islanders. Our only hope of success was to neutralize, by the aid of party spirit, all its dispositions for defense. Such was the object of the movement instigated by Villetard and resulting in the provisional government. This ruse was intended to spare the blood that would necessarily be shed in a forcible conquest, and to prevent Venice from falling into the hands of maritime enemies. In this light it should be judged of by posterity. Our detractors have represented it as an act of felony. The manes of our soldiers butchered at Verona, and of Captain Laugier assassinated by the Slavonians in his own vessel in the port of Venice, will pardon, or at least palliate, our conduct, especially when it is remembered that we entered Venice with the intention of preserving the Republic by giving it some compensations on the right bank of the Po. Moreover, Venice could not be more astonished at being transferred into the hands of Austria, than were the Republics of Dantzic, Elbing, and Thorn at being made Prussians. The declarations of moralists do not change the course of events in this world. The historian Botta, after quoting with admiration the philippics of the priests, calling upon the people to assassinate us, reproves us for treating these men as enemies! Such is history!

**NAPOLEON GOES TO MILAN.**—After these events, I established my head-quarters at Passeriano, near Udina, where I waited for the Emperor's plenipotentiaries, in order to arrange the definitive conditions of peace. I had signed at Montebello, on the twenty-fourth of May, with the Duke of Gallo, a preliminary convention, in order to accelerate the progress of the negotiations. The Cabinet of Vienna having refused to ratify this, I repaired to Milan in order to hasten the organization of the Cisalpine Republic, annexing to it all the countries that naturally belonged to it, and thus to show to Austria her limits. Modena, Reggio, Bergamo, Ferrara, and Bologna were annexed to Lombardy, forming together a single state of nearly three millions of inhabitants. I was satisfied with the indications of a revival of public spirit; already the Italians began to consider themselves as good soldiers as the Germans; I had elevated their moral character in calling upon them to share the glory of our destinies.

**REVOLUTION OF GENOA.**—I profited by my sojourn at Milan to direct the democratic revolution which overthrew the Genoese oligarchy and made the Ligurian innovators entirely de-



pendent upon us; the Valteline was added to the Cisalpine Republic, whose existence was solemnly proclaimed on the ninth of July. Three centuries' constant intercourse between France and Genoa had made the latter a kind of French port; we had more partisans there than in any other city. The oligarchists alone, from fear of democratic tendencies, inclined to our enemies. The Directory, desirous of destroying aristocratic influences in all the surrounding states, could not overlook Genoa, the nearest and most important of all. In July, 1796, it directed me to demand satisfaction for certain griefs which it pretended to have against the Senate; but being then too much occupied with Wurmser, I was obliged to content myself with pecuniary satisfaction. Nevertheless, the agents of the Directory, instigated by the ambassador Faypoult, neglected no opportunity to extend the influence of the democratic party, whose progress was so rapid that the Genoese Senate soon saw itself threatened with the same fate as that of Venice.

A tennis party became the subject for a popular insurrection; on the ninth of May, the multitude disarmed the troops of the line, took possession of the gates, and appointed a committee to demand reforms of the Senate, which, too weak to make resistance, promised such changes in the constitution as should be deemed necessary. Some patricians, more bold than others, eight days afterwards, stirred up an insurrection among the colliers and peasants of the neighboring villages; a violent reaction followed; the parties fought in the streets, and the Senate triumphed. I had gone from Montebello to Milan when I heard this news. I regarded Genoa as the most important acquisition which could be made to France for the consolidation of my work in Italy. *This great fortress, perched upon rocks against which it would be exceedingly difficult to construct regular works of siege, might be the key of Lombardy, as we possessed neither Piedmont nor, as yet, the route by the Simplon.* It was then of little consequence to me whether Genoa was ruled by a patrician Doge, or by a band of plebeian conspirators; what I wanted was that *French* influence should predominate, and, as our banners were the banners of democracy, it was necessary to side with that party. I sent one of my *aids-de-camp* to Genoa to consult with Faypoult and take cognizance of all the details of the affair.

**CHANGE IN THE GENOESE CONSTITUTION.**—Called upon by the deputies of the Senate to decide these matters, I at first demanded the liberation of the French and the chiefs of the revolutionary party, and the arrest of the leaders of the reaction. Some days after, the deputation of the Senate, accompanied to Milan by Faypoult, signed with me at Montebello a convention putting an end to the Genoese oligarchy. This singular compact.

in which the French Republic appeared as the mediator between the Senate and the Genoese people, contained twelve articles, the first of which recognized the sovereignty of the people. The legislative power was confined to two representative councils, one of three hundred, and the other of one hundred and fifty members. The executive devolved upon a Senate of twelve members, with the Doge at its head. These latter, and the senators, were nominated by the two councils. Until the new government should be installed, the authority was confided to a commission of twenty-two members, presided over by the present Doge.

This form of government was not at all appropriate to the situation and character of the Genoese. Indeed, it was impossible for this little republic to be governed by a representative body of four hundred and fifty unpaid members, without substituting the aristocracy of wealth (which is the most objectionable of all aristocracies) for that which we had just abolished. But I then paid but very little attention to these matters; I regarded Liguria as an indispensable addition to France, and these changes in its constitution as temporary, and calculated rather to facilitate this annexation than permanently to ameliorate its condition. Nevertheless, the little council the next day ratified the convention of Montebello by a vote of fifty-seven to seven. From that moment the council and the colleges ceased their functions and surrendered their authority to the Doge and the provisional commission.

**NAPOLEON APPOINTS A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.**—Nothing was said in the convention of Milan about the appointment of the provisional government, but, as I was not in the habit of leaving things half done, I myself appointed the members, selecting the most distinguished democrats; and on the thirteenth of June the Doge was required to convoke this commission.

**THE DISORDERS CONTINUE.**—Although there was still some fermentation among the lower classes, a part of whom were still armed, yet the revolution was effected with order; in the evening the Golden Book was burnt by the democrats on the place of Aquaverda. The next day a decree of the provisional government abolished the *noblesse* and all feudal rights; the armorial bearings on the doors of hotels were destroyed, and, as such popular movements are never exempt from excesses, sacrilegious hands dared to break the colossal statues of those Dorias who were formerly the pride of the Genoese name.

While the legislative commission was engaged in forming a constitutional compact, I directed General Duphot to organize a corps of six thousand Ligurians to be added to the number of our auxiliaries. But the oligarchists were not yet completely re-



duced: a committee assembled at Pisa organized in the month of September the insurrection of the Riviera di Levante, and of the Bisagno. General Duphot marched against the insurgents, but was driven back into Genoa; they even got possession of Fort Eperon. But, reinforced by the inhabitants of the Ponente, the Genoese democrats, and some French troops from Tortona, Duphot finally triumphed over all their efforts, notwithstanding the instigations of the Durazzos, the Dorias, the Spinolas, and the Pallavicini. This was the last effort of a government really prudent, and friendly disposed toward France. The victim of revolutionary dogmas, some have thought it might have avoided its ruin by admitting, in 1796, a tenth part of plebeian senators and forming an alliance with France. It owed a slight sacrifice to the opinion of the age; and if, after the concession, it had fallen, the odium of it would have rested upon its enemies. Nevertheless, the Directory looked as much to its independence and neutrality as to its form of government. We desired Genoa as a base for our operations in Lombardy, so long as the direct passes of the Alps were not in our possession.

NEGOTIATIONS OF UDINA AND PASSERIANO.—The congress with Austria was first appointed to meet at Berne, but was afterwards changed to Udina, where I treated with Meerfield and Gallo. The Directory, jealous of its prerogatives, sent General Clarke as an adjunct in these negotiations, and gave me orders which must have been a great obstacle to an agreement, had not the Cabinet of Vienna itself retarded the negotiations immediately after the preliminaries had been signed. The counter-revolutionists, with Pichegru, Villot, and Imbert-Colomès at their head, had so far succeeded in the elections as to have a strong party in the councils. A violent contest took place between the executive and legislative powers; the latter, instead of assisting the operations of the government, threw all possible obstacles in its way. These internal difficulties revived the hopes of our enemies.

AFFAIRS OF ENGLAND.—The situation of our affairs with England also exercised a considerable influence upon the negotiation. The great genius of its prime minister could not save this power from receiving rude shocks in the course of this year. Ireland was in insurrection; and although Hoche's expedition failed to attain its object, still it raised the hopes of the insurgents to such a degree as to render it necessary for the government to employ force to repress them. Truguet was not discouraged by the ill-success of Hoche. The peace of Leoben had restored all his activity. He had at Cologne a superb army, which in a few weeks could be upon the shores of the Channel. They

thought to make the English tremble for their own firesides. The assistance of Spain and Holland, with their respectable naval forces, seemed to give promise of success. Spain, especially, might have added much weight to the scale, if the gold of Mexico had sufficed to procure good workmanship in her ship-yards, and a better organization and stronger emulation among her sailors. Those colossal men-of-war, the pride and predilection of Spaniards, were, for the most part, bad sailors, and required better officers than theirs to maneuver them.

**BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT.**—Nevertheless, the junction of the combined fleets in the Channel could not fail to produce great results; for the bond of union between Ireland and England was on the point of rupture. The British admiralty made every exertion to extricate itself from this embarrassment. Lord Bridport blockaded Brest; Duncan watched the Texel; and Jervis, who was in the Tagus, watched the movement of the Spanish fleet. This fleet of twenty-seven ships and ten frigates, under Admiral Cordova, an officer celebrated in the war of American independence, sailed from Carthage, passed the strait, and raised the blockade of Cadiz. Jervis had only fifteen vessels, but, full of noble confidence, he met the Spaniard half way. The battle was fought off Cape St. Vincent. The English admiral surprised the enemy, pierced his line, cut off nine of his vessels, defeated them, and captured five of his large men-of-war. Nelson, to whom much of this victory is attributed, signally distinguished himself in this battle.

**NAVAL TACTICS.**—The Spaniards, eighteen of whose vessels had not even entered into the engagement, shamefully fled to Cadiz. Jervis owed his triumph to the application of the same principles which I had adopted at Montenotte, Castiglione, and Rivoli. On land, as on the sea, the first talent of a commander is to paralyze a part of his adversary's forces, and concentrate all his own on the decisive points. It is astonishing that no French admiral ever knew how to apply this simple rule, and that all of them fought in parallel order, vessel to vessel, which is in formal opposition to the first principles of the art. Suffern is the only one who made the proper maneuver, and he owed it to chance.

After this check, the Spanish naval power was completely paralyzed. Jervis, with his force increased to twenty-one vessels, swept the Mediterranean, and the English even blockaded and bombarded Cadiz. Nelson attacked Teneriffe, but was repulsed, with the loss of an arm. In the Antilles, Admirals Harvey and Abercromby captured from the Spaniards the important post of Trinidad, which offered a point for attacking the continent of



South America. But less fortunate at Porto-Rico, the latter officer was repulsed with loss.

**MUTINY IN THE BRITISH NAVY.**—Thus all things were not prosperous with proud Albion; but even at the moment of victory, she was on the brink of ruin. A frightful insurrection broke out in the two great fleets of the Nore and the Texel. The mutiny was carried to such a pitch that the sailors took command of some of the vessels; and the fear of punishment, getting the better of their patriotism, might have induced them to steer for our ports for safety. Fortunately for England, no one thought of it, and this mutiny, produced by a discussion about pay, was suppressed by a wise union of force and concession, supported by all the powerful resources of discipline and patriotism.

**NEGOTIATIONS OF LILLE.**—These events, so well calculated to cause terror in London, joined to the certainty that Austria was in favor of peace, and that Holland and Spain might yet concert with our fleet at Brest a descent upon Ireland—all these things combined to stagger the English government. The suspension of specie payments by the bank, and the rejection of the fiscal measures of Pitt, added much to the effect produced by the mutiny in the navy. Under these circumstances the minister deemed it necessary to gain time and to negotiate a treaty of peace, afterward either executing or breaking it, as might best suit his purpose. He sent Malmesbury, on the fourth of July, to Lille, to enter into negotiations with Maret, Letourneur, and Pleville-Lepelley. The first named of these alone conducted the negotiation and met with unexpected success; the instructions of the minister, Charles Delacroix, were an almost incredible tissue of absurdities. They demanded the restitution of the vessels taken at Toulon, or an equivalent; and also, under the name of restitution, the surrender into our hands of Jersey, Guernsey, and even Gibraltar. Besides this, it was necessary to treat for France, Spain, and Holland, which rendered the negotiation a very delicate and complicated affair. Maret had too much intelligence to undertake such a mission till a change in the Directory had replaced Delacroix by Talleyrand, who left the negotiator without restraints. Thanks to his moderation and skill, the affair was most ably conducted; and he obtained for France the restitution of all her colonies, an indemnity for the vessels taken at Toulon, and even the renunciation of the title, *Roi de France*. These two last concessions were mere bagatelles, but they flattered the spirit of the time. He obtained for Spain the restitution of all her colonies except Trinidad. As to Holland, the restitution of all her colonies, without exception, was promised, but Malmesbury having observed that he could not re-

turn to the English people without preserving, for the sake of appearance, some of their trophies, it was agreed that the port of Trincomale should be declared neutral and be occupied alternately by an annual English and Dutch garrison. The English garrison was then in possession, and it was understood that no change would take place. It is worthy of observation that in this discussion Malmesbury wished to retain the Cape of Good Hope, and offered St. Helena in exchange, but Maret declined the offer. He corresponded with me through the intervention of Clarke, and we should have effected a general peace, had it not been for the tricks of Rewbel, the avowed leader of the war party.

**AFFAIRS OF THE INTERIOR—18TH FRUCTIDOR.**—I was no less thwarted by the obstacles constantly thrown in my way by the minister, Rewbel, than by the influence exercised by the councils upon the resolutions of the Cabinet of Vienna. Foreseeing the possibility of a new rupture, I urged the ratification of the treaty made some six months before with the King of Sardinia, and which the Directory, contrary to all reason, had rejected. But I was again disappointed; and in my discontent I complained bitterly to those whom I thought my friends in the Directory. It was represented to me that the republican party was likely to fall even by the hands of the constituted authorities, who, transformed into blind instruments of the *reactionnaires*, were divided into two distinct factions. Each party sought to attach to itself a distinguished general. The royalists had gained Pichegru and were now maneuvering to secure Moreau. Another party sought Hoche. My glory having excited the jealousy of many members of the Directory, they were desirous of raising up one of my rivals to balance the influence which I had acquired with the public. I determined to side with the republicans, and sent General Augereau to the Directory at Paris to take command of its troops there. Barras and his colleagues, who were in a position to know these things, assured me of the existence of a plot to overthrow the republic, and papers found in the *portefeuille* of Count d'Antragues, minister of Louis XVIII., seized at Venice, confirmed these reports. The more I engaged in political affairs, the more I was convinced of the necessity of terminating and regulating the revolution; it was the offspring of the age, and could not retrograde without the cost of oceans of blood and the humiliation of France. I therefore fully concurred in the affair of the eighteenth Fructidor, which destroyed the constitution of the year III., the offspring of Utopians, who, as a balance of power, had introduced into the state a system of perpetual squabbling, which must necessarily impede the progress of affairs. If this *coup-d'état* led to the exile of Carnot, Barthélemy, and the



fifty-three Deputies, and the gratification of mere personal animosities under the cloak of public good, the fault is to be attributed to those who deceived me; it did not depend upon me to direct its course and lead it to more beneficial results.

**FOREIGN NEGOTIATIONS.**—The newly organized Directory, with Talleyrand\* in place of Charles Delacroix, as minister of foreign affairs, did not show itself much more skillful or pacific than before. The first result of the change was the breaking off of the negotiations at Lille, where Treilhard and Bonnier had succeeded Maret and Letourneur. They imperiously refused all the demands of England, and revived the discussion of subjects which had already been agreed upon by their predecessors. Thus the swaggering vanity of Rewbel and Merlin rejected the only opportunity that occurred of arresting, by a favorable maritime peace, the threatening increase of English power on the ocean. A similar result was near being produced at Passeriano. The eighteenth Fructidor produced, on the part of France, no other change in the negotiations than the recall of Clarke,† and my being left in sole charge. The Directory refused to ratify the alliance with Sardinia, as if this treaty was to rescue a victim from its ambition. This body now opposed the cession of Venice, on the ground that it might increase the maritime power of Aus-

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\*Charles Maurice de Perigord, Prince of Talleyrand, was born at Paris, in 1754. At the breaking out of the Revolution, he was bishop of Autun, but he soon left his profession and became one of the most rabid politicians of that age. His first diplomatic mission was to England; after this he was exiled, but returned as soon as the decree of banishment was repealed. He filled many important diplomatic missions under Napoleon, who raised him, in 1805, to the dignity of sovereign prince of Benevento. In 1814 and 1815 he favored the Bourbons, and at the Congress of Vienna did everything in his power to unite the Allies against Napoleon. He joined Louis XVIII. at Ghent, and returned with him to Paris. In 1830 he was sent to London as ambassador from the new government of Louis Philippe. He died in 1838. His diplomatic talent was very great, but his reputation for intrigue is much higher than that for honesty.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

†Clarke (Henri Jacques Guillaume), Duke of Feltre, was born at Landrecies, in 1765. He was educated at the Ecole Militaire of Paris, and entered the army in 1782, and attained the grade of general in the early wars of the Revolution. Under Napoleon he acted mostly in a diplomatic character, and was rewarded for his services with the title of Duke of Feltre. He was an industrious, laborious man, and a good administrator. After the restoration, he became a servile flatterer of the Bourbons, and enjoyed considerable favor at court. His chief foible was pride of descent; he spent much of his time in hunting up old family documents, and sought to prove himself related to half of the faubourg St. Germain. His conduct as minister of Louis XVIII. did much to blast the reputation he had previously acquired under Napoleon. He died in 1818.—*Biographie Universelle*.

tria, whereas it had formerly assented to this, in the hope of gaining Mantua. It even carried its pretensions so far as to refuse all indemnity in Italy.

NAPOLEON RESIGNS.—Disgusted with the opposition and apparent distrust of the Directory, I sent in my resignation on the twenty-fifth of September, a few days after having notified the plenipotentiaries that if peace were not signed by the first of October, I would then treat only on the basis of *uti possidetis*. Uncertain what result would be produced by this declaration, I sought to detach Bavaria and Würtemberg from Austria, and sent to them, under different pretexts, General Desaix, whom curiosity had brought into Italy. But, surrounded as he was by the agents of Austria, it was impossible for this officer to succeed in his mission.

COBENTZEL TAKES PART IN NEGOTIATIONS.—The moment the imperial deputation received the news of the eighteenth Fructidor, they dispatched General Meerfield in all haste to Vienna. As the Emperor could no longer hope anything from a royalist reaction, he immediately sent Meerfield back with Count Cobentzel, who was furnished with more positive instructions. Henceforth the negotiations progressed with less interruption. But Austria did not appear any more pliant; far from renouncing Mantua, which had been assured to her in the preliminaries, she now demanded Venice, the Legations, and the line of the Adda. Indignant at such pretensions, I contested even Dalmatia and Ragusa, of which she had already taken possession. The Directory did not confine itself to these menaces: it formally declared as its *ultimatum*, to limit Austria by the Isonzo, and to send her for an indemnity to the secularizations in Germany—a circumstance that seemed to render the rupture inevitable.

NAPOLEON AND THE DIRECTORY.—In the mean time the Directory, seeing the danger of accepting my resignation after the services I had rendered the public, sent an agent to me to enter into satisfactory explanations. Having determined to continue the war, it felt that it still had need of my sword, and it now conceded everything which it had formerly refused. The army of Italy was reinforced by three demi-brigades and a regiment of cavalry; more than eight thousand *requisitionnaires* joined the skeletons of my infantry; I was also promised a *remonte* of sixteen hundred horses; it also submitted the treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with Piedmont for the ratification of the councils; finally, as a proof of its condescension, Kellerman was removed and the ambassador Cacault was recalled from Naples, because I had previously shown dissatisfaction at their conduct.



PEACE OF CAMPO-FORMIO.—I did not wait the effect of all these resolutions; but, encouraged by the secret mission of Botta, and pretty certain of the sanction of the Directory, I determined not to limit myself by the instructions of the ministers, who would have produced the same results at Passeriano as at Lille. After the usual form of high demands, made with the design of more easily obtaining the object desired, I decided abruptly to close without any further authorization. Many reasons contributed to produce this result. Our army in Italy was in a flourishing condition, and had a good base of operations in Osoppo and Palmanova; but the season was too far advanced for a campaign in Carinthia, and by allowing the Emperor the winter for organizing his forces, we would risk all the advantages of the initiative. Besides, the position of the respective armies was not in our favor. The Austrians were near the center of their power, in the neighborhood of their magazines and *dépôts*, with their flanks secured on the one side by Croatia or Hungary, and on the other by the Tyrol, all warlike provinces, ready at a moment's warning to second military operations. We, on the contrary, had everything to fear for our rear; Naples was ready to embrace the first opportunity to give vent to her hatred; Venice wished to remove us from her neighborhood; and the King of Sardinia, whose treaty of alliance had been rejected by the council, might take this occasion to declare against us. Moreover, Austria had opposed to me the main body of her forces, while the mass of ours was still on the Rhine, some two hundred leagues behind my army, which, for a month or more, would be obliged to sustain the whole weight of the war. In fine, the rupture of the Directory with England, the incoherence of the plans adopted by the government in case of war, made it my duty to be less exorbitant in my demands, and to consent to the double cession of Venice and Salzburg. Therefore, on the seventeenth of October, when everybody was expecting a renewal of hostilities, peace was signed at Campo-Formio.\*

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\*When the French *ultimatum* was made to Cobentzel, he positively refused to receive it, preferred a new trial of arms, and charged to Napoleon's obstinacy the blood that would be shed in the new contest. Upon this, Napoleon, with great coolness, although he was much irritated at this attack, arose, and took from a mantelpiece a little porcelain vase, which Count Cobentzel prized as a present from the Empress Catharine. "Well," said Napoleon, "the truce is at an end, and war is declared; but remember, that before the autumn I will shatter your monarchy as I shatter this porcelain." Saying this, he dashed it furiously down, and the carpet was instantly covered with its fragments. He then bowed to the congress and retired. The Austrian plenipotentiaries were struck dumb. A few moments afterward, they found that as Napoleon got into his carriage he had dispatched an officer to the Archduke Charles, to inform him

**CONDITIONS OF THE TREATY.**—The treaty consisted of twenty-five articles patent, ceding Belgium and Lombardy (Mantua included), and consenting to the limits of the Rhine and the Alps; the states of Venice were ceded to Austria as far as the left bank of the Adige, with the fortress of Verona and a fixed *arrondissement*. The provinces of Brescia and Bergamo, situated on the right bank, were given to the Cisalpine Republic, and the Ionian Islands to France. Fourteen secret articles, more important in some respects than the treaty itself, specified the limits of the Republic and the disposition to be made of the resulting territory. Should the Diet refuse the cessions on the left of the Rhine, the Emperor promised to give no support to the German Empire: the free navigation of this river and of the Meuse was promised: France consented to the acquisition by Austria of the country of Salzburg, and that she might receive Innviertel from Bavaria, and the city of Wasserburg on the Inn. Austria ceded the Frickthal to be given up to Switzerland, the Imperial Fiefs for Liguria, and the Brisgaw to the Duke of Modena in exchange for his states which had been amalgamated with the Cisalpine Republic. France agreed to yield the Prussian states between the Rhine and the Meuse. Indemnity was promised in Germany to the princes who had been dispossessed on the left of the Rhine, the same as to the Stadtholder. In fine, Article VII. left an opening for still further partitions, in stipulating that *if one of the contracting powers should make any acquisitions in Germany, the other might make equivalents.*

**RESULTS OF THE TREATY.**—This was a glorious peace, and might have been lasting; it was glorious inasmuch as it secured to France Belgium, the line of the Rhine and of the Alps, Mayence, great influence in Italy, and the Ionian Islands—an important possession which might secure to us the key of the Levant and afford immense maritime advantages; it might have been lasting because it gave Austria ample compensation for the provinces she had ceded to us. Being now separated from Piedmont by the Cisalpine Republic, Austria had suffered to pass into our hands

that the negotiations were broken off, and that hostilities would commence in twenty-four hours. Count Cobentzel, seriously alarmed, sent the Marquis of Gallo to Passeriano, with a signed declaration that he consented to the ultimatum of France. It was on signing the treaty on the following day, October 17th, that Napoleon directed the first article, acknowledging the French Republic, to be stricken out. "The French Republic," said he, "is like the sun; they who cannot see it must be blind. The French people are masters of their own country; they formed a republic; perhaps they may form an aristocracy to-morrow; and a monarchy the day after. It is their imprescriptable right; the form of their government is merely an affair of domestic law."—*Montholon.*



the influence over the House of Savoy and northern Italy; but her own territory, contiguous to the Adige, with Verona, Legnago, and Venice, gave her a much better base for future operations against this part of Italy. Peace ought, therefore, to have appeared to her so much the more advantageous as she had, as it were, been rewarded for her defeats. Beaten at Jemappes, Fleurus, Juliers, Loano, Ettlingen, Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione, Bassano, Arcole, Rivoli, she had, nevertheless, rounded off her territory by an addition of three millions of inhabitants; she had exchanged her distant provinces of Belgium for Galicia, which was bordering on her own frontiers; she had received the states of Venice in exchange for Lombardy, with which she could hold no communication except by passing through foreign territory; she had exchanged the port of Antwerp, blasted and ruined by the closing of the Scheldt, for that of Venice, which was much more advantageous to her commerce and to her political power. As to France, she had additional reason to rejoice at this peace, inasmuch as the English had just gained a great naval victory; Duncan had, on the eighteenth of October, at Camperduyn (Camperdown) on the coast of North Holland, beaten and destroyed half of the Dutch fleet, and this important success might raise an additional obstacle to a maritime peace, and also increase the difficulty of trading with Austria. But the highest passions were excited, and they did not fail soon to involve the two hemispheres in a new conflagration. The mania of propagandism which had seized upon the Directory, the want of any fixed system in our foreign policy, the hatred borne by all foreigners to our republican institutions, could not fail, in a short time, to provoke a new war.

**REVOLUTION OF LA VALTELINE.**—Scarcely had the treaty of Campo-Formio been signed, when new elements of discord began to rise: the revolution of the Valteline was the beginning. This country, subject to the Liges-Grises, had strong motives for wishing its emancipation; it was properly a part of Italy, as it spoke the same language, was situated on the southern slope of the Alps, and drew all its grain from Italy. Its inhabitants, excluded from all political functions, very naturally desired an order of things that would give them some part in the government. An insurrection was incited against the Grisons; these called for the mediation of France. France answered by annexing the Valteline to the Cisalpine Republic. The sterile advantage of extending the territory of this republic to the high Alps caused the danger of this junction of the Valteline to an Austran province to be overlooked. In fact, the French Republic, certain of the friendship of the Swiss, ought not to have given to a state, whose ex-

istence was as precarious as that of the Cisalpine, rights which might some day revert to the ancient possessors of Lombardy. The Valteline, united to the Grisons, closed the access of Switzerland on the side of the Tyrol, diminished the influence of Austria over the Helvetic valleys, secured the Cisalpine frontier, and perfectly covered the line of French troops called to fight on the Adige. To unite this province to a state formerly Austrian was to establish a direct contact between the upper Tyrol and the communications of the French army, to open the route of the Tonal and the Breglio by Sondrio on Milan—in fine, to give the key of the Rhetian Alps to Austria, if she should ever regain possession of the Adda.

**NEGOTIATIONS AT RASTADT.**—Austria had made peace only on her own account; it was still necessary to treat with the Empire. This crowd of petty German principalities were of themselves incapable of carrying on the war, and a treaty with them would have been a mere formality, had it not been necessary to obtain their assent to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine in favor of France, and of Salzburg and Innviertel in favor of Austria. Moreover, it was necessary to indemnify the princes who had lost territory by these arrangements. A congress was assembled at Rastadt to settle these minute and complicated questions. I repaired thither as the head of the French legation; the other members were Bonnier and Treilhard; but I soon perceived that the discussions, being no longer supported by victory, were taking a deplorable turn, which did not at all suit me. I was too much accustomed to decide authoritatively to have sufficient patience for a long and minute investigation. I therefore left Rastadt, having first provided by a military convention for the execution of the treaty of Campo-Formio, so far as concerned the transfer of Mayence to our troops and the evacuation of the other places of the Rhine by the imperialists.

**PASSAGE OF THE SIMPLON ASKED OF THE VALOIS.**—To consolidate as much as possible the young republic which I had created, I had, on leaving Italy, demanded of the Valois free passage by the Simplon for the troops returning to France. I was desirous to possess this upper valley of the Rhone, which offered us the most direct communications with Milan, especially at a time when Piedmont, still independent, might range herself on the side of our enemies. The Swiss very properly declined acceding to a demand which destroyed the system of their neutrality. The Directory, already designing to revolutionize that country and to draw it within its own meshes, was now only the more inclined to execute its imprudent project.

**DIRECTORY FOMENTS REVOLUTION IN SWITZERLAND.**—Rewbel and Talleyrand had formed the project, it is



said, of surrounding France by petty democratic republics, either to cover our frontiers by separating them from Austria, or to form a federative system capable of balancing new coalitions. They flattered themselves by this singular means to create a new system of political equilibrium, not between the masses of powers, but between the dogmas of governments! To think of defending the French Republic against European monarchies by surrounding it with a girdle of petty democratic states was a piece of Utopian diplomacy destitute of the first principles of common sense. These feeble states, instead of avoiding points of direct contact with Austria, would keep us in continual altercation; as they could only exist under the protection and patronage of France, we would be obliged to mingle in all their frontier difficulties with Austria. A Cisalpine custom-house officer could, therefore, bring about a war as easily as the *nez coupé* of the English Jeffreys had between George II. and Louis XV. Our alliance with Spain and our friendly relations with Prussia showed that it was very easy to acquire weight in the real balance of Europe without attaching to it any *doctrinaire* ideas: these in international policy have but little weight, and are more often a pretext than an object.

Conformably to this absurd project of the Directory, Mengaud was charged with stirring up at Bâle, Arau, and Zurich a revolution in which France could interfere as she had done at Genoa. Mangourit was doing the same among the Valois; and similar effects were easily produced in the Pays-de-Vaud, which had been ceded to the canton of Berne, in 1565, under the guarantee of France.

RECLAMATION OF THE VAUDOIS.—With better foundation for their demands than the Valtelines, or the *bourgeois* of *terra-firma*, and all those who demand their part of inalienable political rights, the Vaudois wished to obtain from the Bernese the same prerogatives which they had enjoyed under the Dukes of Savoy. This was nobody of politicians demanding equality; it was an enlightened people demanding for their notables the part in public affairs which belonged to them by treaties. France was the guaranteeing power, and therefore she possessed the right of intervention; but, instead of doing this nobly and in good faith, she did it in a reprehensible and underhand way.

INVASION OF BERNE.—The Vaudois rose in insurrection, drove away the Bernese magistrates (*baillés*), and called to their aid the division of Masséna, which was then cantoned in Savoy, on the banks of Lake Geneva. This division entered the country in the early part of January, under the orders of Brune, and advanced as far as the borders of the Pays-de-Vaud. The Bernese assembled in all haste a corps of twenty thousand militia on the

Sarine. The Senate of Berne, distracted by internal dissensions, and paralyzed by a powerful French party, decided to make concessions: it promised to revise its constitution in the course of a year, and to admit a number of deputies representing the ancient subjects of Vaud and Argovie. The more reasonable of the Vaudois were disposed to accept these concessions, but the majority rejected them: in times of revolution, everything is suspected and unsatisfactory; and these advantages, which really exceeded their most sanguine hopes at the outset, now appeared insufficient to the sectaries of liberty and equality, who wished all or nothing. Moreover, pacific concessions did not at all suit the views of the French Directory, who wished to profit by the frenzy of its partisans to subject all Switzerland to its influence, and to establish a central government which should be under its own domineering control. It required Berne to disband its army and to give pledges of its sincerity. The old *avoyer*, Steiger, a venerable magistrate, very different from the degenerate oligarchists of Venice and Genoa, preferred the resort to arms. Berne, showing herself as great in the moment of danger as she had been moderate in the beginning of the difficulties, most nobly answered to this appeal. The combat soon began: Schawembourg penetrated from Bienne on Soleure and on Berne with a division of the army of the Rhine, while that of Brune was driven back on the Sarine. They nevertheless formed a junction the next day at Berne. A superb arsenal and a treasure of twenty millions became the prey of the avaricious conquerors, who were much more occupied in enriching themselves with the Bernese spoils than in sustaining the political rights of the Vaudois, for which they pretended to fight.

**HELVETIC CONSTITUTION.**—A uniform constitution was concocted by Talleyrand, Ochs, and Laharpe, to bind into one bundle the uncivilized democrat of the little cantons and the proud oligarchist of Berne. It was necessary to employ artillery to impose upon the Swiss this pact of the united Helvetic Republic. I had been a warm partisan of the Vaudois; I had even advised that their just demands be sustained by diplomacy, and by an imposing demonstration; but I was indignant at the ulterior conduct of the Directory toward the Swiss. In driving these mountaineers into the arms of Austria, we lost all support to our armies on the Adige, and Italy became subject to the masters of the Rhetian Alps, which take in reverse all the lines of the Adige, the Mincio, and the Ticino. We were certain to pay dearly for this error, which cost us, in 1799, all Italy to the Var.

**NEUTRALITY OF SWITZERLAND.**—The question of Swiss neutrality was connected with the highest combinations of



European policy. The German Empire, Austria, France, and Italy were equally interested in preserving this neutrality. Without it the line of the Rhine was a vain barrier, and the Alps no longer secured France and Italy from invasion. By possessing Switzerland, France weakened instead of strengthening her power; for the slightest success of the Austrians on the banks of the Var opened to them the access of the Jura, and enabled them to attack the soil of France by the only vulnerable point of her frontier. The same reasoning applies to Italy; with the neutrality of Switzerland, France, then mistress of Mantua, of Pizzighettone, and the fortresses of Piedmont, had a very decided advantage over the imperialists, reduced as they were to the walls of Verona and to the ramparts of Palma-Nova. But destroy the prestige of this neutrality, and the least success obtained in Switzerland by an imperial army would destroy all defense in Italy, and force the French army to fall back in order to arrest the enemy on the confines of Dauphiny, or on the banks of the Rhone. The plans of the Directory, in destroying the neutrality of Switzerland and violating that territory, were, all things considered, the height of folly. In considering the increase thus given to the French line of defense, we are not to regard the mere circular extent of a hundred leagues, but the permanent contiguity of a line running from Venice by Trent and Lake Constance to the marshes of Friesland and the North Sea. This space being cut by the mass of the Alps, and the centre neutralized, each of these isolated fractions would necessarily present an independent line of operations. One might, therefore, select on either of these wings a strategic point most suitable for his operations, without being troubled with what was passing at the accessories. For example, operations by the left to cover the Rhine would be carried on between Strasburg and Mayence without any danger to the other extremity along the sea or on the neutral line. If operations were directed by the right for the protection of Lombardy, the defense would be entirely confined to the line of the Mincio or the Adige. If, on the contrary, the Swiss territory be included in the front of operations, the line of defense would extend from the Adriatic to the mouths of the Yssel, and for this entire extent of three hundred leagues every point would be exposed to an attack. The lines of the Adige and the Rhine (between Strasburg and Mayence) would then be only secondary fractions, subordinate to other operations; and, should the combatants be drawn into Switzerland, the occupant of this country, reduced to defend himself there, would be obliged to cover Bâle, Schaffhausen, Rheineck, St. Gothard, the Simplon, and Mont-Cenis, without being able to dispense with imposing

forces on the Rhine and the Po. Thus the defensive power, having its forces cut up into twenty separate corps, would be greatly exposed to an active and enterprising opponent, who, by the rapidity of his movements, might multiply his assailing forces. Indeed, the following campaign did not fail to prove that, although the salients Schaffhausen and the Simplon offer strategic advantages for a simple passage, Switzerland, as a field of operations, should never be included in the plan of a campaign. This truth is fully demonstrated by the events of 1799, and the operations of 1805 and 1809. With my title of mediator, and the powerful influence I possessed in Switzerland, I could have taken possession of that country with impunity, but interest directed me to leave it intact. However highly I valued two or three debouches, I knew how to render them subordinate to the calculations of policy, and I have proved that a route may always be found for maneuvering on the communications of the enemy, without trampling under foot national rights, and destroying the equilibrium of European states.

REVOLUTION IN ROME.—A few days before the fall of Berne, Rome had surrendered to Berthier. My brother Joseph had been named ambassador near the Holy See. All Italy was then in a fever: it was a strife who should plant the first tree of liberty. Naples was also in fermentation, and the prisons were insufficient to contain all who were arrested on suspicion. Rome could not, in this revolutionary excitement, forget entirely her former greatness: all who, in the country of Cicero, of Emilius, and of Brutus, could read their alphabet, threw off the monastic and pontifical yoke to bring back the glorious days of the consular government, and, strange as it may seem, a part of the clergy partook of these sentiments. Since the peace of Tolentino, harmony had been but partially established: Joseph felt that he must act with prudence. The partisans of France exhibited a desire to reëstablish the Roman Republic, but he persuaded them from the project. Being afterward indirectly informed that a conspiracy would break out on the twenty-sixth of December, he thought to give proof of his loyalty to the Holy See by frankly reporting the facts to the Cardinal Secretary of State, Doria. But these princes of the church were too much prejudiced against us to appreciate such an act of kindness. They redoubled their watchfulness and severity, but, in spite of all their precautions, an insurrection actually broke out on the twenty-eighth, in the vicinity of the palace of France; the multitude invaded the *enciente* of its jurisdiction, crying out: *Long live the Roman Republic! Long live the French Republic!* Charged upon by the gendarmes and the trabans of the Pope, this crowd took refuge under the portico of the palace,



which it was impossible to prevent. They were pursued and fired upon, even in the courts.

PROCLAMATION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.—This act was a violation of the law of nations. Young General Duphot, an officer of merit, affianced to one of my sisters, rushed out, sword in hand, to defend an asylum regarded as sacred, and was basely murdered, being pierced with many balls. The quality of the offender adds to the heinousness of the offense. Such an act on the part of the *sbirri* of the Pope could not be passed over unpunished. Berthier marched upon Rome, and encamped, on the tenth of February, at the head of two divisions under the walls of the castle St. Angelo. Five days after, at the foot even of the Quirinal, was heard the cry of Roman Liberty, a cry that had not been uttered in the vicinity of the capital since the famous conspiracy of Rienzi. The people assembled in the Forum, like their illustrious ancestors, drew up a declaration of their enfranchisement, and proclaimed their consuls, a senate, and tribunes. It was a ridiculous parody of the Rome of the Scipios; but these magic words struck the minds of the rest of Europe, and if the Directory had been more skillful, and better advised in the choice of its agents, it might have drawn immense advantage from it. Berthier, yielding to the wishes of the people, marched at the head of his grenadiers to the capital, and there proclaimed the recognition of the Roman Republic. The Pope had no other alternative than to abdicate; and, what was exceedingly annoying to Pius VI., this revolution took place on the fifteenth of February, the twenty-fifth anniversary of his pontificate, and three days after, to return thanks for the abolition of his sovereignty, and the reëstablishment of the Roman Republic, a solemn *Te Deum* was chanted in *St. Peter's* by fourteen cardinals! On the twentieth of February the Pope left Rome, never to return; Berthier gave him an escort. He repaired to the Carthusian monastery of Pisa, where he remained till the thirtieth of April, 1799, when he was transferred to France. The conquest of Rome became an unfortunate affair by the ulterior faults which followed it, and the great extension it gave to our line of operations. The government of Rome should have been organized, and a small corps left for its defense, the rest of the army being withdrawn to the line of the Adige. This rich city was overrun by military chiefs, who were not very delicate in their distinctions of *meum* and *tuum*, and more particularly by numerous depredating civil agents, who fell upon the treasures of St. Peter like a cloud of vampires. The army was left without food or pay, while these rascally civilians were swimming in gold; it mutinied, as the British seamen had done a year before, and if a military revolt is ever susceptible of excuse, it certainly was

under such circumstances. Masséna, who had succeeded Berthier, was forced to leave the army, which he could not recall to duty, and which accused him (unjustly, perhaps) of not only tolerating these abuses, but even of participating in them. Two such events as the invasion of Rome and Switzerland were more than sufficient to put an end to the peace of Campo-Formio; indeed, under the circumstances, that treaty could be little more than a truce.

**NAPOLEON'S RECEPTION AT PARIS.**—While these events were preparing a new storm, my new title of general-in-chief of the army of England, and still more, the project of an expedition into Egypt, called me from Rastadt to Paris. I could not better celebrate my return to the capital than by bringing there the ratification of peace. Therefore, I was received with transports bordering on delirium. All hearts opened to hope; the wounds of *La Patria* were about to be healed; with her glory raised to the clouds, France was about to reëstablish her political relations on both continents, and, sooner or later, force England into a peace which would secure our conquests; industry, the arts, commerce, would then take the impetus which the Revolution seemed calculated to impress: in a word, every thing seemed to promise a rich and prosperous future. The Directory, giving me a formal audience on the tenth of December, at the Luxembourg, proclaimed me *the man of Providence, one of those rare prodigies which Nature bestows upon the human race only at periods far remote*. France did not fail to echo the pompous eulogy of its president. I was forced to take refuge under the modest garb of a member of the Institute in order to escape the importune acclamations of a people always enthusiastic in its admiration and ever ready to change its object. The authorities were emulous in giving testimony of national gratitude. A committee of the Council of Ancients passed an act presenting me with the estate of Chambord and a grand hotel in the capital; but the Directory, alarmed at the proposition, refused its assent.

**GENERAL REMARKS.**—During the two years that I had commanded in Italy, I had filled the world with the *éclat* of my victories; the coalition had been dissolved; the Emperor and the princes of the empire had formally recognized the French Republic; all Italy had submitted to our laws and influence; two new republics, like the French, had been created; England alone remained in arms, but she had manifested a desire for peace, and the fault of its not being signed rested with the Directory. To these great results in the external relations of the Republic, must be added advantages gained in its interior administration and in its military power. At no time had the French soldiers shown



so decided a superiority. It was due to the influence of the victories in Italy, that the armies of the Rhine and the Sambre-et-Meuse had been able to carry the French standards to the banks of the Lech. At the beginning of 1796, the Emperor had one hundred and sixty thousand troops on the Rhine, ready to invade France. Our brave but undisciplined armies were then scarcely capable of securing the fortified lines of defense, much less of making conquests. The victories of Montenotte, of Lodi, etc., carried the alarm to Vienna; they forced the Aulic Council to recall from its armies in Germany Marshal Wurmser, the Archduke Charles, and more than sixty thousand men, thus establishing the equilibrium there, and enabling Moreau and Jourdan to resume the offensive. More than one hundred and twenty millions of extraordinary contributions had been raised in Italy; one half of this had supported my army, and the other half, transmitted to the treasury of Paris, had assisted in providing for the expenses of the interior and the support of the armies of the Rhine. In addition to all this, the treasury owed to my victories an annual saving of seventy millions, which, in 1796, was required for the support of the armies of the Alps and of Italy. Considerable provision had also been made in hemp and ship-timber, and the vessels captured at Genoa, Leghorn, and Venice had greatly increased our naval force at Toulon. The National Museum had been enriched by *chefs-d'oeuvre* of the arts from Parma, Florence, and Rome, which were valued at more than two hundred millions. The commerce of Lyons, Provence, and Dauphiny had begun to revive the moment the great *débouché* of the Alps was opened. The naval forces at Toulon, reorganized and reinforced by the squadrons of Spain, now ruled the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the Levant. Happy days seemed assured to France, and for these she was indebted to the conquerors of Italy.

## CHAPTER IV.

## NAPOLEON'S EXPEDITION INTO EGYPT.

Difficulties of Napoleon's Position at Paris—Origin of the War in Egypt—State of Hindostan—Projects of the Sultan of Mysore, and the Apathy of France—State of the English Forces—Object of the Expedition into Egypt—Napoleon examines the Port of Antwerp—The Continent again involved in hostile Preparations—Napoleon departs from Toulon—Capture of Malta—Debarkation at Alexandria—March on Cairo—Battle of the Pyramids—Entrance into Cairo—Naval Battle of Aboukir—Results of this Battle—Difficulties with the Porte—Revolt of Cairo—Expedition into Syria—Passage of the Desert, and taking of Jaffa—Resistance of St.-Jean-d'Acre—Battle of Mont-Tabor—Continuation of the Siege of St.-Jean-d'Acre—Raising of this Siege—Return to Cairo—Debarkation and Battle of Aboukir—Napoleon decides to return to France.

## DIFFICULTIES OF NAPOLEON'S POSITION AT PARIS.

—My brilliant reception in the capital was sufficient to flatter the vanity of the most modest, and to incite the least ambitious. It was evident that I could aspire to everything in France. Nevertheless, the moment had not yet arrived to profit by this popularity; it was necessary to wait until the Directory should entirely destroy its own influence. France had proclaimed me her hero; but this was not sufficient, and to become the head of the state, it was necessary to be its savior and restorer. However great my claim to the national gratitude, it did not give me the right of overthrowing an established government to which I owed my rapid advancement and a part even of my glory: it would eventually destroy itself by its own incapacity and the disasters it would bring upon France; then only could I appear on the stage as the savior of my country. I knew well what would be the inevitable course of events. It was only necessary to leave the silly heads of the Directory to their own measures; for, independently of the weakness of the individuals composing this body, it could not, from the nature of things, continue a long time. Either the Directory would attempt to seize the dictatorship, like the Committee of Public Safety, or it would itself fall a prey to anarchy,



like the Executive Council of 1792; in either case, its fall was inevitable.

ORIGIN OF THE WAR IN EGYPT.—Nevertheless, the part I had to play was embarrassing. They had conferred upon me the pompous but illusory title of general-in-chief of the army of England. This was a mere bugbear, by which the Cabinet of London was not to be duped; there was nothing prepared at that epoch to give to the project any reality; all that could possibly be done was to throw some twenty or thirty thousand men into Ireland: an enterprise, advantageous without doubt, but not suited to my ambition. I was too important a personage to remain with folded arms at Paris. Although the Directory had mingled its acclamations with those of all France, I knew that Rewbel and Merlin were secretly opposed to me: under a pretext of a hierarchy of powers, they censured the resolution which I had taken of my own accord; they accused me of having treated with Austria instead of marching upon Vienna, which, in their opinion, would have secured the revolution of Germany, and given Rewbel the pleasure of fabricating a few democratic republics from the *débris* of the Holy Empire! This was, according to them, the most infallible means of securing the triumph of the principles and the preponderance of France over all her neighbors. They supposed an empire like Austria could be revolutionized as easily as Rome or Milan, or rather, they were ignorant that no one could be less disposed in favor of their Utopian theories than the subjects of the Court of Vienna. Their shallow declamations against me were scandalous. It was necessary for me to take some step; for every day the most opposite factions knocked at my door: now, the royalist agents sought to demonstrate to me the impossibility of continuing the republican system in France, and to induce me to restore the monarchy; now, the most ardent sectaries of the Republic came to complain of the assaults of the Directory upon liberty, and to urge me to act the Gracchus. I was therefore obliged to make common cause with the Directory, or to join in the conspiracy against it. I was unwilling to do either. The only reasonable course for me to pursue was to absent myself, and to do so with *éclat*. I knew that to keep the public attention fixed on me it was necessary to attempt something extraordinary. Many anonymous letters, very well written, had already been addressed to me, warning me of the difficult part which I had to play in France. One of these letters advised me to form a state for myself in Italy, as Dumouriez had thought to do in Holland. But I was not foolish enough to do this. I shall allude to this proposition again.

I had spoken vaguely during the negotiations of Campo-

Formio of a project on Egypt, although I had then no idea of taking charge of it myself. Talleyrand had also mentioned it. On my return, I offered to put it in execution. As the results might be immense, the enterprise seemed worthy of my ambition. Of course the majority of the Directory received with delight a proposition for ridding themselves of a pacificator whose popularity they feared. They were therefore enchanted to see me thus anticipate their wishes by a voluntary exile. Some statesmen wished to retain me, endeavoring to convince me that I was called by the circumstances of the time to take the helm of affairs. I replied that the pear was not yet ripe, and that I was going to win new titles to their confidence.

We had no very accurate idea of what was passing in the East, for the loss of Pondicherry and the European embarrassments of the Republic had withdrawn attention from that quarter. But we remembered that Tippoo-Saib, chief of the empire of Mysore, founded by Hyder-Aly with the assistance of France, had proposed to Louis XVI., in 1788, to drive the English from India, if France would assist him with eight thousand European troops, and with a good number of officers to lead his forces; and that Louis XVI., on account of the internal troubles of France, had not accepted a proposition which would have embarrassed him with a maritime war at the moment when he was threatened with a revolution. Finally, we knew that the English, to punish Tippoo for this message, had assisted the Nizam against him, and, having besieged him in Seringapatam, had forced him into a treaty in 1792, stripping him of half his dominions. We therefore had reason to expect some support from the Sultan of Mysore. We also knew that the Mahrattas, although enemies of the Mogul and Mussulman race, were equally hostile to the English East India Company, and that it might be possible to find among them the elements of a powerful alliance. But to appreciate fully the expedition into Egypt, it will be necessary to speak more particularly of the real state of India prior to that epoch.

**STATE OF HINDOSTAN.**—The Tartar prince Aureng-Zeb, contemporary of Louis XIV., extending the conquests of his predecessors, founded in the centre of India the Mogul empire, with a population of not less than fifty millions, a revenue of nine hundred millions, and an army of eight hundred thousand men. This immense empire was divided into numerous provinces, governed by Subadars and Nabobs. This conqueror died in 1707; and such is the miserable condition of the despotic dynasties of the East, that his successors, in the short space of forty years, harassed by their own vassals and attacked by the Persians under the terrible Thamas Kouli-Kan and by the Mahrattas, were compelled to ask



the aid of Europeans, and to surrender to them several provinces. The stories of the revolutions and counter-revolutions that have taken place within the last fifty years in the *presqu'île* of the Ganges seem more like Arabian tales than history. Passing over the details of these contests, we will look merely at the general results.

It was not till the middle of the eighteenth century that the British East India Company, appreciating the system proposed by the skillful Dupleix for France, began to take part in the quarrels of the native princes. Here, as in Europe, the British policy was to *divide and conquer*. At one time sustaining the Hindostan princes against Mussulmans of the Mogul dynasty, and at another taking the part of the latter against the natives, if these seemed too strong, this Company succeeded in appropriating to itself the most important parts of the territory of both its *protégés* and its enemies. At the epoch of the French Revolution, India was divided into five principal states: those governed by Mussulman princes were at the south; Mysore, subject to Tippoo-Saib; at the north, Mogul, subject nominally to Schah-Alloun, but in fact to his principal officers; still further north, Zeman-Schah reigned over the Afghans, who inhabited Candahar and Cabul. By the side of this kingdom lay that of Beloochistan, inhabited by a warlike and savage people. In the centre of the *presqu'île* was the empire of the Mahrattas, founded by Sevaji, an Indian prince, who, having maintained himself in possession of the kingdom of Sattara, afterward succeeded in capturing the greater part of the conquests of the Moguls in the Deccan. Soon after his death all the petty tributary princes rendered themselves independent of the great rajahs who succeeded him, and whose authority was successively circumscribed to the fortress of Sattara. Feigning to recognize the right of this family to the crown, the Peishwah, its prime minister, obtained absolute power over the northern part of the *presqu'île*, where he founded the kingdom of Poonah. Madaji-Schindiah did the same in the north and east. This able man, conquering the army of Ismaël-Beg, and succoring Schah-Alloun against the ferocious Golaem-Cadir, succeeded in reëstablishing the preponderance of the Mahrattas in the states of Mogul, where he exercised supreme authority in the name of the Emperor, to whom he left only the palace and a small income; sole heritage of the colossal power of Aureng-Zeb. Madaji-Schindiah had been seconded in his operations by a European corps, or one organized and instructed in the European manner by a Savoyard officer named Boigne. This celebrated Mahratta died in 1794; and his nephew, Dowlut-Row, without inheriting his talents, pursued his system, preserved his preponderance over the Mogul, and succeed-

ed in extending it, in 1796, as far as the states of the Peishwah, placing Bodje-Row, whom he held entirely under his tutelage, on the throne of Poonah. General Peyron had succeeded Boigne in the command of the army of Schindiah, composed of five brigades of European organization, thirty-four thousand well-disciplined infantry, and a very large force of cavalry. A third Mahratta state, governed by the Rajah of Berrar, extended to the north of the Deccan: although less powerful than the two preceding, it was one of the most formidable members of the confederation. The family of Holkar reigned over Malwa, and twenty other petty feudatory princes, independent of these, had *diaghirs*, a kind of dotation. It thus appears that the Mahratta people formed a numerous confederation, much like the German Empire, differing from it only in the nature of Eastern organization and Eastern institutions. The Hindoo confederation presented, in fact, the singular spectacle of a great hereditary rajah possessing vast dominions without authority, and surrounded by two great dignitaries, who, not satisfied with making their power hereditary, did not scruple to divide among themselves the domains of the prince from whom they received the investiture. Still more to be pitied, the Emperor of the Moguls distributed crowns without the power of retaining one, for, properly speaking, he was a sovereign without subjects; a despot incapable of making himself obeyed, he sold to adventurers the right of exercising absolute authority in his provinces; poor, though all the money of Hindostan was stamped with his image, he prided himself in having great kings for his tributaries, though he depended upon their generosity for his own support.

The finesse of Lord Clive, the profound Machiavellism of Hastings, and the wise policy of Lord Cornwallis had successively been directed to connect the Company with the complicated interests of these states, and to intermeddle in their differences with an appearance of loyalty. Always appearing upon the scene as an umpire, this Company was enabled to arrange the conditions of treaties to suit its own interests; it aided the weaker power against the stronger for the double purpose of profiting by the spoils of the latter and of removing all obstacles to its own ambition. Thus, by the aid of the Mahrattas and the Nizam, it had, in 1792, conquered Tippoo-Saib, whom it could not forgive for having sent ambassadors to Louis XVI. with proposals for expelling the English from India. Two years after, the Mahrattas in their turn attacked the Nizam, overrun the country with two hundred thousand men, without any efforts on the part of the English Company to succor this prince, whom it held under its tutelage. Either dissatisfied with this conduct of the Company, or aspiring



to independence, he had confided to an officer named Raymond the care of organizing, in the European manner, an army of fifteen thousand men, and gave him, for their pay, the revenue of a rich province.

**PROJECTS OF THE SULTAN OF MYSORE.**—Tippoo-Saib, since the unfortunate treaty of Seringapatam, which had deprived him of half his empire, had thought only of vengeance. France, distracted by anarchy and discouraged by the loss of Pondicherry, seemed to have forgotten the advantage it might derive from the hostile disposition of the people of Hindostan against the English Company. Not a vessel, not a man had been sent to India; and from the carelessness of the governors of the Isle-of-France, one would suppose that the very existence of the two *presqu'iles* of the Ganges had been entirely forgotten. At the end of 1796, Truguet had thought of sending assistance to the Sultan of Mysore, but his project was based on the possibility of forming battalions of negroes in the plantations of the Isle-of-France, and its execution was never even begun. A few adventurers were on the eve of doing what Louis XVI. and the Committee of Public Safety had neglected. Rippaud, a Corsican, cast away on the coast of Mangalore, was taken to Tippoo-Saib, and by relating the victories of the Republican armies in Europe, excited in that chief the hope of obtaining succor from the ancient allies of his father. He sent an ambassador to the Isle-of-France with a project of alliance to be submitted to the Directory; a project so well combined that it would have done credit to the best European diplomatist. The reply of Governor Malartie shows that it was not appreciated by him; he, however, sent to the Sultan thirty non-commissioned officers, artillerymen, and artisans, who were estimated at a high price, but who disgraced the French uniform by their revolutionary extravagances, and furnished a pretext to the English Company to assail the Sultan of Mysore. We have reason for believing that the Directory were never well informed of what took place on this occasion. Nevertheless Tippoo did not stop here: seeking to allay the rivalry of the Mahrattas, he sought to arm the Peishwah and Schindiah against the Company; and, carrying his views still further, he sought the alliance of Zeman-Schah. The joint forces of these several states might amount to fifty thousand men armed and disciplined as Europeans, and three hundred thousand soldiers of the native organization. If the tumultuous impetuosity of the Mahrattas, the chivalric bravery of the Rajpootas, and the unbridled ambition of the chiefs, had been so directed as to act in concert for the deliverance of India, no doubt this formidable coalition would have soon triumphed over the English, particularly if a French division, commanded by an

able general, had served to regulate the operations of these combined forces.

**STATE OF THE ENGLISH FORCES.**—The English East India Company had then for allies only two or three subaltern nabobs and the Nizam; still this last, in sending the English battalions of its guard to throw themselves into the hands of Raymond, gave reason to think that it would return sooner or later to the policy of its predecessor, who had fought under the flag of Hyder-Ali. But the Company had now become redoubtable in itself, for each of the three Presidencies of which it was composed formed veritable empires. The first of these, including Calcutta, Bengal, the coast of Orissa, and the rich valley of the Ganges as far as Oude, was the centre of the general government, and was equal to the mother country in power and wealth. The second, composed of the possessions of the Deccan about Madras, had its seat of government in that city. The third, established at Bombay, united the establishments of Malabar and Surat to the factories of the Persian Gulf. The joint forces of these Presidencies amounted to twenty-five thousand Europeans and sixty thousand well-organized Sepoys.

**OBJECT OF THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.**—Such was the state of India when I undertook to open a direct communication with that country. I was convinced that this was the shortest way to reach the heart of England, for at this epoch India was everything to her, excluded as she was from the greater part of the American continent. The expedition to Egypt had three objects: 1st. To establish on the Nile a French colony, which, without resorting to slave labor, might supply the loss of St. Domingo and all the sugar islands; 2d. To open to our manufacturers new outlets in Africa, Arabia, and Syria, and to furnish to our commerce all the productions of this part of the world; 3d. To furnish a base of operations for moving an army of fifty thousand men on the Indus, and of raising the Mahrattas, the Hindoos, the Mussulmans—in a word, all the oppressed people of these vast countries. An army, one half of Europeans and the other half of the people of the burning climates of the tropics, transported by ten thousand horses and as many camels, carrying with them provisions for fifty or sixty days, and water for five or six, and a doubly furnished train of artillery with one hundred and fifty field-pieces, would reach the Indies in four months. The desert is no obstacle to an army abundantly supplied with camels and dromedaries. This expedition would give an exalted idea of the French power; it would draw public attention to its chiefs; it would surprise Europe by its boldness—these motives were more than sufficient to induce me to attempt it.



Egypt, it is true, was tributary to the Ottoman Porte, who was one of the oldest allies of France, and who, since the age of Francis I., had made common cause with her. But the Mameluke being the true master of the country, and in open revolt against the Grand Seigneur, we had reason to believe that the Divan, already fully occupied with war against Passwan Oglu, Pacha of Widdin, and against the Wechtabies, and so weak as to be unable to reduce a large body of insurgent pachas, would not blindly join our enemies for the mere shadow of suzerainty, which, if necessary, we could acknowledge as well as the Mamelukes. We had every reason to expect, with a skillful negotiator, to succeed in convincing the Divan of our friendly disposition.

**NAPOLEON INSPECTS THE PORT OF ANTWERP.**—Full of confidence in the results of my mission, I urged forward the preparations for my departure. But in order to distract the attention of the enemy from the ports of the Mediterranean, where everything was in full activity, I profited by my title of general-in-chief of the army of England to make an inspection of the ports of the coast. Having gone as far as Antwerp, I saw in the superb basin of the Scheldt the important advantages that might one day be derived from this position: it had upon me the same effect as the beautiful Neva had upon Peter the Great.

**NEW TROUBLES ON THE CONTINENT.**—In the meantime the political horizon of the continent was again overcast. After my departure from Rastadt, the congress had broken off the discussions upon the conditions of peace with the German Empire. The French plenipotentiaries had difficulty in obtaining the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, for it overturned the constitution of that empire by absorbing the three electorates of Mayence, Trèves, and Cologne. But the great powers, having tasted the benefits of secularization, hoped to make acquisitions at their convenience. Austria thought to secularize the archbishoprics of Salzburg, Passau, and Trent; Bavaria, the bishoprics of Franconia (Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Aichstedt); Prussia, those of Münster, Paderborn, etc. These powers, therefore, definitely agreed to the line of the Rhine. It was a vain formality, for the Directory, in its presumptuous career of propagandism, was already embroiling the whole continent in new difficulties. England took advantage of these difficulties to form a new coalition, and sounded the alarm at the same time at St. Petersburg, at Vienna, Berlin, Turin, in Tuscany, and at Naples. It was generally believed that the Empress of Russia, at the moment of her death, was about signing a treaty of subsidy with England. Already an imperial ukase had ordered a levy of one hundred and thirty thousand recruits; whether these preparations were intended for taking part

in the continental contest, or for the conquest of Turkey, or to punish the young Gustavus of Sweden for his rupture of the contract of marriage with the Grand Duchess Alexandrina, they announced the approach of great events. But the Emperor Paul, in ascending the throne, instantly changed the affairs of the North. He revoked the levy, and directed his whole attention to the internal affairs of his vast empire. These pacific demonstrations had an immediate influence upon the Russian finances, the price of paper money even exceeding its nominal value. But the whimsical character of the Emperor gave hope to the Cabinet of London that he might yet be induced to join in the war against France, and no means for obtaining this object were left untried. At this time an event took place at Vienna which might serve, in some degree, as an index of the popular feelings of the Austrians, and of the present sentiments of the government. Bernadotte, our ambassador at Vienna, had raised the tricolored flag on his hotel in celebration of a victory over the Austrians. The hotel of the embassy was attacked by an irritated populace, and the flag seized and burnt; Bernadotte left Vienna the next day. The Directory at first wished to declare war, and to place me in command; but I persuaded it from such a course, demonstrating that Bernadotte was in the wrong, and that Austria, if resolved on war, would have avoided such a hasty and immature act. Nevertheless, there were other circumstances which indicated new difficulties. I, therefore, wished to defer my departure, but the Directory, having settled the affair of Bernadotte, insisted; and, placed in the alternative of ruin or obedience, I complied. The Directory, delighted at getting rid of me, granted all my requests. I prepared my departure in profound secrecy; this was necessary for its success, and added to the singular character of the expedition. Never were such formidable preparations better disguised.

**DEPARTURE FROM TOULON.**—I repaired to Toulon on the tenth of May, 1798. On the nineteenth, I set sail with thirteen ships of the line, six frigates, and transports for twenty-five thousand troops. I was joined at sea by the squadrons from Bastia, Genoa, and Civita-Vecchia, with seven or eight thousand men who also belonged to the expedition. On the ninth of June, we reached Malta.

**TAKING OF MALTA.**—I had maintained an understanding with a small number of French officers, more devoted to their country than to this knighthood, already falling to decay; the Order had made no preparations for defense; nothing was ready to oppose us, and if we had not taken possession, it is certain that the English would have done so, for this post was essential for our communications with France. I feared lest some measure of



their former glory might induce the knights to defend themselves which might have retarded, and perhaps defeated, my expedition: fortunately for us, they surrendered more readily even than I had hoped, and thus placed in my hands one of the strongest works in Europe.

**DEBARKATION AT ALEXANDRIA.**—After having left a good garrison at Malta with the necessary instructions for its defense, I continued my voyage with rare good luck. The English fleet in pursuit crossed our course without meeting us. It arrived at Alexandria before us; but Nelson, hearing that we had not been there, went in search of us on the coast of Syria. We reached Alexandria on the evening of the thirtieth of June. I commenced the debarkation the same night at the anchorage of Marabou, and the next day I marched on Alexandria with the part of my army which had already debarked. A column followed the shore of Marabou, and made an attack on the side of the New Port. Two others turned the city, and assailed it on the side of Pompey's Pillar and the gate of Rosetta. A numerous population manned the walls and the towers of the city of the Arabs. My artillery had not yet been landed; nevertheless, our columns carried the first *enciente* by assault; the new city and the forts capitulated the same day. The possession of Alexandria gave me a secure footing in Egypt. The debarkation continued without obstacle. My army, thirty thousand strong, was divided into five divisions under the orders of Generals Kléber,\* Desaix,† Reynier,‡

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\*Kléber (Jean-Baptiste) was born at Strasbourg, in 1754. His parents were poor, but his early education was attended to by the curate of a village of Alsace. He was admitted, while still young, into the military school of Bavaria, where he completed his education and was commissioned in the army of the Electorate. He afterward resigned and returned to France. He entered the French army in 1792 and distinguished himself at the defense of Mayence. He served in the following campaigns, and had already acquired a brilliant reputation when he started on this expedition, which has immortalized his name.

†Desaix (Louis Charles Antoine) was born at St.-Hilaire-d'Ayat, in 1768. He was educated at the military school of Effiat, and at the age of fifteen entered the army as sub-lieutenant. He early distinguished himself for his enthusiastic love of study. His promotion was very rapid, for we find him a brigadier-general in 1793; in 1794 he was made general-of-division and greatly distinguished himself with the northern army, and also, in 1796, with the army of the Rhine. He joined Napoleon in Italy in 1797. A mutual attachment was instantly formed, which continued till the death of Desaix on the field of Marengo.

‡Reynier (Jean Louis Ebenezer) was born at Lausanne, in 1771. He received a scientific education to prepare him for the profession of engineer. He entered the military service in 1792, and was made general-of-brigade in 1794. He had greatly distinguished himself previous to the campaign in

Bon,\* and Menou;† my cavalry, amounting to three thousand men, had only three hundred horses; the remainder were to be mounted in this country.

**MARCH ON CAIRO.**—To give the Mamelukes no time to concert means of defense, it was essential to push forward rapidly the conquest of Egypt. The *élite* of their forces was composed of cavalry, the most redoubtable in the world; their infantry were merely militia, inferior in every respect to our soldiers. Success depended on the rapidity of our attacks and the consternation produced by our victories. The Crusaders had failed against Egypt because theirs was a war of religion, carried on against the entire masses of Islamism. This danger was now to be avoided. Thanks to the revolts and independence of the Mamelukes, the Mussulman population was divided; we came as the friends of the Porte and thus gained a good part of the Turks. Victory is always the surest means of making partisans; by offering at the same time the laurel and the olive, we might gain those who were inclined to peace, and whom the violent administration of a war-like horde rendered very unhappy. St. Louis had required four months to reach Cairo, and had there halted; I would reach there in fifteen days, and immediately push forward to other conquests.

I left Alexandria on the sixth of July; and directed my march across the desert upon Rahmania, where I was rejoined by Kléber, who had marched by Rosetta, taking possession of this place. On the way we first encountered the Mamelukes, a part of whom

Egypt. He served in the south of Italy during the campaigns of 1805 and 1806. He served in Spain, and also under Napoleon, in the campaigns of 1809, 1812, and 1813. He was made prisoner at the battle of Leipzig, and died in the beginning of 1814. He was the author of several works on Egypt.

\*Bon (L. A.), born at Romans, in 1758, first entered the army in 1775, but, after some years' service in the colonies, retired to civil life. He again entered the army in 1792, and in 1794 was made general-of-brigade. He distinguished himself in the Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, and won great admiration by his bravery and skill in Egypt. He was killed at the siege of St.-Jean-d'Acre. His widow and family were afterward most liberally provided for by Napoleon.

†Menou (Jacques François) was born in Touraine, in 1750. He was of a noble family and was a *maréchal-de-camp* in the army before the Revolution. He was a politician of some distinction, but had seen little service; he owed his place in the army of Egypt rather to political influence than to military merit. After the death of Kléber, he became the commander-in-chief, but was utterly incompetent for the duties of his station. After his return to France, he received from Napoleon several political appointments, but was no longer employed on military service. He died in 1810.—*Biographie Universelle*.



were repulsed by my advanced guard under Desaix. We now ascended the Nile, and pressed forward toward Cairo.

**COMBAT OF CHEBREISS.**—But, before reaching the capital of Egypt, it was necessary to fight. On the thirteenth of July we encountered Mourad-Bey, the most courageous of all the Mameluke chiefs, who was posted, with four thousand horsemen, near the village of Chebreiss, with his right flank covered by a flotilla. Nothing can compare with the beauty of the *coup-d'oeil* presented by this African cavalry; the elegant figures of the Arabian horses, relieved by the richest trappings; the martial air of the riders, the variegated brilliancy of their costumes, the superb turbans enriched with their plumes of office; all together presented to us a spectacle new and peculiar. The Turkish cavalry, which is really very fine, is, however, far from equal to that of the Mamelukes. The combat began between the flotillas; ours, which, in ascending the Nile, kept pace with our march, was first attacked by the enemy. To disengage it, I attacked Mourad-Bey. I adopted the order of battle used by the Russians against the Turks, each division being formed in squares enclosing the equipages, and the few cavalry which I possessed. These squares were disposed in echelons so as to flank each other. In vain did the Mamelukes present themselves against the different sides of the squares; at last, harassed by the fire of my artillery, they fell back toward the capital.

**BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS.**—On the twenty-first of July we arrived in sight of Cairo; we had seen the pyramids for some days. The aspect of these wonderful monuments of antiquity, braving the storms of ages, and now surrounded by the superb cavalry of the Mamelukes caracoling in the plain, excited in the breasts of my soldiers a mingled feeling of astonishment and pride. I profited by this to raise their enthusiasm to the highest pitch, addressing them in words as lasting as the Pyramids themselves.

"Soldiers! you have come to rescue Egypt from barbarism; to bring civilization into the East; and to save this beautiful land from the yoke of England. Forty centuries are looking down upon you from the tops of these monuments!"

Mourad-Bey had armed the village of Embabeh with artillery, and the intrenchments with militia, supported by six thousand Mameluke and Arabian cavalry. I advanced with my squares. Desaix and Reynier were to extend their line, the right in advance, so as to cut off all communication from Embabeh to the upper valley of the Nile, while the divisions of Bon and Kléber should attack the front of the intrenchments. The Mame-

lukes seeing Desaix in march, attacked him in great numbers; but all their brilliant charges failed against the intrepidity of the French squares. Never were charges better made, or better sustained; but the vigor and ardor of these famous Mameluke horsemen even augmented the disorder in their own ranks; unable to penetrate our squares, they sought to die in the attempt. At the left the intrenchments of Embabeh were carried by our troops, and the enemy, seeing himself shut in between our line of squares and the Nile, fled toward Upper Egypt, except fifteen hundred men who were drowned in the river; and their camp and forty pieces of artillery fell into our hands.

NAPOLEON ENTERS CAIRO.—This brilliant victory cost me only two hundred men *hors de combat*, and it opened to me the gates of Cairo, which I entered on the twenty-fifth. Ibrahim-Bey, who commanded the Mamelukes of the right bank of the Nile, fell back on Belbeis. Mourad-Bey, with those of the left bank, took the road to Upper Egypt. I sent Desaix in pursuit. This able general with his small force established himself in Upper Egypt, and checked the operations of Mourad-Bey, who, always beaten, but never discouraged, renewed his attacks with admirable constancy. To complete our conquests it was necessary to dispose of Ibrahim-Bey. I left Cairo on the seventh of August with the divisions of Reynier, Menou, Kléber, and the cavalry, directing my march on Belbeis. Ibrahim retired toward the desert of Syria; I continued the pursuit. On the eleventh my cavalry overtook and defeated his rear-guard at Salchich. Ibrahim escaped, with about a thousand cavalry, across the desert to Gaza. I left Reynier at Salchich with orders to fortify this post as a protection to Egypt on the side of Syria. The division of Kléber was directed on Damietta, the possession of which rendered me master of all the shore. With the division of Menou I returned to Cairo.

NAVAL BATTLE OF ABOUKIR.—But all my hopes were marred by the fatal event at Aboukir, which was caused by neglect to obey my orders. I had several times directed that our fleet should be withdrawn into the old port of Alexandria, or, if that could not be effected, to immediately set sail for France. It was pretended that the canal leading to this port was too shallow for our vessels of the line, but the soundings made by my orders proved that a seventy-four-gun ship could pass. Brueys thought the operation hazardous, and preferred the open sea to a possible blockade in port. He, therefore, made preparations to sail for Corfu or Toulon. While ranged in close order in the harbor of Aboukir, he was attacked on the evening of the first of August. Nelson pierced his ill-arranged line, and destroyed the left, while



the right was obliged to remain an idle spectator of the combat. The battle continued thirty-six hours, and ended in the destruction of three-quarters of our fleet. Admiral Brueys, by a glorious death, expiated his fault, which proved so fatal to the French navy.\*

\*Alison endeavors to attribute to Napoleon all the faults of the battle of Aboukir, but, notwithstanding his erroneous statements and garbled quotations, his documents prove the very reverse of what he asserts. The account given by Jomini, in the text, is perfectly correct. Napoleon urged upon Brueys, time and again, the importance of securing his fleet in the harbor of Alexandria; he sent engineers to make the soundings at the entrance, suggested to the naval commander the use of water camels or butts on which to float his larger ships over the bar; Brueys wished to take position in Aboukir Bay, where he could secure his line by land batteries. But on the twenty-sixth of July he had determined to follow Napoleon's advice, and wrote to him that he would enter the port. On the thirtieth Napoleon wrote to Brueys, "I am induced to believe that you are by this time safely in the port." The battle was fought on the first of August.

With respect to Alison's charge, "that the only real culpability in the case is imputable to Napoleon, in having endeavored, after Brueys' death, to blacken his character," in his report to the Directory, it may be remarked that it is not true. The report states nothing but what is given in his previous correspondence with Brueys. He says that the Admiral had neglected his advice, which was actually the case, but he speaks of his error in the mildest possible terms. Indeed, he and Brueys were personal friends, and it was to this friendship that Napoleon attributes Brueys' unwillingness to sail for Corfu till he could hear from him at Cairo. This looks much more like excusing his faults than like "blackening his character." The following is Napoleon's letter to Madame Brueys on her husband's death: "Your husband has been killed by a cannon ball, while fighting on his quarter-deck. He died without suffering; the death the most easy and the most envied by the brave. I feel warmly for your grief. The moment which separates us from the object we love is terrible; we feel alone on the earth; we almost experience the convulsion of the last agony; the faculties of the soul are annihilated; the world is seen only through a veil which distorts everything. We feel as if nothing longer binds us to life; that it were far better to die; but when, after these first and unavoidable throes, we press our children to our hearts, tears and more tender sentiments arise; life for their sakes becomes tolerable. Yes, madam, they will open the fountains of your heart; you will watch their childhood, educate their youth; you will tell them of their father, of your present grief, of the loss which they and the Republic have sustained in his death. After having resumed the interest in life by the cord of maternal love, you will, perhaps, feel some consolation from the friendship and warm interest which I shall ever take in the widow of my friend."

For further information on this subject, the reader is referred to Gourgaud, vol. II., Norvins, vol. I., and to Thiers' "History of the Revolution." Alison rests his assertions on such absurd authorities as Bourlienne, and an anonymous work called "*Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat*," neither of which, however, confirm his most important statements against Napoleon. These have no other origin than his own imagination.

**FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF THIS EVENT.**—Although this catastrophe changed the chances of our expedition, still we were not without hopes of success. We could maintain ourselves in possession of the country if we should succeed in attaching the inhabitants to our cause. With money, arms, and officers, we could recruit our legions as well as the Mamelukes. All my efforts were now directed to this object. But to this there were two opposing obstacles: the first was the maritime blockade, which prevented any commerce of exportation, the true source of that country's wealth; the second was the religion. The Koran directs the extermination of idolaters, or subjects them to pay tribute; it allows no obedience or submission to an infidel power. In this it is more favorable to a military spirit than the Christian religion, which directs us to render under Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and declares that the empire of Jesus Christ is not of this world. We have already said that in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries the dogmas of Islamism had raised up immense obstacles to the crusaders in Syria, for the war, being one of religion, was necessarily one of extermination, in which millions of Europeans were destroyed. If such a spirit had animated the Egyptians in 1798, we should have been lost; my little army, incited by no fanatical zeal, and already disgusted with the country, could not have held out six months against a population of several millions of exasperated Mussulmans. Fortunately for us, the intercourse between the Egyptians and Europe had destroyed the influence of these precepts of the Koran. Religious hatred had not been carried to fanaticism, as in the tenth century. I therefore did not despair of conciliating the Imans, the Muftis, the Ulemas, and all the ministers of the Mussulman religion. The French army, since the Revolution, was indifferent to all forms of worship; even in Italy, they never went to church. I took advantage of this circumstance to persuade the Mussulmans that my soldiers were so many cenobites, disposed to embrace Mohammedanism. The Christians of different denominations in Egypt, who were quite numerous, wished to profit by our presence to get rid of the restrictions imposed on their worship. I opposed this, and took care to maintain religious affairs on the same footing as they were. Every day, at sunrise, the Scheiks of the Grand Mosque came to my house; they overwhelmed me with marks of their regard, and I held long conversations with them on the life of the Prophet and the contents of the Koran. I assisted at many of their ceremonies, and, by respecting their usages and their belief, succeeded in inspiring them with great confidence.

**DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PORTE.**—By the same system, I used every effort to calm the Porte. On landing in Egypt,



I had sought to prove that there was no reason for its taking umbrage at my expedition, as I had come to chastise the rebellious Beys, to destroy the English commerce in the Indies, and to render Egypt the *entrepôt* of the East. I hoped that Talleyrand would repair to Constantinople for the same object; but the old fox feared the Seven Towers; confiding his mission to a subaltern, he found pretexts for staying at Paris, and thus left an open field for the ministers of Russia and England. Nevertheless, the Porte still hesitated to declare openly against us; but the destruction of our fleet soon removed its doubts. On the first of September Ruffin, our *chargé-d'affaires* at Constantinople, was conducted to the Seven Towers, and war was declared. Up to this time I had conceived well-grounded hopes for the success of our project of colonization. Egypt, except an occasional incursion of the Mamelukes, appeared tranquil. The *savants* who had accompanied my expedition were exploring this antique cradle of civilization; scientific establishments, formed under their direction at Cairo, contributed to drive away the *ennui* which one is so apt to feel in a strange land; some of these learned men assisted in forming armories, foundries, powder manufactories, and all the military resources furnished by the arts. But the rupture with the Porte clouded our happy prospects.

REVOLT OF CAIRO.—The news of this event now spread through Egypt and caused a general fermentation. The chiefs of the Mussulmans having declared against us, we were now only *Christian dogs*, and to exterminate us was meritorious service. A serious revolt broke out at Cairo on the twenty-second of October. General Dupuis, who commanded there, and some three hundred of our officers and soldiers, were strangled. It became necessary to resort to severe punishment; my troops who were encamped about the city penetrated there and made a great carnage of those who were found armed. After two days of massacre, tranquillity was restored, and the quelling of the sedition seemed to consolidate our power in Egypt. Desaix had just completed the subjugation of Upper Egypt, gaining over the remains of the Mamelukes the victory of Sediman.

EXPEDITION INTO SYRIA.—Our repose was not of long duration; I learned that the Turks were assembling an army in Natolia to enter Egypt by marching along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. Djezzar, Pacha of St.-Jean-d'Acre, was already collecting magazines for this army, and preparing to furnish it a reinforcement of troops collected in Syria. The best means of disconcerting these projects was to destroy the preparations before the Ottoman army could come to the support of Djezzar. I therefore resolved to march into Syria with such of

my troops as were not absolutely necessary to guard the coasts, and to maintain tranquillity in Egypt during our absence. On the tenth of February I left Cairo with the divisions of Bon, Lannes, and the cavalry. On the seventeenth I reached El-Arich, where I found the divisions of Reynier and Kléber, which had come from Salchich and Damietta. Reynier had already carried the village of El-Arich by assault, but the fort still held out. This little fort might, for a long time, have resisted our means of attack, but, fortunately, the garrison capitulated on the twentieth.

**CAPTURE OF JAFFA.**—Although the total force of my expedition did not exceed thirteen thousand men, still I was obliged to make them march by isolated divisions across the desert which separated us from Syria, so as not to exhaust the wells, our only resource in this arid country. After forty-eight hours of the most fatiguing march, we reached the plain of Gaza. All the army united near this city, which had been evacuated by the enemy, leaving us in possession of its great magazines. On the third of March we reached Jaffa. The garrison was numerous and disposed for defense. I established batteries against the outer wall. On the seventh the breach was found practicable, and the city carried by assault. We captured on this occasion two thousand prisoners, who very much embarrassed me. The weakness of my army did not allow me to detach an escort to guard them; on the other hand, they could not be released on parole, for they did not consider it binding; moreover, a part of them had already been discharged at El-Arich, on their promise not to again serve against us, and were now taken in arms. Knowing of no other course to pursue, I caused them to be shot. I did this with great repugnance; but as the barbarians treated Christian prisoners in this way, and gloried in sending their heads to Constantinople, I felt the less scruple in the course I was forced to pursue. My enemies have not failed to reproach me with this action, which, judged of by the rules of civilized warfare, is not justifiable, but which the laws of retaliation, and of necessity, in the difficult circumstances in which I myself and my army were placed, will perhaps excuse it in the eyes of posterity.\*

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\*Thiers, in speaking of this event, says, "that when Napoleon summoned the commandant of Jaffa to surrender, the latter replied *by cutting off the head of the messenger!* The place was then carried by storm after extraordinary exertions, and having no means of disposing of the prisoners without allowing them to return and swell the enemy's ranks, he decided on a terrible measure, *the only cruel act of his life.* Transported into a barbarous country, he had involuntarily adopted its manners." Alison gives the following version of this affair: "When the prisoners were assembled, a council of war was summoned to deliberate on their fate. For two days the terrible question was debated, What was to be done with these cap-



**RESISTANCE OF ST.-JEAN-D'ACRE.**—Djezzar-Pacha had taken every means for the defense of St.-Jean-d'Acre, which place was invested on the eighteenth of March. The fortifications of the place consisted in a wall flanked by towers and surrounded by a ditch. But our means of attack were not even sufficient for the reduction of these slight obstacles, for Sidney Smith, commanding the English cruisers, had captured the siege-train which I had sent from Alexandria by sea, and put it in battery against us. The trench was opened on the twentieth of March. Djezzar, under the direction of a French engineer and a French artilleryman, made a most desperate defense. My first assault on the twentieth having failed, the hopes of the besieged were increased.

**BATTLE OF MONT-TABOR.**—From my posts of observation at Saffet and Nazareth, I received intelligence of the approach of an army from Damascus and Palestine. To check this

tives? and the French officers approached it without any predisposition to cruel measures. But the difficulties were represented as insurmountable on the side of humanity. If they sent them back, it was said, to Egypt, a considerable detachment would be required to guard so large a body of captives, and that could ill be spared from the army in its present situation; if they gave them their liberty, they would forthwith join the garrison of Acre, or the clouds of Arabs who already hung on the flanks of the army; if they were incorporated unarmed in the ranks, the prisoners would add grievously to the number of mouths, for whom, already, it was sufficiently difficult to procure subsistence. No friendly sail appeared in the distance to take off the burden on the side of the ocean; the difficulty of maintaining them became every day more grievous. The committee, to whom the matter was referred, unanimously reported that they should be put to death, and Napoleon, with reluctance, signed the fatal order. It was carried into execution on the tenth of March."

These circumstances greatly palliate, though, of course, they can not fully justify, the act. The opportunity thus offered to Allison to blacken the character of Napoleon is too good to be lost, and he accordingly proceeds to give him what he calls "his deserts"; such phrases as "atrocities," "foul deed," "iniquitous and atrocious act," "execrable deed," etc., are most unsparingly applied.

It may be interesting to the unprejudiced reader to compare Allison's remarks in this place with his labored defense of Hastings for the cold-blooded murder of Nuncomar, for the horrible Rohilla war, carried on under his direction, and for the cruel treatment and robbery of the princesses of Oude. In the former case, Macaulay says, "a man was unjustly put to death in order to secure a political purpose." In the second case, "Mr. Hastings put down by main force the brave struggles of innocent men, fighting for their liberty; he folded his arms and looked on, while their villages were burned, their children butchered, and their women violated." "More than a hundred thousand people fled from their homes to pestilential jungles, preferring famine and fever and the haunts of tigers to the tyranny of him to whom an English and a Christian government had, for shameful lucre, sold their substance and their blood, and the honor

hostile force, I dispatched toward the Jordan two small corps of observation: Kléber, with his division, to Nazareth; and Murat, with a detachment of about two thousand men, to Saffet. A few days afterward I learned that the enemy had passed the Jordan at the bridge of Giz-el-Mesania, and that Kléber would be attacked. I flew to his assistance. I left the camp before St.-Jean-d'Acre, on the fifteenth day of April, followed by the division of Bon and the cavalry: the next morning I arrived near Mont-Tabor in sight of the enemy, who, with the great mass of his infantry, occupied the village of Fouli. Their cavalry of about twenty thousand horse inundated the celebrated plain of Esdrelon, where the division of Kléber, formed in two squares, and entirely surrounded, maintained its position with admirable bravery. My

of their wives and daughters." "The finest population of India was subjected to a greedy, cowardly, cruel tyrant." To extort money from the princesses of Oude they were seized and imprisoned at Tyzabad. "Their two male attendants," continues Macaulay, "were, by orders of the British government, seized and imprisoned, ironed, starved almost to death, in order to extort money from the princesses. After they had been two months in confinement, their health gave way. They implored permission to take a little exercise in the garden of their prison. The officer who was in charge of them stated, that if they were allowed this indulgence, there was not the smallest chance of their escaping, and that their irons really added nothing to the security of the custody in which they were kept. He did not understand the plan of his superiors. Their object in these inflictions was not security, but torture; and all mitigation was refused. Yet this was not the worst. It was resolved by an English government that these two infirm old men should be delivered to the tormentors. For that purpose they were removed to Lucknow. What horrors their dungeon there witnessed can only be guessed. Food was allowed to enter the apartments of the princesses only in such scanty quantities that their female attendants were in danger of perishing with hunger. Month after month this cruelty continued, till at length, after twelve hundred thousand pounds had been wrung out of the princesses, Hastings began to think that he had really got to the bottom of their revenue, and that no rigor could extort more. Then at length the wretched men who were detained at Lucknow regained their liberty. When their irons were knocked off, and the doors of their prison opened, their quivering lips, the tears which ran down their cheeks, and the thanksgivings which they poured forth to the common Father of Mussulmans and Christians, melted even the stout hearts of the English warriors who stood by." These are the words of an impartial English writer, long years after the events had transpired. Allson justifies these proceedings on the ground of the "overbearing pressure of state necessity." Hastings, he says, "did evil that good might come of it," and he, therefore, has no words of censure for him, only the most unbounded praises for his "firmness and ability," his "great achievements," his "far-seeing wisdom and patriotic disinterestedness." His deeds, he says, "originated in overbearing necessity." Verily, circumstances alter cases! "It is your bull that has gored my ox."



arrival was a thunderbolt to the enemy: already discouraged by the invincible resistance of Kléber's squares, they did not venture to fight my fresh troops, but precipitately fled. We carried the village of Fouli with the bayonet, and the Ottoman army, utterly routed, fled across the Jordan at the bridge of Giz-el-Mesania, and retired on Damascus. This singular victory had such a marvelous effect upon the enemy that he did not venture to trouble our army again during the siege. I left Kléber at Nazareth, and with the rest of the troops returned to Acre.

CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE.—The siege was pushed with obstinacy, but with little success. The Turks, directed by Philippeaux\* and Tromelin, and assisted by the English of the squadron of Sidney Smith, defended themselves with great valor. The place had already sustained five assaults when a flotilla, fitted out at Rhodes, and having on board the famous corps of Hussein-Pacha, came to reprovision the port. Seeking to anticipate this succor, I directed, on the eighth of May, the sixth assault to be made. Again we were repulsed. There seemed no further hope of carrying the place. By obstinately continuing the siege, I might risk the safety of my little army. I was therefore obliged to prepare to retreat. But I was so little accustomed to reverses that I could not retire from this enterprise without making one more attempt. Kléber had just rejoined me; his troops were fresh; I flattered myself that they might assist me in carrying a place whose open breaches presented some chances of success. On the morning and evening of the tenth of May, I renewed the attack for the seventh and eighth times. The ardor of my troops seemed to have acquired new strength; but nothing was capable of shaking the obstinate intrepidity of the besieged.†

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\*Philippeaux was an emigrant engineer-officer of great merit and distinction; he had been a schoolmaster of Napoleon at Paris, and had studied with him the science of engineering. Tromelin was an artillery officer, also in exile. He afterward returned to France and asked service under Napoleon. The latter gave him a colonel's commission, saying to him, "I only ask you to injure my enemies as much as you did me in Egypt."

†Napoleon received during the siege an affecting proof of devotedness. While he was in the trenches, a shell fell at his feet; two grenadiers, who observed it, immediately rushed toward him, placed him between them, and, raising their arms above his head, completely covered every part of his body. Happily the shell respected the whole group; nobody was injured. One of these brave grenadiers afterward became General Dumesnil, who lost a leg in the campaign of Moscow, and commanded the fortress of Vincennes, at the time of the invasion in 1814. The capital had been for some weeks occupied by the Allies, but Dumesnil still held out. Nothing was then talked of in Paris but his obstinate defense and humorous reply when summoned by the Russians to surrender: "*Give me back my leg, and I will give up my fortress.*" (*Las Casas.*)

**RAISING OF THE SIEGE.**—On the twenty-second of May I raised the siege and directed my march to Egypt. On the way we laid waste all the country, both to supply ourselves with provisions for crossing the desert, and to deprive the Turks of the means of following us to the frontiers of Egypt. I was obliged to leave behind all who could not follow us. There were fifty men sick of the plague who could not move with the army, and who must be left to the ferocious Djezzar. I caused opium to be administered to them to relieve them from their sufferings. In this I did wrong: but, yielding to a natural feeling of humanity, I did to them what, in similar circumstances, I could wish done to myself. In this action, from which I could derive no possible advantage, I had no idea that I was furnishing to my enemies matter for calumnious interpretations.\* I ought to have left these unfortunate men to the mercy of the Turks, since such was the hard lot which destiny had reserved for them.

**RETURN TO CAIRO.**—Returning into Egypt, I marched to Cairo with the main body of my forces, and reached that place on the fourteenth of June. Kléber returned to Damietta. I left a

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\*It is believed that the author has here fallen into an error, which does not appear in his great scientific "History of the Wars of the French Revolution." In the retreat from Syria, Napoleon showed every care for his sick, giving up, for their transportation, the horses of his artillery and his staff; he himself gave the example to his officers of marching on foot. From Jaffa, three separate detachments of sick were dispatched for Egypt; the first under Colbert, by sea, directed on Damietta, the other two by land, on Gaza and El-Arich. About fifty or sixty, declared incurable, could not be taken with the army, for want of means. Napoleon suggested to his physician, Desgenettes, that it would be more humane to give them opium than to leave them to the cruelties of the Turks. But the proposition was rejected and not again alluded to. Napoleon said at St. Helena, that he would have advised this course if the case had been that of his own son. This circumstance furnished grounds for believing that opium was actually administered, and the report was most industriously circulated by the English. But it has since been disproved by the highest authority and indisputable evidences. Even Alison dares not venture to assert its truth, but expresses a fear that it *may* have been so. His language is as follows: "At Jaffa he visited the plague hospital, inviting those who had sufficient strength to rise, to raise themselves on their beds, and endeavor to get into litters prepared for their use. He walked through the rooms, affected a careless air, striking his boot with his riding-whip, in order to remove the apprehensions which had seized all the soldiers in regard to the contagious nature of the malady. Those who could not be removed were, it is feared, poisoned by orders of the general; their numbers did not exceed sixty; and as the Turks were within an hour's march of the place, their recovery hopeless, and a cruel death awaited them at the hands of those barbarians the moment they arrived, the painful act may perhaps be justified, not only on the ground of necessity, but of humanity."

This story was first circulated by Sir Robert Wilson, with all the hor-



strong garrison at Cattieh. In the meantime Desaix had finished the subjugation of Upper Egypt, the battle of Semanhout having completed the ruin of the Mamelukes.

The ill success of my Syrian expedition had made me still more sensible of the necessity of influencing the people through the instrumentality of the ministers of Islamism. I proposed to them to publish a *fetam*, directing the people to take the oath of obedience to the general-in-chief. The proposition startled them, and an old man replied to me: "Why do you not turn Mussulman with your whole army? A hundred thousand men would then flock to your banners, and being disciplined by you, you could with them restore the Arabian power and conquer the entire East." I opposed to this the necessity of circumcision and abstinence from wine. But they said that an accommodation could be made with Heaven: that a man might drink wine and still be a good Mussulman, provided that he doubled his good works. I then caused to be drawn the plan for a mosque more grand than that of Gemil-el-Azar, under the pretext of raising a monument to the conversion of the army; but in fact I wished to amuse them and gain time. The *fetam* of obedience was given by the Scheiks, who declared me the friend of the Prophet, and especially protected by him. The report was generally circulated that in less than a year the whole army would assume the turban, and our soldiers soon felt the good effects of this innocent and, under the circumstances, justifiable ruse.

**BATTLE OF ABOUKIR.**—Toward the end of July the Mamelukes again appeared in Lower Egypt, and Mourad-Bey again descended toward Gizeh. While engaged in making my dispositions to pursue him, I heard that fifteen thousand Turks had just landed from the fleet of Rhodes at the *presqu'île* of Aboukir, and carried by assault the fort of that name. I felt the necessity for instant action. On the twenty-fourth of July, the part of my army destined for this expedition was assembled at the wells between Alexandria and Aboukir. The next day I attacked the Turks. The two lines of intrenchments with which they had secured the *presqu'île* were successively carried, notwithstanding the obstinate resistance which they opposed. At the same time Murat succeeded, by my orders, in penetrating between

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ribble details which his ever-fruitful imagination could suggest. To give the account the greater probability, he asserted that he possessed indisputable evidence, which would soon be produced. It however, never appeared. Dr. Desgenettes and others afterward completely refuted the story, and at this day none but a rabid English tory or a Scotch libeler would think of attaching the slightest credit to it. For a very important and detailed account of Napoleon's treatment of his sick, the reader is referred to Dr. Desgenettes' "*Histoire Médicale de l'Armée d'Orient*."

their lines with some squadrons, and creating a panic there. All endeavored to regain their vessels, and those who were not killed in the attempt perished in the waves; of twelve or thirteen thousand men, only two thousand made their escape into the fort, and two hundred, with the Pacha commanding in chief, were taken prisoners. All the others were killed or drowned. Our loss was about a thousand men *hors-de-combat*. This victory fully effaced the stain which the defeat of our fleet had attached to the name of Aboukir. The fort, after a warm bombardment, surrendered on the second of August. This success consolidated my power in Egypt, so that with an annual reinforcement, it could be maintained.

NAPOLEON RETURNS TO FRANCE.—At this epoch more important affairs were attracting my attention. At St.-Jean-d'Acre we had learned that a new coalition was formed against France. We had received by Sidney Smith many English journals and the French gazette of Frankfort, informing us of the reverses of our armies in Italy and of the Rhine, and the successive revolutions which had disorganized and disgraced the Directory. I had also received a letter from the government announcing the departure of Admiral Bruix from Brest, to combine with the squadrons of Toulon and of Spain to carry home the army of Egypt should circumstances require it. They renewed the authorization of my return to France. Bruix had not made his appearance, and it was probable that he had been driven from his course, or had given up the undertaking.

I felt myself able to restore to my country the lustre of victory and the benefits of internal and external peace. Everything now proved that the French were tired of the Revolution, and that it was time to bring it to a close. It was necessary for me to hurry back, or some one else might profit by these favorable circumstances. I had now no motive for prolonging my stay in Egypt. The country was completely conquered, and the only task left was to colonize it. The principal arrangements for this were made, and Kléber was as capable as myself of carrying them into execution. I could better serve my country in Europe than to remain here. Moreover the time was propitious. If my reputation had suffered any by the affair of St.-Jean-d'Acre, it was more than retrieved by the brilliant and important victory of Aboukir. I therefore set sail for France on the twenty-fourth of August, with four small vessels, leaving Kléber the commander-in-chief of the army of Egypt. I have been much blamed for this step, but unjustly. In the first place, I was fully authorized by the government. In the second, the Egyptian expedition was either desperate, or capa-



ble of sustaining itself. If a treaty of evacuation was to be signed, the lowest officer in the army was as capable of doing it as the highest; on the other hand, Kléber was fully capable of conquering all the enemies then existing in the country. This general, intelligent, enterprising, valiant, was one of the finest men in Europe. He was the *beau-ideal* of an officer; terrible in combat, calm and cool in combination, able in administration, beloved by the soldiers; he resembled, in all respects, Marshal Saxe. Though not among the first rank of captains, still he was capable of becoming one; though as yet no great strategist, he was, by his genius and habit of command, pretty certain of learning the art. I will hereafter speak of the results of this happy choice. To follow the thread of events, we will now trace a rapid outline of the campaign of 1799.

## CHAPTER V.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1799.

Situation of Europe in 1798—Exorbitant Demands of the Directory at Rastadt—Russia in Favor of the Empire—Negotiations of Prince Repnin at Berlin—Embarrassments of Prussia—Views of Austria—Secret Convention between England and Naples—Favorable Chances for Austria—Alliance between Austria and Russia—Policy of the Directory—Affairs of Switzerland—Treaty of Alliance concluded at Paris—The smaller Cantons refuse the Oath of Fidelity—Expedition of Schawembourg against Stanz—The Grisons call upon the Austrians—French Law of Conscription—Consequences of the Defeat at Aboukir and the Declaration of War by the Ottoman Porte—Decree for a Levy of two hundred thousand Men—Embarrassed State of the Finances—Negotiations drag along through the meddling of Spain—State of the Negotiations at Rastadt—England—Russia—Spain—Portugal—Sweden and Denmark—War commenced by the Court of Naples—Joubert seizes upon Piedmont and occupies Tuscany—Ferdinand flies to Sicily—Championnet takes Possession of Naples—Erection of the Parthenopean Republic—The Russians advance toward Italy—The Directory takes the Initiative without Preparation—Masséna gets Possession of the Grisons—The Archduke marches against Jourdan—Battle of Stockach—Reverses in Italy—Retreat of the Army behind the Rhine—Attack upon our Plenipotentiaries at Rastadt—Tardy Enterprise of the Archduke—Suwarrow in Lombardy—Grand Naval Expedition of Admiral Bruix—Macdonald's Army evacuates Naples—Suwarrow enters Turin—Masséna driven from the Grisons—The Archduke penetrates into Switzerland—Masséna evacuates Zurich—The Archduke paralyzed by Cabinet Orders—Macdonald returns upon Modena—Suwarrow attacks him on the Trebia—General State of Affairs—Dissatisfaction against the Directory—Political Operations of Stéyes—Address to the Councils—The Nomination of Treillard is annulled—Merlin and Laréveillère resign—Consternation at the Result of the Battle of Trebia—Formation of Clubs—Talleyrand is replaced—The Directory close the Manège—New Plan of Operations proposed—Joubert is charged with its Execution—He debouches from the Apennines—Battle of Nov!—Masséna recaptures the smaller Cantons—Project of the Archduke—New Plan of the Coalition—The Archduke marches on Manheim—



Plan of Suwarrow—Battle of Zurich—Korsakof retires to the Rhine—Suwarrow passes the St. Gothard and marches on the Muttenthal and Glaris—Defeat of the Austrians in this Canton—Difficult Retreat of Suwarrow—Efforts of Korsakof on Winterthour—Movements of the Archduke and Suwarrow—Descent of the Anglo-Russians into Holland—Lecourbe raises the Siege of Philipsbourg—Efforts of Championnet to save Coni.

**SITUATION OF EUROPE IN 1798.**—While we were hoping to found, on the banks of the Nile, a formidable *point d'appui* for overthrowing the English power in India, France found herself threatened upon her own territory. My departure for Egypt, instead of rendering the Directory more prudent, had only increased the desire for new conquests. Its agents treated the Cisalpine Republic as the Roman proconsuls formerly treated the nations she had conquered. In Piedmont the agents of propagandism excited such serious troubles that the King deemed it necessary to ask the assistance of the French troops to calm them. Brune, pretending to fear the dangers that might result from them to the army, required that Charles Emmanuel should deliver up to him the citadel of Turin, in order to secure the public tranquillity.

**EXORBITANT DEMANDS OF THE DIRECTORY AT RASTADT.**—The Congress at Rastadt, having at first recognized the Rhine as the boundary of France, after my departure, took a step directly the opposite. The Directory, dissatisfied with the conditions of the treaty of Campo-Formio, soon redoubled its pretensions, and preferred, through its plenipotentiaries, the most exorbitant demands, asking the forts of Kehl and Cassel; all the islands of the Rhine; the demolition of Ehrenbreitstein; in a word, to place themselves offensively on the right of the Rhine, in violation of the conditions of the treaty: moreover, the free navigation of all rivers emptying into the Rhine was demanded, and that the debts of the countries conceded to France on its left bank should be paid by those given us as indemnities; this was the height of absurdity. Such demands were not the result of a noble ambition, but rather of a morbid trickery, and a love of propagandism. The composition of the Directory, the stoic Rewbel, the aristocrat Barras, the pettifogger Merlin, the fanatic Laréveillère, the poet François-de-Neuchâteau, were not men of true ambition, but of mere pretension—short-sighted politicians. Adding these exaggerated pretensions to the revolutions with which Europe was everywhere threatened, it was evident that peace could not be of long duration. If war did not immediately break out, it was because the enemy wished time for preparation.

The Cabinet of Vienna, though acquainted with the dispositions of England and Russia, was nevertheless desirous of negotiating. It preferred to make its complaints, and demand redress of grievances, before resorting to arms. Negotiations were opened at Selz. Baron Thugut, who had resigned to avoid signing the treaty of peace with us, had just resumed the portfolio from the hands of Cobentzel, and the latter had come to Selz to negotiate with François-de-Neuchâteau. The special object of these conferences has not been avowed, but we may conjecture what were the interests agitated there; it is evident that the councillors of Francis II. betrayed his confidence, if they admitted the state of Europe at the middle of the year 1798 to be equivalent to that which had been stipulated at Campo-Formio. It was true that at each of its aggressions, the Directory had openly protested its desire to maintain friendly relations with the Imperial House, as if it were necessary to assail directly a state of the first order to give just cause for war. Instead of the evacuation of Switzerland, and the reëstablishment of its entire independence, which were to be the first pledges of the execution of the treaty of peace, the recent conventions, transforming the Cisalpine Republic, Rome, and even Piedmont, into mere conquered provinces, authorized the Cabinet of Vienna to demand that these states should be restored to independence, or that the House of Austria should obtain equivalents, at least, for this increase of a rival power. If we are to believe reports which have too much the appearance of probability, several provinces in the Italian peninsula were bartered at Selz as an indemnity to the Emperor for his loss of Salzburg and Innvierthal, and for permitting the ascendancy of France over the new Republics.

**RUSSIA AND THE EMPIRE.**—The Cabinet of Vienna, convinced by the rejection of its propositions that no accommodation could be expected with the Directory, decided to ally itself to Russia. This latter power could hardly remain an idle spectator of events which were changing the face of Europe; as the guarantee of the state of Germany in virtue of the treaty of Teschen, it saw the German Empire threatened with destruction by the extension recently given to the system of secularization and indemnity. And even had Paul I. been but little interested, on the score of policy, in what was passing in Switzerland, at Turin, at Rome, and in the Mediterranean, still he would naturally have been drawn into these events from the affection which he had constantly shown for the Order of Malta.

**NEGOTIATIONS AT BERLIN.**—The Cabinet of St. Petersburg felt all the advantage of its position, and, yielding to the proof of dangers which threatened the general system of Europe,



it sent Prince Repnin at first to Berlin, and then to Vienna, as much to induce these two courts to desist from all indemnity in Germany as to concert the means of forcing back the ambition of the Directory within the limits marked out by treaties.

**EMBARRASSMENT OF PRUSSIA.**—The first object of this mission was not difficult to accomplish, for Frederick William found in the terms even of the treaty of Campo-Formio the means of recovering Guelderland, if the system of indemnity were rejected. But Prussia, more scrupulous on the second article, persisted in observing a neutrality. The young King, animated with a love of wealth, exaggerating the advantages of peace, directed his whole attention to repairing the breaches made in the state by the dissipation of his father. He was convinced that policy imposed on him no other combinations than that of forcing respect to his frontier and his flag, and of enriching his own country, while his rivals were devoting all their energies to mutual destruction. Severe critics have found fault with the administration of Count Haugwitz, the prime minister; and notwithstanding the eloquent defense published some years afterward by the celebrated Lombard, it yet remains to be demonstrated that the Cabinet of Berlin fully appreciated all the advantages of its position. Undoubtedly this position was a delicate one; Prussia, as is usually the case with powers of the second order, was called upon to maintain the equilibrium between two superior masses just ready to come in collision. On whichever side the Cabinet of Berlin took part, the balance of power might so incline as to render all counterpoise useless; and yet it was embarrassing to remain a mere idle spectator of the dismemberment of the German Empire, and the subjugation of Switzerland and Italy. An armed mediation had probably been much better than a strict neutrality. This kind of intervention, when of proper and timely application, often marks a vast and profound policy; all the logic of Lombard had not sufficed to prove that Prussia might not, by such a course, have prevented a war. By pronouncing with firmness, frankness, and moderation, she had obliged the Directory to evacuate the territories invaded since peace was declared, and the Cabinet of Vienna to moderate its pretensions.

**VIEWS OF AUSTRIA.**—Austria on her side, however much disposed to fulfill her engagements, could not overlook the necessity of laying the basis of the future relations of the four great powers. She could not fail to gain by doing this; for if they should fail to agree, there was every chance in her favor in resort to arms. The news of the defeat of Aboukir and of the declaration of war by the Ottoman Porte against France proved conclusively to the Cabinet of Vienna that in again entering the war

it would be their own fault if they did not reconquer and hold a great part of Italy. Fortune seemed again to place it within their reach. It was true that there was an army of one hundred thousand French between the Alps and the Tiber, but this army, left in want and neglect by the political administrators, and scattered over an immense territory to secure our conquests, was utterly incapable of taking the field with any chance of success. Besides the arbitrary acts of the Directory toward the Cisalpine Republic, and the despotism successively exercised by Trouvé and Brune over the magistrates of an independent Republic, had disgusted the Lombards, even those most attached to France, at the same time that it redoubled the hatred of the partisans of Austria. Brune had, indeed, been replaced by Joubert in the command of the army of Italy; but the evil had been done, and an impression made which it was very difficult to efface, especially while the original causes were still existing. Piedmont had been no better treated and we had given abundant cause to the Court of Turin for hostile feelings toward us. Far from acting with frankness toward our ally, we had attempted to revolutionize that country, as we had Switzerland, and to make her enter into the absurd system of *democratic balance* of which I have before spoken; and the occupation of the citadel of Turin, far from arresting the partisans of propagandism, only rendered them more audacious. Thus Charles Emmanuel, although he had concluded the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, promising us an auxiliary corps of eight thousand men, could not submit, with good grace, to such treatment as he received. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, notwithstanding his desire for peace, was still an Austrian prince; this was enough to determine his course. The Directory coveted his territory, as a link to connect the Roman with the Ligurian and Cisalpine Republics. These projects could not fail to make us enemies. The venerable Pius VI., deposed from his temporal power, nevertheless exerted his spiritual influence to incite our enemies against us.

**SECRET CONVENTION BETWEEN ENGLAND AND NAPLES.**—To these chances of success for Austria, it must be added that the Cabinet of Vienna counted on assistance from Naples, this latter power being evidently of a hostile disposition toward France. A treaty signed the nineteenth of May, 1798, as a simple defensive measure, had been followed by a levy for completing the Neapolitan army. Acton did not wait for the victory of Nelson before manifesting his intention of returning to his former system of policy; the reception given to this admiral, in spite of the treaty of Paris, permitting him to be provisioned in the port of Syracuse, so as to facilitate his pursuit of the fleet



which was conveying my army, unmasked the partiality of this cabinet. A secret convention, signed on the eleventh of June, by the plenipotentiaries of the two courts, had formally allied Naples and England against France. No sooner was the victory of Aboukir known than the councillors of Ferdinand IV. threw off the mask, by ordering a levy of all men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, to protect, it was alleged, the coasts of the Two Sicilies against the dangers to which they had become exposed since the taking of Malta. Not only were the regular regiments filled to the complement, but a larger body of well-organized provincial militia had raised the force of the Neapolitan army to sixty thousand men: a powerful auxiliary, which ought to have secured to the imperial armies a decided superiority in the Peninsula.

**CHANCES IN FAVOR OF AUSTRIA.**—Under such circumstances, when the Russians and the Turks were marching in concert against the common enemy; when, on the one side, Lombardy was holding out to her its hands, and, on the other, the very heart of her states was menaced by the irruption of the French in Switzerland—how could Francis II. hesitate to act? Even if he had renounced all ambition of regaining his possessions, the safety of the Austrian monarchy imposed on him the duty of rescuing Germany from the danger threatened by the establishment of the French at the gates of the Voralberg. But be that as it may, his first care was to secure Naples from the fate of Rome, by signing the defensive treaty of May 19th. This was deemed sufficient to guarantee her from invasion.

**HER ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIA.**—To these alliances of simple precaution, there soon succeeded measures of more serious import: no sooner was the futility of the conferences of Selz known, than Count Cobentzel departed for Berlin and St. Petersburg, for the purpose of joining the interests of these two courts. The alliance with Russia was not difficult; and, in October, an auxiliary army, with Suwarrow at its head, entered Galicia and directed its march on Moravia. On the other side, the Aulic Council, on hearing the fall of Berne, hastened to put the imperial armies on a respectable footing; this measure was but too well justified by passing events.

**POLICY OF THE DIRECTORY.**—In fact, was there any hope left that Rewbel and his colleagues could be brought to adopt a more moderate system? Had the influence of Talleyrand in the policy of France been marked by anything to justify his reputation as a good diplomatist? Indeed, had not all these invasions and steps of false policy been made since his installation into office?

**REVOLUTION IN HOLLAND.**—The exactions of the agents of the Directory extended from the sources of the Tiber to the mouths of the Ems and the confines of Rhetia. The oppression of these tyrannical proconsuls was felt wherever there appeared the slightest germ of resistance, and wherever men dared to believe that liberty did not consist in blind obedience to their pretensions. The Cisalpine Republic had hardly recovered from its astonishment at the arbitrary dismissal of its magistrates when Holland had her turn. Here, at least, the pretext was plausible. The Batavian constitution being accepted, the only thing wanting was the appointment of the new authorities. The Provisional National Assembly, such as it had remained after the twenty-second of January, had decreed on the fourth of May, after the example of the convention, that the greater part of the new legislative body should be taken from its own members, so natural is it to wish to retain authority when one has once tasted its charms. General Daendels, anxious to manifest his love of liberty, went to Paris to denounce the views of certain members of the government. These denunciations were sustained by Charles Delacroix, then minister at the Hague. The Batavian Directory hurled against its refractory general an order of arrest, and demanded his surrender from France. But Daendels, having made his court to Rewbel, returned on the tenth of June with orders to General Joubert to assist him in his enterprise. The contest soon began; the commissioners designated to replace the chambers were arrested by the Directory. The National Assembly prepared for resistance; and Daendels, in imitation of Augereau, appeared at the head of a few companies of grenadiers, dissolved the legislative body, and sought to arrest three Directors, Wreede, Langen, and Finyie; but two of these took to flight, and the third was soon released. The power was confided to a provisional government, until the constitutional authorities could properly be organized.

**AFFAIRS OF SWITZERLAND.**—Switzerland was not exempt from these commotions. The constitution which had been fabricated at Paris after models entirely unsuited to the condition of the people, was everywhere rejected by the smaller cantons. The Grisons called upon the Austrians, in conformity to ancient treaties, for protection, and a division of the corps of Bellegard advanced to Coire. The unusual burdens to which the country was subjected by the cantonment of forty thousand men seemed odious: the vexatious conduct of the proconsul Rapinat at length completed the exasperation of the two parties; he had caused the dismissal of two Directors, who were replaced by Laharpe and Ochs. The first hesitated to act; but the fear of being



accused of having drawn his country into difficulty without the courage to extricate it, decided him.

**TREATY OF ALLIANCE CONCLUDED AT PARIS.**—A treaty between Switzerland and France was signed at Paris, on the nineteenth of August. For the honor of the negotiators, Jenner and Zeltner, as well as of the Helvetic government, we must believe that these stipulations were dictated by force, and justified by the refusal of all the neighboring powers to interfere in favor of the oppressed; for this alliance offensive and defensive imposed on Helvetia the furnishing of a contingent, and the construction of two military roads, into Italy on the one side, and into Suabia on the other. It was worse than a conquest and a formal reunion of France; for, in case of war, Helvetia would be obliged to bear all the burden of the levies and imposts, and all the consequences of being made the theatre of the war, without the slightest hope of compensation. The paltry price paid for this sacrifice was the acquisition of the Frickthal, and the promise of the evacuation of Switzerland in three months: an illusory clause, the execution of which seemed impossible, and even in contradiction to the tenor of the treaty.

**THE SMALLER CANTONS REFUSE THE OATH.**—While the Helvetic Directory was thus joining its destinies to those of the French Republic, under such unfavorable auspices, the interior was threatened with civil war. The carrying into operation of a constitution accepted with so much repugnance was not enough; they required the whole people to take a solemn oath of fidelity. This oath, taken in the greater part of Helvetia, met with a strong opposition in the smaller cantons. Schwitz and Unterwald, especially, swore to die rather than submit to it. The Directory was much incensed that the sons of William Tell should dare to think themselves more free than Jacobins.

**EXPEDITION AGAINST STANZ.**—Schauwembourg, resolved to stifle all resistance in the germ, directed two columns against the canton of Unterwald. Two or three thousand exasperated peasants, ill-armed and ill-directed, opposed an army of seven or eight thousand veterans, victorious in a hundred battlefields: they fought bravely, and as the men perished one after another, the ranks were filled by the women; but there was no possibility of success. After a most bloody contest, the inhabitants were either killed or subjugated, the towns and hamlets were burned, and the whole country laid waste. Let us draw the veil over these scenes of horror, so utterly disgraceful to France, who thus prostituted the blood of her brave men to impose, at the cannon's mouth, the metaphysics of a few republican fanatics on

a people who had long known and appreciated the principles of true liberty.

Schwitz and Uri, to avoid the disasters of Stanz, took the required oath; but they did not less fail to experience a thousand vexations.

#### CALL UPON THE AUSTRIANS FOR PROTECTION.—

But the fate of the Grisons was still to be decided. Florent Guyot, the French Minister, copying the Planta and the Salis-Seevis, could not induce the patricians to submit to the popular *régime* and the most onerous of political yokes. Vainly did they solicit at Paris the preservation of their antique institutions and their independence: the reply of Talleyrand leaving them no hope, they submitted themselves to the councils of Salis, who, being in the Austrian interest, called upon the Cabinet of Vienna for assistance. A corps of six or seven thousand men, stipulated in ancient treaties with the Emperor Maximilian, was sent for their protection; on the nineteenth of October an imperial division entered Coire.

**FRENCH LAW OF CONSCRIPTION.**—The Directory, on the return of François-de-Neuchâteau, began to feel the necessity of preparation for war. Its armies were mere beggarly skeletons; the best regiments were fighting on the banks of the Nile and in the sands of Syria. Requisitions furnished no men, the old revolutionary law being no longer possible of execution. The Directory appealed to military men for some new project for recruiting the army; and General Jourdan presented one, near the end of August, for subjecting to military service, without distinction, all men between the ages of twenty and twenty-five. This levy, less harsh than the old system of requisitions, effected one entire generation; by ranging the entire military population into five classes, it permitted the calling out successively the required number of men, leaving a chance of drawing lots and obtaining substitutes.

**CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEFEAT OF ABOUKIR.**—The disaster of Aboukir, and the declaration of war by the Ottoman Porte, proved to the Directory the impossibility of maintaining our conquests in Egypt against the combined forces of England and Turkey. /It now began to regret bitterly ever having undertaken this expedition.

**LEVY OF TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND MEN.**—The only course to be pursued, under these circumstances, was to press forward the levy to complete the army organization, to negotiate with moderation, so as at least to gain time, and, if the thing was yet possible, to really avoid a rupture. They proceeded to levy a part of the two hundred thousand conscripts, which



a law of the twenty-eighth of September put at the disposal of the Directory. A treaty signed at Luzerne, on the thirtieth of November, stipulated for the levy of an auxiliary Helvetic corps of fifteen thousand men which France agreed to equip and support. The conscripts were levied without much difficulty, except in Belgium, where the standard of revolt was raised by a few malcontents; but it was readily put down by military power.

**FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.**—But there was still greater difficulty in obtaining money than men. The factitious representations of money were destroyed; specie had disappeared; the regular imports were almost nothing, while, on the contrary, the expenses were tripled by the premiums it was necessary to pay to procure contractors for supplies.

**NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED.**—Notwithstanding the activity of preparations for hostilities on all sides, either through a desire for peace, or for the purpose of gaining time, the negotiations were continued through the mediation of Spain, the Spanish ambassadors at Paris and Vienna exchanging the respective propositions. Austria, in deference to Russia and Prussia, was ready to renounce the Innviertal, but asked in exchange Mantua, the line of the Mincio, the evacuation of Switzerland and Rome by the French troops, and the restoration of the independence of Piedmont and the Cisalpine Republic. If these demands had been made in good faith, with the intention of establishing a *bona fide* peace, we cannot deny their justice. But was it not to be feared that when Mantua was once surrendered, and Italy and Helvetia evacuated, the Cabinet of Vienna would provoke a new war? When a mutual distrust is established between great powers, there results only tricks of policy and diplomatic stratagems: the Directory wished to monopolize everything that could strengthen her against her enemies; and Austria saw in these encroachments a spirit of intolerable usurpation. Thus, in spite of the pacific state of affairs at the Congress of Rastadt, the increase of military forces was pushed with activity. The Russians advanced into Moravia without precipitating a step which circumstances might yet render unnecessary.

**NEGOTIATIONS AT RASTADT.**—The Congress at Rastadt, during this interval, had progressed toward the accomplishment of its task, without observing that its labors were subordinate to the private negotiations between the great powers. The French had obtained almost all that they desired. The demolition of Ehrenbreitstein presented some difficulties, but the depuration of the Empire was too much inclined for peace not to consent to it on condition of the restitution of Kehl, which we had destroyed. The system of secularization presented by Roberjeot

had just been adopted, the *ultimatum* of the French plenipotentiaries for the first basis was admitted, and everything seemed to take a satisfactory turn when the news of the march of the Russians toward Moravia provoked a note from the French government, signifying that it would be regarded as a declaration of war if these troops should cross the territory of the Empire, and all negotiations would be suspended, till proper satisfaction was given on this subject. This note terminated the operations of the Congress of Rastadt, which thenceforth existed only in name, for the war of the second coalition had already begun by the hostilities of Naples.

ENGLAND.—To see the thunders of all the other nations directed upon France, now deprived of her ablest defenders, was a real triumph for England. This time, at least, her cabinet had no need of deep-laid combinations to form a new coalition, for the folly of the Directory had done more than all the agents of Albion to unite the opposing interests of Russia, the Ottoman Porte, and Austria. Nevertheless, the British minister lost no opportunity to incite them against France; for he offered subsidies, in November, to the Cabinet of Vienna, which refused them, it is said, on account of the negotiations then pending with the French Directory in relation to the cession of a part of Italy. The English squadrons, since the victory of Aboukir, had commanded the Mediterranean, and, for the purpose of forming a permanent establishment there, had just taken possession of the island of Minorca. The island of Gozzo had been retaken by Nelson in the name of the King of Naples, and Malta, already blockaded by sea, was soon to be invested by land.

But England did not confine herself to these external means of strengthening her power; the union of Ireland and Great Britain, with the formation of a single imperial parliament, was calculated to form a reconciliation and amalgamation of the two people, and to greatly increase the national power. The increase of military forces resulting from the detachment of five thousand men to the East Indies, and an expedition to destroy our power in Egypt, required a corresponding increase of the levies and expenses. The navy, by multiplying its stations and colonial conquests, also required proportional pecuniary sacrifices. The interest on the immense national debt was annually increased by new loans, notwithstanding the admirable system of sinking funds. But new plans of taxation added an immense sum to the receipts of the preceding year, and easily covered the annual budget.

RUSSIA.—The wrecks of the Order of Malta, refugees in Germany, had just conferred on the Emperor Paul the dignity of



Grand Master of the Order, in place of Baron Hompesch, and the sentiments of this prince, known for a long time, left no doubt as to the value which he would attach to this title. The Turco-Russian fleets arrived in the Archipelago near the end of October, and, preceded by an appeal of the Greek archbishop to the faithful, raised the Ionian Isles against the French, who, confined in small number within the ramparts of Corfu, soon found themselves attacked both by land and sea.

**SPAIN.**—The Cabinet of Madrid remained faithful to its natural alliance, notwithstanding the many sacrifices required of it by the chiefs of our turbulent Republic, and, although contrary to the real interests of both France and Spain, it was anew to hazard its fleets on the ocean, or on the Mediterranean. One had thought from its imbecility, and from the conduct of France toward Piedmont and Naples, allies of the family of Charles IV., that this monarch would have followed his political interests in connecting himself with the Cabinet of St. James. But, drawn on by the course of events, Spain agreed to furnish her stipulated contingents; at the same time the efforts of her diplomatic agents at Paris and Vienna to prevent hostilities attested that she appreciated the consequences of a maritime war.

**PORTUGAL.**—Portugal was chained more closely than ever to the car of British fortune, and the victory of Aboukir was a certain guarantee that she would remain in this dependence for a long time.

**SWEDEN AND DENMARK.**—No change of importance had taken place in the situation of Sweden and Denmark. Although their flag began to feel the shackles placed by England upon the commerce of neutrals, they still prospered amid the universal embarrassments.

**WAR COMMENCED BY NAPLES.**—The signal for the new war was given, to the great astonishment of Europe, by the Neapolitans, who on this occasion seemed animated by a most unusual military ardor. The Court of Naples had increased its army to seventy thousand men, and placed the celebrated Mack\* at its head. This general, the disciple of Lacy, had directed with success the expedition of the Prince of Coburg against Dumouriez, in 1793; but in the campaign of 1794 his plans were a violation of the principles of the art: he had imagination and intelligence, but

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\*Mack (Charles, Baron von) was born in Franconia, in 1752. He early distinguished himself against the Turks, and was gradually promoted, till in 1804 he became commander-in-chief in the Tyrol, Dalmatia, and Italy. He was then fifty-two years of age. After the defeat of Ulm, he retired to his farm in Bohemia, and died in obscurity, in 1828.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

was wanting in spirit and judgment. Ferdinand IV., vain of the pomp and show of his battalions, and incited on by Nelson and Acton, ventured to throw himself with fifty thousand men upon the Roman states, which were then defended by Championnet\* with eighteen thousand men, scattered from the Adriatic to the Mediterranean. Mack advanced, between the twenty-third and twenty-seventh of November, on Rome, in several columns, and obliged the little army of Championnet to fall back on Civita-Castillana (ancient Veii), whose natural ramparts enabled him to wait there for reinforcements. To seek these, the general-in-chief departed for Ancona. In his absence Mack attacked Macdonald† and Kellerman, who repulsed him with loss. Championnet, on his return, captured at Calvi an isolated Neapolitan regiment, which had ventured to threaten his communication: he afterward maneuvered to cut off the division of Damas, which had taken the direction of Viterbo. Mack being alarmed, evacuated Rome, and Ferdinand IV. returned to Naples, ordering a *levée-en-masse*. Damas, abandoned by his friends, concluded a treaty with Kellerman for permission to reëmbark.

**SEIZURE OF PIEDMONT AND OCCUPATION OF TUSCANY.**—Championnet returned to Rome on the thirteenth of December, and remained there some days, waiting to hear from Northern Italy; for it was reported that the King of Sardinia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany had risen at the same time, and made common cause with the King of Naples. The relations between the Directory and the Court of Turin were such as to give credence to this report. Joubert, on hearing of the invasion of the Roman Empire, made requisition, through the ambassador Eymar, for the contingent of eight thousand men stipulated in the treaty of the preceding year for all wars of the French Republic in Italy. The Cabinet of Turin excused itself on the impossibility of immediately collecting this division, and Joubert, without waiting for the ulterior orders of the Directory, but sure of acting in accordance with its views, drew up a kind of manifesto of his griefs, united, on the fifth of December, the divisions of Victor and Des-

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\*Championnet (Jean Etienne) was born at Valencia, in 1762. He entered the Spanish army at the age of fourteen, but afterward returned to France, and was rapidly promoted till he became commander-in-chief of an army. He died in 1800.

†Macdonald (Etienne Jacques-Joseph Alexandre) was born at Saucene, in France, in 1765. He entered the army at about nineteen, became a colonel at twenty-seven, general-of-brigade at twenty-eight, and general-of-division at thirty. He was made a Marshal of France on the field of Wagram. He died in 1840.



solles\* on the Tecino, and while Novara, Suza, Coni, and Alexandria were falling by surprise into the hands of the French, he directed these two divisions on Vercelli. The Piedmontese troops, after a semblance of resistance, were driven in upon Turin, which city the republicans, already masters of the citadel, entered at the same time with the enemy. Charles Emmanuel, humiliated and disgusted with his unstable and limited power in Piedmont, signed, on the eighth of December, a renunciation of all rights to the throne of that country, and went into voluntary exile, it was said, to Sardinia, merely stipulating for his personal safety till his arrival there. But no sooner had he reached Leghorn than he published a solemn protestation against an act drawn from him by force. Having thus effected without difficulty the dethronement of this sovereign, Joubert directed a division on Florence, when his own, ready to strike, was arrested by new protestations of attachment from the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and perhaps, also, by orders from the Directory. Nevertheless, the division occupied Leghorn, and a part of the grand duchy. Being now certain of the submission of all Italy, Joubert hastened to announce to Championnet that he could resume the offensive against Naples, and sent him reinforcements.

**FERDINAND FLIES TO SICILY.**—The ill-success of the expedition to Rome had so terrified King Ferdinand that he left Naples the twenty-first of December, and embarked for Sicily at night, with as much precipitation and disorder as if the French had been at the gates of his capital.

**CHAMPIONNET TAKES NAPLES.**—But Championnet, waiting to hear from his left, which, under Duhesme, was to subjugate Pescara, and arrive by Sulmona, did not pass the Volturna and invest Capua till the third of January. In the center, the division of Lemoine advanced upon Popoli, overthrowing the corps of Gambs, and then proceeded to Venafro; on the extreme right, Kellerman and Rey marched by Itri on Gaeta, which important place, with a fine garrison of three thousand men, but commanded by an octogenarian officer, was basely surrendered without striking a single blow. A general insurrection, ordered by the court and the priests, was near changing the entire face of affairs, for Championnet was besieged in his own camp under the

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\*Dessolles (Jean Joseph Paul Augustin) was born at Auch, in 1767. He entered the army at twenty-five; *chef-de-bataillon* at twenty-six; general-of-brigade at thirty, and general-of-division at thirty-two. He distinguished himself as chief-of-staff to Schérer, Moreau, and Prince Eugene, and as general-of-division in Italy and Spain. His great bravery won for him the name of the *French Denis*.

walls of Capua. But the provisional government, confided by the King to Prince Pignatelli, had so little confidence in the insurgent people that it hastened to sign an armistice, giving us Capua, Benevento, and a sum of two millions. On hearing of the armistice, the exasperated people accused Mack and the provisional government of treason; disarmed the troops of Damas, which had returned from Orbitello by sea; and sent detachments to arrest Mack. Pignatelli demanded troops of Mack for his personal protection against the infuriate mob; but the brigade of Dillon, sent for this purpose, was arrested and disarmed by the insurgents; and Mack himself sought safety in the camp of Championnet, by surrendering himself, the fifteenth of January, a prisoner of war.

Championnet, having now united all his divisions, advanced toward the capital. The population of this city and the environs, incited by the priests, ran to arms with the cry of *Viva la Santa Fede*, forced the viceroy, Pignatelli, to fly for safety into Sicily, and threatened to bury themselves beneath the ruins of Naples. In default of military courage, this people was animated by lively and tumultuous passions; the resistance was, like the excitable and fickle character of this people, obstinate the first day, but disorderly and feeble the second. Championnet entered, victorious, into Naples, the twenty-first of January. If the Court of the Two Sicilies had declared war after the opening of hostilities on the Adige, there had been some reason in it, but to rush in this way blindfold to its own destruction was an act of perfect madness. Nevertheless, this fault turned to the account of the coalition by the more serious ones which it caused the French government to commit.

**ERECTION OF THE PARTHENOPEAN REPUBLIC.**—The Directory, having one hundred and sixteen thousand men in Italy, estimated its power there by what I had accomplished with fifty thousand men; it thought to occupy all, and consequently became weak everywhere. Fifty-three thousand had sufficed to Championnet for the reduction of Naples, and if the Directory had offered Ferdinand an acceptable peace, no doubt this pusillanimous prince would have hastened to accept it, so that the army of Championnet could have returned to Mantua in time to take part in the campaign. But instead of doing this, Rewbel thought to create a Parthenopean Republic; an absurd project, requiring military force to sustain this Utopian theory against the Court of Naples, the English, the priests, and six millions of people; thus depriving us of thirty thousand men on the Adige, and exposing them to almost certain ruin. Adding to this detachment the division of Gauthier in Tuscany, the troops required for the occu-



pation of Piedmont, the division of Valteline for securing the junction with the army of Helvetia, the division of Liguria, we have in all sixty thousand men on detached service, leaving Schérer only forty-seven thousand combatants on the Adige, and ten thousand at Mantua; a force entirely insufficient to oppose the powerful preparations of the coalition.

**THE RUSSIANS ADVANCE TOWARD ITALY.**—Already the Russian troops, crossing Styria, are directing their march upon Italy; the Archduke Charles crosses the Inn, enters Bavaria, and advances toward Ulm. General Kray assembles seventy-one thousand Austrians between Verona and the Tagliamento.

**THE DIRECTORY TAKES THE INITIATIVE.**—The Directory, like most imprudent governments, had rendered itself offensive to its neighbors, without being prepared to sustain its aggressions. It now resolved to anticipate its enemies, and charged General Lahorie, formerly *aid-de-camp* to General Moreau, but a man without genius, with drawing up a plan of operations. Jourdan, with the army of the Danube, hardly thirty-six thousand strong, was to move on Ulm, between this city and the mountains, while Masséna, with thirty-eight thousand men of the army of Helvetia, should advance across the Rhetian and Tyrolean Alps—that is, across the precipices of the Grisons, of the Voralberg, and the Tyrol, to the Inn. At the same time Schérer, at the head of forty-seven thousand men, was to attack Verona and the Adige. In other words, Schérer was to oppose seventy-one thousand Austrians assembled under the orders of Kray, between Verona and Udina, and soon to be sustained by two Russian corps of twenty thousand men each. Jourdan was to attack the Archduke Charles, who had at least seventy-eight thousand men, on the Lech and in the Voralberg; and Masséna was, in part, to oppose Hotze, detached from this army, and, in part, Bellegarde, who covered the Tyrol with forty-four thousand Austrians. A third Russian army of thirty thousand men, under Korsakof, arriving in July, would serve as a reserve to that of the Archduke.

**MASSÉNA SEIZES THE GRISONS.**—Masséna, notwithstanding the disproportion of the respective forces, commences operations on the sixth of March; he passes the Rhine, turns and carries the Fort of Luciensteig, and then debouches on Coire, where Auffenberg, invested with three thousand men, is forced to surrender; he now pushes the *débris* of this corps on the Engadine, where Lecourbe, coming from Bellinzona, has penetrated by Tüsis. General Dessolles marches from Bormio on Taufers, at the head of the division of Valteline, designed to effect the junction; he there overthrows the corps of Landon, who, cut at the

same time by the right of Masséna, loses four thousand men and saves hardly five hundred fugitives across the glaciers.

#### THE ARCHDUKE MARCHES AGAINST JOURDAN.—

The Archduke Charles, hearing of the passage of the Rhine by Jourdan, advanced against him at the head of sixty thousand men. To facilitate the operations of his colleague, Masséna had, on the fourteenth of March, caused the intrenchments of Hotze at Feldkirch to be attacked; in spite of the vigorous efforts of Oudinot,\* the attack failed, and the French were repulsed. Hotze soon marched with the half of his corps against the right of Jourdan to assist the Archduke. Masséna, profiting by this movement, renewed his attack upon the enemy's intrenchments, on the twenty-second of March, with the divisions of Ménard and Oudinot; but being again repulsed, he withdrew his troops, with considerable loss, into the Grisons and Rhinthal.

**BATTLE OF STOCKACH.**—Jourdan, on the twenty-fifth of March, with only thirty-five thousand men against sixty thousand, gave battle to the Archduke, attacking his whole line at the same time; St.-Cyr, commanding the right, debouched by Tuttlingen, and Ferino with the left by Schaffhausen, at ten leagues from each other! The Archduke from his central position overthrew the isolated corps of Soult at Stockach, and it certainly was no very difficult matter for thirty thousand men to overpower ten thousand. St.-Cyr, who was within three leagues of the rear of the enemy's line, with twelve thousand men, had the good sense to seize upon the bridge of Sigmaringen, and retire in haste on the Black Forest so as to regain Strasbourg. The right, under Ferino, separated from the *corps de bataille*, threw itself on Schaffhausen. Our troops made a fortunate escape, for, had I commanded the enemy's forces, I could have destroyed the whole army; I would have dealt with the corps of St.-Cyr as I did with the corps of Lusignan and Provera at Rivoli.

**REVERSES IN ITALY.**—Schérer did no better. His adversary waited, between Verona and Legnago, the arrival of Melas and the two divisions of Austrian reserve, before taking the offensive. Favored by this state of things, Schérer found himself, with the main body of his forces, before two imperial brigades isolated in the intrenchments between the Adige and Lake Garda. He attacked them on the twenty-sixth of March with three divisions, carried the camp of Pastrengo, the plateau of Rivoli, and

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\*Oudinot (Charles Nicholas) was born in 1767. He entered the army young, became a captain at twenty-three, *chef-de-bataillon* at twenty-four, colonel at twenty-five, general-of-brigade the same year, and general-of-division at twenty-eight. He was made Marshal of France on the field of Wagram.



the bridges of Polo on the Adige; then carried his center under Moreau against Verona, while the right extended itself toward Legnago. This last-named general here found himself opposed to Kray and the *élite* of his forces; the Austrian general debouched from Legnago, fell on Montrichard, pushed him by Auguiari on the Menago, and threatened to cut off the road to Mantua. Kray, instead of profiting by this success to draw the mass of his forces on this point, repassed the Adige in order to march to the assistance of Verona, which was now threatened by the center and left of the French army. Moreau fought with the center before Verona, on the twenty-seventh, but without any result. On the twenty-eighth Schérer, who had for two days groped his way along the whole line, thought to throw the left under Serrurier across the Adige; it would advance from Polo toward Verona, seek to turn this place, which, from its position, it was impossible to do, and then debouch in the middle of the whole imperial army. On the twenty-ninth they found that the maneuver was impossible, which undoubtedly saved Serrurier from total destruction.

Schérer, remembering my maneuver of Arcole, conceived the ridiculous idea of repeating it; he assembled two-thirds of his army at Ronco for the purpose of passing the Adige at that place, forgetting that, in 1796, I was master of Verona and Legnago, and that in passing at Ronco I threw Alvinzi into a *cul-de-sac*. But now, the Austrians being masters of these two places, the conditions of the problem were completely changed. To throw himself upon Ronco with thirty thousand men in the midst of seventy thousand enemies, who were masters of Verona and Legnago, was to pass his army under the Caudine Forks. As a climax of folly, the division of Serrurier advanced alone, on the thirtieth, from Polo on Verona in order to attract the enemy's attention, while the mass of the army filed by the right toward Ronco. Kray fell upon this compromised division, drove it upon Polo with the loss of two thousand men; the remainder only saved themselves by hastily destroying the bridges. It was most fortunate for Schérer that Kray, debouching from Verona, on the second of April, forced him to renounce his absurd project. The army, returning from Ronco to Magnan through horrible mud, had its right overwhelmed the fifth of April, and was rallied under the cannon of Mantua in complete disorder. If Kray, who, from the third to the fifth, was opposed only by the two divisions of Moreau, had overthrown them before the return of Schérer, the latter would have been driven on the lower Po, and surrounded. In the battle even, the Austrians deviated from their first plan, which was a good

one, and directed, *mal-à-propos*, their principal effort on the right of the French, instead of attacking the left. Nevertheless, their victory had important results: Schérer could sustain himself only behind Mantua. After having completed the garrisons of this city, Ferrara, and Peschiera, he fell back in rear of the Chiesa.

**RETREAT OF THE ARMY BEHIND THE RHINE.**—The retreat of the army of the Danube drew after it the little army of observation under Bernadotte, who had thrown a few bombs into Philipsbourg. The Directory, at the same time, accepted the resignation of Jourdan and united his troops, as well as those of Bernadotte, under the command of Masséna. This unfortunate beginning proved to the presumptuous Directors the impolicy of their plan. They had begun war without having prepared the means, thinking that one hundred and twenty thousand scattered French were capable of conquering two hundred thousand concentrated Austrians. But in other respects this unequal contest was not without credit to the generals and soldiers of the Republic; and we hardly know which is most astonishing, the temerity of the French government, or the inconceivable timidity of the Aulic Council in deriving so little profit from its advantages.

**ATTACK ON OUR PLENIPOTENTIARIES AT RASTADT.**—But the stupor caused by an event so unexpected was soon dissipated by the tragical *dénouement* of the interminable Congress of Rastadt. In entering Swabia, Jourdan had declared Rastadt a neutral town, giving a safeguard to the congress. This situation favored the designs of France, who wished to detach the princes of the Empire from the Austrian alliance: already the turn of the negotiations promised the Directory full success, when the battle of Stockach and the retreat of the army of the Danube caused the diplomatic scales to suddenly incline on the side of the conqueror. From this time also the Cabinet of Vienna undertook to direct the affairs of the south of Germany. Desiring to know the state of the negotiations between the princes of the German Empire and the Directory, it charged Count Lehrbach, its minister plenipotentiary, to devise some means to get possession of their correspondence with the Republican negotiators. The Count could devise no surer way of accomplishing this object than to seize upon the papers of the French legation at the moment of the breaking up of the congress, and he was authorized by his court to make upon the Archduke Charles a requisition for the troops necessary for this *coup-de-main*. The Archduke at first refused to allow his soldiers to mingle in any way in these diplomatic affairs; but when Count Lehrbach exhibited the orders of his government to this effect, the Archduke felt obliged to obey, and put at his dis-



posal a detachment of Szeckler's hussars. The colonel of the corps was admitted to the secret. The officer charged with the affair was only to carry off the French diplomatic papers, and if an opportunity occurred, to administer some blows with the flat of the sabre upon the persons of Jean Debry and Bonnier, as a punishment for their haughty bearing in the negotiations. Roberjeot, a fellow-student and personal friend of the Austrian minister, had been excepted by name from this course of treatment.

The French plenipotentiaries were to depart on the twenty-eighth of April; but, on the evening of the nineteenth, they were summoned to retire immediately, as the city was to be given up to military occupation the next day. They therefore set out the same night for Strasbourg. But hardly were they outside of the town when the Austrian hussars, on the watch for their prey, surrounded the carriages; but forgetting the details of their instructions, these soldiers, the greater part of whom were intoxicated, struck the envoys without distinction of person with the edge of their swords, and left Bonnier and Roberjeot dead on the spot. Jean Debry, severely wounded in the arm and head, escaped as by miracle, and at daylight sought refuge in the house of the Prussian minister. This unprecedented violation of the most sacred rights produced in France an electrical effect. On every side was raised the cry of vengeance, and the same energetic feeling was manifested by the nation as in 1792. The Directory profited by this state of things to facilitate the levy of the conscription, and to give a degree of momentary popularity to its cause.

**TARDY ENTERPRISE OF THE ARCHDUKE.**—In the mean time the Archduke Charles had not profited by his successes; if he had passed the Rhine at Schaffhausen with sixty thousand men, and combined an attack with the forty thousand of Bellegarde, Masséna, half-buried in the Engadine, would have been lost. But they gave the French time to carry into Switzerland the entire army of Jourdan as fast as it returned to Alsace, and Masséna, who had taken the command of it, established the mass of his forces along the Rhine as far as Lucisteig, prolonging his right into the Engadine. The Austrians had committed the fault of rendering Bellegarde independent of the Archduke, and it is undoubtedly to this circumstance, as much as to the sickness of this prince, that we are to attribute the inconceivable inaction of his army from the twenty-seventh of March to the fourteenth of May.

**SUWARROW IN LOMBARDY.**—During this interval,

Suwarrow,\* arriving on the Chiesa, the seventeenth of April, drove Schérer behind the Adda. The French army was already reduced to twenty-eight thousand men by losses in battles, detachments for garrisons, and the mania of occupying all Italy. Schérer scattered what remained from Pizzighettone to Lecco. The right, under Montrichard, was even thrown across to the right bank of the Po to cover Modena and Bologna, or to enter into communication with Tuscany and Rome. The Directory, justly irritated against its general, recalled him; Moreau took command on the night of the twenty-fifth of April, and was attacked early the following morning, without having had time to rectify the position of his forces. Although the Allies had employed thirty-five thousand men to blockade Mantua, Peschiera, and Ferrara, they still had fifty-four thousand on the Adda. To cover a line of twenty leagues with twenty-eight thousand men, against a force double that number, is impossible: the detachments of Moreau, assailed on the twenty-seventh of April, at Cassano and Vaprio, are pierced by the center; and Serrurier, cut off toward the left at Verdirio, is forced to lay down his arms. Two days after, Suwarrow enters Milan. Moreau, who had reached the Ticino with hardly twenty thousand men, divides them on Valencia and Turin. Suwarrow passes the Po at Placentia to march on Alexandria. Kray is charged with the blockade of Mantua. Count Hohenzollern attacks successively the places of Peschiera and Orzinovi, which are reduced in a few days. He is then charged with besieging the citadel of Milan, and with observing the troops which are returning from the Grisons into the Valteline. Kaim blockades Pizzighettone, which place is surrendered without opposition. Klenau, by the aid of a powerful flotilla, armed at Venice, and assisted by the defection of General Lahoz, and by the insurrection of the adjoining provinces, attacks Ferrara. The entire edifice which I had constructed in Italy is crumbling into ruins with the most frightful rapidity.

**EXPEDITION OF ADMIRAL BRUIX.**—The Directory, seeing the danger threatened by the new coalition, resolved upon a maritime expedition, for the triple purpose of uniting the squadron of Brest with those of Spain in the Mediterranean, of bringing

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\*Suwarrow was born at Luskoy, a village of the Ukraine, in 1730. He was educated in the Military Academy of St. Petersburg. He entered the army at seventeen, and distinguished himself in the Seven Years' War. He was a general at thirty-eight. He distinguished himself mostly in the wars against the Turks and in Poland, for which services he received from his government rich rewards, and the titles of count, prince, marshal, and generalissimo of the Russian forces. He died in the early part of 1800, soon after his return from Italy.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.



home the army of Egypt, and of returning into the ocean to attempt a descent upon Ireland, which had been projected for so long a time. Some say that it was intended, at first, to embark some of our forces in Italy and reinforce my army in Egypt, but that the unfavorable turn of our affairs there, and our expulsion from Lombardy, compelled them to change this part of the project. Be this as it may, Bruix sailed the beginning of April with twenty-five vessels from Brest to Cadiz and then to Toulon. He put to sea again the thirtieth of May; formed a junction at Carthage with the Spanish forces under Massaredo; made his cruise without having revictualled Malta, without having succored Egypt, in a word, without having undertaken any thing; and again entered Brest with the Spanish fleet. Keith, his fleet being increased by reinforcements to forty-eight vessels, sought for him in vain in the Mediterranean, and followed him to before Brest. This expedition, which had no other result than to bring the Spanish squadron as a hostage to Brest, and to concentrate all our naval means in that port to be blockaded or to rot, is still an inexplicable enigma to all naval men.

EVACUATION OF NAPLES.—While they were thus driving us from the Grisons and upper Italy, Macdonald, who had succeeded Championnet, after fighting at Naples, in the Abruzzos and Apulia, against the *débris* of the Neapolitans and an insurgent multitude, had just received orders to return toward the Po, and was marching on Rome. Suwarrow detached the division of Ott upon Modena to observe him. A Turco-Russian fleet had reduced the Ionian Isles, and laid siege to Corfu. The destruction of the army of Naples seemed certain; to the fault of recalling it too late, they had added the new absurdity of directing garrisons to be left in the forts at Naples, at Gaeta, at Capua, at Civita Vecchia, and at Rome. Moreau was convinced at Turin that the capital of a subjugated kingdom cannot be well disposed toward a conqueror who reduces it to the post of a provincial city; he ought to have thrown a garrison into the citadel and to have concentrated his forces toward Valencia and Alexandria, in order to cover Genoa and the passages of the Apennines, the preservation of which was indispensable to save Macdonald and the army of Naples. Suwarrow had followed Moreau by the right bank of the Po, and the road to Alexandria. His advanced guard took the road from Valencia to Turin by the left bank. This guard, too ardent, attempted to pass the river without orders at Bassigliano, to attack the French camp near Valencia; but, meeting a timely charge from the eighteen thousand men which still remained to Moreau, it was repelled with loss.

**SUWARROW ENTERS TURIN.**—This skirmish and the fine defense of Moreau near Marengo and Alexandria did not prevent Suwarrow from passing the Po again at Cambio and entering Turin as a conqueror, on the twenty-seventh of May, the inhabitants of the city attacking the garrison in concert with the advanced guard of Wukassowich. Moreau arrived at Asti, surrounded by enemies and insurgents who had just surprised Ceva and thus intercepted his last communication. He resolved to unite his forces on the Apennines, opening for himself an issue to join the division of Perignon, who was guarding Liguria.

**MASSÉNA IS DRIVEN FROM THE GRISONS.**—While these things were occurring in Italy, Masséna, pressed on all sides in the Grisons, got off much more easily than could have been expected. Wearied with an inaction of five weeks (from the twenty-seventh of March to the thirtieth of April), the Austrians had finally combined an attack upon the fort of Lucisteig for the first of May, in concert with a party of the Grisons, who had asked their aid. But Hotze managed the affair so badly that one of his columns, under the orders of General St. Julien, debouching before the others, fell into the midst of the division of Ménard, who surrounded it and forced it to surrender. A redoubtable insurrection broke out the same day in all the Alps, from Coire to Schwitz and Altorf: Masséna was obliged to send the entire division of Soult to reduce these two little cantons and to reëstablish the communication with the St. Gothard.

Lecourbe, having ventured into the Engadine, sustained himself against the superior forces of Bellegarde, and covered himself with glory at Zernetz, while the small division left by Dessolles in the Valteline under the orders of Loison was exposed to the attacks of the right of Suwarrow. It seemed lost, for sooner or later the enemy would pierce by Coire on Dissentis, or by the Italian bailiwicks on the St. Gothard. Lecourbe saw that he could not do better than to first relieve Bellinzona, menaced by Count Hohenzollern. He marched on Taverna and drove out the Prince of Rohan on the thirteenth of May, the very moment when a storm much more formidable was breaking out on his left. The Austrians, after having passed a fortnight in recovering from the skirmish of the first of May, had at last concluded to try, on the fourteenth, a new attack on Lucisteig, and the Archduke had sent for this purpose a reinforcement of twelve thousand men, with orders to act in concert with Bellegarde. By these powerful means they succeeded in carrying the fort, pierced the division of Ménard, threw back his left on Sargans, and pushed his right, in the direction of Dissentis, to the foot of the St. Gothard. Le-



courbe left Loison to defend the avenues of Airolo, and hastened to the defense of the menaced Alps.

The Cabinet of Vienna, more intent upon consolidating its power in Italy than in destroying the organized corps which we had compromised in the Grisons, had directed Bellegarde to leave only the division of Haddick to take the St. Gothard, and march by the Valteline on Milan, in order to reinforce Suwarrow, who was about to attack several of the fortifications and also the army returning from Naples. This contributed to save Lecourbe, who returned on Altorf after a retreat not less honorable than difficult; he very much cut up the brigade of St. Julien, which had descended from Dissentis on the valley of the Reuss, and another detachment which had ventured into the Muttenthal between him and the *corps-de-bataille* of Masséna.

#### THE ARCHDUKE PENETRATES INTO SWITZERLAND.

—On his side the Archduke Charles, thwarted in some measure by the departure of Bellegarde for Italy, had at last passed the Rhine at Schaffhausen on the twenty-seventh of May. Hotze passed the river toward Coire; Masséna fell back behind the Thur, thinking to prevent the junction of the two corps, attacked that of Hotze at Frauenfeld, and gained a partial advantage which did not prevent him from retiring on Zurich two days afterward. This city has a bastioned *enceinte* of very thick masonry; on the south side, where the Limmat, which runs impetuously from the lake, serves as ditches, the body of the place is commanded by the Zurichberg, and, notwithstanding the defiladement of its works, it could not long resist a siege. Masséna had caused a large intrenched camp to be marked out upon this mountain in order to connect its defense with that of the plateau of Hong.

MASSÉNA EVACUATES ZURICH.—The Archduke attacked him on the sixth of June, but without success: an Austrian column succeeded, by gliding secretly along the lake, in reaching the gate; but it was punished for this audacity. Nevertheless, the position of Masséna was a critical one. At the approach of the Austrians, the mountaineers of the Grisons, of the smaller cantons, and of the Valois had taken up arms. The success of the Allies in Italy threatened the Simplon and the St. Bernard; the St. Gothard was carried, and Lecourbe driven back on Schwitz and Altorf. It would have been imprudent for him to sacrifice his army in order to hold Zurich with a defile in rear. Masséna preferred the line of the Albis, a precipitous mountain which borders the Limmat and the lake from Bruck to Utznach; he therefore abandoned the city to the Austrians.

**THE ARCHDUKE PARALYZED BY THE AULIC COUNCIL.**—The Archduke now received orders from the Aulic Council to attempt nothing decisive before the arrival of the powerful reinforcements of Korsakof, who was approaching with thirty thousand Russians; he therefore remained, till the month of August, encamped behind Zurich, which gave to Masséna time to secure himself in his fine position, and to the Directory an opportunity to send him reinforcements.

**MACDONALD RETURNS UPON MODENA.**—In the mean time Macdonald had evacuated Naples and Rome, in order to rejoin Moreau; weakened by the garrisons which he had been directed to leave behind, but reinforced by the division which had occupied Tuscany, he advanced with thirty thousand men on Modena. Moreau detached the division of Victor on the Trebia, which formed a junction with Macdonald at Firenzuola on the fourteenth of June. Moreau himself defiled through the Apennines in order to descend into the plain. He thought to unite the thirty-four thousand men of Macdonald with the sixteen thousand which he had in Liguria. In thus resuming the line of the Po with fifty thousand men, he hoped at least to relieve Mantua, which the scattered position of the enemy's troops rendered not impossible. Nothing is more likely to cause an injudicious dissemination of troops than rapid conquests over an enemy who is himself too much scattered. The Allies experienced this: at the moment that Macdonald descended from the Apennines on Modena, Kray was before Mantua, Hohenzollern and Klenau toward Bologna, Ott at Parma, Seckendorf and Wukassowich toward Ceva and Montenotte; Froelich was observing Coni; Lusignan was near Fenestrelles; Bagration had just subdued Suza; Suwarrow with the *corps-de-bataille* of Melas, and the division of Kaim, was besieging the citadel of Turin; finally, Bellegarde, having descended from the Valteline on Milan, was going to swell the forces of the Russian general in the central plains of the Bormida, and Haddick, left in the Valois, was guarding the Alps against the right of Masséna. As soon as the Allies heard of Macdonald's approach, they sent against him the detachments of Klenau and Hohenzollern, who marched on Modena, and were separately beaten on the twelfth of June: the latter, quite seriously cut up, was driven behind the Po, and the former fell back in a little better order on Ferrara.

**SUWARROW ATTACKS HIM ON THE TREBIA.**—Suwarrow, hearing these events, left Kaim at Turin to blockade the citadel, and hastened, by forced marches, to join Ott at Placentia, he



directed Kray to leave only a small division at Mantua, and also to march by Mezzana-Corte on the Po, where he hoped to collect fifty thousand men independently of Bellegarde, who remained near Alexandria to observe Moreau. Suwarrow arrived on the Tidone, the fifteenth of June, found Ott closely pressed, but relieved him and repulsed Victor. Macdonald, the next day, concentrated his scattered columns and attacked the enemy. Kray not having yet arrived, Suwarrow had collected only thirty-three thousand men, so that the two armies were about equal. A most sanguinary combat took place between these forces, animated on the one side by the remembrance of ancient victories, and on the other by that of recent advantages. Macdonald, who was waiting for Moreau at the foot of the Apennines on the left, committed the fault of directing his efforts in the opposite direction and along a river without bridges, where his army might be repulsed. Suwarrow, with better judgment, directed his efforts against the opposite wing, certain that if he repulsed the left of the French he would obtain great results. After a most memorable contest of three days, the French army, with half its number *hors-de-combat*, was driven back upon Tuscany. Its loss seemed certain; but Moreau having beaten Bellegarde in the plains of Alexandria, the army of Suwarrow being itself turned, and Kray having by the positive orders of the cabinet remained quiet at Mantua, the Russian marshal, disgusted with the conduct of his allies, left Macdonald time to return by the Corniche from Pontremoli, and to bring his army back to Spezzia; it was truly in a deplorable state, but to save it at all was accomplishing much. This disaster destroyed all hope of repairing our affairs in Italy. Suwarrow, victorious at the Trebia, had first designed to fall upon Genoa and complete our total expulsion from Italy, but the Emperor had given positive orders to the Austrians to limit themselves to the sieges of Mantua, Alexandria, and Tortona.

GENERAL STATE OF AFFAIRS.—In less than four months from the opening of the campaign, the French armies had been driven from all their conquests and some leagues from their frontiers. Notwithstanding the one hundred thousand conscripts which had been incorporated in the different regiments, there remained scarcely two hundred thousand men—exhausted by fatigue, discouraged by twenty defeats, in want of every thing—to oppose the victorious Austro-Russian armies, seconded as they were by the people of Italy and Switzerland, who had by this time become fatigued and disgusted with the tyrannical yoke of the Directory. Everywhere fortune seemed to have deserted the Republican standards; the army of the East, forced to raise the

siege of Acre after sixty days of open trench, had returned to Egypt; in India the English had carried by assault the capital of Mysore, dividing with the Nizam this kingdom of the ancient ally of France. The King of Naples and the Grand Duke of Tuscany returned to their capitals; the King of Sardinia was recalled by Suwarrow. The coalition was triumphant, and England, who was its soul, impatient to accelerate the downfall of the French Republic, signed a treaty with Russia for an expedition to drive the French from Holland. The ascension of the Prince of Brazil to the throne of Portugal, which he had in fact occupied for the last seven years under the title of Regent, in consequence of the mental alienation of the Queen, left this kingdom not less subject to English policy.

**THE FRENCH DIRECTORY.**—Such, in few words, was the situation of the belligerent powers; but France had other vicissitudes than the fate of arms; and the Directory, even had it been able to overcome the external opposition caused by its absurd system of foreign policy, could hardly have dispersed the storm which was collecting against it in the very heart of the Republic. After the eighteenth of Fructidor, arbitrary power and immorality seemed to have been its only rules of conduct. It had inherited the embarrassments of the Committee of Public Safety, without being heir to the dictatorial power from which that body had derived its strength. In seeking to extend its control over the people, it had lost the public confidence; the nation regarded each step of the Directors in the career of power as an act of insupportable tyranny, formally opposed to the object of the Revolution. The legislative body took advantage of these difficulties to oppose the Directors. It accused them of “having violated the laws of nations in attacking, without manifesto or declaration, Switzerland and the Ottoman Empire; of having suppressed the primary assemblies, erected bastilles, banished whoever had the misfortune to displease them; of holding seats of justice in Holland, Italy, and Switzerland, and attempting to reduce the representatives to a state of continual servility.” Under such a state of public feeling, all attempts of the Directory to carry the elections proved abortive, and the new Deputies arrived with a firm resolution to overturn a tyranny which the dangers of the country and the hope of victory alone had thus far sustained.

**POLITICAL OPERATIONS OF SIÈYES.**—The nomination of Sièyes in place of Rewbel confirmed the Deputies in their project. This new Director, having perceived that Merlin and Treilhard, imbued with the doctrines of their predecessors, completely



controlled the feeble Laréveillère, felt the importance of destroying this majority, and conferred on this subject with my brother Lucien and Genissieux, the leaders of the Councils. It was now determined to seize the first occasion to eliminate these Directors by a *coup-d'état* like that which had been made on the eighteenth of Fructidor, to get rid of obnoxious legislators.

**ADDRESS TO THE COUNCILS.**—To this effect, addresses from several of the departments were sent to the Councils. The leaders attacked in a special manner the administration of the Directory, which, with seven hundred and twenty-five millions of taxes, let each branch of the public service suffer for want of funds; they accused the minister of war of having sold at prices below their value, for purposes of speculation, one hundred and thirty thousand fire-arms from the arsenal of Paris. La Vendée was in insurrection, and Belgium was opposing, with an armed hand, the levies of men and taxes. Each day's session brought the most virulent attacks against the mediocre chiefs of the executive power.

**TREILHARD'S NOMINATION ANNULLED.**—The contest might have been uncertain so long as the threatened Directors acted in concert. It was therefore necessary to begin by destroying this triumvirate; but how to do this without a direct violation of the constitution? In seeking to overthrow it, would not a pretext be given this body for attacking the national representation? In this perplexity a Deputy recollected very opportunely that Treilhard had been elected three days sooner than the law allowed: the two councils seized upon this pretext to annul his nomination. It is said that Treilhard himself acknowledged the illegality of his appointment, and left his colleagues with more pleasure than regret. This operation for some days completely paralyzed the Directory by the division of the four remaining members. But the number was soon completed by the appointment of the minister Gohier, who inclined the balance in favor of the reform party.

**MERLIN AND LARÉVEILLÈRE RESIGN.**—Still it was only a half victory, for it was yet necessary to get rid of Merlin and Laréveillère. These at first attempted to make way against the storm, but being menaced with charges against them at the tribune, they sent in their resignation on the night of the sixteenth and seventeenth of June. Their condescension disarmed the violence of the legislative body, which was satisfied with merely loading them with sarcasms. They were called mere ciphers, men of small capacity, of small passions, and petty vengeance! In their

places were appointed Roger-Ducos, an old conventional, and General Moulins. Sièyes still remained leader of the Directory. (Bernadotte was appointed minister of war.)

No sooner were these changes effected than the news of the evacuation of Zurich and Moreau's retreat upon the Apennines showed the necessity of more vigorous measures. It was no longer the question to investigate the deficit of the finances, but rather to devise means to supply this deficit. Jourdan proposed a forced loan of one hundred millions levied on the wealthy classes: a disastrous measure always repugnant to public opinion, and which the urgency of the circumstances alone could justify. All classes of the conscription were placed at the disposition of the Directory, and if the levy had been executed without obstacle, it would have furnished a reinforcement of two hundred thousand men. Time and money were alone wanting. Battalions of national guards were placed as garrisons in the frontier fortifications, so as to render all the regulars disposable, and to prepare for the dangers of an invasion.

CONSTERNATION AT THE NEWS OF THE BATTLE OF TREBIA.—Hardly were these measures adopted, when the news of the battle of Trebia came to add to the public distress. So many disasters, justly merited, affected the different parties very differently: the good and patriotic French were sorely grieved at them, the republicans were enraged, internal enemies rejoiced, but all, with one accord, agreed in pronouncing anathemas against the government which had brought them upon the country. Where then are the conquerors of Turcoing, of Fleurus, of Rivoli, of Castiglione? was heard from all parts. Are not the armies composed of the same soldiers and commanded by the same generals who formerly carried the glory of France from the Noric Alps to the confines of Bohemia? In reflecting more attentively upon the causes of former successes, it was perceived that they were produced by masses skillfully directed upon important points, rather than by mere valor and love of country, as had been supposed. Although moments of crisis and of popular excitement are ill calculated for reflection, it was, nevertheless, perceived that results had been attributed to general causes, which, in reality, were due mainly to individual skill. A universal clamor rose against Rewbel and Talleyrand for the impolitic administration and usurpation of the government. Even those who were the least capable of pointing out what course ought to have been pursued, saw evidently that the government had been ill administered.

FORMATION OF CLUBS.—The public calamities led to the



formation of new political clubs. A society, worthy offspring of the Jacobins, was formed at the Manège; there, at the very door of the Council of Ancients, they declaimed about the ignorance and stupidity of the administration. To avoid the law against societies directed by presidents, they appointed Drouet *regulateur des débats*. These ardent republicans, without wishing for the triumph of the *prolétaires*, thought to turn these leaders to their own account, and soon the club of the Manège equaled that of the Cordeliers. France was threatened with an anarchy more horrible than that of 1793, for then the dictatorial power of the Committee of Public Safety, sustained by victory, remedied in some degree the vices of a mere popular government; but as no such authority now existed, there seemed no barrier to protect the nation from plunging into the gulf of anarchy. Already the tribune of the Manège resounded with accusations against those who directed the administration of affairs, and the populace only waited for the signal for beheading them. After Rewbel and Schérer, the conduct of Talleyrand was most severely condemned: he was formally accused of projecting the fatal expedition to Egypt, the cause of all their misfortunes. Compelled to seek some means of justification, he declared that the expedition had been planned before he came into office. This threw the responsibility upon Charles Delacroix, who, to exculpate himself, declared that although the project might have been agitated before the Revolution, it never had been made a question of discussion while he held the portfolio.

**TALLEYRAND IS SUPERSEDED.**—The justification of Talleyrand not satisfying his opponents, the Directory, in deference to public opinion, appointed Reinhard minister of foreign affairs, Robert Lindet to the finances, and Cambacérès as minister of justice. But a change of ministers could not immediately effect a change of foreign policy, as there was no chance of negotiating a peace, and the dismissal of Talleyrand was not sufficient to dissolve the coalition. In looking at the past, they found good reasons to bitterly regret the extravagances of 1798. How different would have been the results if they had applied themselves to consolidating the influence of the Republic in Italy, in interesting Spain in it by the aggrandizement of the infant Duke of Parma, and the House of Savoy by just indemnities, instead of alienating the courts of the peninsula by the revolutions of Genoa, Rome, Montferrat! To raise a power in favor of the son-in-law of Charles IV. would have been an excellent means of proving to the Queen of the Two Sicilies and to Charles Emmanuel of Piedmont that we knew how to estimate the alliances of princes who frankly entered into

friendly relations with us; it would have induced Spain to redouble her efforts at sea, and at the same time to furnish for the common guard of Italy the contingent stipulated at San Ildefonso. By this means, instead of having need to send Macdonald to Naples, and Gauthier to Tuscany, we should have had one hundred and forty thousand French, Spanish, and Italian combatants to oppose the imperialists on the Adige.

**THE MANÈGE CLOSED.**—But the time for recriminations was passed. To preserve our power in Italy was no longer the question; the means of saving France were now to be looked after. The attention of the Directory was now turned to the interior of France, where the ravings of the society of the *Manège* threatened a general anarchy. Such disorders at the very door of the legislative palace became intolerable; the society, driven from their place of sitting, installed themselves in the Rue du Bac, under the presidency of the *regulateur* Angereau. The debates became daily more stormy; the eulogy of Babœuf, pronounced from the tribune of the society, proved that it was time to strike. Sièyes appointed Fouché minister of police; this ancient proconsul, whose business energy no one can deny, hastened to close this den of Jacobinism; at the same time that the Directory prohibited the abuses of the public press.

**NEW PLAN OF OPERATIONS.**—This was all well enough for the interior; but something else was requisite to arrest the enemies of France. Certain of obtaining by the new law the two principal elements of war, the Directory now occupied itself with devising the means of repelling the threatened invasion on the east. It directed the topographical bureau to draw up a plan of operations against the allied armies on the supposition of Masséna's being driven from Switzerland, and to indicate the natural and artificial obstacles which might in this direction be opposed to a great invasion. Although a military officer of distinction had pointed out in a luminous memoir its natural direction in the trough of the Jura and the Vosges, General Clark, chief of this bureau, persisted in maintaining that it should be directed by Switzerland and the coast Alps on Lyons. He consequently presented a long work, pointing out all the measures to be taken for covering the frontier of the Alps. These views consisted principally in forming an army for guarding the two St. Bernards, the Simplon, Mont-Cenis, Mont-Genèvre, and the Col de l'Argentière; while the army of Italy, debouching from the Apennines, should resume the offensive to prevent the siege of Coni and raise that of Mantua, and the army of Helvetia should operate a powerful diversion on the Limmat.



**JOUBERT IS CHARGED WITH ITS EXECUTION.**—The new Directory feeling the necessity of some brilliant stroke to save its credit, Joubert, a young general of much promise, was appointed to replace Moreau in Italy, while the latter was destined for the command of the army of the Rhine. Joubert was to reorganize an army of forty-five thousand men in Liguria and to advance anew on the Po, to relieve Mantua. Championnet, put on trial for having dared to brave the proconsuls of the Directory at Naples, descended from the prisoner's box to take command of an army of thirty-four thousand men which had been organized in the Alps. If the proximity of Grenoble and Chambéry was a sufficient motive for this army, instead of sending the troops by Provence to Genoa, there certainly was no sufficient reason for appointing two chiefs to these armies and assigning to that of the Alps a part principally defensive. Mantua, but weakly blockaded for some months past, had been more strongly invested since the fall of Peschiera, and, all the preparations being made, Kray was to open the trenches on the fifteenth of July: Latour-Foissac capitulated on the thirtieth. At the same time Chasteler and Bellegarde besieged still more vigorously the citadel of Alexandria, which capitulated on the twenty-second of July, after seven days of vigorous attack, in which the Austrian artillery very much distinguished itself.

**HE DEBOUCHES FROM THE APENNINES.**—Joubert arrived about the beginning of August and debouched from the Apennines on Novi, on the twelfth. He was accompanied by Moreau, who, called to the command of the army of the Rhine, nevertheless wished to remain with his young friend till after the battle. They hoped to have only some forty thousand men to oppose. It had been rumored that Mantua had capitulated, but they did not believe it. On the evening of the fourteenth of August, the right and centre had united on the superb plateau of Novi, at the foot of the Apennines, where they learned the sad news that not only had Mantua surrendered, but that Kray's corps, which had besieged it, was united to Suwarrow, ready to receive them in the plain. It hardly seemed credible that a place which had resisted me ten months should, in three, have been reduced by the Austrians. But Latour-Foissac had made a very poor defense. Admitting that it had been attacked more regularly and that the means of defense were much inferior to those of the Austrian marshal, nevertheless it is certain that he might have prolonged the defense for at least a fortnight, which had been time enough to save it.

**BATTLE OF NOVI.**—They received, during the evening, a

confirmation of this disaster which placed the matter beyond the possibility of doubt. There remained now no object for our army to risk a battle against a superior enemy. It was necessary to return to the Apennines and concert some new project with Championnet; but occupying so good a position, expecting the left to join them the next morning, they did not deem it necessary to make a precipitate retreat, for it did not seem probable that the enemy would attack so formidable a position, when it was for his interest to draw them into the plain. But Suwarrow thought differently, and directed the attack to be begun on the morning of the fifteenth of August at break of day, by his right under the orders of Kray. Already the Austrian columns were climbing the slopes of the eminences which were covered with vines, and debouching upon the plateau. Joubert hastened to the threatened point, put himself at the head of the thirty-fourth regiment, repulsed the enemy, but was himself killed at the first discharge: it was scarcely six o'clock in the morning. Moreau, who seemed in this campaign to be destined to direct all the unfortunate contests, took command of the army, which was now engaged contrary to its wishes and without any object; he at first succeeded in repulsing the enemy. The battle had continued on our left ever since three o'clock, when, at nine, Suwarrow debouched against the centre at the head of the Russian corps, and seemed determined, at all hazards, to carry the front of Novi and its heights. St-Cyr, defended himself with great bravery; twice the enemy, repulsed and taken in flank by Watrin, was driven quite to Pozzolo-Formigaro. At last Melas with the reserve, or rather with the left of the allied forces, arrived at two o'clock from Rivalta, moved along the Scrivia, made eight battalions of grenadiers ascend the reverse of Monte-Rotundo where runs the road from Genoa to Gavi, and thus turned the position. Suwarrow and Kray seconded this operation by a new effort. Retreat now became both inevitable and difficult. It was at last effected by cross-roads on Pasturana, where the defile becomes almost impassable.

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\*The following is Napoleon's portrait of Joubert: "He was a native of Ain. He studied law, but the Revolution made him adopt the profession of arms. He served in the army of Italy, and was there made brigadier and general-of-division. He was tall, slender, and naturally of a feeble constitution. But he had strengthened it in the toil of camps, and in mountain warfare. He was intrepid, violent, and active. He was sincerely attached to Napoleon, who, in 1797, charged him to present to the Directory the colors of the army of Italy. He fell gloriously, at the battle of Novi, when he was yet young, and had not acquired sufficient experience. He possessed qualities which would have raised him to great military renown." He was of the same age as Napoleon.



Perignan and Grouchy, in order to give time to the column to pass the defile, fought in front of it against quadruple forces which the enemy brought against them from all points of a circle. They were wounded and taken prisoners with five or six thousand brave men, who shared their fate; a good part of the artillery fell into the enemy's hands. This fatal day irrecoverably fixed the fate of Italy.

#### MASSENA RETAKES THE SMALLER CANTONS.—

Masséna, more fortunate, gained about the same time (August fourteenth) a signal advantage. By a singular chance he had recaptured the line of the high Alps which he had lost in June, at the very moment that the Archduke Charles, reinforced at last by Korsakof, had intended to resume the offensive on the opposite side.

**PROJECT OF THE ARCHDUKE.**—The Archduke wished to concentrate his army below Bruck in order to cross at once the lines of the Aar, the Limmat, and the Reuss rivers, all considerable streams, which united near this city. From Bruck to Arau, it was only four leagues, and on the same day the Archduke might pass three important barriers and seize the heights of the Jura which separated Arau from Bâle. This movement would have compromised, in a great degree, the safety of the French army, which was extended on the Albis as far as Glaris. The Directory, wishing to urge forward the enterprises of Joubert and Masséna, had pressed the latter to resume the offensive. Lecourbe, having been reinforced, attacked the corps of Simbschen, got possession of the Grimsel, the Furca, the St. Gothard, and the Crispalt, and took four thousand prisoners. The division of the Valois drove Rohan from the Simplon. Soult and Chabran attacked the canton of Glaris, and the left of the Linth. These partial successes, instead of being fortunate, would have led to the ruin of the army, had not the project of the Archduke failed.

Thirty thousand Austrians and as many Russians had united, on the sixteenth of August, opposite the village of Dettingen. The single division of Ney covered Bruch and the Frickthal: there were only six battalions to dispute the passage. Such is the inconvenience of having immense lines and numerous points to guard. The one hundred and twenty-two battalions and one hundred and forty squadrons which composed the armies of the Rhine and the Danube would have formed, if Switzerland had been neutral, an imposing army between Ulm and Strasbourg; while now, compelled to cover everything from Geneva to Düsseldorf, they presented an active force of only seventy or seventy-five thousand men, scattered along a line of one hundred leagues;

there were only eight thousand at the enemy's point of passage. The Austrians, neglecting the ordinary precautions, hoped to throw across their bridge under the protection of forty pieces of cannon which swept the bank, without passing over troops to cover the pontoniers. The brigade of Quetard, which assembled at the noise, was soon forced to retire; the Austrian howitzers set fire to Dettingen. A battalion of carbineers of Zurich threw themselves into the ruins of the houses, and by means of their excellent carbines, these brave and skillful marksmen cut off many of the enemy's pontoniers. Moreover, the rocky bottom of the Aar prevented the ponton anchors from taking hold. Many hours passed in this way. Ten thousand French, under the orders of Ney, having had time to collect near the point of passage, the Archduke became discouraged and renounced his project. This failure of the Archduke to establish his bridges was the greatest piece of good fortune for the French; for had his pontoniers been successful, it is hardly possible to calculate the immense disasters that would have followed. Masséna was then with the reserve in the Muttenthal, and half of his army must have been lost.

NEW PLANS OF THE COALITION.—The Allies, intoxicated with their victories, had seen their line for a moment compromised by dissensions between Suwarrow and the Cabinet of Vienna. The Russian marshal, on his arrival in Turin, had strongly urged the recall of the King of Sardinia to his capital. But Thugut, a more wily diplomatist, wishing to form no conclusions as yet on the future fate of Piedmont, strongly opposed this. He had already sold at Selz some of the Piedmontese provinces, and perhaps he wished to make, on the return of the King, a speculation to obtain from him the Novarais as a condition of peace, and thus to divide with the House of Savoy the title and functions of *portier des Alps*. This policy displeased Suwarrow, who, thwarted also by the inaction of Kray at the epoch of the Trebia, complained with so much bitterness as to threaten serious dissensions in the camp of the Allies.

The Cabinets of London and Vienna agreed to propose to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg a new project; it was agreed:

1st. That all the Russian troops of Suwarrow and Korsakof should unite in Switzerland to form the centre, and to penetrate into Franche-Comté in concert with a corps of Austrians;

2d. That the Archduke Charles should move with the mass of his army on Manheim, retake this place, pass the Rhine, both to assist Suwarrow and to favor an Anglo-Russian expedition which was to make a descent upon Holland;



3d. That the expedition, under the Duke of York, composed of twenty-five thousand English, and fifteen thousand Russians under General Hermann, should deliver Holland, and, aided by the troops of the Stadtholder levied there, as well as by the diversion of the Archduke, drive the French from Belgium;

4th. That Melas should command the Austrians, now left arbiters of Italy, and complete our expulsion from Liguria and Piedmont;

5th. That the Russian fleet, after having subdued Corfu, should assist the attack on Ancona, which was confided to the corps of Froelich;

6th. That the English should aid the Neapolitans in the reduction of the garrisons left in Naples, Rome, Civita-Vecchia, etc.

**THE ARCHDUKE MARCHES ON MANHEIM.**—As Suwarrow was to leave Italy and debouch into Switzerland, the Archduke had to effect his own movement on the lower Rhine. He commenced his march on the thirty-first of August; but, unwilling to leave Korsakof alone exposed to the blows apparently designed for him by the Cabinet of Vienna, he left the corps of Hotze, of about twenty-five thousand men, in the smaller cantons, and that of Nauendorf, of ten thousand men, at the junction of the Aar with the Rhine, so as to cover the Black Forest and the Russian right. The Archduke, hearing at Doneschingen that General Muller had passed the Rhine at Mannheim with eighteen thousand men, and was then bombarding Philipsbourg, directed the corps of General Starray to the assistance of that city, and marched himself, with fifty-five thousand men, to sustain him. Muller did not wait for him, but hastily repassed the Rhine, leaving the feeble division of Laroche to guard Mannheim. The Archduke attacked it on the seventeenth of September, penetrated by the *tête-du-pont* of Neckerau, and, in spite of the efforts of Ney, gained possession of the place and fifteen thousand prisoners.

**SUWARROW'S PLAN.**—Suwarrow had a difficult task; the attempt of Moreau to raise the blockade of Tortona had induced him to defer his departure till the eleventh of September, eleven days after the Archduke, whereas, to concert matters well, he ought to have set out first. Departing from Asti three roads offered themselves to his choice; he could debouch by the Valois in the Pays-de-Vaud to effect a diversion, but it exposed him to be beaten without a chance of coöperation; he could cross the St. Gothard without artillery, debouch on Schwitz, and unite with Hotze, while his material went by Coire; finally, he could, from Como, take the route of the Splügen and effect his junction by the

Grisons without fighting. He preferred the St. Gothard as more certain than the first, and as shorter than the third.

**BATTLE OF ZURICH.**—Informed by Suchet of the departure of Suwarrow for Switzerland, and knowing that the Archduke had moved the mass of his army on Manheim, Masséna determined to fight Korsakof before the arrival of the marshal; for if he waited for the conqueror of Novi, he would in all probability be driven on the Jura. He assembled about thirty-eight thousand men, and determined to make the attack on the twenty-fifth of September. Soult passed the Linth at Schönis. Hotze and his chief-of-staff being slain at the first fire, his corps became disordered and was driven on the Toggenburg with the loss of five thousand men *hors-de-combat*. Mortier attacked Zurich on the left bank of the Limmat. Lorges and Menard passed the Limmat at Fahr, in order to turn Zurich, and assail the Zurichberg.

Korsakof had received notice from Suwarrow that he would be at Schwitz on the twenty-sixth, and his *corps-de-bataille* was lying in front of the little town of Zurich to attack the Albis, when the cannon of Foy and Lorges thundering in the direction of Fahr gave notice of the danger which threatened it. In the mean time the Russian general, not liking his position, pushed his left between the Zil and the lake, and repelled the false attack of General Drouet. It was not till the arrival of Masséna and Lorges at the north of Zurich that he saw the perils of his position. He had a division opposite Bruck, but was cut off from it by the passage of Masséna at Fahr: it was necessary to decide immediately either to penetrate by the Albis and join Suwarrow in Schwitz, or to attack Lorges with all his forces and drive him across the Limmat. Korsakof did not know how to act; the fear of disobeying Suwarrow made him reject the only wise course which he could pursue, that of falling on Lorges with his entire force. The news of Hotze's death and the defeat of his corps increased his embarrassment; he persisted in maintaining himself with half his forces between the Zil and Zurich, where Mortier and the grenadiers of Klein fought him all day without any decided results. But Oudinot and Lorges were already cannonading the gate of Winterthour, and crowned the heights which commanded Zurich on the north, the only retreat which remained to the enemy.

**KORSAKOF RETIRES ON THE RHINE.**—Korsakof decided, during the night, what course to pursue. His whole army crossed Zurich and debouched on the morning of the sixteenth, to recover the road to Schaffhausen, which it succeeded in doing after having repulsed the division of Lorges. But the latter, on receiving a reinforcement, resumed the attack, and cut off the



enemy's columns, while Mortier penetrated the little town of Zurich, now guarded by only a few tirailleurs. Korsakof succeeded in reaching Schaffhausen, abandoning to us five thousand wounded, two thousand prisoners, and all his artillery. He had more than ten thousand men *hors-de-combat*, and Hotze at least five thousand.

**SUWARROW PASSES THE ST. GOTHARD.**—Hardly had Masséna completed this brilliant victory, when he received the news of Suwarrow's success at the St. Gothard. The marshal, delayed three days at Lucerne, had not been able to attack Airola and the southern slopes of the mountain till the twenty-third and twenty-fourth. Assisted by Strauch, he dislodged Gudin, forced him to retire on the Furca, and bivouacked at the Hospice. A column of six thousand Russians, under Rosenberg, was to march across the rocks, the snows, and the precipices of the Crispalt to descend on Urseren, and to strike Lecourbe, should he venture to make a stand at the Devil's Bridge. This march, as audacious as difficult, attained its object: Lecourbe, hearing at the Hospice of the arrival of the enemy at Urseren, took his resolution in desperation, threw his cannon into the Reuss, climbed the almost inaccessible mountains of Geschenen, followed along their sides, and redescended to Wasen; but he learned here that another Austrian column from the Grisons was already in possession of the valley toward Amsteg; while Suwarrow, on his side, had forced the rear guard at the Devil's Bridge, after a bloody combat, and had effected a junction with Rosenberg. The audacity of Lecourbe increased in proportion to his danger; he attacked the Austrian column without hesitation. The latter, threatened on the other side by the reserve which was coming from Altorf to meet Lecourbe, thought itself very fortunate in effecting its escape by opening a passage to Lecourbe. He then crossed the Reuss at Seedorf, destroyed the bridge, and supported himself against the mountains of Surenen and the canton of Berne.

Suwarrow then descended without obstacle on Altorf and Fluelen, but this was the termination of any practicable road, and it was necessary to embark on Lake Lucerne, which was the only means of communication between this canton and that of Uri. The position was a critical one: Lecourbe had an armed flotilla, and, moreover, had seized upon a small number of the barks found there. The Russian general had no time to hesitate; he climbed the steep precipices of the mountains of Kessleren in the Schachen-thal, where no troops had ever passed before, and which even Lecourbe had considered impracticable: he lost there the few pieces of mountain artillery which he had with him, many men and

horses, and arrived exhausted in the Muttenthal on the twenty-eighth, three days later than he calculated. Hearing of Korsakof's disaster, he hoped at least to be seconded by two divisions of the right of Hotze, who, in the general plan, was to get possession of Glaris and secure a communication with him.

**DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS.**—These divisions, under the orders of Jellachich and Linken, had, in fact, attacked the single brigade of Molitor on the twenty-fifth. Jellachich debouched on Wesen by the difficult path which runs along the lake of Wallenstadt. Molitor imposed on him by the stand which he took, and the Austrian general, hearing of Hotze's defeat and thinking himself lost if he remained where he was, in a *coupe-gorge*, retired on Wallenstadt. The next day Linken, debouching from the Grisons in three columns by the defile of Engi and the Todiberg, descended the valley of Sernst, carried off one of Molitor's battalions isolated in the mountains, and advanced on Glaris; but Molitor, having disposed of Jellachich, opposed to him the same resistance; and the Austrian general, hearing of the fate of his colleagues, and fearing that he himself would be captured, returned to the Grisons. It is to be remarked that Molitor, with four French and two Swiss battalions, had thus routed twelve thousand Austrians, at the very point of their junction with Suwarrow. The localities favored it, it is true, but his firmness, activity, and resolution are not the less worthy of the highest praise.

**DIFFICULT RETREAT OF SUWARROW.**—Suwarrow soon marched from Muten toward the Bragel, a difficult mountain, where he still found the advanced guard of Molitor; this convinced him that the Austrians had disappeared from Glaris, and as a climax to his embarrassment, Mortier and Masséna, with the conquerors of Zurich, had just arrived at Schwitz, and the grenadiers of Klein at Einsiedlen. The least hesitation would have lost all. Auffenberg and Bragation fortunately forced the little advanced guard of Mortier at Kloenthal, on the thirtieth, and descended on Glaris. Suwarrow followed them with Derfelden. General Rosenberg, left with four battalions in the Muttenthal, was there attacked, on the first of October, by Mortier, whom he drove in the most glorious manner on Schwitz. The rear guard, relieved by this success, reached the Bragel without loss. Molitor had fallen back to Neffels, behind the Linth. Bragation was directed to attack him on the first of October. They fought on both sides with fury; the little troop of Molitor did wonders; the enemy was not behind in bravery; at last the arrival of Soult's division, returning from the pursuit of the wrecks of Hotze into



the Grisons, decided the victory. This incident aggravated still more the difficulties of Suwarrow, who had not a minute to lose. He threw himself by the path of Panix and Engi—that is, by the flanks of the Todiberg—into the Grisons, a route frightful in the best season, but which was then the more difficult and dangerous from being covered with snow. The few horses and mules which he had left were abandoned at the bottom of this gulf; many hundreds of men perished among these precipices. No language can describe the horrors of this retreat. Glory is not the exclusive price of dangers and victories, it belongs equally to those who brave the elements, nature, and privations. In this view of the subject, there are few events more glorious for both parties in this memorable war.

**EFFORTS OF KORSAKOF ON WINTERTHOUR.**—During this time Korsakof had been reinforced by some Bavarians and by the little army of Condé, who had just come from the interior of Russia with three or four thousand *émigrés* to conquer France! This general felt that to efface the stain of Zurich, it was necessary at any price to relieve his general-in-chief from his present difficult position. For this purpose he had advanced from Lake Constance and Busingen on Winterthour; but, attacked here by the reserves and the divisions of Lorges and Menard, he was forced to retire behind the Rhine and destroy his bridges.

**MOVEMENTS OF THE ARCHDUKE AND SUWARROW.**—The Archduke Charles had moved, as has been already said, on Manheim, by order of his cabinet; he there soon received news of the disaster of Zurich, which induced him to renounce all other projects than that of saving the army; he therefore returned in all haste to Doneschingen. He proposed to Suwarrow to come and join him so as to re-enter Switzerland by Schaffhausen; Suwarrow preferred to enter from his side by Rheineck. The Austrian general opposed this double operation, and the old marshal became irritated and took the road to Bavaria, where he put his troops in cantonments.

**DESCENT ON HOLLAND.**—In the mean time the English and Russians had executed their projected invasion of Holland. Abercrombie landed in North Holland, on the twenty-seventh of August, with three thousand English, and the next day was followed by twelve thousand more. He found no other opposition than the small division of Daendels. The English squadron of Admiral Mitchel entered the Texel, and the Dutch sailors, incited by the Orange party, broke out in insurrection, and forced Admiral Story to raise the Stadtholder's flag and surrender his

squadron to the English. The choice of the narrow *presqu'île* of North Holland, well suited for the protection of the first debarkation, was also favorable to the defense of Brune. This general collected at Alkmaer the French divisions of Gouvion and Vandamme, and the Batavian divisions of Dumonceau and Daendels; which together formed an army of about twenty-two thousand men. On the tenth of September he attempted to force the advantageous position of Abercrombie at Slaper-Dyc and was repulsed. The Prince of Orange showed himself at the same time on the frontiers of Friesland, but his partisans were not numerous, and would do nothing in his favor. The Russians and English, on the sixteenth of September, landed the remainder of the troops under the direction of the Duke of York; which increased their number to thirty-five thousand. Brune also had reinforcements which carried his to twenty-eight thousand.

On the nineteenth of September the Allies attacked Brune at Alkmaer; the principal effort was made by the Russians near Bergen, and the English, instead of sustaining this effort, threw the mass of their forces into the lagunes of the Zuyder Zee. The Russians divided into two columns; that of Hermann attacked Vandamme and drove him behind Bergen; but Gouvion and Rostoland, having rendered him timely succor, the Russian column, attacked in front and flank, was overthrown; Hermann himself, with two thousand men, was taken prisoner; the rest perished or were dispersed. Essen, who had advanced more to the left, being attacked in front and threatened in rear, fled behind the Zyp. Dundas, assisted by a Russian brigade, had at first beaten Dumonceau at Schoorldam; but the reinforcements which Brune sent there soon forced him to retire with loss. At the center, Pultney gained an important advantage over Daendels, but soon returned to his position. On the left, Abercrombie, finding only feeble detachments at Hoorn, fatigued his troops by marching over difficult roads without any result.

A new attempt was made on the second of October, at Egmont-op-Zee. But, after several unimportant contests, the Allies were again repulsed with considerable loss. Their army was now shut up in the lagunes of Zyp; the autumnal rains increased the difficulty of their position; the disaster at Zurich left them no hope of succor from the Rhine; the Orange party did not move; England had accomplished half her object in the capture of the Batavian fleet. The Duke of York, therefore, resolved to return to London, and secured a safe retreat by an inglorious treaty of evacuation. This treaty was signed on the eighteenth of October.

Such was the state of our affairs when I arrived in Paris.



Switzerland and Holland had just been happily delivered, at the very moment when the projected union of the Russian forces in the center of operations was calculated to menace the French soil with invasion. But the successes of the Allies in Italy still threatened our departments at the south, where reactionary passions began to foment in a manner truly alarming. The state seemed more than ever exposed to the rule of anarchy.

#### LECOURBE RAISES THE SIEGE OF PHILIPPSBOURG.—

The departure of the Archduke from Manheim to the assistance of Suwarrow caused orders to be given to Lecourbe to recross the Rhine and lay siege to Philipsbourg; he succeeded in making the investment, but Starray twice forced him to give up the attempt. An armistice put an end to this enterprise without any direct result on the fate of the war.

**EFFORTS OF CHAMPIONNET TO SAVE CONI—**An operation of still greater importance had also failed in Italy. Championnet, who had succeeded Joubert and Moreau as commander-in-chief in the Alps and in Italy, took advantage of Suwarrow's absence to endeavor to relieve Coni. In order to offer an obstacle to a siege by Melas' troops, more than fifty thousand men were put in motion from Spezzia and the Bochetta, by the Argentièrre, quite to Mont Cenis. Six or seven scattered corps could not easily succeed against the army of Melas, concentrated on the Stura between Turin and Alexandria, and capable of moving in any direction he might desire. It was exactly a repetition of the battle of Rivoli, on a scale ten times larger. Championnet, repulsed near the end of September in a first attempt on Mondovì, made a more serious attack at the end of October; the same fault necessarily produced the same result. St.-Cyr, with the right wing, gained a very glorious success in front of Novi on the twenty-fourth of October; but the division of the center, acting without concert on Fossano, were beaten, the third of November, by thirty-four thousand Austrians. Another combat took place on the tenth, when the French were so scattered that the siege of Coni was carried on by the enemy without further opposition; it surrendered on the fourth of December. While the center was driven into the Alps, Kray forced St.-Cyr on the Bochetta, and Klepau debouching from the coast, attempted to carry Genoa.

While Melas was thus crowning a glorious campaign by maneuvers that did him honor, General Froelich had been directed to reduce Ancona, where General Monnier had kept the field notwithstanding the approach of a Russian fleet, and a corps of observation, composed of Russians, Turks, and insurgent peasants.

The siege was finally begun on the first of November, and, notwithstanding the good defense of Monnier and his little garrison, the place surrendered on the twelfth; the garrison of two thousand seven hundred men, covered with laurels, returned to France on parole.

Such was the issue of this celebrated campaign of 1799, so rich in events, of which I have merely traced an outline to show the state of affairs at the time of my appointment to the Consulate.



## CHAPTER VI.

## THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801.

Napoleon's Return from Egypt—Necessity of a Change in the Government—Stièyes had long meditated a Change—Revolution of the eighteenth Brumaire—Project of a Constitution—Consular Government—Napoleon proposes Peace—Fall of Tippoo-Saëb—Maritime Affairs—Continental Armies—Plan of Campaign—Pius VI. and VII.—Project of the Allies on Genoa and Toulon—Masséna blockaded in Genoa—Napoleon's Plan of Operations on the Rhine—Carnot Minister of War—Passage of the Alps—The French Army arrested by Fort Bard—Melas deceived—Combat of Chiusella—Napoleon marches on Milan—Passage of the Ticino—Disposition of Melas—Surrender of Genoa—Passage of the Po—Battle of Montebello—Battle of Marengo—Convention of Alexandria—Negotiations of General St. Julien—Disapproved by the Cabinet of Vienna—Negotiations for a Naval and Military Armistice—Kléber proposes to evacuate Egypt—He is forced to conquer at Heliopolis—Important Convention with the United States—The English quarrel with Neutrals—Rupture of the Negotiations of London—Conspiracy of Cerrachi—Expeditions against Ferrol and Cadiz—Resignation of Thugut from the Ministry—Occupation of Tuscany—Preparations on the Continent—Plan of Operations—Brilliant Success of the Army of the Rhine—Armistice of Steyer—Inaction of Brune—Passage of the Splügen—Operations of Brune—Junction of the Army of the Grisons—Armistice of Treviso—Infernal Machine—The Neapolitans beaten in Tuscany—Expedition of Murat against Naples—Armistice of Folligno—Peace of Lunéville—Campaign of 1801—English Expedition against Copenhagen—Naval Battle of Copenhagen—Armistice with the Danes, and Death of Paul I.—English Descent upon Egypt—Resignation of Pitt—Situation of France—Necessity of a new Religious System—Best means of accomplishing this Change—Chances in favor of the Reformation—The Concordat—Objections made to it—Fault of my Successors—Negotiations of London—Preliminaries signed—Peace with Russia and the Porte—Acquisition of Louisiana—The Infante of Parma, King of Etruria—Expedition to St. Domingo and Guadaloupe—Provisional Reunion of Piedmont—Affairs of Switzerland and the Cisalpine Republic—Italian Republic—The English—Lord

Cornwallis Envoy to Amiens—Debates upon Malta—The definitive Peace—Its Reception in London and France—The Tribunat abolished—Consulate for Life—The Principles of my Works—Solemn Publication of the Concordat—Reunion of Piedmont—Counter-Revolution in Switzerland—Friendly Relations with Russia—Indemnities in Germany.

**NAPOLEON'S RETURN FROM EGYPT.**—In tracing out the preceding campaign, I have anticipated events: we will now return to the vessel which sailed from Alexandria on the twenty-fourth of August, bearing my destinies and those of Europe. Our passage, though long, was fortunate, and, the sixth of October, I landed at Frejus. My presence excited the enthusiasm of the people. My military glory reassured all those who had been alarmed at the idea of a foreign invasion. My journey resembled a triumph, and I saw on my arrival at Paris that France was at my disposal, for every thing seemed ripe for a great change.\*

**NECESSITY OF A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT.**—After a revolution which had completely destroyed the social edifice, creating new interests and habits, a government, desirous of putting an end to the irregularities and license of popular commotions, should not only endeavor to improve the laws springing from these factions or enthusiastic commotions, but should establish a charter fixing invariably the basis of organic laws, and the

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\*Thiers thus describes Napoleon's reception in France: "The inhabitants of Provence had, for three successive years, been apprehensive of an invasion by the enemy. Bonaparte had delivered them from this fear in 1796; but it had recurred with more force than ever since the battle of Novi. On learning that Bonaparte had anchored off the coast, they fancied that their savior had arrived. All the inhabitants of Frejus thronged to the beach, and in a moment the sea was covered with boats. A multitude, intoxicated with enthusiasm and curiosity, stormed the vessels, and, breaking through all the sanitary laws, communicated with the new comers. All inquired for Bonaparte—all were anxious to see him. It was now too late to enforce sanitary measures. The Administration of Health was obliged to dispense the general from quarantine; otherwise it must have condemned the whole population, which had already communicated with the crews, to the same precaution. Bonaparte immediately landed, and resolved to set out the same day for Paris.

"The telegraph, speedy as the winds, had already spread along the road from Frejus to Paris the extraordinary tidings of the landing of Bonaparte. The most confused joy immediately burst forth. The news, proclaimed in all the theatres, had produced an extraordinary excitement there. Patriotic songs everywhere superseded the theatrical representations. Baudin, deputy of the Ardennes, one of the framers of the constitution of the year III., a wise and sincere republican, passionately attached to the Republic, and deeming it undone unless a powerful arm should come to uphold it, died of joy on hearing of this event."



principles of public liberty; leaving to time and experience to draw up the detailed laws requisite for the administration of the government, and to determine the rights and duties of the citizens. Every intelligent magistrate saw that the constitution of the year III. was detestable, and the authorities it had produced, destitute of capacity; but they were not so well agreed as to the remedies proper to be applied. It was very difficult to determine these. At first sight it might seem most proper to intrust the legislative body with reforming the constitutional part. Nevertheless, it was to be feared that this body, jealous of all executive power, would endeavor to increase its own authority at the expense of the other, thus destroying the fundamental principles of the primitive institutions. If it were given, on the other hand, to the executive power, it was equally to be feared that, under the pretext of public safety, this would be equally inclined to increase its own prerogatives at the expense of the legislative body. If, to avoid these two rocks, the protection or reform of the constitution were confided to a third authority, the desired object seemed but little more likely to be attained, for the same contests would continue, notwithstanding a change of name in the contending parties. Much cruel experience had shown that any important reforms, in a representative government, are attended by great danger to public liberty, and the vices introduced are frequently greater than those attempted to be extirpated.

There was one other means of reform, not less terrible than the three already mentioned, but which is not fatal to the nations which are compelled to resort to it;—I mean the force of the bayonet. Whatever mere politicians may say upon this subject, many instances may be cited where a resort to this remedy has saved the nation from worse calamities, such as the dissolution of the parliament by Cromwell, that of the senate of Stockholm by Gustavus III., and the *coup-d'état* of the eighteenth Brumaire. It may very well happen, however, as it frequently does, that these remedies are worse than the disease itself. It is not my present intention to enter into any minute discussion of these revolutionary reforms, but merely to make a few observations necessary for appreciating the course which I pursued in the important event about to occur in France.

At this epoch every body in France desired a revision of the constitution and the abrogation of the laws passed by the Assemblies. The general opinion was against the Directory, whose administration for the last two years had produced only disasters, whose despotic authority had shown, in the events of the eighteenth Fructidor and the twenty-second Floréal, but whose ineffi-

ciency and absolute nullity had been laid bare on the thirtieth Prairial. The people were equally tired of the scandalous debates which daily occurred in the Councils; and their state of permanent hostility to the executive power caused a desire for a more just balance between the principal authorities of the Republic.

**PROJECTS OF SIÈYES.**—Sièyes, occupying a place for the last three months in the supreme magistracy, had attentively examined the progress of public opinion. Advantageously known by the success of his diplomatic missions, as well as by his administrative talents, and still enjoying the popularity acquired by his earlier writings, he conceived the project of substituting, in place of the existing authorities, a government of more force and unity, and especially guaranteeing the property and rights of citizens. He was the more interested in this, inasmuch as the Jacobins, enraged at the closing of the *Manège*, had already openly denounced him in their journals and demanded that the Councils should annul his election as unconstitutional; some pretended that he had projected the calling of a prince of Brunswick to the throne of France, and that his mission to Berlin was for this object alone; others thought this crafty constitution-maker had reserved for himself the presidency for life of the Republic—an office which he thought to establish. This project was possible, though not exempt from danger; all France was in fact conspiring for the overthrow of the present system, and even the Directors themselves, though each in his own way, were working with ardor for the ruin of the edifice which they felt themselves incapable of sustaining. Many of the legislators soon adopted the project of Sièyes, particularly the members of the Council of Ancients. But the Council of Five Hundred, notwithstanding the changes of Floréal, still contained many old republican zealots who had opposed all the recent changes of the government. Nevertheless, my brother Lucien, president of this Council, had here formed a powerful party.

One of the men upon whom Sièyes most relied was Talleyrand, under whose orders, as minister of foreign affairs, he had acted while ambassador to Berlin. Besides a conformity of views, Talleyrand was as desirous as Sièyes to revenge himself for the vociferations of which a few months before he had been the object. A brilliant triumph was the only thing that could restore his former reputation, and to obtain this, no sacrifice was too great. But a revolution of this character could not be consummated without the assent of the troops; it was, therefore, necessary to gain over some military chief of renown, but docile enough to follow the course which they might mark out, and to stop when they



should command him. Generals Moreau and Joubert were those upon whom they first fixed their attention; the first had inspired some distrust by his equivocal conduct on the eighteenth Fructidor, and death snatched away the second at the moment when they flattered themselves that he would gain by victory sufficient consideration to accomplish this great enterprise.

**EFFECT OF NAPOLEON'S RETURN.**—Such was the state of affairs and of public feeling when I arrived at Paris amid the general acclamations of the people. Sièyes, thinking he could do nothing without me, hastened, with Lucien, to place in my hands all the threads of the conspiracy; it was now agreed that my sword must achieve what they had conceived and prepared. Never, perhaps, were circumstances more favorable for the accomplishment of a project of this nature. The majority of the Directory was composed of three men of no importance; Barras, the only one who had any celebrity, owed his importance entirely to the day of Vendémiaire, and to some services rendered in the navy. If these three Directors had been men of any influence or skill, they might easily have baffled the conspiracy by the weapons which the constitution had placed in their hands; but their own stupor left them plunged into a state of inertia. Besides, they were not fully agreed, and Barras himself was the first to favor a change in the state, provided that he should be permitted to play a part in it.

Although the Directory had changed three of its members since the day of Prairial, still it had no authority. The leaders of the Councils knew that no one would raise a voice in favor of the majority of the Directory. Neither from abroad nor from the army could the triumvirs expect any support. The victories of Masséna in Helvetia, and of Brune in Holland, were compensated by the defeats of the army of Italy, whose exhaustion and feebleness had opened the frontier of the maritime Alps. The ordinary levies were made with greater difficulty from day to day, and the state of penury in which the recently formed auxiliary battalions were left discouraged the conscripts from joining their colors. The patriotic enthusiasm of 1792 had disappeared with the circumstances which gave rise to it; and the conduct of the government had completely extinguished its last sparks. Add to this that the victories of the enemy had again lighted up the fires of civil war in the departments of the west, and that the vociferations of 1793, renewed at the Club of the Manège, had provoked the odious law requiring hostages from the nobles, the relatives of the *émigrés*, and the principal proprietors of the cantons designated as royalists. This unfortunate measure, far from attaining its object, had renewed the civil war and massacres in Poitou and

Brittany. The finances were squandered, the public credit destroyed, and the sources of public income dried up. Thus the weakness of the government and the faults of its institutions had united to place France upon the very brink of ruin. Everybody seemed desirous to rescue the country, and each had his favorite plan. In these projects they all made me a confidant. They all counted on me, because they deemed my sword necessary to carry their projects into execution. But I counted on no one, and there was nothing to prevent my selecting the plan which I might think the best.

Fortune was about to place me at the head of the state; I was called to rule the Revolution, to prepare the future destiny of France, and perhaps of the world. I could not choose respecting a change of government; the rule of the Directory was already virtually at an end. It was necessary to place in its stead some imposing authority, and there was none more truly imposing than military glory. The Directory must therefore be replaced, either by me or by anarchy. France could not hesitate between the two. The republicans, who had at first received me with so much *empressement*, distrusted my projects. Even the presence of Sièyes did not satisfy them. He undertook to draw up a constitution; but the Jacobins feared my sword even less than the speculative pen of an abbé.

REVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE.—All parties now ranged themselves under two banners—those opposed and those favorable to my elevation. Nevertheless, it became necessary to employ the bayonet in effecting the revolution of the eighteenth Brumaire, though I at one time had hoped that it might be made by acclamation. The signal was given in the Council of Ancients, where we had on our side all moderate men, intelligent magistrates, the crafty and the ambitious, and some of those political alchemists, called *doctrinaires*, who sought for a *balance of power* as they would seek for the philosopher's stone. But, fearing a strong opposition, we had procured the calling of an extraordinary session, at eight o'clock, for the morning of the eighteenth Brumaire (November ninth), taking care to notify our friends first. The majority, one hundred and fifty members, met at the appointed time and voted a transfer of the Councils to St. Cloud, where they would be secure from the mob which the partisans of the Directory might incite against us. I was at the same time invested with the command of the troops, and all authority necessary for securing the transfer of the Councils and the maintenance of the public tranquillity. The measures were taken with precision; the Council of Five Hundred, when notified of the



decree of transfer, began to murmur at it, but Lucien, the president, declared the session closed, and the Council adjourned to meet again the next day at St. Cloud.

Immediately on being invested with the command, I established my head-quarters in the Tuileries, where a force of eight thousand men was soon collected. I passed them in review and harangued them. The most important posts were intrusted to the generals most devoted to my interests. All those who were dissatisfied with the Directory, and Moreau, one of the first, came to offer me their services and to solicit a command. High-sounding proclamations were issued to the Parisians, inviting them to remain quiet, and promising public tranquillity and security. I sent to the Directors, Barras, Gohier, and Moulins, an imperative invitation to hand in their resignations. The two *militaires* obeyed, but the lawyer refused. Barras sent me his resignation by his secretary, hoping that our former relations might induce me to give him a place in the new government. But I knew him too well to make a colleague of him. His message was received in the Tuileries, where a committee of Ancients, the minority of the Directory (Sièyes and Roger-Ducos), and the greater part of the military chiefs were assembled. I took advantage of the occasion to influence the minds of my troops and all others present. Replying briefly to the messenger of Barras, I added with a loud voice: "What have you done with that France which I left so brilliant? I left you peace, I have found war; I left you victories, I have found defeats; I left you the millions of Italy, I have found despoiling laws and wretchedness. What has become of the hundred thousand Frenchmen whom I knew? all my companions in glory? They are dead! . . . Such a state of things can not possibly last; in less than three years it would lead us to despotism. . . . It is time to restore to the defenders of the country that confidence to which they have such strong claims. We wish no better patriots than those brave men who have been mutilated in the service of the Republic."

The next day the legislators removed to St. Cloud, preceded by five thousand soldiers, who guarded the avenues and gates of the château. The Ancients had their session in the ancient gallery, and at the orangery. The preparations for the accommodation of the members delayed the session for a couple of hours, so that the republicans had time to concert a plan of resistance, or rather of attack. The sessions were begun in a strong manner. I first entered the meeting of the Ancients, and proved to them the existence of a conspiracy, denouncing to them the overtures made to me by Barras and Moulins to strike a *coup-d'état* in their favor. I

demanded prompt measures to save the Republic; they opposed to me the constitution, and I showed that, violated on so many occasions, it had become a mere collection of words, utterly useless, except as a cloak to factions. After strongly urging the majority not to disappoint the expectation of France, I cried out: "Shall I tremble before factionists! I whom the foreign coalition could not destroy! If I am guilty of perfidy, be ye the Brutuses; and you, ye brave grenadiers who have accompanied me here—let those bayonets, with which we have so often triumphed together, be instantly pointed at my heart. But if any orator, paid by foreigners, dares to pronounce the word *outlaw*, let the thunderbolt of war instantly crush him. Recollect that *I march accompanied by the god of fortune and by the god of war!*" It was Mahomet speaking to his faithful Seides!

These words, although addressed to my soldiers, were also intended for my opponents. I was now engaged in the contest, and I must either conquer or die. There was no middle course. But it was not from the Council of Ancients that I had most to fear; my most formidable adversaries were sitting in the Council of Five Hundred. At the opening of the session of this body, Gaudin, one of the secretaries, was charged with proposing the formation of a committee of seven members to report on the public danger, and on the means of obviating this danger. His speech was the signal for the tempest; cries of *Vive la constitution, à bas les dictateurs!* drowned his voice. In the midst of this tumult Delbrel moved that, first of all, the representatives should renew their oath of fidelity to the constitution of the year III.; his motion passed unanimously. Lucien saw himself compelled, though unwillingly, to swear first. The republicans had succeeded in producing a momentary enthusiasm, and in gaining over to their party those who had not been admitted into the secret of the conspiracy. But they did not know how to profit by their first success; and, instead of declaring the country in danger and adopting a vigorous course, they consumed three hours in taking the oath and in vain debates on the resignation of Barras. At this moment I descended from the hall of the Ancients to that of the Five Hundred. I had been informed of what was passing there, and presuming that the scene would not be very tranquil, I had put the troops under arms and directed a detachment of grenadiers to be ready to aid me if necessary.

These precautions were not useless; for hardly had I crossed the threshold of the door, when they raised the cry of *outlaws*. The deputy Bigonnet sprang to the tribune, and, apostrophizing me, directed me to retire. Some crowded around the tribune, and



others, by their threatening looks and gestures, manifested their intention of making me suffer the fate of Caesar. In vain did I endeavor to make myself heard; my most furious enemies, among whom I noticed Aréna and Destrem, advanced against me (it is said) armed with poignards. Seeing that nothing could be effected in this way, I left this assembly, of which an angry sea lashed by the winds gives but a feeble image, and took refuge among my soldiers. But my departure did not restore order; Lucien, left alone to make head against the storm, had to support the invectives of a great number of the representatives, who accused him of being my accomplice, and insisted upon his declaring me an *outlaw*. Every moment the disorder increased; opposite propositions were made from the different corners of the hall, and the president tried in vain to restore tranquillity. This violent state could not long continue: Lucien, seeing his command disregarded and his voice drowned by the vociferations of the most fiery members, stripped off his insignia of office and left the hall in the midst of a detachment which I had sent to his rescue.

I only waited for this signal to avenge myself for the insults I had received. But to give my conduct all the forms of legality, Lucien harangued the troops, telling them that the national representation was exposed to the poignards of a band of assassins, and, in his quality of president, requiring their aid to drive these factionists from the council hall. To these words, closing with the usual phrase of *Vive la République*, the soldiers responded by *Vive Bonaparte!* Twenty grenadiers advanced toward the hall, and the superior officer, who preceded them, summoned the deputies to retire. Prudon, Dignonnet, and General Jourdan invoked the constitution and apostrophized the grenadiers; these, astonished at such words from one who had formerly led them to victory, opposed only their force of inertia; the slightest incident might have destroyed our projects. But Murat soon decided everything by declaring *that the legislative body was dissolved*. The charge was beaten, new troops approached, and in an instant the hall was abandoned by the representatives. Some fled to the Council of Ancients, and denounced, at the bar of the Council, the act of their expulsion. But the Ancients paid little attention to their complaints, and were occupied with the report of the committee on the formation of a provisional consular government.

At nine o'clock they succeeded in collecting together a considerable number of deputies in the orangery, and Lucien declared the Council in majority and opened the session. Most of the opposition members were absent, and the few that were present were too much frightened to make any formal opposition. The

project of Chazal passed unanimously. Its principal features were the abolition of the Directory, the appointment of myself, Sièyes, and Roger-Ducos as Consuls of the Republic, the expulsion of sixty-one deputies noted as demagogues, the adjournment of the legislature for three months, and the appointment of two temporary committees of the two Councils, the one to make the necessary changes in the organic principles of the constitution, and the other to remodel the civil code. This law was soon sanctioned by the Ancients, and, after receiving the oaths of the new administrators of France, the two Councils, at five o'clock in the morning, closed their long and stormy session.

During the two days of these debates the inhabitants of the capital remained perfectly tranquil. Accustomed to political storms, and giving no faith to the promises of liberty given by a party of demagogues, they rejoiced at an event which promised them more quiet and happy times. No one took any interest in a constitution so frequently violated by its pretended friends. The authorities of the former government had lost all influence or consideration; all hope was placed in the coming administration. Natural partisans of a *régime* somewhat monarchical, the nobles and priests now looked for the end of their misfortunes; landholders for the resurrection of credit; holders of national property for the guarantee of their possessions; the army for an end of its disasters; in fine, the whole population looked for a new era of happiness and security. The abolition of the odious laws of hostages and of forced loans soon justified a part of these hopes; and public confidence, which seemed to have departed forever, insensibly pervaded all classes of the nation. In this revolution Moreau had volunteered his assistance, and, commanding a battalion under my orders, had marched to the Luxembourg. This course of conduct does not very well accord with the title of Seide of Republicanism, to which he frequently laid claim, nor with his pretended projects for restoring the Bourbons in 1813!

PROJECT OF A CONSTITUTION.—After the dissolution of the Councils, they were replaced by a legislative commission, and a committee was charged with drawing up a new constitution. Sièyes amused us with the project of a Grand Elector, who should appoint two consuls, with the power of absorbing them in case they ventured to exceed their powers. One of these consuls was to be charged with the foreign policy and war, and the other with the affairs of the interior. It was the height of absurdity to think of dividing the public administration between two consuls independent of each other, as if the internal and external affairs were



entirely disconnected; but what seemed still more ridiculous was an elector, without authority and without disposable forces, charged with directing and even impeaching a consul who had at his disposal an army of half a million of men! It was evident that Sièyes intended himself for the office of *absorbing elector*, so as to govern without either the trouble or responsibility of doing so. This kind of Grand Lama for a ruler did not at all suit a war-like nation, like the French, much less a people plunged into all the embarrassments of a great revolution, and an internal and external war to which history hardly furnishes a parallel.

CONSULAR GOVERNMENT.—I demonstrated these faults, and proposed a first consul, chief of the state, and two other consuls as a consulting Council. This project was approved, to the great displeasure of the disappointed Lycurgus. The first place in this trio belonged of right to me; and, to avoid all rivalry, I took good care that my rivals should be neither military men nor men of ambition. I caused Cambacérès and Lebrun to be chosen. The first was a jurist celebrated for his erudition, the second had been an enlightened administrator; both were men of business, but without energy—in fine, just such colleagues as I desired. The ministry was composed as follows: Berthier, minister of war; Talleyrand, of foreign affairs; Barbé-Marbois and Gaudin, of finance; Bourbon, Forfait, and Décrès, successively, of the navy; Abrial, then Regnier, of justice; Laplace, my brother Lucien, then Chaptal, of the interior; the inevitable Fouché, of police; the important post of secretary of state, which served as a kind of center to all the other branches of the government, was given to Maret, who united the talents of a statesman to a thorough knowledge of diplomacy, and who passed through the Revolution with a reputation unsullied.\*

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\*Hugues Bernard Maret was born at Dijon, in 1763. After completing his studies, he repaired to Paris, and at the sittings of the States General became reporter for the *Bulletin de l'Assemblée*, and afterward for the *Moniteur*. His first diplomatic post was secretary of legation to Hamburg; he was afterward promoted to Brussels, and in 1792 received the important mission to London. On his way to Italy as minister to Naples, he was arrested by the Austrians and cast into prison, where he was confined for nearly two years. He distinguished himself at the negotiations of Lille with Lord Malmesbury. After the eighteenth Brumaire, his career became inseparable from that of Napoleon, who sent him on many important missions. He was made Duke of Bassano in 1809. On the return of the Bourbons in 1815, he was banished to Gratz, in Syria, but in 1820 was permitted to return to France and settle upon his estates in Burgundy. He has been described by all historians as a man of much intelligence and a most unshaken fidelity. He enjoyed the utmost confidence of Napoleon, and never betrayed it.

The public voice had given to me the first place in the state. The resistance which might be opposed to me did not trouble me, because it only came from those who were ruined in public estimation. The royalists had not yet appeared. Had they come, they would have been instantly seized. The mass of the nation had confidence in me, for they knew that the Revolution could not have a better guarantee than mine. My strength consisted in placing myself at the head of the interests which it had created, for by making it retrograde I should have found myself on the ground of the Bourbons.

It was necessary that the nature of my power should be wholly new, in order that all ambitions should there find the means of living; but there was nothing definitive in its nature. Men of theories, who wished something definitive, found fault with it. This, however, was its great merit, for it was a dictatorship in disguise, a kind of government most suitable for times of crisis and in a transitory order of things. Perhaps it would have been better to have boldly seized the dictatorship; every one would then have seen my power; this would have been of much advantage. The dictatorship would have prejudiced nothing for the future, would have left opinions in suspense, and have intimidated the enemy by showing him the firm resolution of France: but the name was objectionable, and the time for a definitive order of things had not yet come.

If by the constitution I was only the first magistrate of the Republic, I had for the baton of command a sword more formidable than the sabre of Scanderberg. There was an incompatibility between my constitutional rights and the ascendancy which resulted from my character and my actions. The enlightened public felt this as well as I did. Things could not long continue so, and were naturally tending to changes which would give force and stability to the state.

The public will placed me at the head of the state. I had on my side a large body of the people; my opponents were mostly men who had lost the public confidence. In assuming the reins of power I found more courtiers than I wished; my ante-rooms were crowded.\*

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\*Thiers, an ardent republican, and staunch friend of republican governments, writes as follows on the overthrow of the Directory, and the establishment of the Consulate: "Such was the revolution of the eighteenth Brumaire, on which such opposite opinions are entertained, which is regarded by some as an outrage which annulled our struggling liberty, by others as a daring but necessary act, that put an end to anarchy. What may justly be said of it is, that the Revolution, after assuming all the



**NAPOLEON PROPOSES PEACE.**—The present situation of France gave me uneasiness. Notwithstanding my chances of success, I preferred peace. I could then offer it in good faith, for the preceding disasters were not of my making. I could come forward unembarrassed by the differences of the former administration. Mr. Pitt refused it: and never did this statesman commit so great an error, for this moment was perhaps the only one when the Allies could have made peace with security. France, in asking peace, acknowledged herself vanquished, and the people relieved themselves of all their misfortunes, except that of being under the yoke of adversity. By this refusal, the English minister forced me to redouble my efforts, and in this way I extended my empire over the west of Europe. The form of this refusal was not less extraordinary than the thing itself: I had addressed myself directly to the King of England: the letter remained unanswered; the secretary of foreign affairs wrote one to Talleyrand in which he indicated the restoration of the Bourbons as the only means of ending the war in Europe.

It was curious to see a government which had twice, in the treaties of Lille, recognized the Republic and the Directory, now

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characters, monarchical, republican, and democratic, at length took the military character, because, amid that perpetual conflict with Europe, it was requisite that it should constitute itself in a strong and quiet manner. The republicans deplore so many useless efforts, so much blood spilt to no purpose, in order to found liberty in France, and they are grieved to see it immolated by one of the heroes whom it had brought forth. But here the noblest sentiment leads them into error. The Revolution, which was to give us liberty, and which has prepared everything for our enjoying it some day or other, was not of itself, neither could it be, liberty. It was destined to be a great struggle against the old order of things. After conquering in France, it was requisite that it should conquer in Europe. But so violent a struggle admitted not of the forms or the spirit of liberty. For a moment, and but a brief one, the country possessed liberty under the Constituent Assembly; but when the populace became so menacing as to intimidate public opinion; when it stormed the Tuilleries on the tenth of August; when, on the second of September, it sacrificed all those of whom it felt distrust; when, on the twenty-first of January, it forced every one to compromise himself with it by imbruing his hands in royal blood; when, in August, 1793, it obliged all the citizens to hasten to the frontiers, or to part with their property; when itself abdicated its power, and resigned it to that great Committee of Public Safety, composed of twelve individuals—was there, could there be, liberty? No, there was a violent effort of enthusiasm and heroism; there was the muscular tension of a wrestler engaged with a potent antagonist. After this moment of danger; after our victories, there was a moment of relaxation. The latter end of the Convention and the Directory exhibited moments of liberty. But the struggle with Europe could be only temporarily suspended. It soon recom-

refuse to treat with an authority much more firmly established, and made illustrious by victory. It was, in fact, the very vacillating and temporary character of the Directory which constituted its merits, for, in the estimation of England, that was best which was best calculated to injure France. At the same time that I proposed peace to England, I sought also to treat with Russia. Paul I. was indignant at the reverses sustained by his troops in Holland, and cast the blame of it upon the English. Suwarrow also complained of the Austrian general for abandoning the smaller cantons at the moment that he entered them. Irritated by his disastrous but honorable retreat, he afterward disagreed with the Archduke Charles, in consequence of which the Russian army separated from the Austrians and retired into Bavaria. Profiting by this occasion, I endeavored to conciliate the Emperor Paul; I sent him back, without exchange or ransom, five or six thousand prisoners with a complete new outfit. This was not lost: no treaty was concluded, it is true, but the Russians took no further part in the coalition, and their army soon returned to Poland. Although its force was reduced to thirty or thirty-five thousand, its retreat was nevertheless an important event. The

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menced, and, on the first reverse, all parties rose against a too moderate government, and invoked a mighty arm. Bonaparte, returning from the East, was hailed as sovereign, and called to supreme power. It is absurd to say that Zurich had saved France. Zurich was but an accident, a respite; it required a Marengo and a Hohenlinden to save her. It required something more than military successes. It required a powerful reorganization at home, of all the departments of the government, and it was a political chief, rather than a military chief, which France needed. The eighteenth and nineteenth of Brumaire, were, therefore, necessary. All we can say is, that the twentieth is to be condemned, and that the hero made a bad use of the service which he had just rendered. But we may be told that he came to perform a mysterious task, imposed, without his being aware of it, by Fate, of which he was the involuntary agent. It was not liberty that he came to continue, for that could not yet exist. He came to continue, under monarchical forms, the Revolution in the world; he came to continue it, by seating himself, a plebian, on a throne; by bringing the pontiff to Paris to anoint a plebeian brow with the sacred oil; by creating an aristocracy with plebelans; by obliging the old aristocracies to associate themselves with his plebeian aristocracy; by making kings of plebelans; by taking to his bed the daughter of the Cæsars, and mingling plebeian blood with the blood of one of the oldest reigning families in Europe; by blending all nations; by introducing the French laws in Germany, in Italy, and in Spain; by dissolving so many spells; by mixing up together and confounding so many things. Such was the immense task which he came to perform; and meanwhile the state of society was to consolidate itself under the protection of his sword; and liberty was to follow some day."



refusal of England and Austria left me no choice; I sought peace, but they forced me into war; it was therefore necessary to prepare to prosecute it with vigor. Although European affairs fixed so much of my attention, I nevertheless neither forgot the army which I had left in Egypt, nor the maritime means necessary for its succor.

**FALL OF TIPPOO-SAËB.**—Great events had occurred in the East: at the moment that I raised the siege of St.-Jean-d'Acre, our ancient ally, Tippoo-Saëb, fell in India. As soon as the English ministry had learned the certainty of my descent in Egypt, it withdrew from the Tagus, Gibraltar, and other ports, all the disposable forces, and set sail in all haste with a corps of five thousand men for India. The Marquis of Wellesley resolved to profit, without delay, by these reinforcements to strike a decisive blow against Tippoo-Saëb, so as to deprive us of the powerful support which this Mussulman warrior might afford us in the center of Hindoostan. Certain of the alliance of the Nizam, and of the neutrality of Schindiah and the Mahrattas, the sworn enemies of the Mussulman caste, the English, under Generals Harris, Stuart, and Wellesley (afterward Wellington), attacked the states of the Sultan, and, after several combats more or less disputed, laid siege to Seringapatam, which was breached and taken on the third of May, 1799, after an assault more celebrated than bloody. Tippoo, faithful to his glory, buried himself beneath the ruins of his palace, and his estates were divided between the English company and its creatures. This important and decisive blow, joined to the probable fall of Malta, which had been blockaded by the English for two years, rendered the situation of our army in Egypt extremely precarious, but not yet desperate.

**MARITIME AFFAIRS.**—I directed Gantheaume to leave Brest and carry to Egypt reinforcements of arms and munitions. The Spanish fleet being still confined to Brest, where (it will be remembered) it had returned with Bruix, and that of Holland not yet recovered from the disaster of Camperdown, I did not see, for the moment, any thing that could be done at sea. Ireland no longer offered the same chances as formerly under the Directory; England, taking warning by the descent of General Humbert's little detachment, had concentrated there a powerful army under Lord Cornwallis: more than forty thousand men had been successively transported to Ireland, and the greater part of the insurgents, deceived by promises which were never realized, had laid down their arms. Since 1796, the affairs of St. Domingo had taken a more favorable turn: Toussaint L'Ouverture having de-

clared, with his blacks, in favor of the Republic, reëstablished order in the culture of the fields, defeated the mulattoes, shut up the English in St. Marc, where General Maitland, despairing of success, proposed to recognize him as sovereign of Hayti. The Directory had sent Hédouville to him, but the adroit and jealous Toussaint had forced him to return to France, and in the hope of avoiding an open rupture with us, he declined the proposition of our enemies and affected the most entire devotion to the Republic. Guadeloupe supported itself with success. Martinique had for six years been in the possession of the English; the Dutch colonies of Surinam and Essequibo, on the South American continent, had fallen into their power, as well as the island of Curacao.

**CONTINENTAL ARMIES.**—If the maritime war offered few opportunities for my activity, the continental war occupied me so much the more seriously. The army of Italy, reduced to thirty thousand active men, had taken refuge on the rocks of Genoa. Ten thousand others were guarding the Maritime Alps and Dauphiny. The army of the Rhine, which amounted to one hundred thousand combatants, was cantoned in Alsace and Switzerland, from Strasbourg to Schaffhausen. Our troops did not venture to recross the Alps in presence of the superior forces which the enemy had collected in the basin of the Po. It was necessary for us either to enter Germany and Italy at the same time, or to strike such decisive blows on the Danube as to enable me to reconquer the peninsula, by dictating peace to Austria. It was necessary to recapture Mantua, Alexandria, and Milan, at Vienna. This was my plan.

I called in the conscripts; I caused arms to be forged; I woke up the sentiment of national honor, which had only slumbered in the breasts of Frenchmen. I collected an army, young, it is true, but full of enthusiasm. Our reverses had again lighted up the fires of civil war in La Vendée. I sent there two divisions of the army of Brune, which had been so victorious in Holland. The approach of these troops and a more moderate course on the part of the government caused the insurgents and the royalist chiefs to lay down their arms. These forces were now disposable for operations in the south of France.

Miserable as was the condition of the army of Italy, that of the Rhine, united with the army of Helvetia, was in all respects good; I gave the command of it to Moreau, sending him a sufficient number of recruits for completing his corps and enabling him to take the offensive. The remainder of my disposable troops were collected at Dijon, where I organized an army of reserve of forty



thousand men, which, from this central position, could march into Swabia, Switzerland, or Italy, as circumstances might require. The divisions which had just suppressed the insurrection in La Vendée formed the nucleus of this army.

PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.—The possession of Switzerland gave us an opportunity to take in reverse the enemy's lines of operation in Italy and Swabia. My first thought was to leave on the defensive the army of Masséna in the Apennines, and to move those of the reserve and of the Rhine into the valley of the Danube. The constitution of the year VIII. not allowing a consul to command an army in person, my intention was to give the command of the reserve to a lieutenant, and to leave the grand army to Moreau; but in following the headquarters of the latter, I could direct the operations of both. I wished Moreau to cross at Schaffhausen, take Kray in reverse, and drive him into the angle of the Main and the Rhine, cutting him off from Vienna; in a word, effecting against the left of the Austrian general the same operation which, five years after, I effected against the right of Mack at Donawert: we might afterward march without obstacle against Austria and reconquer Italy at Vienna. (But it was impossible to overcome the obstinacy of Moreau, who wished to play some brilliant part on his own account. He at first refused to command under me, if I came to his army; and he afterward objected to my plans, pretending that the passage at Schaffhausen was dangerous. I was not yet sufficiently firm in my position to come to an open rupture with a man who had numerous partisans in the army, and who only wanted the energy to attempt to put himself in my place. It was necessary to negotiate with him as a separate power, as indeed, at that time, he really was. I therefore left him the command of the finest army which France had seen for a long time, and allowed him to move upon the Danube at his pleasure. I myself decided to conduct my conscripts by the St. Gothard into Lombardy, securing the concert of Lecourbe, as soon as Moreau should gain his first success. Our affairs in Italy at this time seemed ruined beyond hope. England was preparing to act there with an army; Naples, Tuscany, Rome, encouraged by our past reverses, might make great efforts against us.)

PIUS VI. AND PIUS VII.—In evacuating Italy, the Directory had caused Pius VI. to be removed to France. This was certainly a great error, if nothing more. They certainly could not at

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that time expect to transfer the Holy See into France,\* and the Directory could not hope to entirely destroy its influence. The aged Pius VI. had already one foot in the grave, and he expired at Briançon, a few days after his arrival. He appointed at his death the celebrated Chiaramonte, Bishop of Imola, who was proclaimed Pope, at the beginning of 1800, under the title of Pius VII. He was an excellent pontiff, and professed for me sentiments which never belied themselves. We both regretted, more than once, that our respective positions placed us in opposition. But the Church wishes to rule. . . . it is exclusive; the policy of the Vatican has always been the same since the time of Gregory: if it has sometimes slept under moderate and philanthropic popes, still it has always woke up under the more ambitious, and Europe should never cease to watch it.

**PROJECT OF THE ALLIES ON GENOA AND TOULON.**—England, who had never neglected an occasion to expel us from a maritime port, had concerted with Austria a project to drive us even from Genoa! General Abercrombie, after his unsuccessful expedition to Holland, was directed to assemble a corps of twenty thousand English at Minorca, to assist the imperialists. It is probable that the views of the Cabinet of London were not confined to Liguria, and that, full of confidence in the success of the fine army of Melas, it hoped to carry the standards of the coalition even to the walls of Toulon.

**MASSÉNA BLOCKADED IN GENOA.**—The Austrian general, who had an army three times as numerous as that of the French, had succeeding in penetrating, April sixth, from Cairo to Savona, and in this way cutting in two our line of defense. Masséna, with the right of the army, twelve thousand strong, had been obliged to shut himself up in Genoa. Melas caused this place to be invested with thirty-five thousand Austrians under Ott, while Kaim covered Piedmont, and he himself, with the remaining thirty thousand men, moved against the left of the French army commanded by Suchet. The latter, with only eight or nine thousand, pressed in front by superior forces, and constantly turned by the left, was obliged to fall back and cover himself behind the Var.

**NAPOLEON'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS.**—The news of these events, vexatious as they were in themselves, assured me that

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\*The transfer of the Pope to Paris, by Napoleon, was a different affair. Rome was then a part of his possessions, and the removal was merely a change of the Holy See from one of his capitals to another.



Melas had directed his attention exclusively to the vicinity of Genoa, and would not be prepared to parry the blow which I was preparing to strike. I felt that the propitious moment had arrived for invading Italy on the side where I was least expected. But as it was necessary to hasten to the rescue of Genoa, and as the march by the St. Gothard was a long one, I resolved to attempt the St. Bernard, leaving the first of these routes to the corps which was to march from the Rhine. I set out from Dijon about the first of May.

**FIRST OPERATIONS ON THE RHINE.**—In order to accelerate the arrival of the reinforcements which Moreau was to send me, it was necessary to wait for him to take the initiative; his army began to move about the last of April. It was more than one hundred thousand strong, without including the garrisons of Mayence, Strasbourg, and the other places of the Rhine. Kray, who was opposed to Moreau, had as large a force, but the Aulic Council had paralyzed his left by ordering it to remain in the mountains of the Voralberg. Favored by this circumstance, which secured him the superiority of disposable forces, Moreau made demonstrations by his left toward Kehl, moved with the half of his army from Bâle on Engen, and there effected a junction with Lecourbe, who had just passed the Rhine at Schaffhausen at the head of the army of Helvetia, which was to form the right wing. Kray, encamped at the sources of the Danube, near Doneschingen, instead of operating to prevent the junction, fell into the snare, and pushed his right toward Kehl. While returning, his army encountered that of Moreau at Engen, when it was too late; it was beaten on the third of May. Lecourbe contributed most to this success by carrying Stockach, a decisive point which menaced the enemy's line of retreat. Kray was not more fortunate at Moskirch, two days later, although he had been rejoined by his right wing before the arrival of Moreau's left; he now retired on Ulm in two columns; one of these was defeated at Biberach, on the eighth of May. Having sustained great losses, he took refuge in the vast intrenched camp at Ulm.

**CARNOT MADE MINISTER OF WAR.**—Berthier having been made commander-in-chief of the army of reserve, the portfolio of war was given temporarily to Carnot. As soon as I thought the battle of Engen had been fought, I dispatched this minister to detach twenty thousand men by the St. Gothard on the Ticino; I myself at the same time set out from Dijon for Geneva. Moreau was greatly offended at the mission of Carnot; nevertheless, after what had passed on the subject of the plan of the cam-

paign, how could I throw myself headlong into Lombardy before being certain that the detachment would be made without some difficulty or delay?

**PASSAGE OF THE ALPS.**—On the eighth of May, I arrived at Geneva, from whence I ordered demonstrations to be made toward Dauphiny, while the columns of the army of reserve were already defiling by Lausanne toward the lower Valois. The passage of the high Alps presented many difficulties, but I knew that they were not insurmountable. I threw my principal column, thirty-five thousand strong, on the Great St. Bernard: General Chabran, with a division of four thousand men, took the road by the Little St. Bernard; General Moncey, with a corps of fifteen thousand men, detached from the army of the Rhine, received orders to descend from the St. Gothard on Belinzona; a small column under the orders of General Bethencourt was to pass the Simplon, directing itself on Domo-Dossola; finally, in order to distract the attention of the enemy and deceive him with respect to my movements, I ordered General Thureau to assemble about five thousand men, drawn from the places of Dauphiny, and to debouch on Suza by Mont Cenis and Mont Genève.

These well-combined movements produced the most happy results. Melas, kept in uncertainty by my stay at Geneva and the demonstrations of Mont Cenis, prolongs his stay at Ventimiglia. First thinking to march with twenty thousand men into Piedmont, he now changes his opinion, and marches later with only two strong brigades. His army is distributed as follows: Wukassowich, commanding the right wing, holds the upper Ticino, at the foot of the St. Gothard; Laudon guards the debouch of the Simplon; Briey covers the valley of Aosta with three thousand men; Haddick and Kaim occupy, with twenty thousand men, the plain of Piedmont, the debouch of Ivrea, the valleys of Suza, Pignerol and Coni: the main body of the army is fighting in Liguria and on the Var. The seventeenth of May, General Lannes, who commanded my advanced guard, leaves the town of St. Pierre and marches on the Great St. Bernard. The baggage and cannon are dismounted, and the latter drawn upon troughs or pieces of timber hollowed out and fitted to receive them. My presence and the grandeur of the enterprise animate the soldiers to overcome all obstacles.\*

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\*Thiers thus describes Napoleon's personal passage of the Alps: "The arts have represented him bounding across the snowy Alps on a fiery charger; but here is the truth unvarnished. He ascended Mount Saint Bernard in the gray greatcoat which he always wore, conducted by a



In penetrating these gorges of the Alps I felt the most happy presentiments. The shouts of my soldiers, echoed back by the mountains, announced to me a certain victory. I was returning to Italy, the theatre of my first arms. My grenadiers, after having reached the summit of the St. Bernard, threw up their caps with their red plumes into the air, and uttered shouts of joy, the ordinary precursors of victory. A halt was made at the Hospice, where, through my care and that of the good monks who here devote themselves to the cause of humanity, refreshments were prepared for the columns. After a short repose, they gayly resumed their arms and descended the mountain, whose southern slope offered the most smiling aspect, astonishing the eye and animating the courage of my soldiers. The Alps were crossed, and we descended like a torrent into Piedmont. We were all young, generals and soldiers. We feared neither fatigues nor dangers; we cared for nothing but glory.

guide of the country; displaying, in the most difficult paths, the abstraction of a mind occupied elsewhere; discoursing with the officers whom he met here and there on the road; and then, at intervals, conversing with the guide who accompanied him, making him talk of his life, his pleasures, and his troubles, like some idle traveler who has no better occupation. The guide, who was quite young, laid before him, with ingenuous simplicity, the particulars of his obscure life, and, above all, the grief he endured for want of a little money, which rendered him unable to marry one of the maidens of the valley. The First Consul, now listening to him, now questioning the passengers, with whom the mountains were alive, arrived at the hospital, where the good monks received him with great eagerness. Hardly had he alighted, before he wrote a note, which he handed to his guide, desiring him to give it without delay to the administrator of the army, who had remained on the other side of the Saint Bernard. In the evening, when the young man returned to Saint Pierre, he learned with surprise how mighty was the traveler he had conducted in the morning; and also that General Bonaparte had given him a field and house; in fact, the means of marrying, and realizing all the dreams of his modest and moderate ambition. This mountaineer died recently in his own country, proprietor of the field which had been given to him by the ruler of the world.

"This singular act of benevolence, at a moment of so much preoccupation, is worthy of attention. If it had been the mere caprice of a conqueror, distributing at random good and evil, alternately crushing an empire and building up a cottage, even such a caprice were worth the recording, if it should merely be to tempt the masters of the earth to do likewise. But such an act reveals something further. The human soul, in the moment when it burns with ardent wishes, is inclined to benevolence, and does good, as it were, to merit that good which, itself, it seeks at the hands of Providence."

The First Consul halted a few minutes with the monks; thanked them for their cares toward his army; and made them a splendid gift, to be applied to the consolation of travelers and the poor.

**THE ARMY ARRESTED BY FORT BARD.**—Nevertheless, an obstacle, whose importance we had not properly estimated, was near arresting us at the very threshold of our career! The army descended the valley of the Doria, after routing, at Chatillon, a small corps of the enemy, which was too feeble to oppose our march. But on reaching the little fort of Bard, which, situated on an impregnable rock, was garrisoned by only four hundred men, we found our passage closed. It refused to surrender at our summons, and resisted all our attempts at an escalade. Lannes, with the infantry, succeeded in effecting a passage by the mountains of Albaredo; but neither horses nor cannon could pass! It was almost maddening to see one's self arrested by a mere handful of men!

I caused a new road to be cut through the rocks for my cavalry. My soldiers, like those of Hannibal, debouched by a road cut out with their own hands. But if the Carthaginian general was embarrassed by his elephants, I was no less so by my cannon. Seeing no other means of extricating myself from this dangerous position, I resorted to stratagem. Covering the wheels of the carriages with straw so as to prevent all noise in their movements, we drew them, in the night, while the garrison was asleep, through the streets of the faubourg directly under the guns of the fort! This bold but perilous operation was attended with perfect success, and full of hope, we continued our march on Ivrea.\* Lannes

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\*Napoleon was still at Martigny when the couriers of Berthier came to inform him of the difficulties of passing the little fort. "This announcement," says Thiers, "of an obstacle considered insurmountable at first, made a terrible impression on him; but he recovered quickly, and refused positively to admit the possibility of a retreat. Nothing in the world should reduce him to such an extremity. He thought that if one of the loftiest mountains on the globe had failed to arrest his progress, a secondary rock could not be capable of vanquishing his courage and his genius. The fort, said he to himself, might be taken by bold courage; if it could not be taken, it still could be turned. Besides, if the infantry and the cavalry could pass by it, with but a few four-pounders, they could then proceed to Ivrea at the mouth of the gorge, and wait until their heavy guns could follow them. And if the heavy guns could not pass the obstacle which had arisen, and if, in order to get away, that of the enemy must be taken, the French infantry were brave and numerous enough to assail the Austrians and take their cannon.

"Moreover, he studied his maps again and again, questioned a number of Italian officers; and learning from these that many other roads led from Aosta to the neighboring valleys, he wrote letter after letter to Berthier, forbidding him to stop the progress of the army, and pointing out to him, with wonderful precision, what reconnaissances should be made around the fort of Bard. He would not allow himself to see any serious danger, except from the arrival of a hostile corps, shutting up the debouch



had already taken this place, and driven the Austrians on Romano. There were only three thousand of the enemy in the valley of Aosta, at the time of our passage; but more than thirty thousand were scattered in the valleys of the Ticino and the Po.

**MELAS IS DECEIVED.**—Melas had not comprehended my maneuvers. On learning that the army of reserve was marching toward Genoa, he imagined that our only object was to make some demonstration toward the north of Piedmont, in order to turn his attention from Genoa and relieve Masséna and Suchet. He deemed it merely necessary to detach from Vintimille on Turin a corps of seven thousand men. However, he soon followed himself at the head of another division, leaving Ott to besiege Genoa with twenty-five thousand men, and Elsnitz to cover the Var with eighteen thousand more. Still thinking that we were merely making

of Ivrea; he instructed Berthier to send Lannes as far as to Ivrea by the path of Albaredo, and make him take a strong position there, which should be safe from the Austrian artillery and cavalry. 'When Lannes guards the entrance of the valley,' added the First Consul, 'whatever may happen, it is of little consequence; the only result may be loss of time. We have enough provisions to subsist ourselves awhile, and, one way or other, we shall succeed in avoiding or overcoming the obstacles which now delay us.' "

The details of the several unsuccessful attempts to carry the place are too long for insertion. The final operation is thus briefly given by Alison: "In this extremity, the genius and intrepidity of the French engineers surmounted the difficulty. The infantry and cavalry of Lannes' division traversed, one by one, the path on the Monte Albaredo, and re-formed lower down the valley, while the artillerymen succeeded in drawing their cannon, in the dark, through the town, close under the guns of the fort, by spreading straw and dung upon the streets, and wrapping the wheels up so as to prevent the slightest sound being heard. In this manner forty pieces and a hundred caissons were drawn through during the night, while the Austrians, in unconscious security, slumbered above, beside their loaded cannon, directed straight into the street where the passage was going forward. A few grenades and combustibles were merely thrown at random over the ramparts during the gloom, which killed a considerable number of the French engineers, and blew up several of their ammunition wagons, but without arresting for a moment the passage. Before daylight a sufficient number were passed to enable the advanced guard to continue its march, and an obstacle which might have proved the ruin of the whole enterprise was effectually overcome. During the succeeding night the same hazardous operation was repeated with equal success; and while the Austrian commander was writing to Melas that he had seen thirty-five thousand men and four thousand horses cross the path of the Albaredo, but that not one piece of artillery or caisson should pass beneath the guns of his fortress, the whole cannon and ammunition of the army were safely proceeding on the road to Ivrea. The fort of Bard itself held out till the fifth of June, and we have the authority of Napoleon for the assertion that if the passage of the artillery had been delayed till its fall, all hope of success in the campaign was at an end."

a diversion, and deceived by Thureau's attack on Suza the twenty-second of May, Melas sent Kaim from Turin to oppose this little column, and moreover, assigned to him the greater part of the reinforcements which he had brought from Nice; he marched, on the twenty-fourth of May, to Savigliano. He thus had, to oppose the sixty thousand men I was leading into Lombardy, only eighteen thousand scattered in three corps under Wukassowich, Laudon, and Haddick.

I reached Ivrea the very day that Melas was at Savigliano. Chabran was left to continue the siege of Fort Bard. Thureau, after forcing the pass of Suza, established himself at Bussolino, whence he could menace Turin; Moncey, descending from the St. Gothard, penetrated into the Italian bailiwicks; Bethencourt moved against Fort Arona. My plan developed itself majestically, and the enemy was still ignorant of it!

**COMBAT OF CHIUSELLA.**—General Haddick had marched from Turin on the Chiusella, where he received the troops driven by Lannes from Ivrea; these forces together formed a corps of ten thousand men. Lannes attacked him on the twenty-second, forced the bridge of Chiusella, and threw the enemy on Chivasso. He entered here the next day, and Haddick retired to Turin and rejoined Melas.

**NAPOLEON MARCHES ON MILAN.**—I had pushed my advanced guard on Chivasso merely to make the enemy believe that Turin was my object; but I took good care not to move in that direction. To secure the execution of my projects, which tended to nothing less than to seize all the communications of the Austrians, it was absolutely necessary to maneuver on Milan: this was a thunder-clap that would act on the opinion of the people of Italy, and strike terror into the enemy's army, at the same time that it accelerated my reunion with the fifteen thousand men whom Moncey was conducting from the army of the Rhine. I marched from Ivrea, by Santhia, Vercelli, and Novara, toward the Ticino.

**PASSAGE OF THE TICINO.**—The advanced guard under Lannes, now the rear guard, masked my movement by marching by Crescentino, Trino, and Mortara on Pavia. The new advanced guard, commanded by General Murat, forced the passage of the Ticino at Turbigo, on the thirty-first. General Laudon had assembled some troops for the defense of this river; but he was beaten and lost fifteen hundred men *hors-de-combat*. General Wukassowich, hastening from the upper valley of the Ticino to his assistance, arrived too late, and merely had time to save himself on the



Adda. The Austrians threw two thousand men into the castle of Milan, and fell back, to the number of six thousand, to the banks of the Mincio. I entered Milan on the second of June.

DISPOSITIONS OF MELAS.—Melas, not yet knowing the character of the army to which he was opposed, at first thought of passing the Po at Casale, in order to attack me in rear; but on learning from Haddick and Wukassowich that I had at least sixty thousand men in Lombardy, he renounced the plan, and thought it necessary to draw to himself the forty thousand men of Ott and Elsnitz before hazarding a battle. Elsnitz had been left at the Var with seventeen thousand men, and having, in spite of his superiority in number, been unable to force the position of Suchet on the right of that river, received orders to retreat so as to gain the head of the valley of the Tanaro, and to descend as far as Asti. Ott was directed either to close the affair with Masséna immediately, or to raise the siege of Genoa, repass the Bochetta, and fly to the defense of the Po toward Placentia. The retrograde movement of Elsnitz begun on the twenty-eighth of May. Suchet, whose corps had been increased by reinforcements to twelve thousand men, closely followed him to the Tanaro, and by skillful maneuvers against his right, anticipated him at the Col-de-Tende, cut his center, and subjected him to a loss of eight thousand men *hors-de-combat*. The following days Suchet, advancing by Finale on Savona, marched to the assistance of Genoa, but was too late.

SURRENDER OF GENOA.—Masséna capitulated on the fifth of June, after sustaining a close blockade and a horrible famine for *sixty days*. After the third of May he had several conferences with General Ott, when the latter received orders to make him a *bridge of gold* if he would surrender immediately, or to raise the siege, should he appear disposed to prolong it. This incident spared Masséna from resorting to the act of desperation upon which he had decided, rather than to surrender a prisoner of war. He had resolved to throw himself into Tuscany at the head of his famished column; the orders of Melas spared him this. The eight thousand men still remaining of the French garrison obtained free egress; but only six thousand rejoined Suchet in the environs of Savona. Ott, proud of his conquest, hastened to throw a strong garrison into Genoa, repass the Bochetta, and march by the valley of the Scrivia on Tortona, with the intention of disputing our passage of the Po; but he was too late, for a double passage had been effected at the same time, on the sixth of June, by Lannes, at San-Cipriano, and Murat at Nocetto, near Placentia, after having easily defeated the detachments sent to oppose them.

**PASSAGE OF THE PO.**—Matters were now hastening to a crisis. I had already established myself on the enemy's rear; but he could yet escape by the right bank of the Po by descending as far as Borgo-Forte, opposite Mantua. It was therefore necessary to cut off this last resource. I decided to cross the river with the division of Watrin, Chambarlhac, Gardanne, Monnier, Boudet, and the cavalry of Murat, forming a total of thirty thousand men; the remainder were charged with securing my own communications with Switzerland and guarding the left bank of the Po. The division of Chabran, made disposable by the capitulation of Fort Bard, moved to Vercelli, and occupied Ivrea, Chivos, Crescentino, and Trino. Bethencourt continued to blockade Arona; Moncey remained in the Milanais. One of his divisions was posted at Pavia, another blockaded the castle of Milan, and the third occupied Crema and Brescia, so as to check the Austrian troops which were posted on the Mincio. The division of Loison blockaded Pizzighettone and the Castle of Placentia, observed the Lower Po, and covered the rear of my army. I confess that this position was too much disseminated, and that the attempt to envelop Melas by wishing to cover all was a little hazardous. It had been more wise to unite fifteen thousand men on Tortona, because, if Melas had defiled upon the Mincio by Milan, I should nevertheless have conquered all Italy by a single march, and, by uniting myself to Masséna, have had no further need of my communications by the St. Bernard; but success intoxicates, and I wished all or nothing. Moreover, I had hoped that Masséna would hold out some days longer, and that, debouching by Tortona, we should be able to form a junction by Novi.

**BATTLE OF MONTEBELLO.**—It has just been said that the corps of Ott marched in all haste from Genoa to take part in the defense of the Po: he could not arrive in time, and only reached Montebello, where he encountered the corps of Lannes. Being very desirous to reach Placentia, and thinking that he had to oppose only a detachment of my army, Ott precipitated himself upon the burg of Casteggio, contrary to all the principles of war; concentration being now his only hope, all partial combats were to be avoided by the Austrians. Lannes received the enemy at the head of the division of Watrin and Chambarlhac; he even took the offensive, in order to turn him by the heights which commanded this burg and all the country to the Po. The Austrians fought with intrepidity; victory was doubtful, when the arrival of Victor with the division of Gardanne decided the battle in our favor. The enemy, with both his wings turned, was completely



defeated; his center, driven to the bridge of Casteggio, was overthrown: he lost six cannon, five thousand prisoners, and three thousand killed and wounded. Ott threw two thousand men into the citadel of Tortona and fell back on Alexandria, where Melas was concentrating his forces. This event was of the greatest importance, inasmuch as it diminished the enemy's forces by eight thousand men at the very moment when he was obliged to effect a passage, and animated the courage of my soldiers on the eve of a decisive battle.

**BATTLE OF MARENGO.**—I continued my march on Alexandria. The twelfth of March we passed the Scrivia and debouched into the plain of San Giuliano. A rear guard left by Ott at Marengo was routed by the division of Gardanne and obliged to repass the Bormida. I placed my army in echelons on the road from Tortona to Alexandria. The division of Gardanne established itself at Pedrabona, opposite the *tête-du-pont* which the Austrians had preserved on the Bormida. It was supported by Victor with the division of Chambarlhac at Marengo, and by Kellerman's\* brigade of cavalry. In rear of Victor was Lannes, de-

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\*Kellerman (François-Etienne) was born at Metz, in 1772. He was the son of François Christophe Kellerman, the victor of Valmy. In 1790 he was attached to the French Embassy to the United States of America, and returned to France in 1793. In 1797 he served with Napoleon in Italy and was adjutant-general; he distinguished himself at the passage of the Tagliamento, and, as a reward for his bravery, was sent to Paris with the colors captured on that occasion; he was also promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. He also distinguished himself in Italy, in the campaign of 1799. In 1800 he crossed the Alps with Napoleon, and commanded a brigade of cavalry under Murat, which, at the battle of Marengo, numbered four hundred and seventy men. In the first period of this battle his command had suffered greatly and was reduced to two hundred and fifty men, when Bonaparte ordered him to be reinforced with one hundred and fifty more. With this force he greatly distinguished himself in the final attack, and his brilliant charge contributed greatly toward the victory of Marengo. He was immediately promoted to the rank of general-of-division and joined the army of Brune with the command of three brigades of heavy cavalry. In 1805 he commanded a division under Bernadotte, and was wounded at the battle of Austerlitz. In 1808 he served in Portugal, but the operations here were unfortunate, and he concluded to sign the famous treaty of Cintra. In 1809 he succeeded Bessières in the command of northern Spain. In 1813 he distinguished himself at the battle of Lutzen, and was wounded on the eve of the battle of Bautzen. He also served with credit in 1814. On the return of Napoleon from Elba, he joined the standard of his former general and was appointed to the Chamber of Peers. At the opening of the campaign he received a command in the army, and again fought with great bravery at the head of the fourth corps of cavalry. On the second restoration of the Bourbons he was eliminated from the Chamber of Peers.

ployed near San Giuliano with the division of Watrin and Champeaux's brigade of cavalry. Finally, the division of Monnier formed the last echelon at Torre-di-Gafaralo. Rivaud's brigade of cavalry, posted at Sale, observed the lower Tanaro and the Po on the right of the army. On our left I sent General Desaix with the division of Boudet to Rivalta, in order to prevent the enemy from defiling by his right toward Novi. Desaix was in this way to endeavor to secure communications with the army of Italy, which was descending the valley of the Bormida by Dego on Aquis. I thought that I might safely do this, as the enemy, from his indifference in the defense of the plain of San Giuliano, seemed not to wish a battle, and, on the contrary, was seeking so to maneuver as to fall back on Genoa, and afterward gain Parma and Modena. Moreover, I was deceived by the false information of a spy whom I believed in our interest, but who, it appeared, was acting a double part. This error came near costing me dear.

Melas had not finished assembling his army till the thirteenth. The next morning at break of day he passed the Bormida at the head of thirty-five thousand men, and attacked us with vigor. The division of Gardanne was forced to retreat: Victor rallied it to the right of the division of Chambarlhac, which formed a line from the village of Marengo to the Bormida. General Haddick, with the right of the Austrians, deployed in two lines opposite the position of Victor; Kaim, who formed their center, placed himself obliquely to the left of Haddick; Ott was thrown on Castell-Ceriolio; the reserve under the orders of Elsnitz remained in rear of the right, on the road from Marengo to Alexandria; but two-thirds of his cavalry was most untimely detached to the south of Alexandria on the road to Aquis to observe Suchet and Masséna.

We were not prepared to receive battle. I hasten to arrange my echelons in such a way that they may sustain themselves, and to recall Desaix from Rivalta on San Giuliano. At ten o'clock in the morning I am obliged to push forward Lannes, and put him in line at the right of Victor, whose flank Kaim is preparing to turn. Victor defends with vigor the passage of the rivulet of Barbotta, which runs to Marengo: a murderous and well-sustained fire is kept up on both sides: the Austrians sustain considerable loss; Melas engages half of the cavalry of reserve which remained after his foolish detachment. This isolated brigade is precipitated into the marshy rivulet, and the enemy, who had double the number of cavalry, sees himself from the beginning of the action deprived of the aid of that arm at the very moment when it might decide the victory. Lannes succeeds in resisting the attack of the enemy's



center; but in the mean time Ott, having passed beyond Castel-Ceriolo, and assisted by the cavalry of the center under the orders of Frimont, threatens to take our right in reserve. I oppose to him my grenadiers of the guard. These eight hundred brave men advance into the plain between Castel-Ceriolo and Villa-Nova and form there a square like an impregnable redoubt, against which are spent the reiterated efforts of the Austrian squadrons. Profiting by the glorious resistance of this troop of the *élite*, I direct on Castel-Ceriolo five battalions of Monnier's division, in order to expel the light infantry of the enemy. Unfortunately, a vigorous charge of the Austrians on the left of the division while on march, separates General Monnier from his troops, forces him to throw himself toward Lannes, compels the brigade of the left to retreat, and obliges that of Cara St.-Cyr to follow the movement of the line, at the moment when his tirailleurs are penetrating into Castel-Ceriolo.

Nevertheless, the instantaneous occupation of this village gives a *point-d'appui* to my right and reestablishes my affairs on this wing. But on the other wing we are less fortunate: Victor, after having resisted the enemy for several hours, can sustain himself no longer; his left yields and loses the support of the Bormida; his center is pierced, and his entire corps is driven back on San Giuliano. The defeat of the left exposes the flank of Lannes and forces him to retreat; he effects this in good order across the plain in the direction of La Ghilina.

Already the Austrians utter shouts of victory. My generals, Berthier in particular, think the battle decidedly lost. Desaix and myself do not yet despair. This general advances rapidly on San Giuliano; the six thousand fresh troops which he brings me can, under such a chief, effect miracles. I direct my whole attention to prolonging the movement of retreat on the left, in order to gain time for Desaix to arrive on the field of battle. The enemy, after a short halt, advances with new vivacity; but the want of cavalry, which had been foolishly directed against Suchet and Masséna, prevents him from profiting by the advantages of his position; if a part of his cavalry could be thrown against Victor, it would complete the rout of the army, and decide the victory against us.

At last, near five o'clock in the afternoon, Desaix debouches from San Giuliano, and forms in advance of this village; Lannes establishes himself obliquely between the right of Desaix and Villa-Nova; the square of my guard connects its right with Castel-Ceriolo. The cavalry of Champeaux forms in rear of Desaix, and

that of Kellerman in rear of the interval between Desaix and Lannes. Victor endeavors to assemble his battalions in rear and to the left of Desaix. The enemy advances, extending his line on both flanks. His left, under Ott, already reaches Villa-Nova; his center, after making a halt at the high ground of Guasca, directs its course on San Giuliano, and the right debouches from Cassina Grosa. Melas thinks himself so certain of victory that he goes to Alexandria to dispatch the news of my defeat to Vienna and Genoa, while his chief-of-staff, Zach, is to advance in column by the great road to Tortona to gather the fruits of victory. The latter has so little doubt of his success, that he marches by echelons separated by considerable intervals. The first, composed of five thousand men of the *élite*, which he conducts in person, is followed at the distance of a quarter of a league by three other corps under Kaim, Bellegarde, and Elsnitz. At the moment when the head of the column reaches San Giuliano, my artillery of reserve is unmasked and pours in its deadly volleys; at the same time Desaix attacks with impetuosity; unfortunately, one of the first balls strikes this brave man in the center of his breast, and deprives France of one of her ablest defenders, and me of one of my dearest companions in arms. Our troops, exasperated at the death of their illustrious chief, redouble their efforts. Our enemies, who thought victory certain, are staggered by these attacks. Kellerman\* seizes the moment to charge them in flank with four

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\*The English translator of the American edition of Thiers' "History of Napoleon" makes this Kellerman the same as the one that gained the victory of Valmy, and, to do this, makes an incorrect translation of Thiers' remarks on this affair. He then adds in his notes: "He (Kellerman) was the *real winner* of the battle of Marengo, changing it by a single charge of cavalry, from a rout to a victory. For this, Napoleon never forgave him." Again he contradicts Thiers, in saying that Napoleon recompensed *all* his generals for their services at Marengo, and says: "He (Napoleon) did *not* recompense Kellerman. No other officer of his distinction but was made Marshal of France far earlier than he. It has been always stated, heretofore, that after Desaix's fall, Zach's men were rallied, had assumed the offensive, and that the French foot were again in disorder, when Kellerman charged, *without orders*, and retrieved the fight."

Alison makes a similar statement to the above, and then remarks: "United with the great qualities of Napoleon's character was a selfish thirst for glory, and consequent jealousy of any one who had either effectually thwarted his designs or rendered him such services as might diminish the lustre of his own exploits. His undying jealousy of Wellington ! ! ! ! was an indication of his first weakness; his oblivion of Kellerman's inappreciable services are instances of the second. \* \* \* The obligation was too great to be forgiven. Kellerman was not promoted like the other generals, and never afterward enjoyed the favor of the chief, on whose brow he placed the diadem."

Any one at all familiar with French history must be forced to smile



squadrons. The column is broken; the head, crushed and surrounded, surrenders. Profiting by this advantage, our troops push forward. Kellerman leaves it to the infantry to collect the prisoners, and advances against the division of Kaim, who is following Zach a quarter of a league in rear; the same disorder is carried here by a brilliant and timely charge of the cavalry. The Austrians, in consternation, retreat. In vain their reserve at-

at the innumerable absurdities into which these two writers have been carried by their English prejudices; the American, however, will feel mortified to see such absurd notes attached by the *English* editor of the *American* edition of so impartial and generally correct a history as that of Thiers; and he will be not a little astonished, upon examining the original text, to find it has been incorrectly translated so as to make it support one of the foregoing statements respecting Kellerman. The passage we allude to is this: "*The brave Kellerman, who this day added much to the glory of Valmy, attached to his name, dashed upon the squadrons,*" etc. This is made to read in the *Anglo-American* edition, "*The brave Kellerman, who on this day added so greatly to the glory he had won at Valmy, dashed,*" etc. Thiers, translated in this way, is made to support statements which he is very far from doing in the original.

The elder Kellerman, to whom the translator of Thiers here alludes, was not at the battle of Marengo, but for his victory of Valmy, won while Napoleon was a mere captain, Napoleon made him a Marshal of France among the very first that were made. No one was made Marshal "earlier than he." The younger Kellerman, his son, never was made Marshal. The charge of Napoleon having neglected him is absurd. For his services in 1797 he made him a brigadier-general, and honored him with the colors taken at the passage of the Tagliamento. In 1800 the cavalry was commanded by Murat, and consisted of the three brigades of Rivaud, Champeaux, and Kellerman, that of the latter being much the smallest one. For his valuable services on the field of Marengo he was made a general-of-division, and attached to the army of Brune, with the command of three brigades, numbering two thousand one hundred. Rivaud was also made a general-of-division, but his command was not increased to the same degree as that of Kellerman. Champeaux was killed at Marengo.

Kellerman did good service at Marengo, for which he deserved and received great credit. But it is absurd to call him the "*real winner*" of the battle. On this subject Thiers very justly remarks: "Some detractors have sought to attribute to General Kellerman the gaining of the battle of Marengo, and consequently all the results which this memorable day brought in its train. But if General Bonaparte is to be despoiled of the glory of that day, why not attribute it to that noble victim of the happiest inspiration, to that Desaix, who, divining the orders of his chief before he had received them, brought him the two-fold offering of the victory and of his life? Why not attribute it again to that intrepid defender of Genoa, who, by detaining the Austrians on the Apennines, gave General Bonaparte time to descend from the Alps, and handed them over to him already half defeated? So speaking, Generals Kellerman, Desaix, Masséna, could all be the true conquerors of Marengo! all except General Bonaparte! But in this world it is by the voice of the people that glory is decreed; and it was by the voice of the people that he was proclaimed conqueror of Marengo; who, discovering by the glance of genius, what advan-

tempts to sustain itself at Marengo: nothing can resist the impetuosity of our soldiers. The enemy retreats across the Bormida in the greatest disorder, leaving in our hands eight colors, twenty cannon, and six thousand prisoners. General Ott, who in the mean time had advanced to Chilina, thinks himself fortunate in regaining Castel-Ceriollo, already occupied by our tirailleurs, and at last, with difficulty, reaches the *tête-du-pont* of the Bormida.

tage might be taken of the upper Alps to burst down upon the Austrian rear, had, during three whole months, deceived their vigilance; who had brought into existence an army which had before no being; who had astounded Europe by the miracle of that creation; who had crossed the St. Bernard without any beaten road; who had swooped suddenly upon the midst of startled Italy; who had surrounded his unfortunate adversary with unequalled art; who had, to sum the whole, delivered a decisive battle, which, if lost in the morning, was gloriously recovered in the evening. And certainly, had it not been won that night, it would have been on the ensuing morning; for independent of the six thousand men of Desaix's division, the ten thousand men from the Ticino, and the ten thousand posted on the lower Po, presented infallible means for the destruction of the enemy's army. Let us suppose a case. Let us suppose that the Austrians, conquerors on the fourteenth of June, had entangled themselves in the gorge of the Stradella; that they had found at Placentia Generals Duhesme and Lolson, with ten thousand men to dispute the passage of the Po, with General Bonaparte in their rear, reinforced by Generals Desaix and Monecy—what would these Austrians have done in this narrow gorge, blocked by a well-defended river, pursued by a superior army? They would but have experienced a disaster more serious than on the plains of Bormida. The true conqueror of Marengo, therefore, is he who mastered fortune by a series of combinations, admirable for their depth and power, unequalled in the history of mightiest captains.

What shall we say, then, more? He was well served by his lieutenants. Nor is it needful to detract from any glory to make his shine the brighter. Masséna, by his heroic defense of Genoa; Desaix, by his most fortunate determination; Lannes, by his matchless firmness on the plain of Marengo; Kellerman, by his admirable charge of cavalry—all contributed to secure his triumph. He recompensed them all in the most striking manner; as for Desaix, he embalmed his fate with the most honorable regrets. The First Consul ordered the most magnificent honors to be done to the man who had performed for France services so important; he took every care of his military family, placing near his own person his two *aide-de-camp*, who were left without employment by the death of their master; these were Colonels Rapp and Savary.

The following personal narrative of Desaix's *aid-de-camp*, afterward Duke of Rovigo, would seem to put this question beyond a doubt: "It was now about three o'clock; very few musket shots were fired; the two armies were maneuvering, and preparing for a last effort. General Desaix's division occupied the point which came nearest in contact with the enemy, who were advancing in close, deep columns along the road from Alexandria to Tortona, leaving the latter town on their left. They had nearly come up to us, and we were only separated by a vineyard lined by the ninth light infantry, and a small corn-field, which the Austrians were entering. We were not more than a hundred paces apart, and could distinguish each other's features. The Austrian column halted on perceiving Desaix's division, the position of which became so unexpectedly known



**CONVENTION OF ALEXANDRIA.**—This was truly a great victory, and it could not fail to produce incalculable results. As Melas still had an army as numerous as our divisions which were present at Marengo, he might resume the combat the next day; but if defeated, he must pass beneath the Caudine Forks and surrender at discretion. Having a bridge across the Po at Casale, it has been said that he ought to have taken advantage of it to throw

to them. The direction of its march would infallibly bring it upon the centre of our first line. It was no doubt endeavoring to ascertain our strength previously to opening its fire. The position was becoming every moment more critical. 'You see how matters stand,' said Desaix to me; 'I can no longer put off the attack without danger of being myself attacked under disadvantageous circumstances; if I delay, I shall be beaten, and I have no relish for that. Go then in all haste and apprise the First Consul of the embarrassment I experience; tell him I can not wait any longer; that I am without cavalry, and that he must direct a bold charge to be made upon the flank of that column, while I shall charge it in front.'

"I set off at full gallop, and overtook the First Consul, who, was causing the troops placed to the right of the village of Marengo to execute the change of front which he had directed along the whole line. I delivered my message to him, and after listening to it with attention, he reflected a moment, and addressed me in these words: 'Have you well examined the column?' 'Yes, General' (he went by this title at the time I speak of). 'Is it very numerous?' 'Extremely so, General.' 'Is Desaix uneasy about it?' 'He only appeared uneasy as to the consequences that might result from hesitation. I must add his having particularly desired I should tell you that it was useless to send any other orders than that he should attack or retreat—one or the other; and the latter movement would be at least as hazardous as the first.'

"'If this be the case,' said the First Consul, 'let him attack; I shall go in person to give him the order. You will repair yonder (pointing to a black spot in the plain), and there find General Kellerman, who is in command of that cavalry you now see; tell him what you have just communicated to me; and desire him to charge the enemy without hesitation as soon as Desaix shall commence his attack. You will also remain with him, and point out the spot through which Desaix is to debouch, for Kellerman does not even know that he is with the army.'

"I obeyed, and found Kellerman at the head of about six hundred troopers, the residue of the cavalry, which had been constantly engaged the whole day. I gave him the order from the First Consul. I had scarcely delivered my message when a fire of musketry was heard to proceed from the left of the village of Marengo; it was the opening attack of General Desaix. He rapidly bore down with the ninth light regiment upon the head of the Austrian column; the latter feebly sustained the charge; but its defeat was dearly purchased, our general having fallen at the very first firing. He was riding in the rear of the ninth regiment, when a shot pierced his heart; he fell at the very moment when he was deciding the victory in our favor. Kellerman had put himself in motion as soon as he heard the firing. He rushed upon that formidable column, penetrated it from left to right, and broke it into several bodies. Being assailed in front, and its flanks forced in, it dispersed, and was closely pursued as far as Bormida.

"The large masses of troops that were in pursuit of our left no sooner perceived this defeat than they retreated, and attempted to reach the

himself on the left bank, and attempt to force his way by Milan and Brescia on Mantua. This might have been very well if he had been certain of repelling Chabran and Moncey; but should these succeed in checking the heads of the Austrian columns in the low grounds of Lombardy, where the troops could move only on the causeways and dykes, would I not have had time enough to pursue him, and force him to surrender? In the direction of Genoa

bridge in front of Alexandria; but the corps of Generals Lannes and Gardanne had accomplished their movement: those masses had no longer any communication with each other, and were compelled to lay down their arms.

"The battle, which until midday had turned against us, was completely won at six o'clock.

"As soon as the Austrian column was dispersed, I quitted General Kellerman's cavalry, and was returning to meet General Desaix, whose troops were debouching in my view, when the colonel of the ninth light regiment informed me that he had been killed. I was at the distance of only a hundred paces from the spot where I had left him. I hastened to it, and found the general stretched upon the ground completely stripped of his clothes, and surrounded by other naked bodies. I recognized him, notwithstanding the darkness, owing to the thickness of his hair, which still retained its tie.

"I had been too long attached to his person to suffer his body to remain on this spot, where it would have been indiscriminately buried with the rest.

"I removed a cloak from under the saddle of a horse lying dead at a short distance, and wrapped General Desaix's body in it, with the assistance of a hussar, who had strayed on the field of battle, and joined me in the performance of this mournful duty. He consented to lay it across his horse, and to lead the animal by the bridle as far as Gorrofolo, while I should go to communicate the misfortune to the First Consul, who desired me to follow him to Gorrofolo, where I gave him an account of what had taken place. He approved what I had done, and ordered the body to be carried to Milan for the purpose of being embalmed.

"Being only an *aid-de-camp* to General Desaix at the battle of Marengo, my personal observations were limited to what the duties of that situation enabled me to see; whatever else I have mentioned was related to me by the First Consul, who felt a pleasure in recurring to the events of this action, and often did me the honor to tell me what deep uneasiness it had given him until the moment when Kellerman executed the charge, which wholly altered its aspect.

"Since the fall of the imperial government, some pretended friends of General Kellerman have presumed to claim for him the merit of originating the charge of cavalry. That general, whose share of glory is sufficiently brilliant to gratify his most sanguine wishes, can have no knowledge of so presumptuous a pretension. I the more readily acquit him, from the circumstances that, as we were conversing one day respecting that battle, I called to his mind my having brought to him the First Consul's orders, and he appeared not to have forgotten that fact. I am far from suspecting his friends of the design of lessening the glory of either General Bonaparte or General Desaix: they know as well as myself that there are names so respected that they can never be affected by such detraction; and that it would be as vain to dispute the praise due to the chief who planned the battle, as to attempt to depreciate the brilliant share which General Kellerman had in its successful result. I will add to the above a few reflections.



his chances were scarcely any better: Suchet, already at Aquì, could prevent the execution of such a project. The Austrian general was obliged to choose one of two courses—either to attack me again at Marengo, or to surrender to me the fortresses of Italy, and save to his master his army of sixty thousand men; the first was the most glorious, but the second the most certain and prudent; he would surrender fortresses which did not belong to Austria, and preserve a fine army.

The next day after the battle, Melas sent me a messenger to treat for a convention. I seized with joy this opportunity to secure, without further bloodshed, the greater part of Italy: I gave Melas permission to retire with his army to the Mincio; in return he surrendered to me the fortresses of Coni, Alexandria, and Genoa, Fort Urbino, the citadels of Tortona, Milan, Turin, Pizzighettone, Placentia, Ceva, and Savona, and the Castle of

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"From the position which he occupied, General Desaix could not see General Kellerman; he had even desired me to request the First Consul to afford him the support of some cavalry. Neither could General Kellerman, from the point where he was stationed, perceive General Desaix's division; it is even probable that he was not aware of the arrival of that general, who had only joined the army two days before. Both were ignorant of each other's position, which the First Consul was alone acquainted with; he alone could introduce harmony into their movements; he alone could make their efforts respectively conduce to the same object.

"The fate of the battle was decided by Kellerman's bold charge; had it, however, been made previously to General Desaix's attack, in all probability it would have had a quite different result. Kellerman appears to have been convinced of it, since he allowed the Austrian column to cross our field of battle, and extend its front beyond that of the troops we had still in line, without making the least attempt to impede its progress. The reason of Kellerman's not charging it sooner was, that it was too serious a movement, and the consequences of failure would have been irretrievable; that charge, therefore, could only enter into a general combination of plans to which he was necessarily a stranger."

Alison, in support of his false account of this affair, refers to Jomini, Napoleon's "Memoirs," Dumas, Savary, and Bülow, not one of whom confirms his statements, which have no higher authority than the petty lies of Bourrienne, the scandal circulated in the saloons of Paris and collected by the gossiping Duchess d'Abrantès, or by Alison's esteemed friend, "*Captain Basil Hall*." Directly opposed to these are the positive statements of the generals who fought on the field of Marengo, and of all the continental historians of acknowledged authority.

Napoleon's jealousy of Kellerman is too absurd to merit serious attention! Did he show this in promoting him from his insignificant command at Marengo to the rank of general-of-division, and afterward general-in-chief of a *corps-d'armée*, and by loading his family with favors? In return, Kellerman served him faithfully through his whole career. He was a brave man, but his generalship can in no way be compared with that of Soult, Masséna, Davoust, Suchet, Desaix, Kléber, Ney, Lannes, Oudinot, Eugene Beauharnais, Macdonald, Victor, and of many others that might be named.

**Arona.** The armistice of Alexandria was shortly afterward extended to the army of Germany. Moreau, rendered more circumspect by the large detachment under Moncey, had skirmished for a month around Ulm and the intrenched camp; but, at last convinced of his superiority over Kray, he began, about the middle of June, to maneuver to deprive the enemy of the advantages of this camp; he passed the Lech, the right in advance, took possession of Augsburg, completed his change of front to establish himself in battle array on the right bank of the Danube, and to threaten Kray's communications with Vienna: this maneuver was a good one, and proved completely successful. The French army did not stop here, but crossed the Danube at Hochstädt, revenged in these plains the defeat of the French army under Tallard and Marsin, and beat the left and reserve of Kray, who was obliged to retreat to the Iser. Moreau anticipated him at Munich, and made him change his course to the Inn, where a convention, signed at Parsdorf, also put an end to hostilities in this direction.

I had reason to hope that the reverses of Austria would dispose her to treat for peace. Even from the battle-field of Marengo, I had charged St-Julien as a bearer of pacific messages to the Cabinet of Vienna, giving it to understand that I was ready to treat on the same conditions as at Campo-Formio. Although my brilliant victory had not yet carried me to the Noric Alps as in 1797, still the army of the Rhine was in a much more threatening attitude than at that epoch.

**NEGOTIATIONS OF GENERAL ST-JULIEN.**—The Cabinet of Vienna sent back M. St-Julien with a letter of credence from the Emperor himself, which caused me to give faith to whatever he said. The intention of his government was to negotiate in concert with England, with which power it had concluded a treaty of subsidy two days before hearing of the disaster of Marengo. The situation was embarrassing, and, in fact, to treat separately eight days after such a transaction would have been a felony. General St-Julien having delivered his letters, I proved to him the advantages that must result to his court from treating without loss of time; for I could not consent to any delay, without requiring the strongest guarantees, inasmuch as our victories in all directions would enable me to continue operations with success; every week's delay would therefore cost Austria a fortress or a province. This officer, consulting the military interest rather than the diplomatic position of his cabinet, signed, on the twenty-fifth of July, the preliminaries of the same basis as the treaty of Campo-Formio. Duroc was sent with him to Vienna to obtain the ratification.



**DISAPPROVAL OF THE CABINET OF VIENNA.**—Thugut, furious that his envoy had gone further than he wished, exiled him to Transylvania, and rejected the preliminaries, at the same time signifying his readiness to continue the negotiations in concert with the English; for in the mean time Lord Minto, the English ambassador at Vienna, had declared that his cabinet was disposed to negotiate for the common interests of the two courts. Although, under the circumstances, this resolution seemed natural enough, still I felt indignant at it because the Emperor's letter was of a character to make it binding upon his government to abide by the engagements entered into by his envoy;\* because these engagements were of themselves moderate; because the intervention of England was intended to protract negotiations at a time when delay was far more advantageous to them than to me; finally, because I was unwilling to connect the cause of Austria with that of England. I therefore ordered Moreau and Brune to immediately denounce the armistice both in Italy and Germany.

**NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NAVAL AND MILITARY ARMISTICE.**—This had its effect at Vienna. The cabinet felt the necessity of peace; on the other side, I did not wish to decline it simply because of a breach of forms, and, moreover, I had commenced negotiations at London by Otto for a naval armistice. I wished to gain a double advantage from my victories on the Inn and the Mincio to obtain, on the one hand, a naval armistice which would allow me to send some frigates to Egypt and Malta with arms, men, and munitions; and, on the other, to require Austria to give up to me the places of Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsbourg. Austria consented to it; the armistice was signed at Hohenlinden the twentieth of September, and confirmed at Castiglione for the army of Italy. England was unwilling to admit a naval armistice, in hopes that Malta, which had been closely blockaded for two years, would soon fall into her hands, and that she might prevent any reinforcements from being sent to Egypt for the purpose of consolidating our position there.

**KLÉBER PROPOSES TO EVACUATE EGYPT.**—In fact, an event had just occurred in the East which might have important consequences. After my departure from Egypt, General Kléber, looking at the dark side of things, had denounced me to the Directory. When his letter reached Paris I was at the head of the government! I did not deem it necessary for Bonaparte the

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\*The Emperor's letter stated, "You will give credit to every thing which Count St-Julien shall say on my part, and I will ratify whatever he shall do."

*First Consul* to avenge the quarrels of Bonaparte the general. I answered Kléber by encouragements. In the mean time the Vizier Mehmed-Pacha, convinced that he had only to present himself to gain the victory, advanced on El-Arisch with fifty thousand men. Kléber proposed to him to evacuate Egypt, which the Turks eagerly accepted. But the English, hearing that this treaty was in full course of execution and that most of the forts had already been surrendered to the Ottoman troops, now thought best to refuse its ratification, although it had been negotiated in concert with Admiral Sidney Smith. They did not doubt but that Egypt would be entirely occupied by the Turks before their refusal would be received, and that our army, compelled to embark, would easily fall into their hands. This Machiavellic calculation turned to the confusion of its authors.

VICTORY OF HELIOPOLIS.—Kléber had committed a manifest imprudence; he felt the necessity of repairing his fault by victory, and, on the twentieth of March, he moved against the Vizier, who was advancing on Heliopolis. In less than four hours he completely routed the Turkish army, drove it into the desert with a loss of ten thousand men, and returned in triumph to Cairo, which place had momentarily been in possession of a Turkish corps. The Vizier revenged himself for this defeat by basely procuring the assassination of his conqueror, on the very day of our victory at Marengo. The victory of Heliopolis would have consolidated our position in Egypt, if we could have sent a reinforcement of a few thousand men and the necessary means for founding a colony. Pitt and Grenville feared this, and tried every means to postpone the naval armistice. I showed them how ridiculous it would be for me to cease hostilities toward one power, over which I possessed such decided advantages, and to continue them against the other. Grenville acknowledged the force of the argument. They admitted the necessity of a naval armistice and of breaking up the cruisers; but they wished to interdict all navigation of state vessels, and to admit into Malta and Alexandria provisions for only fifteen days. With such terms it was hardly probable that peace could be made either with the two powers collectively, or with Austria alone.

IMPORTANT CONVENTION WITH THE UNITED STATES.—I profited by the leisure afforded me by this suspension of hostilities to repair to Paris for the purpose of arranging our relations with the United States. The absurd operations of the demagogue agents of the Committee of Public Safety had involved us, in 1793, in difficulties with these elder sons of French Liberty,



and the disgraceful prevarications of the agents of the Directory had prevented Pinkney from establishing between us that good harmony which ought never to have been interrupted. In truth, the Americans had to reproach themselves for having consented to the right of maritime search, arrogated to herself by England; but it was not, by openly breaking with them, nor by an attempt at intimidation, that they were to be brought to other sentiments. My victories opened a new way. The deputies who had been at Paris for two years came to an understanding with my brother Joseph and Røederer, and concluded at Morfontaine, on the thirtieth of September, a convention placing our ulterior relations on the same footing as the most favored nations, and sanctioning the sacred principles of maritime rights. The liberty of neutral navigation was here solemnly proclaimed, with no restrictions but those which result from the universal law regarding ports actually blockaded, and contraband merchandise—that is, provisions, arms, and military munitions. Finally, the principle that the flag covers the merchandise was here established, as the only one which a just and wise legislation could admit.

**THE ENGLISH QUARREL WITH NEUTRALS.**—This event was of the highest importance; for in the month of August Denmark and Sweden became engaged in serious disputes with England, who, not content with setting at naught all the rules of maritime law, did not blush to attack even convoys escorted by Danish and Swedish ships-of-war: Russia and Prussia, interested in maintaining the respect due to their flags, took part in these important discussions; and a storm which thickened on all sides began to threaten the British trident.

**RUPTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF LONDON.**—In such occurrences it was not for me to set an example of yielding to English pretensions. I was only the more firmly resolved not to treat till I could secure my dearest interests by a naval armistice. The conditions imposed by Lord Grenville not accomplishing this object, negotiations were broken off at London the ninth of October, and I declared that I would only treat with England and Austria separately.

**CONSPIRACY OF CERRACHI.**—The same day that the negotiations were broken off at London, my life was threatened by a conspiracy at Paris. Some obscure factionists, comparing themselves to Brutus and Cassius, meditated in darkness the means of destroying a general whom their disordered imaginations painted as another Cromwell or an Oriental despot. I was that night to attend the Opéra, and all Paris knew it. Fouché

came to inform me that the conspirators, for want of a capitol, had chosen the corridors of the theatre for the execution of their bloody design. I was urged not to go. I did not follow a course so unworthy, but took the necessary measures for securing the guilty. Cerrachi and Arena were taken with poignards and arms with which they intended to assassinate me: they were tried and condemned.

EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FERROL AND CADIZ.—England, in the midst of the disputes to which she had given rise, redoubled her audacity and activity to secure all the advantages to be derived from the existing state of things; and to make the English people forget the horrors of a famine which was desolating the three kingdoms, she carried her victorious flag to all parts of the globe. It seemed as though the English government only wanted garrisons to take possession of half the world. The loss of these colonies reacted on the policy of the European states as well as on their marine; to deprive a commercial people of distant trade takes from a nation the first elements of a military marine, and deprives it of the means of sustaining its colonial system.

For six months past Holland had been deprived of the colonies of Surinam and Demarara on the American continent; the islands of Curaçoa and St. Eustacia had followed the same fate. Admiral Popham had just set sail with an expedition for the South Sea. A considerable armament, the troops of which were to be commanded by General Pultney, was preparing in part to join Abercrombie upon some important enterprise. A great maritime power threatens all at once, without the enemy's knowing where to expect the blow; it can strike when and where it pleases. The expedition of Pultney might intend a descent upon Holland, which we had stripped of troops to form the army of the reserve, and afterward the Gallo-Batavian army, which was assembled by Angereau at Mayence; it might attack Antwerp, Flushing, or Boulogne; it might insult Spain, or descend upon Egypt. I assembled a corps at Amiens under the orders of Murat, with the impression that the attack was to be directed upon Holland. This corps was composed, in part, of grenadiers collected from all the garrison battalions in the interior. But Pultney sailed toward the coast of Spain, where he thought to do with the fleet of the Ferrol what Abercrombie and Mitchel had done in the Texel with the Batavian fleet. Pultney landed on the twenty-fifth of August, attacked Fort St. Philip and the heights of Brion; but Admiral Moreno, having landed a part of the equipages of his squadron, baffled a project which appeared to have been based on the hope of



a surprise, and on the ordinary negligence of the Spaniards. Pultney, having failed in this project, made sail for Cadiz. At the same time Abercrombie, the armistice rendering his forces useless in Italy, had received orders to appear before Cadiz; the junction of the two squadrons was effected at Gibraltar.

At the head of this new armada Lord Keith appeared, on the sixth of October, before the rich city of Cadiz, then a prey to the ravages of the yellow fever, and deserted by a considerable part of its inhabitants. Less audacious than the celebrated Essex, he at first confined himself to bombarding the city; General Morla, who was in command, opposed him with a firm countenance. At last Abercrombie decided to land a part of his troops at the point of San Lucar, but they were soon reëmbarked, because (it was alleged) of the fear of the pestilence. Perhaps with greater energy, these two enterprises would have been successful; it is incomprehensible that such immense means should be expended upon mere demonstrations.

**THUGUT RETIRES FROM THE MINISTRY.**—While the maritime war was pushed with so much activity, nothing was yet decided upon the continent. Thugut, who in 1797 had resigned from the ministry rather than treat with us, again pretended, on the fourth of October, to yield the portfolio to Count Cobentzel; but the latter, having left Vienna in a few days for Lunéville, where a congress was to be assembled, the portfolio was transferred to Count Lehrbach, under whose name Thugut continued to direct affairs. He still flattered himself that he would be able to deprive us of Italy. His army was reinforced on the Mincio. The Neapolitans, having terminated their intestine wars and juridical massacres ordered by the Queen, and barbarously executed on board the vessels of Nelson, advanced to the confines of Tuscany. Abercrombie might, at any moment, make a descent at Leghorn with the little army which he carried from Minorca to the coast of Tuscany and thence to Gibraltar. The Grand Duke was organizing his militia to aid an Austrian corps commanded by General Sommariva.

**OCCUPATION OF TUSCANY.**—I resolved to frustrate the junction of these stormy elements. General Dupont received orders to enter Tuscany, disarm the militia, and occupy Florence and Leghorn; which he executed on the sixteenth of October after the slight combats of Barberino and Arezzo.

**PREPARATIONS ON THE CONTINENT.**—The activity of political negotiations during the months of July, August, and September had not prevented the two parties from continuing their

military preparations. I had sent into Switzerland a second army of reserve, formed at Dijon by Macdonald, of about fourteen or fifteen thousand men. Augereau assembled at Mayence a little Gallo-Batavian army of the same force. These two corps were intended to relieve my two principal armies of those accessories which trouble the flanks, divide the forces, and form the pretext of all the faults of mediocre generals. Macdonald would cover, at the same time, in the Tyrol, the left of Brune and the right of Moreau; he might become the corps of maneuver against the enemy and connect the two armies. Augereau would sweep the left of the Danube, check the forces which the enemy was assembling in Bohemia, and leave Moreau's fine army entirely free in its movements.

The Austrians had also profited by this interval. The Archduke Palatine had gone to Hungary to renew there the *levée-en-masse* of 1797. The Archduke Charles, who had been most unjustly deprived of the supreme command, urged forward, in the government of Bohemia, which had been conferred upon him, the organization of legions of ten or twelve thousand men, who were soon to enter into the line. Recruits were collected from all the hereditary states for completing the regiments. The little army of Condé, changed from the service of Russia to that of England, and a fine Bavarian contingent, further reinforced the imperialists. The Emperor Francis, himself, repaired to his army to revive their patriotism and love of glory. Yielding to considerations for which it would be difficult to assign any cause, he deemed it his duty to replace Kray by the Archduke John, a young prince, instructed in the military art, but having neither the experience nor the genius of his brother, the Archduke Charles. They gave him for counsellors the same generals, Lauer and Weyrother, who had been the guides of Wurmser and Alvinzi in the great days of Bassano and Rivoli, and who, notwithstanding all their erudition, always maneuvered very well to secure their own defeat; for nothing is worse than erudition without correct principles. After these preparations, Austria thought it would be base for her to surrender to us Mantua, of which she was still in possession. It is rare that a state makes peace after a defeat, without renouncing some of its lost possessions as a recompense for the sacrifice of the others; a nation, preserving its self-respect, is seldom seen yielding more than it has already lost, when in a condition for self-defense. It will be hereafter shown how these natural maxims were misconceived in the conditions which they attempted to impose on me. All hope of peace having disappeared, I decided to



break the armistice, in the middle of November, notwithstanding the rigor of the season. Should we give Austria the advantage of a whole winter's repose, the chances would be entirely against us; Moreau and Brune, therefore, received orders to resume hostilities.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS.—I had conceived a very bold project for outflanking the army of Bellegarde on the Mincio, by making Macdonald cross the Rhetian Alps so as to debouch on Trent and throw the Austrians back on the lagunes of Venice, at the same time that Brune attacked them in front. In order to execute this the more certainly, Murat was directed to march from the camp of Amiens for Italy, as soon as the destination of Pultney should render his corps disposable. I, for a moment, thought of marching with eighty thousand men by the Noric Alps on Vienna, at the same time that Moreau would arrive there by the valley of the Danube. I decided, however, not to go in person to the army of Brune, which, by the turn of events, would only be an near Monzambano; the right, under Dupont, was to make a secured at Paris at the epoch of Marengo. The party conquered at the eighteenth Brumaire was not yet dead: at the first news of the success of Melas, brought by a commercial courier, the Jacobins, thinking me conquered, proposed to Carnot, the minister of war, it is said, a *coup-d'état* against me. We can only guess what course he would have taken if an hour afterward my courier, announcing a decisive victory, had not changed the face of affairs. I deemed it more wise to direct matters from the interior of my cabinet, and Berthier resumed the duties of minister of war.

Macdonald found his task impossible of execution, and his means disproportionate to the end; he sent his chief-of-staff to bring me his objections. After listening attentively to the *exposé* of this officer, I interrogated him on the presumed force and positions of General Hiller's corps on the side of Germany, and of the divisions of Loudon, Dedowich, and Wukassowich, which covered the Italian Tyrol. Taking a *coup d'oeil* of this mass of the Great Alps between the Rhine and the Adige, I analyzed the different hypotheses which this vast theatre presented for my combinations, and then replied: "We shall carry, without opposition, this immense fortress of the Tyrol; it is necessary to maneuver on the flanks of the Austrians, to threaten their last point of retreat; they will immediately evacuate all the upper valleys. I will, in no respect, change my plans. Return immediately; I am about to break the armistice: *Tell Macdonald that an army passes always, and in all seasons, wherever two men can place their feet*: the army of the Grisons must be at the sources of the Adda, the Oglio, and the

Adige; within fifteen days after the resumption of hostilities; let the report of its arms be heard on Mount Tonal, which separates them; and on reaching Trent, let it form the left of the army of Italy, and maneuver in concert with this last on the rear of Bellegarde. I shall be able to reinforce them as soon as necessary: it is not on the numerical force of an army, but rather on the object and importance of the operation, that I estimate the importance of the command."

BRILLIANT SUCCESS OF THE ARMY OF THE RHINE.—

Hostilities recommenced toward the end of November. A few days after, Moreau gained the decisive battle of Hohenlinden. The Archduke John, wishing to take the initiative, instead of awaiting us behind the formidable position of the Inn, threw himself into the woody country between this river and the Iser, in order to debouch on Munich, while the corps of Klenau, with a good part of his cavalry, debouched by Ratisbon and joined him at Dachau. The Archduke, by Weyrother's advice, on the third of December, penetrated into the great forest of Hohenlinden in four columns. Three of these columns marched by roads difficult at best, but now rendered almost impassable by a deep snow. The principal column, composed of the center of the army with all the parks and reserves, passing along a fine road, debouched two hours before the others, on Anzing, fell into the midst of Moreau's division, and met a warm reception. By a chance not less fortunate, Richepanse, going into the forest, engaged the left of the Austrians, which had been much retarded, thus got possession of the road, and took the center of the Archduke *en flagrant délit*, by attacking him in reverse in a defile of which Moreau was disputing the outlet. Assailed on all sides in this *coupe-gorge*, the Archduke John, after having lost one hundred pieces of cannon and twelve thousand men, was exceedingly fortunate in regaining the Inn.

This victory was so much the more fortunate as it had been gained without the right wing under Lecourbe, or the left under Collaud, taking part in it; Moreau had called them to him as soon as he heard of the march made by the enemy on the offensive, but they had not had time to arrive. The victorious army pursued with impetuosity the frightened foe. The heads of our columns, led on by Lecourbe, Richepanse, Decaen, young warriors, full of activity and ardor, scarcely waiting for repose, pursued the enemy with that vigor of which I had given an example in 1796. The imposing barrier of the Inn, notwithstanding the three *têtes-de-pont* which had been entrenched during the armistice, and the



fortified place of Brannau, could not arrest them more than a day. The faulty position of the enemy permitted Moreau to menace the right, and to pass the Inn on the extreme left near Rosenheim. The Austrians made a stand in advance of Salzburg, and Lecourbe came near being engaged there alone on disadvantageous terms: his firmness gave him time to remedy the evil. The Salza, the Traun, and the Enns were crossed with the same vigor. Richepanse operated with great skill, and succeeded in carrying off several of the enemy's rear guard. General Klenau, who had gone to cover Ratisbon with a pretty numerous corps, particularly in cavalry, paralyzed by the rout of the principal army, could do no better than to join General Simbschen and the legions of Bohemia, to fall upon the little army of Augereau, who, after having reduced Wurtzburg and invested its citadel, was advancing toward Nuremberg. But the slight advantages gained by the Austrians on this secondary point did not prevent the main army from being driven back to St. Polten in the greatest disorder. Richepanse, Decaen, and Lecourbe in this short campaign covered themselves with glory, particularly in the passages of the Inn and the Salza, and the combats of Schwanstadt, Vocklabruck, and Lambach.

The Archduke Charles took from the hands of his brother the command of a defeated and disheartened army, which in twenty days had lost twenty-five thousand men *hors-de-combat*, one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and four thousand carriages. Coming without reinforcements and without any immediate hopes, how could he be expected to immediately restore confidence and victory?

**ARMISTICE OF STEYER.**—He proposed an armistice. Moreau had orders to consent to it only on condition that Austria would agree to separate her cause from that of England, and to treat separately, and without delay. Forty-eight hours were required for an answer from Vienna; but Moreau refused to suspend his march, certain that the results of anterior movements would give him a number of prisoners and a quantity of baggage. Finally, the Cabinet of Vienna consented to everything, and General Grune signed, on the twenty-third of December, an armistice at Steyer, for the army of Germany only.

**INACTION OF BRUNE.**—The army of Italy had remained wholly inactive. Brune had no interest in hurrying on affairs, for he was waiting for Macdonald and Murat. On the other side, Bellegarde, ignorant of the destination of the two last generals, waited only for a cessation of the autumnal rains to render his

movements less difficult in the lagunes of the Oglio and the lower Po.

**PASSAGE OF THE SPLÜGEN.**—The army of the Grisons, obedient to my orders, rushed, full of ardor, across the snows and glaciers of the Splügen, at an epoch when even the traveler trembles to expose himself there with all the ordinary precautions to secure his safety. Drifted masses of movable snow, concealing frightful precipices, threatening avalanches, and a thousand dangers of all descriptions, were insufficient to arrest the brave men accustomed to despise death. The columns, after extraordinary efforts, debouched at last on the smiling shores of Lake Como. But this was not all; food was required, and the Valteline was incapable of furnishing it; it was necessary to seek supplies for the army in Lombardy. Macdonald crossed the secondary and abrupt chains of the Col d'Apriga, less elevated than the Splügen, but more difficult, perhaps, for an army.

He proposed to Brune to send him his left wing, in order to render more decisive his attack by the mountains. The latter feared that, by weakening his forces in the plain, he would expose himself to be defeated by Bellegarde; and if he were beaten and driven back behind the Adda, that the army of Macdonald would be lost in the gulfs of the Tyrol. In some respects both were right; it was well to act by the left, but not to act in a partial manner. If I had been there, I should have marched with my left and the *corps-de-bataille* to join Macdonald, and treat Bellegarde as I did Wurmser in 1796 at Bassano, leaving only a light corps on the Adige. Macdonald, piqued at Brune's refusal, went away to attack the Tonal, whose icy crests now bristled with the enemy's intrenchments, and was repulsed.

**OPERATIONS OF BRUNE.**—The passage of the Mincio took place on the twenty-fifth of December; it was to have been made near Monzambano; the right, under Dupont, was to make a secondary attack at Volta. A delay caused a counter-order to be given to the center and left; Dupont did not receive it till he had effected his passage, and thus the demonstration became the main attack. This wing had to sustain all the efforts of Bellegarde against Pozzolo. Suchet came to his assistance without consulting Brune, and our troops maintained themselves, by miracle, on the left bank. The next day Brune passed at Monzambano; the enemy yielded every where to the efforts of our army, whose victorious march was retarded but for a moment by the Adige. The left, under Moncey, ascended the river by Roveredo.



**JUNCTION OF THE ARMY OF THE GRISONS.**—Macdonald, on his side, after having left the half of his little troop under Baraguey-d'Hilliers at the sources of the Adige, passed the rocks of the Val d'Apriga, and descended on Breno, so as to communicate with the brigade of Lecchi, which Brune had sent to meet him. Repulsed, as has been said, at the attack of the Tonal, he had to fall back by Pisogno and the Col de San-Zeno on Storo, cutting a passage through the thick ice, as he had done through the deep snows of the Splügen. This short campaign was memorable, especially for the fatigue of all kinds which the troops supported, and the natural obstacles overcome by their resignation, courage, and devotion. History will transmit it to posterity as one of the monuments of our glory.

Macdonald, at last, effected his communication with Moncey on the fourth of January; on the seventh he debouched by the Col de Vesagno on Trent, where he was joined by Vandamme, who descended the valley of the Noss as soon as the enemy had evacuated the Tonal. The right of Bellegarde, caught at Calliano between Moncey and Macdonald, seemed lost. General Laudon saved it by deceiving Moncey with a false report of an armistice. The Austrians passed by the Brenta to rejoin Bellegarde. Moncey, who thought to enter Trent in consequence of the arrangement made with Laudon, was greatly surprised to find Macdonald already there. Piqued at having been the dupe of so old a stratagem, though almost always repeated with success, he followed Laudon and Wukassowich by the gorges of the Brenta. Macdonald followed, by Botzen, the trail of the Austrian division, which had covered the Grisons and the upper Adige, and which Baraguey-d'Hilliers was pushing on Meran. He was on the point of surrounding it, when the armistice of Treviso tied his hands, at the very moment when he was about to collect at least some trophies of his hard and toilsome campaign.

**ARMISTICE OF TREVISO.**—Brune, who had advanced without energy to Treviso, took it upon himself to conclude an armistice, leaving Mantua to the Austrians and granting a free exit to the garrisons of the Forts of Verona, Legnago, Peschiera, and Ancona, which they evacuated to him; this was a double folly; for Mantua was to become the decisive point of the coming negotiation with the Cabinet of Vienna, and the garrisons which he allowed to escape would soon have been compelled to surrender prisoners of war. I had foreseen this, and ordered Brune, three days before, not to treat without obtaining Mantua. This order reached him two days too late. This strange convention was so

much the more absurd on our part, as Murat was at this very moment descending into Lombardy, and arrived on the Po with a fine corps of the *élite* of twelve thousand men. I ordered Brune to immediately break this armistice, and push forward, at least till he obtained the cession of Mantua. Cobentzel, hearing at Lunéville of this difficulty, consented to the surrender of this place, thus giving force to the convention of Treviso.

**INFERNAL MACHINE.**—Although every thing had succeeded to my wishes, nevertheless the event of the third of Nivose (December twenty-fourth) taught me that I was still over a volcano. This conspiracy was unexpected: it is the only one of which the police did not get some previous intimation. It succeeded, because it had no confidants. It was simple, for it included only my carriage as it was passing in the Rue St. Nicaise, which was to be blown up by a mechanical contrivance, denominated *the infernal machine*. I escaped by miracle. The interest shown by all classes in my escape indemnified me for the risk I had run. The time was ill-chosen; for nothing was prepared in France for the restoration of the Bourbons. The guilty were sought out. I suspected only the Brutuses of the street-corners. In committing crimes, the perpetrators seek to make an honor of it. I was astonished when, upon inquiry, it was ascertained that it was to royalists that the inhabitants of the Rue St. Nicaise were indebted for being blown into the air.

**THE NEAPOLITANS BEATEN IN TUSCANY.**—During the discussions between Brune and the Austrians, the Neapolitans, who never did any thing at the proper time, thought to drive our detachments from Sienna and to invade Tuscany. Count Damas entered there at the head of eight thousand Neapolitans. Sommariva, starting from Ancona, was to raise an insurrection in the neighboring valleys and cross the Apennines to form a communication with him. Murat was then approaching Parma. Miorlis, taking council only from his audacity, marched with three thousand Franco-Cisalpine on the Neapolitans, and completely routed them at San Donato, on the fourteenth of January. The armistice of Treviso, paralyzing Sommariva, exposed Naples to our blows.

**MURAT'S EXPEDITION AGAINST NAPLES.**—Certain that peace would soon be concluded with Austria, or, at any rate, that the armistice would give us plenty of time to deal with Naples, I directed Brune to reinforce Murat with two divisions, and ordered the latter to march upon Rome at the head of twenty-



seven thousand men. I coveted the superb harbor of Tarentum, which had served the Carthaginians as a bulwark to resist the Roman power in the peninsula, and where, with some new works, the most numerous fleets could find a refuge. It had to me a double interest at the time when Egypt was still in our possession: it was an advantageous point of departure for carrying succor to our establishment there.

Murat advanced without obstacle as far as Foligno. In the mean time the Court of Naples began to appreciate the danger threatened by the consequences of the battle of Marengo. If Queen Caroline was carried away by her hatred to us, it nevertheless must be conceded that she had a superior mind. She repaired to Vienna, and thence to St. Petersburg to solicit the support of Russia, which had so powerfully contributed to her restoration to the throne. The intentions of Paul I. on Malta would naturally incline him to any project calculated to give him consideration at Naples; but the taking possession of this island in the name of England so exasperated him that he decided to make common cause with me. He sent M. Kalitschef to Paris, and Lewaschof into Italy. The feelings of this enthusiastic prince were carried so far that Louis XVIII. was obliged to leave Mittau and repair to Warsaw.

ARMISTICE OF FOLIGNO.—I had too much interest in pleasing Paul, and too little to gain in paralyzing the great forces at the extremity of the *presqu'île*, not to listen to the intercession of Lewaschof. Murat, in accordance with my orders, signed, at Foligno, an armistice with the Court of the Two Sicilies, which gave us satisfaction for all our complaints, and consented to our occupation of the roadstead of Tarentum until the general peace. Soult was detached with ten thousand men to take possession of it, and I directed him to immediately commence the construction of the necessary works for securing it from the English. Murat had gone to Rome, where he was well received by the Pope. He assured the Holy See of my pacific intentions toward him, and good harmony was soon established between us.

PEACE OF LUNÉVILLE.—The peace signed February 9th, at Lunéville, put an end to this second coalition; it differed very little from that of Campo-Formio. The principal amendment ceded Tuscany to the Infante of Parma, transporting the Grand Duke to Salzburg. This clause was important, as it called in the intervention of Spain in the affairs of Italy, as it was under Louis XIV. and Louis XV., and completely disinherited the House of Austria, which, possessing Verona and Venice, might have more

easily entered there to the aid of Tuscany. The other principal articles of the treaty were: first, the Emperor, stipulating both in the quality of Emperor of Austria, and in the name of the Germanic Empire, cedes Belgium and all the left of the Rhine; second, he consents that Lombardy shall form an independent state; third, in exchange, Austria retains the states of Venice to the Adige, the *thalweg* of which, from the Tyrol to the sea, forms the boundary; fourth, the Duke of Modena receives Brisgau in exchange for his state, which is annexed to the Cisalpine Republic; fifth, the Grand Duke of Tuscany renounces his states and his part of the Isle of Elba to the Infante Duke of Parma, and is to receive a full and entire indemnity in Germany; sixth, France surrenders Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein, on condition that these fortifications remain in their present condition; seventh, the princes dispossessed on the left of the Rhine are to receive indemnity in the German Empire; eighth, the Batavian, Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics, being recognized as independent by article eleventh, their people are to adopt such form of government as they may deem best. This article, though conformable to the principles of public and natural law, was an inevitable germ of discord, and we soon had occasion to prove this. What is just is not always wise and politic. All things considered, the day when this peace was signed appeared to me the most happy of my life, for it was one of the most fortunate for France; she was again great and respected; she could taste the sleep of the Lion, and wake in an imposing attitude on the bosom of prosperity.

CAMPAIGN OF 1801.—At the moment when I was terminating, with so much advantage, the war of the second coalition, important events were preparing in the north of Europe and in Africa. To properly understand these, it will be necessary to go back a little. The great maritime power of the English had degenerated into an unsupportable despotism. Neutrals had been no more spared than the enemy. The principles of international law had in all time prescribed that convoys of merchant vessels escorted by neutral vessels of state shall be free from visit; but that, in exchange, state vessels shall convoy neither prohibited goods nor foreign ships. These just rules were the last refuge of European commerce in time of war. But England most unblushingly violated the most consecrated of maritime rights; she seized convoys destined for France; those carrying French merchandise, and articles useful to the Republic. She even attacked and carried away Danish and Swedish frigates for attempting to defend



the property intrusted to their care, and for which their own honor and the honor of their government was pledged; to fail in this charge was to tarnish and disgrace their flag. With such international laws, the commerce of Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and Holland would be completely at the mercy of the Cabinet of St. James, and no nation could recognize such a state of things without renouncing its independence and the principal sources of its prosperity.

ENGLISH EXPEDITION AGAINST COPENHAGEN.—England replied to the just reclamations of the neutral governments, *that she ought to do every thing she could to secure her maritime power, and that she could do all that she wished.* These pretensions and the usurpation of Malta by England, who took possession of this island in her own name, instead of that of the Order of which Paul I. was grand master, offended Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden. All cried to arms against a monopoly both insulting and injurious. Preparations were making at Copenhagen, Stockholm, Cronstadt, and at Reval. A quadruple alliance was formed in the north for the preservation of their honor and maritime rights.

England knew well that after getting rid of Austria, I would direct all my efforts to the naval affairs. It was therefore important for her to attack the northern powers with vigor, before allowing time for any concert of action between us; it was necessary to attack the others while twenty-five Russian men-of-war were still frozen in their ports. The Cabinet of St. James, far from yielding to the storm, sent an ambassador to Copenhagen, supported by twenty men-of-war. The *ultimatum* having been rejected through the influence of Bernstorff, Nelson effected the passage of the Sound, an operation of no serious difficulty, inasmuch as the Swedish batteries refused to fire upon him, and presented himself before Copenhagen. The approach to this place was defended by ten old hulks of vessels, a number of gun-boats, and two formidable land batteries on the right and left of the line.

NAVAL BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN.—On the second of April, Nelson attacked this line with twelve ships and several frigates, passing along the side of the middle ground which divides the channel into two parts; one of his vessels ran aground. The combat was terrible; the right of Nelson could effect nothing against the Three Crown Battery, and his center was overwhelmed by a violent cannonade; eight or nine hundred guns were vomiting death upon his vessels. There was so little space that the vessels were certain, if dismantled, to run aground on the bank where

they would be still exposed to the fire of the Danish line. The position was so hazardous that the admiral-in-chief, Parker, gave the signal for retreat. Nelson replied by the signal for deadly combat. Nevertheless, the Danish hulks had greatly suffered, many of them were rendered completely unmanageable, and floated out between the two fires. Nelson, who had just run aground with his own and two other vessels, now resorted to a flag of truce, under pretext of saving the wounded of the Danish hulks, which, according to him, had surrendered, but of which he could not get possession.

**ENGLISH ARMISTICE WITH THE DANES.**—The Prince-royal, who had covered himself with glory in defending the land batteries, and preparing to resist the English, fell into the snare of Nelson and concluded an armistice. Although the conditions of this armistice were very honorable to the Danes, it was of immense importance to the English. It is certain that had not this armistice been made, Nelson would have been greatly embarrassed to effect his escape. It is said, as a reason for forming this armistice, that during the battle the Prince of Denmark had learned of the death of Paul I., an event calculated to dissolve the Confederation of the North. This is possible; for the Emperor fell on the night of the twenty-second of March, and the news might have reached Copenhagen by the second of April. Be that as it may, the success of the English at Copenhagen, and the pacific dispositions announced by the Emperor Alexander on his coming to the throne, destroyed all the hopes of the neutrals, and England, on the eve of a threatening crisis, came out victorious.

**ENGLISH DESCENT UPON EGYPT.**—Her arms were not less fortunate in Egypt. The result of the battle of Heliopolis had shown the Cabinet of St. James the necessity of taking a more decided part. The turn given to affairs in Italy rendered a large body of troops disposable. Abercrombie was appointed to lead them to the banks of the Nile. He landed at Aboukir, on the eighth of March, with sixteen thousand men, and was soon followed by six thousand others. He was to act in concert with the army of the Grand Vizier, who debouched from Syria by the desert, and the corps of Baird, coming from India by Suez. If Menou had been a man of ability, he would have beaten these corps separately, and driven the English into the sea, as I had previously done with the Turks. But he divided his own troops, and, contrary to the advice of his generals, engaged his corps in details. After losing the battle of Alexandria, where Abercrombie met a glorious death, the French general was forced to shut himself up



in that place, while Belliard, left with too many people at Cairo, was invested there by the combined forces of Hutchinson and the Turks. As a climax of ill-luck, Admiral Gantheaume, whom I had dispatched with a reinforcement of six thousand men, appeared three times on the coast of Egypt without having the courage or address to effect a landing; he returned as often to Toulon, so that Belliard and Menou had no other recourse than to sign successively treaties of evacuation.

**RESIGNATION OF PITT.**—In the mean time Pitt had felt that there was no legitimate object for war, and that it was time to make peace. Even before the fleet of Parker set sail from Yarmouth, he had decided to facilitate negotiations for peace; he now retired, and his successor hastened to renew with Otto, who still remained at London, the negotiations which had been interrupted at the end of 1800.

**SITUATION OF FRANCE.**—The Republic was prospering from day to day; on taking the helm of the government, finances had occupied my first care. They were in the most sad disorder; I applied myself incessantly to regulate them. Ten destructive systems had succeeded each other since the time of M. Colonne. The annual receipts at the end of the reign of Louis XVI. amounted, according to the famous report of Necker, to four hundred and eighty millions, but there was a debt with an interest of two hundred and sixty millions. There remained scarcely two hundred and twenty millions for the annual expenses of three hundred and eighty millions, besides the interest on the debt, so that there was an annual deficit. This deficit was to be made up by loans, which only made the matter worse. The Constituent Assembly, under the pretext of economy, thought to reduce the entire expenses to five hundred and thirty millions, but the reduction was merely on paper, and never in reality took place. A milliard of assignats, hypothecated on the national domains, had enabled the ministry to get along till the end of 1791. The expenses of the war forced them to successively augment these emissions; and the second Assembly, in order to court popularity, avoided forced contributions and had recourse to paper money. The Convention made so ridiculous an abuse of the assignats that the sum emitted was carried to fifty milliards, on account of their depreciation. There was a time when the sum of from twelve to fifteen thousand francs in paper money was given for a gold-piece of twenty-four francs.

The Directory had, at first, rejected this depreciated paper and proclaimed a first bankruptcy, ordering the exchange of the

assignats for drafts, at thirty for one; but no one had confidence in rags which did nothing but change their names, and it was necessary to come back, in all government transactions, to specie. This transition was a very difficult and delicate operation where the country was engaged in internal and external wars, and especially when a maritime war was ruining ports, colonies, and all commerce of exportation. For ten years the public debt had been left unpaid, or paid in valueless assignats. The Directory had felt itself unable to pay in money the two hundred and forty millions annually required to pay for the prodigalities of Louis XIV., the Regent, and Louis XV. I thought, after the eighteenth Fructidor, to reduce the debt two-thirds—that is, to about seventy millions funded, and ten millions floating. The remainder was reimbursed in admissible *bons*, in purchases of national property. This second bankruptcy had so shaken the public credit that the consolidated third was worth only twelve to the one hundred, and the other two-thirds, payable in *bons*, were utterly valueless.

Notwithstanding this recession of two-thirds of the debt, the budget was increased to between seven and eight hundred millions; that is, three hundred millions more than under the administration of Necker. The wants of the navy and army and the expenses of the Republican government caused this increase; in truth, the provinces of Belgium, of the left bank of the Rhine, Savoy, and the Comté of Nice furnished to the treasury an increase from the imposts, which might be estimated at sixty millions. The Directory had never been able to raise the receipts to one-half of the sum indicated in the budget; it provided for the wants of government by cutting and selling extraordinary quantities of wood from the national domain, by odious forced loans, by money brought from Italy, and by a ruinous floating debt.

To give order and facility to the public receipts, I caused them to be divided by twelfths from month to month. The receiver-generals were to sign monthly obligations for all taxes on freehold and personal property; so that the treasury, certain of its means, had, after the first of January of each year, at its disposal the capital necessary to secure all kinds of service. The order in the *comptabilité* and expense was placed on a par with that of the incomes; confidence was immediately restored. Indeed, I was obliged to establish a kind of "*chambre ardente*," to repair the squanderings which had been introduced into the supplies, the sale of the national domains, and of the wood. The pitiless Defermont was placed at the head of this liquidation, who, judge and prose-



cutor at the same time, cut away in somewhat a revolutionary style, but who saved the state from the disagreeable necessity of being the dupe of avaricious collectors and of ignoble usurers.

By these wise measures our budget of expenses, which, from time to time, varied from six hundred and eighty to eight hundred millions, was constantly supplied; the treasury was never embarrassed for a single moment, if we except two or three days of crisis occasioned by the fault of the minister; the *rentiers*, contractors for supplies, the civil functionaries, the army, the navy, were all regularly paid. Public credit rose to an equality to the interest of money; a sinking fund was created to increase the guarantees; and France, whose dissolution, for want of money, the political economists in English pay were daily prophesying, was never in a more prosperous situation than at this epoch.\*

Every thing in the interior was progressing equally with the public finances, the war, and the national policy: the important codes were in course of preparation; the list of *émigrés* was reduced to a thousand individuals, noted as movers of insurrection or chiefs of parties, more than one hundred thousand being recalled, and their property, which remained unsold, with few exceptions, restored. Public education, fallen into disorder, was reorganized by a decree of May 1st, 1802, and Fourcroy and Fontanes successively placed at its head. Factions seemed quiet, so much *éclat* had silenced them. La Vendée was gradually becoming tranquil: the departure of Puisaye for America, and the death of Frotté,† who was taken and shot at the moment when he was stirring up a new insurrection in Brittany, left the party without a leader. Georges, the most audacious of all, had been forced to take refuge in England, and the others, wearied with being made instruments and victims, thought only of repose. Even the Jacobins were obliged to applaud my victory, for it was as profitable to them as to me. I had no rivals.

**NECESSITY OF A NEW RELIGIOUS SYSTEM.**—To complete the entire pacification of France, it was necessary to build up again the altars, overthrown in times of the most violent anarchy. The clergy had been schismatic since the famous civil constitution of 1791, the churches were deserted and fallen into ruins. I deemed it incumbent upon me to reestablish the Catholic religion for the same reasons that had induced Henry IV. to adopt

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\*For the details of these financial operations the reader is referred to Thiers' "History of the Consulate," Book I.

†Allson's account of Frotté's arrest and execution is utterly false. For the true facts in this case, see Thiers' "Consulate."

it two centuries before. But if it was important to restore the ministers of the Church, it was no less necessary to bridle their ambition. It was necessary to shut out that army of men of no country, marching under the banner of a foreign chief, who, for ten centuries, in order to raise the tiara above crowns, had substituted ignorance, superstition, fanaticism, and intolerance, for the admirable precepts of the evangelist. In a word, it was necessary to reëstablish the religion of the Fénétons, and not that of the Loyolas or the Mouchys.

**MEANS OF ACCOMPLISHING THIS CHANGE.**—There offered three different means of attaining this object: the first, to again subject the Gallican Church to the discipline of the Court of Rome, and so limiting its power as to prevent any interference in affairs of state; the second, to shake off entirely this troublesome patronage, and to profit by the indifference inspired by the Revolution toward all religious matters, in order to decorate a French prelate with the patriarchship, attributing to him the canonical investiture, and in other respects leaving the Catholic religion with all its existing forms; finally, the third was to declare the Catholic and Protestant Churches equally under the care of the state, and to favor the extension of the latter, which had already spread over a part of France, without the introduction of the Church hierarchy.

**CHANCES IN FAVOR OF THE REFORMATION.**—The latter method would have been, perhaps, more suited to the future interests of France and those of the party which had triumphed in the Revolution. Some writers have thought that this would again have lighted up the insurrection in the west, and have dissatisfied that part of the Republic which it was then very important to calm. Undoubtedly their fears were well founded, if the reform had been attempted by force, for, notwithstanding my power, I might well have failed where Henry VIII. and Gustavus Vasa succeeded: great reformatations in religion are the results of circumstances; to attempt to force them makes more martyrs than proselytes of the people. Mild measures alone can impose laws upon men's consciences. In the existing state of Catholicism in France, it is probable that no invincible obstacle would have been offered to the introduction of a system placing the primitive religion of Henry IV. on a level with that of Charles IX.

Had I been able to foresee the events of 1814 and 1815, I should not have hesitated to pronounce in favor of the Reformed Church. It would have been one of the strongest barriers to the restoration of the Bourbons, especially if it had been adopted by the intelli-



gent part of the nation. The Stuarts have proved the difficulty of reconciling a fallen dynasty and a nation professing a different religion. Those who have wished to form a comparison between the restoration of Charles II. and that of Louis XVIII. have not appreciated this difference of situation. But, influenced by my vast projects, I sacrificed internal advantages to external policy. On the one side, all the facilities for propagating the Reformed religion were then conjectural: it was possible that the introduction of a new religious system would, in spite of appearances, excite the strongest passions. My power was still new, and it was important to consolidate it; I had greater motives than Louis XIV. for saying, *L'état, c'est moi*; everything calculated to produce division or resistance appeared dangerous to my interests, whatever may have been its ultimate influence for the public welfare.

THE CONCORDAT.—It was on this account that the substitution of a French patriarchship for the Holy See appeared to me even less sure of success than the Reformed Church; for if the civil constitution imposed on the clergy in 1791 had caused so much opposition in France, could it be hoped that the priests of the south and west would consent to renounce their obligations to the Pope, and to recognize a prelate whom he could not fail to excommunicate? Would not this measure expose the peace of the provinces to be disturbed by a papal bull forbidding obedience? Moreover, the influence of France in Italy, Spain, and Ireland might be weakened by any change in our religious belief. To oppose England, it was absolutely necessary to have the concurrence of Spain, which was ruled more by the priests than by the sovereign: what hope could we have of perpetuating the alliance between a state governed by monkish fanaticism and a republic struck by the thunders of the Vatican? It was therefore preferable to leave the Church with the schism already existing, than to engage in a change so delicate and so dangerous. But as such a course was not calculated to produce the immediate result which I desired, and as I had already experienced in Italy the influence which the Catholic religion is susceptible of giving to a government, I preferred to treat with the Court of Rome for the reestablishment of religious matters on pretty nearly the same footing as they had existed previous to the Revolution. I nevertheless obtained for the Gallican Church more freedom than it had ever before enjoyed; the number of episcopal sees was considerably reduced, the government retained the power of opposing itself to the excesses of religious fanaticism, and the dangers of "ultramontane" maxims.

**OBJECTIONS MADE TO THIS CONCORDAT.**—This transaction, as honorable to the moderation of Cardinal Gonsalvi as to myself, nevertheless encountered considerable reproach, both from the partisans of the Republic and some celebrated publicists. "Bonaparte," they say, "applied himself, in vain, to destroy the remains of the Revolution, and to close all access to counter-revolutionists, since, by his concordat, he himself opened to the latter a safe entrance, and excavated the mine which overthrew his edifice." This is mere exaggeration: it was the armies of all Europe combined that overthrew my work; the spiritual arms of Rome had but a small part in it. Nevertheless, I afterward saw my error in not entirely throwing off the ultramontane yoke. I was wrong in thinking to avoid the dangers of religious fanaticism by contracting its limits. By remembering how different was the religion of Gregory VII. and Boniface VIII. from that of the first bishops of St. Peter, we can judge what fanaticism is capable of doing in a short time, where it has a point of support from which to move the world. I thought that I had secured France and Europe from its pretensions, but experience proves that I was mistaken.

**FAULT OF MY SUCCESSORS.**—The concordat, with its *articles réglementaires*, filled all the conditions of an excellent religious pact; it secured to society the means of keeping the people under laws of a pure and severe morality; it guaranteed the nation and government against the ambition of a cosmopolite clergy. Religious morality is of inappreciable value to humanity. Its dogmas may even become a powerful political lever in the hands of a statesman, when the influence of its ministers is confined within proper limits; but it often serves as a cloak to factious societies, and to destroy the authority of the most powerful sovereigns, if they neglect to restrain the influence of priests within the just limits which it should never pass. It is not easy to check the authority of a power which founds its pretensions on the mysteries of the Divinity, and thus places them beyond the reach of civil laws.

Spain and Turkey are sad examples of the evils which theocracy may bring upon a nation when the chiefs of the Church are in opposition to the depositaries of the temporal authority. Russia, England, Holland, Prussia, and all Protestant countries, prove the advantages resulting from subjecting the clergy to the civil laws, and to the political authorities of the state, without permitting any foreign interference. That ten centuries of barbarism and error should keep the sovereigns of the seventeenth century under



the weight of Romish influence, and under the sword of the soldiery of Loyola, we can readily believe; they could not throw off this yoke without exposing themselves to a religious revolution, always disastrous when foreign influence is made to interfere, as Spain experienced in the troubles of the League. But that the ministers of my successors should, instead of preserving the salutary restraints secured by the concordat, seek to overthrow the edifice erected for the security of the government and for France, was an incomprehensible absurdity; it was treason to the throne and to the nation, for which posterity and inflexible history will hold them accountable. How could those holding the reins of authority so neglect the simplest axioms of government as to favor the establishment of the ultramontane theocracy? The first of these axioms is, that, as religion is the means of morality to the people, so should it be an element of force to the government: as soon as its ministers pass these limits they become men of ambition and factionists, more to be feared than any other class, since they have a fanatical multitude at their disposal, and place themselves beyond the reach of human power. That princes of the Church, like Ximenes, Mazarin, and Richelieu, should desire a sacerdotal rule, is very natural: but such a thing is very extraordinary in a lay chief of the nineteenth century.

What has occurred since my exile has proved that, in a philosophical view of the subject, I did not pursue the wisest course. But in examining my system in a political view of our relations with Italy and Spain, it will find favor in the eyes of the statesman.

NEGOTIATIONS AT LONDON.—The negotiations with England, resumed after the resignation of Pitt and the peace of Lunéville, did not progress as we desired. Egypt and Malta were a stumbling-block to the two cabinets. The English had debarked twenty thousand men at the mouths of the Nile with success; they were waiting the issue of this operation to treat more advantageously. On my side, I wished to give myself an equivalent situation by threatening Portugal and even England with an invasion. My brother Lucien, then charged with the embassy of Madrid, received orders to concert these measures with the Spanish government.

A little army assembled at Bayonne under my brother-in-law, Leclerc, crossed the Castiles, and presented himself toward Almeida, at the same time that the Prince of Peace, at the head of thirty thousand Spaniards, descended the valley of the Tagus and threatened Lisbon. The Prince Regent hastened to purchase peace at the price of thirty millions and the cession of Olivenza to

Spain. This result did not accomplish my object; I refused to ratify the treaty, requiring the entire occupation of the kingdom. At the same time I had assembled a flotilla at Boulogne to menace Ireland or the coast of England. Nelson attacked this flotilla with his incendiary machines, but was repulsed with loss.

These reciprocal demonstrations had little influence on the negotiations, for they dragged along till the middle of July without any definitive results. The English did not press them, because they learned from day to day the successes of Abercrombie in Egypt; but, on the other side, the *presqu'île* of Tarentum was occupied, Naples reduced, Portugal threatened with invasion; finally, the continental peace was daily consolidating itself, and it was necessary that this uncertainty should end. Otto, on the fourteenth of July, notified the English cabinet that I refused to ratify the treaty of Badajos between Spain and Portugal, and that I insisted on the occupation of the latter kingdom, as a means of compensation for the Spanish colonies which they (the English) retained. This declaration led to others on both sides, so that the negotiations again began to make some progress. In a note of the twenty-seventh of July, Otto explained in these terms:

"The French government desires to neglect nothing calculated to lead to a general peace, which is at the same time for the interest of humanity and the interest of the Allies. It is for the King of England to decide whether it is equally so for the interest of his policy, his commerce, and his people; and, if such be the case, whether a single island more or less distant can be a sufficient reason for prolonging the calamities of the world.

"The undersigned has shown, in his last note, how much the First Consul has been grieved by the retrograde movements of the negotiations; but, Lord Hawkesbury contesting this fact in his note of July twentieth, the state of the question is recapitulated with the frankness and precision which affairs of this importance require.

"The question is divided into three parts: the Mediterranean, the Indies, and America. Egypt will be restored to the Porte; the Republic of the Seven Isles is recognized; all ports in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean occupied by French troops will be restored to the King of Naples or to the Pope; Mahon to Spain; Malta to its Order; and if England deems the destruction of the fortifications of this place as essential to her interests, this also will be agreed to. In India, England will retain Ceylon, and thus become complete mistress of these immense and wealthy territories; the other establishments will be restored to the Allies, the Cape of Good



Hope included. In America every thing will be restored to its former owners. The King of England is already so powerful in this part of the world that to require more would be to pretend to the same preponderance in that part of the world which he now holds in India. Portugal will undoubtedly preserve her integrity.

"The foregoing are the conditions which the French government is ready to sign. The advantages to be drawn from them by the British government are immense; to pretend to greater is to reject a peace, just and honorable to both parties. Martinique not having been conquered by British arms, but having been placed by its inhabitants into the hands of the English, till such time as France should establish a government, can not be regarded as an English possession: never will France renounce it."

"It now only remains for the British cabinet to signify the course which it wishes to pursue; and if these conditions are not satisfactory, it will at least prove to the world that the First Consul has neglected nothing, and has shown a disposition to make any sacrifice to restore peace and spare humanity the tears and blood which must inevitably result from a new campaign."

The negotiation was prolonged till the beginning of September. England no longer limited her pretensions to Trinidad; she laid claim to Tobago and the Dutch possessions on the American continent; she placed obstacles in the way of the restoration of Malta. Mistress of Asia, she no longer disguised her wishes to control America and the Levant. On the eleventh of September I caused a strong and peremptory declaration to be made, insisting upon the occupation of Portugal by my troops, if she did not close the matter.

**PRELIMINARIES SIGNED.**—This firmness had a happy effect. The English government renounced not only the possession of Demarara and Berbice, but also their freedom, which it had at first substituted for the claim to retain them. Finally, the preliminaries of this peace, so ardently desired, were signed at London on the first of October, between Otto and Lord Hawkesbury. Article first directed the prompt cessation of hostilities, both on land and sea, and the restitution of all conquests made by either party after the treaty. The eight following principal articles stipulated the restitution to the French Republic and its allies, Spain and Holland, of all possessions and colonies occupied or conquered during the war, with the exception of the island of Trinidad and the Dutch possessions in the island of Ceylon, of which his Britannic Majesty retained the full and entire sovereignty: the opening of the Cape of Good Hope to the commerce and navi-

gation of the two contracting powers, which were there to enjoy equal advantages: the restitution of Malta and its dependencies by the English to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; the restitution of Egypt to the Porte, the contracting powers also guaranteeing its other possessions: the guarantee of the possessions of Portugal: the evacuation of the Kingdom of Naples and the Roman States by the French, and of Porto-Ferrajo by the English, as well as all ports and islands which they occupied in the Mediterranean or the Adriatic: the recognition of the Republic of the Seven Isles by the French Republic, etc., etc.

The news of this event spread universal joy throughout Europe: commerce, so long stagnated, received a new impulse. The neutral powers took no part against the happy pacification, although it deprived them of all chances of contraband commerce; they anticipated a better future and more friendly relations, which would indemnify them, in some degree, for the burdens imposed by the new maritime rules of the English. Even at London, the most extravagant joy was exhibited; the people seemed as though they had passed from the depths of despair to the very pinnacle of fortune. My *aid-de-camp*, the bearer of the ratification, had his horses taken from the carriage by this people, who drew him in triumph through the streets.

PEACE WITH RUSSIA AND THE PORTE.—I was this year very actively engaged in regulating our foreign policy. A treaty was formed with the Emperor Alexander on the eighth and eleventh of October; our differences with the Porte were also terminated by a treaty; I ratified the convention of Monfontaine with the United States; finally, I regulated the affairs of the Cisalpine Republic, of Batavia, and Switzerland.

ACQUISITION OF LOUISIANA.—I obtained from Spain the retrocession of Louisiana, which we had lost, in 1793, by the disgraceful peace of Paris. The position of this country, so favorable to agriculture, gave it great value in my estimation. Placed between Mexico and the United States, it might one day render me the arbiter of North America; possessing the mouths of the Mississippi, we could control the commerce of the entire country watered by the tributaries of this immense river. If we lost St. Domingo, we could find on the Mississippi the soil and climate necessary for the culture of our colonial commodities. Two years afterward I gave up all these hopes, by selling this precious colony to the United States: the fear that the English might get possession of it and form an establishment which might one day secure them an influence over Mexico and the United States, was the



principal cause which induced me to this alienation of French territory.

**THE INFANTE OF PARMA, KING OF ETRURIA.**—While they were negotiating the peace of London, I directed all my efforts to place the little neighboring states on a suitable basis. I caused Tuscany to be ceded to the Infante Duke of Parma, who was to be recognized as King of Etruria. This prince, of the Spanish branch, would bring a Spanish contingent against the Austrian branch in Italy, so often as I might deem necessary, as had been done under Philip V. and Louis XV. At the same time I drew closer the bonds of connection with the royal family of Madrid. I had need of this power for my maritime designs, and for the expulsion of England from America. Moreover, I gained by this the acquisition of the Duchy of Parma, as an exchange. As a seal to these relations Lucien proposed to me to divorce Josephine and marry Isabella, Infanta of Spain. This alliance would immediately have produced great advantages; it, nevertheless, had its objections. I thought that Lucien was actuated, in this matter, by his hatred to Josephine, and I directed him to not again introduce the subject.

**EXPEDITION TO ST. DOMINGO AND GUADELOUPE.**—I profited by the freedom of the seas, restored by the treaty of London, to attend to our colonial affairs. On my elevation to the Consulate, I found our colonies a prey to civil war, the whites, blacks, mulattoes, attempting their own mutual destruction. The whites were nearly extinct, and the mulattoes, though full of energy and courage, numbered only forty thousand to five hundred thousand blacks, of whom twenty-five thousand men were already organized in regiments. I determined to side with the latter, and loaded them with benefits. To Toussaint, their chief, who had shown talent and zeal in fighting the English, I sacrificed Rigaud and the mulattoes, confiding to Toussaint all the interests of the colony, thinking that he would be satisfied with this. But is there any limit to ambition? Urged on by English intriguers, he published a colonial constitution, and proclaimed himself President for life, as I had made myself Consul. This changed the course of my policy. I now determined to side with the mulattoes, who, from their superiority of mind and education, were the most influential men of the island. I armed thirty ships and sixteen frigates, which carried successively about twenty-five thousand men to St. Domingo. I gave the command to my brother-in-law, General Leclerc, instructing him to *restore the influence of the mulattoes, to capture a hundred of the black chiefs, the chiefs of battalion included,*

*and to fill the vacancies with the mulattoes and whites.* Leclerc landed, but, influenced by the old colonists, he did everything to exasperate the mulattoes instead of conciliating them. Nevertheless, by their assistance he succeeded in reducing the eastern part of the island and Port-au-Prince. Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe resisted, burnt the towns along the coast, and took refuge among the hills. Defeated in several combats, they at last offered to surrender. On the part of Toussaint this was a mere feint to await the rains and fevers of autumn. They soon discovered his ruse, and seized him and sent him to France, where he died in prison. But Leclerc, instead of obeying my instructions, maltreated Rigaud, who had returned to the island by my orders, arrested him and forced him to fly again to France; other mulattoes were ill-treated and some were even drowned. This incited new insurrections, and the chiefs of the two castes stifled their mutual resentment in order to exterminate the whites. In the mean time the yellow fever broke out among our troops, and in three weeks carried away two-thirds of our fine army. Twenty thousand men were dead or dying in the hospitals. The new regiments lost half their number within twenty-four hours after landing. The crews of the vessels were also cut off, leaving the remnant of these brave men no means of escape. My brother-in-law had at least the consolation of not surviving this disaster: he himself died of this cruel epidemic.

At Guadeloupe, Admiral Le Crosse had been no more prudent toward Pélage than Leclerc toward Rigaud, and the colony rose in insurrection against him. Richepanse was sent there, and, more fortunate than Leclerc, his efforts were attended with success.

**PROVISIONAL REUNION OF PIEDMONT.**—The prosperity of my European affairs indemnified me for this disaster at St. Domingo; Piedmont, at first organized as the twenty-seventh military division, to be afterward formally united to France, secured my empire beyond the Alps. Holland, Italy, and Switzerland equally recognized the laws which I dictated.

**SWITZERLAND AND THE CISALPINE REPUBLIC.**—My negotiators at Lunéville, guided by principles of justice, had stipulated that the neighboring republics, which had grown up under French influence, should be free to form their own laws. Nothing could be more just than this provision; nevertheless, these states being constituted and recognized by the treaty, these expressions might apply only to their future independence. without that the state then existing and solemnly recognized should be



troubled by counter-revolutions. It was important that Holland, the Cisalpine Republic, and Helvetia should have charters posterior to the treaty; and that they should not accuse France of having constrained them in their choice. A new government was formed at La Haye, and I assembled a new Italian consulate at Lyons for the month of December, 1801.

ITALIAN REPUBLIC.—The Batavian Republic centralized its power in the person of its magistrates the most devoted to France, which could not fail to extend my influence over it. The Cisalpines erected an Italian Republic, the presidency of which they conferred on me for life. Of course I was not a stranger to these different measures. Italy required a chief, and no one had a better right than myself to the title. France had agreed to form the Cisalpine Republic into a separate state; but I had not deprived myself of the liberty of accepting the magistracy of it. I know that this may seem somewhat a play upon words; but certainly one has a right to interpret treaties as much as possible to his own advantage. Austria did not think best to oppose this measure, and no other European power had any particular interest in it, for the institution was merely a temporary one.

OPERATIONS OF THE ENGLISH.—If the preliminaries of London had excited enthusiastic joy among a portion of the English people, they, nevertheless, met with a strong opposition. The official communication having been made, on the thirtieth of October, to Parliament, the champions of the exclusive party, especially Grenville and Windham, severely criticized the conditions of this treaty, pretending that they were far more advantageous to France than to England. The latter declared *that the ministers having signed the death-warrant of their country, he knew not whether he was invited to a festival or a funeral.* According to him, they had given to France the means of disputing the empire of the seas, since they had restored her commerce, and given her an opportunity to reestablish her navy. He also contended that the peace was neither sure nor necessary. The opposition (Sheridan, for example) approved the peace, but opposed its stipulations, because he said it would bring about the national degradation; sad prognostics for the durability of a treaty in a country where the general interest, inseparable from the national honor, is the first of virtues and the soundest of duties. This was the first time, since the beginning of the war, that the partisans of Fox and Sheridan were seen to vote with the constant supporters of the ministry. Pitt added to the public astonishment by proclaiming himself a defender of a treaty which he made it his glory not to have

signed. These debates in the two houses of Parliament show how different the same thing may appear when viewed through the medium of passion. The partisans of the ministry applied themselves to demonstrate the advantage of the acquisition of Ceylon and Trinidad; the one placed as a sentinel to the vast possessions of India, and the other fortunately situated for observing South America, for a point of departure against the rich Spanish provinces of Caracas and Venezuela, or against the French and Dutch possessions in Guiana. The sanction of the conquest from Tip-poo, and the surrender of Egypt, did not escape the notice of these apologists. Lord Spencer attacked the treaty with arguments more specious than real, but calculated to pique the national pride.

"We have gathered," said he, "but little fruit from the immense sacrifices we have made; we have restored to France and her allies establishments which have cost us the greatest efforts, and whose preservation was due to the brave men who conquered them, due to the security of the British empire, and essential to guarantee us against the aggrandizement of France on the continent.

"The protection which was pretended to be due to the Allies was a derisory excuse, since they have allowed Olivenza to be taken from Portugal, and have made no mention of the House of Orange, which had sacrificed itself for the cause of England, but whose devotion has been rewarded by ingratitude and neglect.

"The cession of the Cape and Cochin will open to the rivals of England the road to India; France gains a formidable position at the mouth of the Amazon, and recovers the Antilles, while England has excluded herself from the Mediterranean, by giving up Malta."

To these exaggerated reproaches, Lord Spencer added his regret at seeing consolidated, by this peace, the principles of the French Revolution, at the very moment that I was about to destroy them! This was not the only error that he committed: the threatening possessions which he saw at the mouth of the Amazon was only a desert extending from Guiana to Cape North and to the river of Arowary, of which the preliminaries made no mention; they only knew that Portugal had yielded them to France by the treaty of Madrid. As to Cochin and the Cape of Good Hope, declared a free port, they were not possessions capable of causing any serious uneasiness respecting the commerce of India.

LORD CORNWALLIS, ENVOY TO AMIENS.—Notwithstanding the many clamors, the new ministers persisted in following out the system which had been decided at the negotiation:



Lord Cornwallis was sent to the Congress of Amiens, where he was to put the seal to the definitive peace, in concert with my brother Joseph, the Chevalier d'Azzora and Schimmelpenninck, the latter for Holland and the other for Spain. The English negotiator was received at Paris with the most distinguished honor. Although his countrymen showed themselves sensible of these attentions, and notwithstanding that the preliminaries had laid the basis with so much precision that it seemed impossible there could be any material difficulty in the negotiations, nevertheless, at the opening of the conference at Amiens the old jealousy and inveterate distrusts seemed to preside over the most important matters of the two cabinets.

**DIFFICULTIES ABOUT MALTA.**—Malta at first presented new difficulties: the minute precautions taken by the powers respecting its disposition prove more conclusively than any thing else the importance attached to this place. The Order of St. John of Jerusalem, to which it was now to be restored, was then scattered and in a state of schism, and, in the eyes of England, was an insufficient and suspected guardian. Lord Cornwallis observed at first that if the English language was incompatible with the rules of the Order, it was necessary, through reciprocity, that the French language should be forbidden! This matter was at last arranged; but new difficulties arose. I then proposed that the fortifications be destroyed, and that Malta be made a lazaretto for all nations, the knights being restored to their primitive functions of simple hospitallers. England opposed this, because she hoped one day to get possession of this formidable fortress. My minister then offered to place this island under the King of Naples, as Lord-paramount, but with the guarantee of Russia, Austria, Prussia, Spain, England, and France. If the troops of the Order were insufficient, each of the six great powers should furnish a contingent. Malta would be respected in time of war, and might serve as a lazaretto to all parties.

England accepted these propositions with certain modifications; she wished the garrison, in default of Maltese troops, to be composed of Neapolitans. The palace of the King of Naples being under the guns of the British fleets, it would be easy for England, in the event of war, to force the government of the Two Sicilies to espouse the interests of the Cabinet of St. James, and thus obtain, if not the retrocession, at least free egress for her squadrons. As these pretensions could not be admitted, and as I desired that the Order should remain independent, I proposed that a Swiss garrison should be put in Malta, large enough to enable

the place to defend itself. This continuation of the discussion, though no obstacle to the peace was made on our side, was not disagreeable to me, as it gave me time to finish the organization of the Italian Republic, whose *consulate*, then assembled at Lyons, offered me the presidency. It was of no great importance that the treaty should formally recognize me as President of the Republic, but if the matter should be consummated previous to the signature of the treaty, there could be no grounds, in case of a future rupture, to charge me with obtaining this thing by force.

DEFINITIVE PEACE SIGNED.—I at last thought best to yield to the obstinacy of the Cabinet of St. James; and it was agreed that the King of Naples should furnish to Malta a garrison of two thousand men for a year, dating from the restitution of the forts, and that if the Order did not raise, by the end of the year, a sufficient force for defending the island and its dependencies, the Neapolitan troops should remain until their place should be supplied by others agreed upon by the guaranteeing powers. After some other discussions on the territory claimed by France around Pondicherry, and the fisheries of Newfoundland, the plenipotentiaries having passed over the question of the recognition of the new states of Italy by the English government, peace was formally signed on the twenty-seventh of March.

Doubts have been raised as to the good faith of the two contracting parties; certainly the treaty was very defective, and not well calculated to prevent difficulties. My own personal position was such as to cause me to attach great value to this peace, which in the public estimation added vastly to my glory; by giving a new impulse to the internal prosperity of France, it brought me very much nearer to the throne: my sincerity, therefore, could not well be doubted, especially as all the principal omissions were in my favor, and it was greatly to my advantage to leave them just where the treaty placed them. But the case was different with the English government: in avoiding all discussion on Tuscany and Piedmont, whose dethroned princes were still her allies, it must be supposed that England kept these as pretexts for a rupture. To consider the matter merely in the relation of political formalities, the kingdom of Etruria might exist without being recognized by the Court of London, and certainly the maritime peace would not have been disturbed for a century: but how could the port of Leghorn be opened to English commerce, if the ministry refused to recognize the prince who reigned there? The question of Piedmont was still more serious: after the treaty of Lunéville, this country had been divided into six departments; this, indeed, was



not a formal reunion, but the administration of this vast territory by General Jourdan, in the name of France, under the denomination of the twenty-seventh territorial division, was a sufficiently plain indication of its ultimate fate. England could not have kept silent, except designedly, on this important circumstance; for even supposing that the French government might for a long time postpone the formal reunion, still it was not less true that France administered the government of this country on her own account, and disposed of its revenues, troops, and fortifications.

Upon Switzerland there was a silence not less extraordinary; and, although the British trading companies and fleets had nothing to gain from the inhabitants of the rocks of St. Gothard, nevertheless, the disposition of a state connected with France by so many relations, political, commercial, and military, was a matter of much importance to the ministry of George III.

It will be seen hereafter how important these omissions were, and that the fault of them is to be attributed to the party most interested in regulating these different objects. However, the treaty differed but little from the preliminaries. The only important difference was in relation to the House of Orange, for whom the remarks of Lord Spencer were not lost, and in whose favor an indemnity was stipulated; and, on the other side, the cessions made by Portugal in Guiana, at the moment of making the treaty, were sanctioned, and the disposition of Malta settled.

ITS RECEPTION IN LONDON AND FRANCE.—These modifications in the conditions of the treaty were not calculated to procure for it any better reception than the preliminaries. The English commercial community, seeing the departure of the French armaments for the Antilles, and the speedy submission of St. Domingo, showed less satisfaction with this peace than had at first appeared. The aristocracy were displeased to see that a democratic and republican branch could bring forth good fruits. Every possible means had been taken to decry the preliminaries, and it was not surprising that the definitive treaty should be received by the multitude with a coldness, strikingly contrasting with the enthusiastic reception of the first. The same objections brought against the preliminaries were repeated on the reading of the treaty of Amiens; Lord Grenville attacked it with his strong and concise logic. He contended that the ministry, in restoring to France her colonies, had done nothing to diminish her preponderance on the continent. Since the preliminaries, the *consulate* of Lyons had consolidated my influence over Italy. The report of the cession of Louisiana to France, kept secret for two years, be-

gan to spread the alarm in America, as well as in England; finally, the death of the Duke of Parma caused the duchy to fall into my hands: the island of Elba already belonged to us. Party animosity was carried so far that Windham even reproached the ministry with having taken insufficient means to secure the independence of Malta, by placing it under the safeguard of a power whose ports were occupied and whose capital was besieged by the French.

The minister Hawkesbury replied that the influence acquired by France over one of the secondary states of the continent interested England only indirectly, and that, a few cases excepted, such a matter could not be regarded as a sufficient reason for engaging in an interminable war. He observed further, that the state of the continent, as sanctioned by the peace of Lunéville, authorized a rupture so much the less as Russia and Prussia had recognized the changes made in Italy. The latter part of this argument was specious, for no public transaction had sanctioned the abandonment of Piedmont, nor of Switzerland, and the reunion of the island of Elba with France.

But these clamors of a double opposition did not prevent the ministry from ratifying the treaty, nor the chambers from voting, by a very large majority, the customary thanks to the King. Amicable relations were soon established between the two governments. Lord Cornwallis was appointed ambassador to Paris, and I selected General Andreossi, a distinguished officer of artillery, for the Court of London.

The treaty had been better received in France, where all were scandalized at the declamations of the English oligarchy against what was called the triumph of revolutionary principles, while in fact these were daily disappearing from France.

**COUP-D'ETAT AGAINST THE TRIBUNESHIP.**—In fact, I had just dissipated the last cloud which had appeared on our political horizon, and turned it to the advantage of my authority. Wherever there is no center of undisputed power, there are found men who wish to claim it themselves. Such was the case with respect to the power which I now held. My authority was only a temporary magistracy; it was therefore unsubstantial. Certain men, who had the vanity to think themselves capable of ruling the state, commenced their political campaign against me. They chose the *tribune* for their place of arms. They there began to attack me under the name of the executive power. These modern Gracchi contended that all authority—that is, all executive power—was hostile to liberty. Starting from this false base, they regarded as praiseworthy any act calculated to oppose and em-



barrass the executive government. If I had yielded to these declamations, they would have been fatal to the state. It had too many enemies on all sides to divide its forces or to lose time in mere contests of words. Recent occurrences were not sufficient to silence these demagogues, who preferred the interests of their own personal vanity to those of their country. To enhance their own popularity, they occupied themselves in contesting the taxes, decrying the government, and contriving obstacles to impede its march. The consular government would have terminated like the Directory, had I not destroyed this opposition by a *coup-d'état*. I dismissed the recalcitrant tribunes.\* This was called *eliminating*; the word was happily chosen. Among the *éliminés* was Benjamin Constant, the favorite of Madame de Staël, a woman extraordinary and celebrated, but for whom intrigue was a necessary element; she wished to be first everywhere, and to lead in political affairs, as her peculiar sphere.

CONSULATE FOR LIFE.—This measure was called for, both by the situation of France and by the projects I was meditating for giving solidity to the government of which I was the head. I saw more clearly from day to day that the constitution of the year VIII. was only a transitory one, and could not last. Counterpoised authorities will only answer for times of peace; the dictatorship alone suits times of great difficulties. It was therefore necessary to strengthen the authority which had been confided to me, every time there was danger, in order to prevent relapses. *In truth a dictatorship for life would still have been only provisional; something definitive was required by the people to give them a strong attitude toward foreigners and tranquillity at home.* But in the existing state of public opinion, I could consult only the wants of the moment. It was enough for the occasion that I had the authority necessary for effecting internal quiet and prosperity, and a preponderance abroad; the name magistracy was nothing. The consulate for life, which was conferred on me the second of August, became the foundation of the edifice which I was to construct. This dignity

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\*According to the constitution of December 15, 1799, the *tribunat* consisted of one hundred *tribunes*, chosen by the conservative senate from the three lists of candidates proposed by the departmental colleges. The powers of the *tribunat* were very limited; it could neither initiate a law nor give it force; the first was done by the consuls, and the second by the legislative body; the functions of the *tribunat* were merely deliberative.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

Thiers says that many of the most intelligent and well-disposed tribunes were strongly opposed to the course pursued by the majority toward the consular government. Many of the demagogues who were eliminated merited their punishment.

had already been prolonged for ten years by a *senatus-consultum* of May sixth, which would have carried it to 1820; but I preferred making it for life, and to wait for more permanent institutions. My task was to put the finishing stroke to the Revolution, by giving to it a legal character, so that it might be recognized and made legitimate by the legal code of Europe. I knew that before this could be effected the legislative power must be consolidated, and all excesses destroyed. I thought myself capable of accomplishing this task, and I was not mistaken.

**PRINCIPLES OF MY GOVERNMENT.**—The principle of the Revolution was the destruction of *castes*, not that of ranks; it was the equality of *rights*, and not of classes: and on this principle I formed my laws. The excesses of the Revolution showed themselves in the triumph of *demagogue* maxims; these I destroyed; I took sides with no faction; these therefore disappeared; the excesses had manifested themselves in the destruction of religious worship; this I restored: in the existence of the emigrants; these I recalled: in the general disorder of the administration; this I regulated: in the ruin of the finances; these I restored: in the absence of any authority capable of governing France; I supplied this want by taking the reins of state into my own hands.

Few men have ever done so many things in so short a time. History will some day point out what France was when I was made Consul, and what she was when she dictated law to Europe. I had no need to employ arbitrary power to accomplish these great objects. Probably this power would not have been denied me, but I did not wish it; I preferred to govern by laws. I made many laws; they were precise and severe, but just. I caused them to be rigorously observed, for that was the duty of the throne; but I had them respected. They will survive me. The civil, commercial, and criminal codes, drawn up under my direction, and in discussing which I took an active part, would be of themselves sufficient to render my reign illustrious.

I felt the necessity of restoring to the army the powerful incentive of military decorations, which had been suppressed by a fatal and abused system of leveling; I created the Legion of Honor, into which all persons who should render important service to the state could enter; this order violated no principle of equality, for the only distinctions admitted were those based on the importance of the service rendered to France. Nevertheless, it was misunderstood and opposed by those captious tribunes, who could see in my creation nothing but pretorian guards: it passed by a small majority.



OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE CONCORDAT.—The concordat with the Pope had been secret for eight months, for two reasons: first, in order to obtain the resignation of the titular emigrant bishops who seemed determined to oppose the new arrangements; second, to discuss at leisure in the Council of State regulations necessary to bring the religious system of the state in accordance with the opinions and wants of the nation. A prelude to these measures was made in establishing a special ministry for the churches, giving the *portfolio* of it to Portalis. I took advantage of the publication of the definitive peace, to proclaim at the same time this great moral and political act. It was, in the eyes of the republicans and of the army, one of the most delicate subjects to manage; for if each one appreciated the morality of the gospel, many of the citizens had a repugnance for its ministers, to whose intrigues and cabals they attributed a part of the troubles of the Revolution. Nothing less than the seventy-seven regulation-articles was required to dissipate the fears inspired by the return of the *recalcitrant* clergy into the Republic. These articles, pledge of a wise and just tolerance, regulated the relation of the different Protestant professions, and thus established the churches which had formerly been anathematized. They took from the Roman Catholics all subject of religious dispute, and rendered the concordat in harmony with the spirit of the age; but the Court of Rome, to whose dogmas and influence their innovations seemed opposed, did not hesitate to secretly undermine them.

The concordat, thus modified, was promulgated on the eighteenth of April, after having been submitted to the legislative body for approval. The ceremony which took place on this occasion at Notre-Dame, attended by a pomp wholly new, offered to the astonished Parisians a striking contrast to the barefaced wickedness affected by the ruling powers of 1793. Since the fêtes of the Dauphin's birth, and the celebrated federation of the Champ-de-Mars, no ceremony had ever been so magnificent as this. The cortège, composed of the guard and of detachments from the different corps of the army, which accompanied the Consuls, the legate of the Pope, the ministers and deputations of the Senate, to Notre-Dame, certainly effaced all impressions which kingly *éclat* had left upon the public mind. The studied solemnity of this politico-religious ceremony was a sinister augury to the partisans of the Republic: it was openly said that the magistracy no longer existed except in name. Several generals (Lecourbe, Monnier, Delmas, and others) incurred, by their disapprobation, a disgrace,

from which they recovered only by offering their services at a time when they deemed the safety of the country as necessarily connected with that of my person. By means of these organic articles, the concordat at first produced only favorable results, for it rallied to the government millions of the country people who for nine years had lamented the overthrow of the altars.

**REUNION OF PIEDMONT.**—The King of Sardinia, Charles Emmanuel VI, retired to his island, had, on the fourth of June, abdicated the throne in favor of his brother, Victor Emmanuel IV. Piedmont was formally united to France the eleventh of September. The island of Elba had been so united some weeks before. Nothing was said in Europe on this event, for it had been foreseen, Turin having been for a year occupied as the head-quarters of a military division, and made subject to French laws. Nevertheless, silence was not consent, and the sanction of treaties was required to legalize these reunions. The Duchy of Parma was also to revert to us on the death of the Duke, since his son had, in exchange, just been proclaimed King of Etruria. I took possession of this beautiful country on the ninth of October, little thinking that it would one day become the heritage of a widow who would outrage my memory, and be wanting at the same time to her own glory and that of her son.

**COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN SWITZERLAND.**—But in Switzerland the desired changes were not so easily effected as in the Cisalpine Republics: the forms imposed upon this Republic by the Directory had created many malcontents. These, instigated by Austria, and thinking themselves authorized by the treaty of Lunéville, took up arms and attempted to reestablish the old Bernese oligarchy. I sent Ney with twenty thousand men into Switzerland. The Bernois and the smaller cantons, who had openly attacked the Helvetian government and driven its weaker forces to Lausanne, were summoned to disband their contingents: order was restored, and I assembled fifty Swiss deputies at Paris to consult with them on the institution best calculated to satisfy the different parties. The act of mediation of the 19th of February, 1803, was the result of these wise measures, and to which the Swiss owed their entire pacification. There was only wanting to this act some indemnity to the Bernois, and the selection of their city as the permanent capital of Switzerland, to make it fulfill all the conditions necessary for the welfare of the country.

**RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.**—Every thing was now arranged except the affair of the German indemnities. I was for a long time afraid lest the eagerness of the Emperor Alexander to



establish amicable relations with England might lead to a misunderstanding between us. These affairs being very complicated, there was reason to fear lest they might result in a rupture of the peace of Lunéville. The moderation of Alexander seconded my views for the repose of the continent. In fact, we then had no cause for rivalry; France and Russia were at that time natural allies. If I had made conquests not yet sanctioned by Russia, the latter had acquired the best part of Poland without the sanction of France; both had concessions to make.

GERMAN INDEMNITIES.—It was necessary to come to an agreement on the indemnities promised by the treaty of Lunéville to Austria and the Grand Duke of Tuscany; on that promised by France to Prussia for the left bank of the Rhine; on that claimed by Bavaria in exchange for the Palatinate; finally, on that of the House of Orange. To obtain all these indemnities it was necessary to encroach upon the Holy Roman Empire. Russia, as the guaranteeing power of the treaty of Techen, had the first voice in the chapter: it was necessary to act in concert, and we succeeded to my great satisfaction. Of course, I might have dispensed with the intervention of Russia in this affair; but her antecedents authorized this course, and I could not with good grace dispute with her a right which I arrogated to myself. We then agreed to act as the mediators, and to act frankly and with good faith in the great work of pacification. Austria was not satisfied with these arrangements; her intentions on the Innviertel had failed; and the Grand Duke of Tuscany had received but half of the indemnity claimed; finally, the entrance of the French troops into Helvetia was near creating difficulty with the Cabinet of Vienna. Nevertheless, these difficulties were arranged; and the good intelligence between me and my powerful ally was still further strengthened by the reestablishment of the commercial treaty made in 1787 by Segur, between France and Russia. Finally, the great decree (*recoz*) of the deputation of the old German Empire completed the continental peace: Europe again breathed freely. England alone, jealous of our prosperity, was preparing for a new contest.

Peace had given a powerful impetus to the prosperity of France. Our ports were filled to overflowing with the vessels of all nations; Paris had become the rendezvous of all Europe; the English, deprived for the last ten years of the pleasures of the continent, came there in crowds. Our trade in wines and other products of the country resumed its former activity; our manufactures, especially those of Lyons, gained a greater reputation

from the fact that all the resources of art and science had been applied to give a greater development to the good taste as well as to the material modes of the fabrication. This Revolution, so much calumniated and misconceived, because it was soiled by abominable excesses and disgraced by demagogues, impressed on the whole nation a general movement of industry and activity, which gave promise of the highest destiny. It was necessary to consolidate its fruits, to banish its excesses, destroy its false maxims, and collect its heritage; imbeciles only could think of making it retrograde.



## CHAPTER VII.

## CAMPAIGNS FROM 1802 TO 1804; FROM THE RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE.

Internal Affairs of France—New Difficulties with England—Mission of Lord Whitworth—His Conference with Napoleon—Hostile Declaration of George III.—Napoleon's violent Language to the English Minister—English *Ultimatum* rejected—Military Occupation of Naples—Invasion of Hanover—Effect of these Operations on the rest of Europe—New Relations with Spain—She declares War against England—Portugal purchases her Neutrality—The English in India—Chances of a Descent into England—Preparations for this Descent—Plots against the Life of Napoleon—The Duke d'Enghein—An hereditary and stable Government necessary to France—Establishment of the French Empire—Impossibility of restoring the Bourbons—Effects of this Establishment of the Empire—General State of Europe—Difficulty with Russia—She refuses to recognize the French Empire—It is recognized by Austria—Indecision of the Porte—The Pope at Paris—Napoleon's pacific Declaration—He offers Peace to England—Organization of the Grand Army—It prepares to embark—Napoleon's Project compared with that of Cæsar—Concerted Movements of the French Fleets—The Fleet of Rochefort—The Toulon Squadron—The Brest Squadron—Nelson sails for Egypt—Villeneuve at the Antilles—He returns to Europe—Nelson also returns to England.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF FRANCE.—While victory and diplomacy continued to elevate the glory of France, every thing in the interior kept pace with my fondest hopes. The state was becoming regenerated with the most wonderful rapidity. I labored with great ardor; apart from the incorrigibles of the Faubourg St.-Germain,\* and a few visionary democrats, the entire nation applauded my labors, and every one manifested his admiration with enthusiasm. To avoid the accusation of self-sufficiency in praising my own works, I will quote the expressions of a man who was my admirer as a visionary (*idéologue*), and my enemy as a fanatic and as an historian.

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\*This is the quarter occupied by the old nobility.

"Glorious in war, glorious in peace, Napoleon eclipsed, in the dazzled eyes of the people, the most brilliant reputations in ancient or modern history; the remembrance of his exploits in Egypt and in Italy electrified all minds and constituted the charm of every conversation. The antique style of his speeches and his proclamations carried his hearers back to the golden ages of Athens and of Rome, and revealed a great genius as well as a great soul.

"It is he who has rescued the Republic from danger, and twice raised it to the highest pinnacle of glory and power. When he is absent, it languishes; when he returns, it revives. Have his enemies triumphed in his absence—the new Hercules strangles them on his return.

"His absence was the signal for war; his presence was that of victory and peace, not only with Austria, but also with Russia, England, Turkey, Portugal, Germany, and the Prince of Orange.

"He obtained, even from barbarians, a treaty favorable to France; Tunis and Algiers have become our friends; the French need no longer fear the cruelties of the ferocious African; their vessels plow the waters of the Mediterranean unmolested; the pirates of Lybia no longer insult the republican flag. It is he alone who has stifled civil discords, restored the exiles to their country, and given to Pope Pius VI. the honors and peace of the tomb. It is he who, by his respect shown to Pius VII., has calmed the consciences and preserved the morals of the people.

"He has immortalized his age by the redaction of many important codes. Our finances owe to him their prosperity; the magistrates, the payment of their salaries; the army, the honor of its colors and the regularity of its support; travelers, the safety of the roads; merchants, the restoration of the channels of interior trade; seamen will some day owe to him the freedom of the seas.

"France everywhere resumes her former glory; palaces, decayed by time or mutilated by the fury of the mob, are repaired; new monuments rise up to attest our glory to future ages; the hand of art, everywhere in France, contributes to the beauty of nature; ruins, the deplorable signs of past discord, are rapidly disappearing; magnificent edifices are springing up under the empire of a magnanimous government. Such are the fruits of the peace which he has conquered and of the concord which he has restored.

"The Revolution is ended; the source of the evils and sorrows of the world is shut up."



These eulogies are merely a repetition of what was said in France. The orators at the tribune, the magistrates by their deputations, writers in their productions, could not find phrases sufficiently sonorous for sounding through Europe my great deeds, or for interpreting worthily the bursts of national gratitude. They intoxicated me with incense. However exaggerated the expressions of those who announced themselves as the echoes of public opinion, my conscience told me that in reality these eulogies were true, and that I merited them.

Nevertheless, I felt that our system was not yet complete; it wanted permanence. Great as was my desire to give to the Revolution a solid and reasonable basis, I nevertheless saw that I should encounter great opposition in accomplishing this, for there was still antipathy between the old and new *régimes*. They formed two masses whose interests were directly opposed. All governments which subsisted by the ancient public law thought themselves endangered by the principles of the Revolution, and these had no guaranty but in forcing the enemy to treat, or in destroying him if he refused to recognize it.

I was the man destined to decide this contest; I found myself at the head of that great faction which wished to destroy the system upon which the world had been governed since the fall of the Romans. And I found myself opposed by the hatred of all those who were interested in preserving this Gothic rust; they acted unwisely, for I alone could restore order and unite the interests of the two parties. If these factions had listened to reason, and made voluntary concessions, in eight days we should have been agreed.

A character more yielding than mine would have sought to avoid the difficulty, by leaving a part of the question to the decision of time; but when I had looked into the bottom of the heart of the two factions, when I saw that they divided the whole world, as in the time of the Reformation, I deemed that the task would be long and difficult. I nevertheless determined to use every exertion to accomplish it. The question was more complicated than some have supposed. The question was not reduced to standing or falling with the Revolution; it was to reconcile it with its enemies without, and to calm those within, till time could effect a complete fusion of their interests with our own: this required two generations. I shall show hereafter that these writers have confounded the relations it bore to France, and its relations toward

foreign powers; they confounded the epoch of the Empire with the epoch of the Republic.\*

At the epoch of 1803, of which I am now speaking, I had devoted two whole years to healing the wounds of France, to uniting opposite interests and opinions, and to calming contending passions. In this I had succeeded beyond all hopes. But I was not deceived respecting the actual state of affairs. The royalists considered it as opening the way for a counter-revolution, and their adversaries thought I was advancing too rapidly in this course which they feared.

To create within the nation a single French interest, and to cause it to be sanctioned and respected by foreign powers, this was the evident object of my mission. I saw that to give this new France a durable basis, it was necessary to reconcile its internal institutions with the old dynasties, and to render it so powerful that they could not attack it with impunity. We required the majority of Europe, in order that the scale might now incline on our side. There were two ways of securing this majority: one by voluntary alliances, and the other by submissions effected by the ascendancy of our power. In the impossibility of obtaining the first, I was under the necessity of adopting the second.

**DIFFICULTIES WITH ENGLAND.**—I was directing all my attention to the accomplishment of these important results, when I became involved in new difficulties with England. The peace of Amiens seemed only to serve her as the means of reconnoitering my edifice, so that she might attack it with greater advantage. She never manifested a disposition to execute this treaty. Instead of surrendering Malta, as had been stipulated in the treaty, the possession of this island fortress was set forth by her writers as the key to the Mediterranean, and as the only means which England had of opposing, in that sea, the alliance of France and Spain: the Cabinet of St. James then resolved to retain it. Instead of evacuating Egypt, as had been agreed, General Stuart continued to occupy Alexandria, and seemed determined to remain there. I sent Sebastiani to reestablish our former relations in the Levant, and to secure the promised evacuation. The toscin was sounded against this mission, because his report had the appearance of a military reconnoissance, and announced that I had numerous partisans in that country; this served the English government as a pretext for maintaining itself there.

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\*The author here alludes to, and mentions by name, the pretended "Manuscript from St. Helena," an anonymous work falsely attributed to Napoleon.



Moreover, I had reason to complain of the gross and injurious personal attacks which were daily permitted to appear in the English journals, and in those of the *émigrés*. England breathed more animosity against me than ever William had shown against Louis XIV.; moreover, the situation of the two powers had been reversed, for now the Pretender to the legitimate throne was in England, and she repaid us with double interest the injury which the Stuarts had sought, with the support of France, to do their sovereign. I had then a double reason to complain. A general, placed by victory at the head of the most powerful state in Europe, daily insulted by journals and pamphlets in which the hand of the English minister was but too manifest, had good cause to be exasperated. My situation and feelings were different from a prince born on the throne, and I could not fail to be indignant that, instead of acknowledging the merit of my military enterprises and of my administration, they, with the most violent animosity, represented my victories as so many butcheries, my government as a despotism, myself as a usurper, my principles and heart as those of a Caligula. I complained of this: they opposed to me the English laws on the freedom of the press: I remarked that foreign refugees had no right to destroy the pacific relations of two powers under shelter of the abuse of the press, and I demanded that these disturbers of the general peace should, by application of the *alien bill*, be sent out of Europe.

MISSION OF LORD WHITWORTH.—England, who had refused this concession, resolved to make us submit to whatever suited her policy. Not satisfied with assisting to deprive us of St. Domingo, she determined to injure us still further by a ruinous commercial treaty: that of 1786 had been too unpopular in France to authorize its renewal. Undoubtedly the exportation of the territorial products of France might, in the estimation of certain ministers, compensate for the loss of her manufactures: but the loss of our colonies had rendered too necessary a good system of home industry, to allow the importation of such merchandise as France could herself produce. I rejected the treaty of commerce, and insisted upon the evacuation of Malta. The Cabinet of London sent me, as envoy, Lord Whitworth, under pretext of concerting measures for preserving peace, but in reality for the purpose of inciting me to war, for he was furnished with no means of reconciling our differences.

CONFERENCE BETWEEN NAPOLEON AND WHITWORTH.—Some weeks after his arrival I had a long interview with him, during which I described to him, perhaps with too much

frankness, my own situation and that of Europe. I declared to him, that it was base to make treaties one day, and to refuse to execute them the next; that nothing would induce me to renounce the evacuation of Malta; that I would sooner see the English encamped upon the heights of Montmartre than to see them in possession of that island.

I complained of the English journals, and especially of the asylum and pay which England had given to Georges and his accomplices, instead of sending them to Canada, as had been agreed upon. "Every breeze that blows from England," said I to him, "comes loaded with hatred and animosity; how do they expect that I should not take offense? With respect to Egypt, I have already given assurance that the mission of Sebastiani had no hostile object. I might have sent there twenty-five thousand men to assist the Porte in driving out the English, whose presence authorized me to do so; *but, whatever desire I might have had to establish a colony there, I have not done so, because it was not worth the while to trouble the peace of the world and make myself the aggressor, in order to conquer a country which must sooner or later fall into the hands of France, either by a dissolution of the Turkish Empire or by an arrangement with the Porte.*" These were indiscreet remarks, which the adroit Whitworth did not fail to repeat, and of which England took advantage in order to justify her own conduct.

After showing him that I desired peace, I enumerated the reciprocal chances in a war: I frankly spoke of a descent and the dangers which it presented; but as there was at least one chance in a hundred, this would be sufficient for me to undertake it. I reminded him that I had four hundred and eighty thousand men in arms, ready at a moment's warning; that Europe no longer desired to ally itself with England, and to sacrifice itself for her interest; that, nevertheless, I desired peace. "I am the most powerful on land; you rule the seas: together, we can govern the world, but the least difference between us will involve the whole universe. If I had not, on every occasion, experienced the animosity of England, I should have done every thing to conciliate her; participation in indemnities; continental influence; treaty of commerce; I would have yielded every thing to a power which had shown me consideration and good will, while, on the contrary, I could yield nothing to implacable enemies."

**HOSTILE DECLARATION OF GEORGE III.**—This long conference was far from adjusting our differences: the English would see in it only my desire to colonize Egypt, as authorizing them to retain the possession of Malta, and to prepare to take the



initiative in the war. The King's speech to Parliament on the eighth of March left no further doubt on this subject. The allegations contained in this declaration were unjust. Can *distant and supposititious* projects of one cabinet toward a province belonging to another be a legitimate cause for a rupture with a third? England can not deny that under Walpole and George I. she had designs upon South America: would this vague desire of her minister to form an establishment in South America have been a legitimate motive of rupture for France?

**NAPOLÉON'S VIOLENT LANGUAGE TO THE ENGLISH MINISTER.**—I could not dissemble my resentment to Whitworth at his next visit to the Tuileries; I addressed to him, perhaps with too much vivacity, the following words: "We have already carried on a war for ten years, and you wish it for ten years longer; you force me into it!" Then turning toward the other ambassadors, I said to them: "The English desire war; if they compel me to draw the sword, I shall not be the first to return it to the scabbard. *If they will not respect treaties, they must be clothed in black.*" Thinking that perhaps I had gone too far, I again addressed Whitworth in these terms: "Why all these war-like preparations? against whom are these armaments? I have not a single ship-of-the-line in the ports of France; if you wish to fight, I shall fight; you may destroy France, but you will never intimidate her. You say that you desire peace; then execute your treaties. Woe to those who will not respect treaties; they shall answer for the consequences to all Europe." I here broke off the conference, lest my feelings should carry me too far.

**ENGLISH ULTIMATUM REJECTED.**—Nevertheless, my ministers having offered to agree to any arrangement that might satisfy the English respecting Egypt, they feigned to give up Malta as their own property, but reserved to themselves the right of occupying this place for ten years! Moreover they demanded, 1st, that the island of Lampedosa should be ceded to England by the King of Naples; 2d, that my troops should evacuate Holland and Switzerland; 3d, that an indemnity in Italy should be secured to the King of Sardinia. On these conditions they would recognize the King of Etruria and the Ligurian Republic. Firm in my resolution not to deviate from the conditions of the treaty of Amlens, I rejected these separate articles, and a new resort to arms became the consequence. I confess that this was exposing much for a little gain; but could I, without disgrace and without

danger, admit these propositions, which perhaps, after all, were not sincere?\*

**MILITARY OCCUPATION OF NAPLES.**—I could not carry on a war without securing, in compensation for the colonies which I would lose, some maritime country which might enable us to sustain this contest. To anticipate the enemy in the occupation of the *presqu'île* of Tarentum, and to close the ports of the peninsula against the English commerce, I directed my troops to reënter the kingdom of Naples. Saint-Cyr concluded a new convention to this effect, and occupied the Abruzzos.

**INVASION OF HANOVER.**—My troops, reinforced in Holland, crossed the Rhine, and, under Mortier, took possession of Hanover. The Hanoverian troops collected to the number of about fifteen thousand on the lower Elbe, capitulated at Altenburg, and were disbanded on condition of returning peaceably to their own homes.

**EFFECT OF THESE OPERATIONS IN EUROPE.**—These movements were certainly to our advantage, but they gave offense to the other powers; Russia had some interest in the fate of Holland, and Austria was not pleased to see the Germanic soil violated by the invasion of Hanover. But as the Cabinet of Vienna knew that we were at war with King George, it could not object to reprisals upon his states; it therefore contented itself with exchanging some insignificant diplomatic notes. The peace of Lunéville, although imposed on Austria, left her so powerful that she had no desire to risk the uncertain chances of a new war. Thugut had resigned the ministry to Cobentzel, a statesman of more moderation; and I could hope to maintain with this court our

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\*English writers have sought for every possible pretext to justify their government in refusing to execute the treaty of Amlens, and in again disturbing the peace of Europe. But even Alison now admits that France was not chargeable with renewing the war. He says: "In coolly reviewing the circumstances under which this contest was renewed, it is impossible to deny that the British government manifested a feverish anxiety to come to a rupture, and that so far as the two countries were concerned, they [the English] were the aggressors."

Napier says: "Up to the peace of Tilsit, the wars of France were *essentially defensive*; for the bloody contest that wasted the continent for so many years was not a struggle for preëminence between ambitious powers—not a dispute for some accession of territory—nor for the political ascendancy of one of other nation—but a deadly conflict to determine whether aristocracy or democracy should predominate—whether equality or privilege should henceforth be the principle of European governments."

Thiers, in his "Consulate and Empire," has discussed at great length, and with great fairness, all the circumstances attending the rupture of the peace of Amlens.



relations of amity. Prussia had no motive to violate her neutrality. Russia observed me, and interposed in favor of Holland, Naples, and the King of Sardinia. Italy was nearly in accord with my system.

**NEW RELATIONS WITH SPAIN.**—Spain had some objections to take part in a new war which might injure her ports and her colonies; she thought to avoid the conditions of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, and preserve her neutrality. This subject was discussed from the sixth of June to the middle of October, 1803. I was not anxious, at the time, that the Spanish navy should unite with ours, and I was not unwilling that the commerce of Spain should prosper under shelter of her neutrality, for France would always receive a greater part of the profits. But, in order not to renounce the advantages which France might derive from the treaty, I substituted for the stipulated contingent an annual subsidy of sixty millions, which was agreed upon in the convention of Madrid, on the nineteenth day of October, between Beurnonville and Cevallos, the minister of foreign affairs.

**ENGLAND PROVOKES HER TO DECLARE WAR.**—England got an intimation of this treaty, for she soon assumed a threatening tone. In fact, this state of things did not suit the British ministry; it required, according to the absolute neutrality of Spain, at least the admission of English commerce into her continental ports; if she were to be excluded from these, war would be preferable. The negotiation continued one year, and assumed a hostile character as soon as the ministry had learned, through Admiral Cochrane, that a squadron of ten or twelve French vessels from St. Domingo, which had taken refuge in Ferrol, were to be armed and repaired in that port, and that the Spaniards were preparing for hostilities.

The war party had, at London, many advocates. The decline of the Spanish marine dispensed with the fear of any serious injury from its hostility; it added little to the material forces of France, but, during the war, all the possessions of Spanish America would be at the mercy of English expeditions, or of English agents who would there foment the spirit of independence; the vessels and galleons would become the prey of their cruisers and their armed vessels. This interest was too evident not to lead to a rupture. The Cabinet of London gave orders to its vessels to attack the Spanish, and several frigates returning from Mexico, with from fifteen to twenty millions in piastres or ingots of gold, were attacked and captured by Admiral Moore, without any previous declaration of war. This was pronounced piracy; Eng-

land sought to justify herself on the grounds that Spain was an ally of France, and furnished her assistance. Spain now formally declared war, which she had vainly hoped to avoid by preserving amicable relations with the English government.

**PORTUGAL PURCHASES HER NEUTRALITY.**—Portugal had also purchased her neutrality by an annual tribute of sixteen millions, stipulated by the treaty of December twenty-fifth, at Lisbon, between General Lannes and the Portuguese minister. The rest of Europe were equally on good terms with us. To draw still closer the bonds of friendship with the United States of America, I ceded to them Louisiana for the sum of seventy millions. I preferred placing it in their hands to running the risk of its falling into those of the English, on account of its vicinity to the United States and Mexico, from which countries I also desired to exclude British commerce.

**GREAT SUCCESS OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA.**—Hardly had the war commenced, when England began to gather the fruits of her former conquests. She doubled her power in the East by the conquest of Hindoostan. The death of Tippoo had rid her of a dangerous rival; but there was still a more powerful adversary, in the Mahratta race—the celebrated Schindiah. He had just regained the power over the Mohammedan caste of Schah-Alloun: he, in fact, held the sceptre of Mogol. So long as this empire existed, the English power would be doubtful. The capitulation of the French army in Egypt had, it is true, diminished this danger. No sooner was this known in India, than Wellesley was emboldened to attack the army of Schindiah. According to the custom of this Company, it now supported the interests of the Mussulmans against the Mahrattas, as it had formerly sustained the interests of the natives and of the Nizam against the Mussulman Tippoo. The troops which had been disciplined by Peyron on European principles deserted the Mahratta prince, who was defeated by Lake and Wellington in the decisive battle of Assey. Delhi and Agra fell into the power of the English, who, masters of the rich empire of Mogol, at length extended their dominion over forty millions of Hindoos.

This event furnishes the best apology that can be given for my expedition to Egypt, the main object of which was to prevent this result; unfortunately, this blow was irreparable, and, although under Louis XVI. it would have furnished a subject for desperate war with England, I had not the means of opposing it, so much were circumstances changed. Besides, these vexatious events were not known in Europe till the beginning of 1803, at the



moment that England proclaimed the rupture of the peace of Amiens. General Decaen, whom I had sent to take possession of the Isle of France and the poor trading establishment of Pondicherry, could do no great thing in the midst of that colossal power; he was soon constrained to abandon this feeble post on the continent, and to limit himself to the defense of the Isle of France.

CHANCES OF A DESCENT UPON ENGLAND.—The continent exhibiting as yet no symptoms of an immediate attack upon France, I profited by the occasion to menace England with invasion. Although difficult, this operation has always been regarded as possible; the descent once made, the capture of London was almost certain. The capital once occupied, a powerful party would be created against the oligarchy. Perhaps we should have encountered some dangers; but Hannibal, in crossing the Alps, or Cæsar, in landing in Epirus, in Africa, or in England—did they look back? London is but a few miles from Calais; the English army, scattered along the coast, could not unite in time to cover the capital. Of course this expedition could not be attempted by a mere *corps-d'armée*; but its success was pretty certain with one hundred and fifty thousand men presenting themselves before London within five days after landing. Flotillas were the only means by which these one hundred and fifty thousand men could be landed in a few hours, and possession be gained of all the shallow waters. It was under protection of a squadron collected in the Antilles, and coming from there with all sail to Boulogne, that this passage was to be effected. If this reunion of the squadron could not be accomplished one year, it might another year. Fifty vessels sailing from Toulon, Brest, Rochefort, L'Orient, Cadiz, would unite at Martinique. Their departure would make England tremble for the two Indies, and while the British fleets were in search of them at the Cape of Good Hope and in the sea of the Antilles, those vessels would unite before Boulogne and secure the landing upon the English coast. Ten hours only would be required for landing one hundred and fifty thousand disciplined and victorious soldiers, upon a coast destitute of fortifications and undefended by a regular army. It has been thought that English patriotism would have caused a *levée-en-masse* for the defense of their country, and that the retreat of my army would have been impossible. This patriotism would have been an obstacle under any circumstances, but preceded by a declaration of democratic principles, we should have found partisans enough in England to effect a disunion, sufficient to paralyze the rest of the nation. If the system of propagandism was ever

an instrument of success, it certainly would have been on this occasion. But experience alone could decide this question; it has never been tried.

A motive more powerful than the difficulty of its execution might have prevented me from attempting this enterprise; this was the equivocal situation of my relations with the continent, and especially with Russia. Austria, at the instigation of Russia or England, might renew the war the moment that I should set foot on the British Isles, and we might, by this doubtful expedition, lose the fruits of ten years of victory. It is certain that such an expedition would never be prudent, without the alliance of one of these powers, and this consideration contributed not a little to my marriage some years afterwards.

**PREPARATIONS FOR THIS DESCENT.**—At all events, as the menace would cost nothing, since I had no other employment for my troops, I could garrison them on the coast as well as anywhere else. This simple demonstration would compel England to make defensive preparations at a ruinous expense. This would be so much gained. In 1803 and 1804 I covered with camps the coasts of Boulogne, Dunkirk, and Ostend; considerable squadrons were prepared at Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon; the shipyards of France were covered with prams, shallops, gunboats, and other craft; and innumerable hands were employed in preparing the ports of the channel for receiving these flotillas.

On the other side, England prepared for the contest. Pitt, far from being discouraged by the imminence of the danger, deemed it his duty to resume the reins of government under these difficult circumstances: he did not confine himself to his famous bill of defense (June 18th, 1804), but, leaving the peaceful duties of the exchequer, he put on the military uniform, and dreamed only of machines of war, battalions, forts, batteries. The aged and venerable George III. left the royal mansion, and daily reviewed his troops; camps were formed on the downs of Dover, and in the counties of Kent and Sussex. The English army, which in 1792 had numbered only seventy thousand men, was successively increased to one hundred and fifty thousand, including the regular militia, but exclusive of the forces employed without the limits of the three kingdoms. The public danger had caused three hundred thousand volunteers (*fencibles*) to be organized in regiments. Independently of a naval force of four hundred and seventy vessels, a flotilla of eight hundred guns covered the coasts of England and Ireland. The two armies were in sight of each other; they were separated only by the narrow strait. The



preparations cost England dear, but it must be confessed that they revived the military spirit of the inhabitants, and prepared them for fighting me on land.

**EXTRAORDINARY PLOTS AGAINST NAPOLEON.**—Notwithstanding these immense preparations for defense, the English ministers were apprehensive of the result of my menaces; to make a diversion, plots were organized against me. In order to have a greater chance of success, they put in motion a multitude of conspirators. But we were informed of them in twenty-four hours, so rapidly are such secrets carried. But as I wished only to punish those who should commit a state offense, I was obliged to wait till indisputable proofs could be collected against them. Pichegru was at the head of this machination: this man, who had more bravery than talents, wished to act the part of a Monk; it suited his character. These projects gave me little trouble, for I knew their extent, and that public opinion at that epoch was against them. Had the royalists succeeded in capturing and murdering me, they would have been no nearer their object. There is a time for all things. Factions, although still stirring, had lost their force; the fear which they had of each other had attached all reasonable men to my cause. The royalist chiefs, wholly forgotten since the pacification of La Vendée, now sought to reappear on the political horizon. This was the natural consequence of the increase of my authority. I was rebuilding a monarchy; this was intrenching on their grounds. They supposed that my monarchy was the same as theirs. Mine rested wholly on great achievements; theirs on hereditary rights. Theirs was founded wholly on ancient usages; mine had no connection with these; it moved in unison with the spirit of the age; theirs made useless efforts to check that spirit. The republicans were alarmed at the height to which circumstances raised me: they feared the use that I might make of this power. They trembled lest I might rebuild the old royalty by the aid of my army. The royalists believed this report, and took pleasure in representing me as a foolish imitator of the old monarchs. Others, more adroit, reported that I was restoring the institutions of the country merely to present France to the Bourbons, as soon as it could be prepared for an offering. Mediocre minds, who were incapable of appreciating me, gave faith to these rumors. This caused the increase of the royalist party, and injured me in the estimation of the people and of the army; both began to doubt my attachment to their cause. This opinion was calculated to produce disunion. It was necessary to undeceive, at any cost, France, the royalists, and the rest

of Europe, with respect to my intentions. To attack these designs in detail would have produced only an ill effect, because it would not have reached the root of the evil. Moreover, this could not be done.

I soon learned that Moreau was connected with these conspirators. It was necessary to deal carefully with this man, for he had an immense popularity. It was important to gain him over to my side. His reputation was too great for us to live as good neighbors. The plan of the campaign of 1800, which he did not understand, or was unwilling to appreciate, had thrown between us the apple of discord and unveiled his pretensions. He deemed himself too important a character to give passive obedience to me. It was necessary to find some fair means of separating him from me: he chose to effect this by taking every opportunity of censuring the measures of my government, and by rejecting all my advances to attach him to my party.

It has been said that I was jealous of him: this was untrue; but he was very jealous of me. I esteemed him as a good soldier; he had as partisans all who were jealous of me, and they were numerous. These men would have made a hero of him had he perished; I wished him to be no more than he really was—a second-rate man. In this I was perfectly successful: his absence effected his ruin; his friends forgot him, and he was no longer thought of.

**THE DUKE D'ENGHEIN.**—But an incident of much greater importance was connected with this famous *procès*. My exterior police had received positive information of a plot formed against me at London by Georges, Pichegru, and other royalist agents, and at the same time, at Stuttgart, by an English agent, named Drake. The relation between these projects was not fully proved. At the same epoch, the Duke d'Enghein appeared on the borders of the Rhine, and it was said that Dumouriez had just arrived there. This created a great stir among Fouché's people; to them there seemed no doubt that this prince was the soul of the whole plot; if such were not the case, would a Bourbon prince show himself at the gates of Strasbourg, on neutral soil it is true, but where he must inevitably encounter great danger? Could it be otherwise than that his presence there, and that of Georges and Pichegru at Paris, was a concerted affair? By concentrating the Revolution in myself, I had rendered more easy the project of its overthrow. It seemed to them that, the First Consul being disposed of, they had only to present the white flag to effect a restoration. In this they were mistaken: nevertheless, all the circum-



stances of this event tallied wonderfully with those which were urging me to determine definitely the opinion of France.

The desire of pleasing me incited the chiefs of the secret police to unravel this plot. Some letters which had been seized contained sufficient information to determine me to seize this prince, convinced, by the reports which I had received, that we should find in his papers a thousand proofs of his projects.

It was important, on one side, to silence the clamors of the party who had wished the Revolution without anarchy, but who now feared a royalist reaction, and, on the other side, to check the royalist chiefs from inciting new troubles in France. I therefore resolved to strike a decisive blow, which was indispensable to fix the opinion of the two millions of Frenchmen who had adhered to and fought for the Revolution.

Orders were therefore dispatched to Strasbourg to send a small column, in the night, to Kehl, to surround the village of Ettenheim and seize the Duke d'Enghein, and all other foreigners found at Offenbourg, and conduct them to Paris. My *aid-de-camp*, Caulaincourt, was the bearer of these orders, and was directed to justify their execution to the Grand Duke of Baden, upon whose territory these captures were to be made. Dumouriez was not there; they had been deceived in the names, the Count Thumeri was mistaken for him. In all other respects the orders were fortunately executed.

The police continued to give assurances of a grand plot, and the capture of several trunks of papers which would prove every thing. I designed to establish a high national court, forming it of a part of the Senate, the chief magistrates, and the highest officers of the army, and to get from it a deliberate and solemn judgment. I gave orders to this effect. Colonel Préval of the cuirassiers, an officer of distinction, was called from Compiègne, to make a report of the affair in conformity with existing laws. As his father had once been under the Duke d'Enghein, colonel of the same regiment, he very properly declined the duty. In the mean time the police had examined the papers of the prince; they found no proof of the conspiracy. It was now necessary to renounce the idea of a solemn judgment by a high national court, for the acquittal of the prince would only increase the odium of violating the territory of the Empire. There were two courses still to pursue: the first and most reasonable one was to detain him, as a measure of state policy, till the general peace, on the charge of inciting troubles in Alsace; the second, of giving him up to a military commission to be tried as an *émigré* who had taken up arms

against France, and, should he be acquitted by the commission, to retain him till the close of the war. On the advice of the principal functionaries, I adopted this last course. It has been seen that in this affair I was led on by a kind of fatality; for if I had known that no trace of a conspiracy would have been found, of course I should have avoided violating the territory of Baden, an action that would appear against me whatever were the issue. The fatal reports of my secret police produced all the evil. If the trunks of papers which were announced by the police had been taken, and the guilt of the prince had been proved before a high national court, all would have been in accordance with the strictest justice toward the accused, and my first design.

It is well known that this military commission condemned the prince, on his own confession, for invading, in 1793, the territory of France, with an armed band. It is also well known that I was left ignorant of the appeal which he made to me, and also of the letter which he wrote to me, till after the execution of the sentence of the court, which, according to military usage, takes place during the session of the court. I was left ignorant of the afflicting details which accompanied this catastrophe; it is enough to be responsible for the principal event—his capture and trial. In this I was drawn on by the perfidious suggestions of my admirers, by false reports, and by the force of events. Considered as a *coup-d'état*, this was calculated to strike terror among the partisans of the restoration of the ancient monarchy, to silence internal discords, and to give to three millions of Frenchmen, who had raised me to power, a pledge of an eternal rupture with the Bourbons.\*

The trial of Moreau and the conspirators was conducted with more formality, and was prolonged for several months. Moreau was banished. The other criminals required a severer punishment. They were all old offenders, often engaged in conspiracy, and it was necessary, once for all, to purge France of these characters. In this we succeeded, for these plots ended here.

Pichegru was found strangled in his bed. Some did not fail to say that this was by my orders. I was totally a stranger to this

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\*This account of the execution of the Duke d'Enghien is free from the passions and prejudices which disfigure so many of the pretended histories of the affair. Allison is entirely carried away by his prejudices and his desire to fix the whole blame of this unfortunate affair upon Napoleon. His account resembles that of a feed lawyer endeavoring to make out his case, more than that of an historian seeking for truth. Any one must be convinced of this by comparing Allison's quotations from Savary with Savary's own account.



event. It would be difficult to conceive why I should snatch this criminal from judgment. He was no better than the others, and the tribunals were there to judge him. I have never in the whole course of my life done any thing without some object.\*

**GOVERNMENT NECESSARY FOR FRANCE.**—These events produced much discussion on the course which I ought to pursue at this decisive epoch. Each one made comments according to his own views: some wished me to destroy the hydra of the Revolution and prepare a bed of roses for the return of the Bourbons; others wished me to connect the interests of the Revolution with my own, as First Consul for life, which, in their opinion, would have secured the Republic and Liberty, and at the same time have given a suitable stability to the first magistracy.

Had this question concerned myself alone, I should have been well satisfied to remain at the head of the state, with the title I then held; but it was one which concerned the interests of France, and I loved France too well to form for her an elective government which would be more dangerous even than the recall of the Bourbons. An elective government gives place to eternal convulsions. These elections lead to civil wars, and open the way for foreign influence. It is fortunate if each new consul does not cause the loss of a province, a colony, and a portion of the national independence. If England had been elective after Cromwell, Louis XIV. and the Stuarts would have subjugated the country and divided it between them.

Many thousand volumes have been written on the maxims of government, and on the institutions most suitable to be adopted by states; but really there has been but very little new on this subject since the time of Xenophon. These controversies will probably continue to agitate the world for a long time, for these discussions are not carried on in good faith on the one side, nor by men of experience on the other. The impracticable theorists

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\*Allson's account of the trial and death of Pichegru is also full of the grossest errors and misrepresentations. He says it was impossible that Pichegru committed suicide. "Death to so old a soldier and determined a character could have few terrors; and the experience of the Revolution has proved that its prospect had hardly ever led to self-destruction." Allson seems to have forgotten his own description of the Reign of Terror and of the horrors of the "Revolutionary army." "To such a degree did the torture of suspense prey upon the minds of the prisoners that they became not only reckless of life, but anxious for death." "If a knock was heard at the door, every one, in agonized suspense, expected his fate. Unable to endure such protracted misery, numbers committed suicide." "The love of life was almost extinguished in every heart," etc., etc. This, however, is only one of the numerous instances in which Allson contradicts himself.

would risk every thing else for a chimerical hope of what they call enlarging the *liberties of the people*; a phrase which each one interprets to best suit his own interests or passions.

Some of these mad theorists have believed in the possibility of a government wholly of the people, or in a pure democracy. Others have preferred an aristocratic government, under the patrician form in republics, and under the form of nobility in monarchies. These have their Jacobins who, under the mask of defending public prerogatives against the throne, merely defend their own feudal privileges at the expense of the administrative power. Such were the Senate of Stockholm, the Polish Diets, and the French *Parlements*. A third party advocate absolute power. They either think this best for the direction of public affairs, or, like the ambitious priests, they advocate it as the best means of enlarging their own authority. Much may be deduced, both from history and reason, in favor of each of these forms.

Democracy exists only where the people choose their rulers directly from their own ranks, and where these chiefs return immediately to this rank at the expiration of their office. This government has never existed but in name, or in small states. peculiarly situated; even at Rome it was merely temporary. The people, led on by ambitious demagogues, have always in a very short time fallen into the hands of the aristocracy. In Europe at this day, no great state exists with this form of government; even the little Swiss cantons can barely sustain themselves; past experience in Europe tends to prove the truth of Corneille's verses:

"Mais quand le peuple est maître on n'agit qu'en tumulte,  
La voix de la raison jamais ne se consulte;  
Les honneurs sont vendus aux plus ambitieux,  
L'autorité livrée aux plus séditieux," etc.

A republic has no means of escaping great dangers but in forming an absolute power, like that of the Committee of Public Safety; there is no man of sense who would not prefer a monarchy of limited authority, but strongly organized, to such a power. Theorists refer to the United States as proof that these evils are not necessary to a republican form of government. To this it may be replied that the weakness of the American government was such in 1814. that, with ten millions of inhabitants, it suffered the disgrace of having its capital captured and sacked by a single division of troops coming by sea! This fact would seem good proof of the want of internal strength in such a government. The United States, with a strong government, would ere this have



become masters of the whole American continent, or, at least, of all north of Panama.

But, be this as it may, no comparison can be formed between that country and France: their situations are essentially different. A nation which has for neighbors only weak tribes of Indians, or European provinces separated from their central governments by three thousand miles of ocean, has nothing to fear from its enemies: it will be the dominant power, whatever may be the elements of its government. But the United States, placed in the center of Europe, could not have existed ten years after the peace of 1783. With a new and unprejudiced people, laborious, agricultural, free from *prolétaires*, without a nobility, having no dangerous neighbors—with such a people a democratic *régime* may flourish. But this case is very essentially different from France at the period of which I am speaking. Spartans and Romans can not be immediately formed of an old monarchy.

An aristocracy has the advantage of a government more strong and concentrated, but it is always egotistical, exclusive, jealous. *A monarch ennobles plebeian merit, but an aristocrat treats it with contempt*; a patrician of Berne or of Venice is more vain and exclusive than a duke, or a peer, or a grandee of Spain. Besides, with an elective aristocracy a great state is exposed to almost certain ruin. How many civil wars have resulted in Germany from the elections of its emperors? How often has France, Russia, and Sweden given kings to Poland under its elective system?

A hereditary monarchical government holds the reins of state with a firmer grasp, is most capable of effecting internal tranquillity, and of carrying out, with a stronger hand, a good system of external policy: it is, therefore, best suited to a great nation, placed in the center of Europe.

The rise or the fall of empires is never the immediate result of internal disorders, or of institutions more or less popular: this comes from external relations. The Greek Empire, with its effeminate emperors and its scullion nobility, might still exist, if Mahomet II. had never come to Constantinople; the degenerate Romans might still govern Italy with their base princes and bad laws, if the Attilas and Genseries and Theodorics had never entered there; Poland might still enjoy its anarchy and its *liberum veto*, if its neighbors had never parceled out its territory among themselves. Exterior policy is, therefore, the most important consideration of all, in forming the government of a state.

From these considerations, I concluded that the government best suited for France, in 1804, was a strong hereditary govern-

ment, of a single individual, administered with reference to the general interest of the nation, and not for the advantage of a privileged *coterie*; this head of the nation to be assisted by consulting assemblies (*assemblées consultatives*), which should have all the power requisite for a good council, but not sufficient to enable them to arrest the car of state for the sake of Utopian theories or personal ambition. To this fundamental basis was to be added:

1st. A well-matured system of election, which would secure a proper system of representation in the Chamber of Communes, giving a suitable influence, in the making of laws, to the interests of property, industry, and the administration. It is absurd to suppose that any administration can proceed when it is deprived of all influence in the discussion of laws.

2d. The equality of all citizens in the eye of the law, and in their eligibility to the public offices.

3d. A nobility, or rather a notability, for life, founded on services rendered to the state, admitting no hereditary nobility but the peerage of the eldest sons of chiefs who, by illustrious victories or eminent statesmanship, have acquired claims to the national gratitude; and even limiting this peerage to three generations, so as to keep the ranks open for new services, and to compel the sons of peers to earn their own importance.

4th. The independence of the tribunals (courts), and guarantees of individuals, except in cases of high treason.

5th. A good penal code for the press, and a tribunal of censure composed of just and worthy men, not subject to removal from office.

6th. A national religion entirely independent of any foreign priesthood.

Of course this system was imperfect, for all human systems are so; but such a government I deemed best suited to the condition of France in 1804; calculated, at the same time, to promote the security and grandeur of the nation, and the public tranquillity, and to put the public administration beyond the reach of demagogues and declaimers, who think to guide the state by unmeaning phrases. Such is the great object which I ever afterward kept in view; such have been the motives of my conduct during all the periods and intestine commotions of my government.\*

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\*This paragraph is much abridged in the translation; but all the prominent views, and nearly the language of the original, are retained. The opinions here given on government are rather those of European than of American statesmen. They are stated with great fairness and candor, and are well worthy of consideration.



**ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE.**—Guided by these maxims, I did not deem it possible to any longer preserve the republican form of government in France; indeed, the majority of the people had become thoroughly tired of it; what France now wished was greatness. This I had assured to her; there was no one else from whom she could hope the durability of her present grandeur. She desired me as her permanent ruler. Every thing was precarious under the consular system; nothing was in its proper place. There existed a republic in name, a sovereignty in fact; a feeble national representation, a strong executive power; authorities submissive; an army preponderating.

Nothing goes well in a political system where names and things do not agree. The government soon loses its importance by the falsehood and deception it is obliged continually to use; it falls into that general contempt inspired by whatever is false; for whatever is false is weak. There is but one secret that can lead to success: it is to be strong, because there is in strength neither error nor deception; it is naked truth.

I was sensible of the weakness of my position, of the fragility of our political edifice. It was necessary to build something solid upon which to base the new interests which owed their origin to the Revolution. The establishment of the Empire was resolved on, and a *senatus-consultum* of the eighteenth of May, 1804, declared it hereditary in my family. Carnot was the only one of note who opposed this measure.\*

I could not become king, for in France the title was odious; fixed ideas were attached to it. The nature of my power being new, it was requisite that my title should be new also. I was not the heir of the Bourbons, and had no claim to their crown, though I had found it trampled under foot; but this was no reason why I should not wear another. I took the title of Emperor, because it was greater and less definite.

**IMPOSSIBILITY OF RESTORING THE BOURBONS.**—My enemies, of the two opposite factions, have never pardoned me for this step; even my own partisans were astonished at it. Some had gone so far as to say that I really thought, at one time, of restoring the Bourbons, and that the menaces of the champions of the eighteenth Brumaire alone deterred me from it.

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\*Napoleon's brothers disliked Carnot, and represented him to the First Consul as being opposed to his administration. Carnot's course was calculated to strengthen the opinion that he had leagues with Napoleon's enemies. But the Emperor afterward learned to appreciate the integrity of his character, and only honored him the more for the independent course he had pursued. Carnot became one of his firmest friends in 1815.

These suppositions are not very complimentary to myself. I was too well acquainted with the world, and with men and things, not to know that if I had accepted the title of constable, or mayor of the palace, or any other which these princes had seen fit to offer me, in less than six months I should have been either an exile or a rebel. A new Charles Martel, could I flatter myself to reign under the name of a new Chilperic, and to carry my victorious eagles, united to the lilies, from the banks of the Elbe to those of the Tagus? Such a rôle is possible only under a monarchy which is uncontested, when the nation is perfectly united, and an imbecile prince is the only obstacle between absolute power and a great captain. But after a frightful revolution, all of whose elements are still in fermentation—the idea is utterly absurd.

I did not doubt the favorable intentions of these princes, but I was also well aware of the false position in which I should be placed. The words of Count d'Artois, on the restoration, *That there was nothing changed in France, except that there was one Frenchman more*, were really sublime; but at the same time perfectly Utopian, like Sièyes' *balance of powers, perpetual peace*, etc. The princes would return with royalists of all conditions; they would have to treat for the interests of a hundred thousand noble families, who had asked of them, as in 1816, "*S'il n'y avait qu'une légitimité?*" The princes would have been at the head of a counter-revolution, and I at the head of those who espoused the principles of the Revolution itself. I should either have consolidated this work, or have ended my career on the scaffold; an alternative which I did not desire. The only means of arranging the affair was to act the Monk of France, and afterward to take refuge in Italy, placing on my brow the crown of King of the Romans. At the epoch of the negotiations of Campo-Formio, I received an anonymous letter, exceedingly well written, advising me to such a course. I thought it came from Louis XVIII. But would I have been any more legitimately the king of Italy than emperor of the French? Would Austria have agreed to the establishment of a new state in Italy which would have expelled her forever from Lombardy? Would France herself have sustained me in this? A contrary course of these two powers was very certain; and under these circumstances, what madman would have left the command of five hundred thousand victorious Frenchmen for that of thirty thousand Italians, incongruous, disorganized, rent by civil feuds, and destitute of any preparations for defense?

EFFECTS OF ESTABLISHING THE EMPIRE.—But let us return to the Empire. Never was there a revolution effected



with so little difficulty as this, in substituting the Empire for a republic which had cost so much blood. The reason is obvious: the principles of the Revolution and of the Republic were retained; the name was the only thing changed; this is why the republicans did not oppose the Empire. Moreover, a revolution in a state is not difficult where no one's interests are affected. The great Revolution being now terminated in a permanent dynasty, its principles became stable. The Republic had merely satisfied opinions; the Empire guaranteed both interests and opinions. These interests were those of an immense majority, inasmuch as the institutions of the Empire guaranteed the equality of all. It was, in fact as well as in law, a democracy, but a democracy stripped of its objectionable features. Liberty was restrained, for without restraints it is of no force in times of great crises; liberty is attainable only by the enlightened classes of the nation, and even these seldom make a good use of it; but *equality* is proper and suitable for all classes. This is the reason that my power is still popular with the nation, even after all the reverses which have crushed France.

My authority did not rest, like the old monarchies, on the false scaffolding of castes and intermediary bodies; it was direct, and had no other support than itself; for in the Empire there was nothing else recognized than the nation and its ruler. But in this nation all were equally eligible to the public functions. The origin of the individual constituted no obstacle to his elevation; the entire movement in the state was upward. This upward movement constituted my strength; but I was not the inventor of the system: it sprang from the ruins of the Bastille; it resulted from the civilization and general intelligence which time had effected in Europe. It will be difficult to destroy this system; it will maintain itself by the force of things, because fact and power must be combined; force can never spring from forms. It no longer springs from the *noblesse*, since the *tiers-état* are allowed to carry arms and constitute the military strength of the state; it no longer springs from the clergy, for the world has now learned the abuses and danger of that order.

That government is most wise which looks for its support to that part of the nation which is the most vigorous, giving it only such limits as may be necessary to maintain it in a salutary direction: these were the principles upon which I rested the foundations of my new edifice.

The destruction of old prejudices and prepossessions in France had laid bare the true source of power; it was, therefore,

necessary to rebuild the authority of government on a plan entirely new; it was necessary to free this authority from all old prejudices, to get rid of that blind devotion called faith. It was heir to no rights; it was therefore necessary to found it on fact (*fait*)—that is, on force. I did not ascend the throne as an heir of ancient dynasties, to repose quietly on the prestiges of habitudes and illusions, but to make laws in unison with public opinion, and to render France formidable in order to maintain her independence.

STATE OF EUROPE.—I was well aware that the recognition of this empire would meet with a powerful opposition abroad; Louis XVIII., who was then living at Warsaw, had given the signal to all the other sovereigns, by an energetic protest against what he called my usurpation. Moreover, the political atmosphere of the continent was far from serene. The dispositions of Russia began to appear less favorable.

DIFFICULTY WITH RUSSIA.—The Emperor Alexander was young, and passionately fond of military glory; inspired from his infancy by the great actions of Catharine, and of Peter the Great, and seeking with avidity for an occasion to prove himself their worthy successor, he wished to run the same career as myself: whether he allied himself to my projects against England, or joined England against me, we were destined to meet in the field of glory. In either case, he could not fail to increase the greatness of his empire, and to place himself, in history, on a level with his illustrious ancestors. Previous to 1803 he had appeared well enough disposed in my favor. The cannonade of Copenhagen, reaching even to Cronstadt and St. Petersburg, had sounded the alarm against English pretensions. This was sufficient to incline this prince in my favor, and the good understanding with which, in 1803, we together arranged the important affair of indemnities in Germany, proves what were the dispositions of Russia toward me at that epoch. But, after that, events induced Alexander to take an opposite course.

He proposed, at the end of 1803, his mediation for peace with England. They demanded that first of all I should evacuate Holland, Italy, and Switzerland. To the last point I made no objections, but, seeing the uncertainty of any successful mediation, I could not consent to the other preliminary conditions; indeed, nothing more could have been required of me in signing a preliminary treaty. I proposed an armistice and a congress, leaving things exactly in *statu quo* till peace could be arranged. The Cabinet of London would admit no mediation till I had first evacuated



Hanover; and, as it was impossible to come to an agreement, it became necessary to renounce all attempts at treaty. My refusal produced a coldness between me and Russia; Marcoff left Paris, leaving only D'Oubril as *chargé-d'affaires*. The character and personal feelings of this ambassador conducted very much to my first difficulty with Russia; perhaps this difficulty must necessarily have occurred on some other occasion, as we were destined, sooner or later, to be opposed; but at this epoch I was wholly occupied with my projects on England, and it will some day be regretted that I was not allowed to complete them. As a judicious historian has said: "It is for the general interest of Europe that the maritime superiority should belong to some continental power, for this is the only means of preserving the rights of nations, and of bringing to bear the whole continental force for the maintenance of the freedom of the seas." So long as my genius and my activity were directed against the British Isles, and on the coast of the Channel, there was no necessity for an interference. But, unfortunately, the passions of men are sometimes stronger than their ultimate interests. The Emperor of Russia had to complain that I had not given the King of Sardinia the indemnity for Piedmont which I had promised by the treaty of October, 1801; he made it a point of honor to insist on this. His troops still occupied the Republic of the Seven Isles, with the intention, undoubtedly, of not surrendering them till after the execution of all that had been agreed upon between us respecting Italy. The neutrality of the north of Germany, violated by my occupation of Hanover, made him suspicious of my ulterior views. The violation of the territory of his father-in-law, the Elector of Baden, in the seizure of the Duke d'Enghein, appeared to him an attack upon the honor of his family; all combined to irritate him. On the seventh of May he addressed energetic notes to the Diet of Ratisbon, against this violation of the territory of the Empire, for which he demanded reparation. The King of Sweden, Gustavus IV., brother-in-law of the Emperor Alexander, and also son-in-law of the Elector of Baden, scattered fire and flames throughout all Europe. Desirous of playing some important part, and thinking himself a second Gustavus Adolphus, of whom he was only the ridiculous *homonym*, he persuaded himself that it was still the age when thirty thousand Swedes could hold the balance of power in Europe; he affected to domineer over all the governments that did not hasten to imitate his example.

**RUSSIA REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE THE FRENCH EMPIRE.**—The *senatus-consultum* which conferred on me the imperial crown tended to complicate this difficulty; just as much as this

event was for the interests of France, to the same degree was it opposed to the interests of the ancient dynasties. To recognize my empire was to give up the ancient principles of legitimacy and the *divine right* of kings. Nevertheless they might, on a mature consideration of the subject, also see something in favor of their system of legitimacy, by the substitution of a monarchy for the Revolution. If the Emperor Alexander, looking on it in this light, had maintained a good understanding with me, he would undoubtedly consulted state interest, though at the sacrifice of the self-love of dynasty. But in the existing state of affairs, this step added a strong motive to those already existing for a rupture. In fact, D'Oubril remitted a note, on the twenty-eighth of August, 1804, which was a kind of manifesto, and demanded his passports. Nevertheless, Russia did not immediately prepare for war. D'Oubril remained at Mayence till the end of October, with the intention, perhaps, of giving me an opportunity of avoiding a rupture, by complying with their demands with respect to Baden and Piedmont. Whether or not this was the real object is unknown, as I did not put it to the test.

**AUSTRIA RECOGNIZES THE FRENCH EMPIRE.**—The Cabinet of Vienna, less scrupulous, or more disposed for peace, made no difficulty in recognizing me as emperor. This event confirmed me in my projects, for Russia was too distant to threaten any immediate danger; I therefore resolved not to yield to her demands.

**INDECISION OF THE PORTE.**—Prussia, Spain, and Denmark hastened to give notice of their recognition of a dignity which was calculated to give greater stability to our friendly relations. But what surprised me most was the hesitation of the Porte in recognizing my empire. It was not that the Turks felt aggrieved at the fate of the Bourbons, for they knew too well how their own fallen princes were treated; but all the members of the Divan had not forgotten the old alliances which united the Ottoman Empire to France. They remembered how their wars in Hungary had assisted Francis I. against Charles V., and Louis XIV. against Leopold I.; and how much, in turn, these were indebted to the first for their powerful diversions against Germany. In the last war of 1789-1791, Louis XVI., embarrassed by internal difficulties, had left to the Anglo-Prussian Alliance the care of intervention for peace. This was the first blow at the credit of France; the disorders of the Revolution, the destruction of the state of Venice, the acquisition of the Ionian Isles, the public discourses of Monge for the resurrection of Greece, and especially the expedition to Egypt, had exasperated the Divan against repub-



lican France, and had produced the strange phenomenon of the standard of Mohammed waving by the side of the banners of Russia and England!

Feeling the necessity of a good understanding with the Porte, I had sent Marshal Brune there, in the quality of ambassador; he was at Constantinople when I assumed the imperial crown. The English took every means to prejudice the Turks against me, representing me as the author of the expedition to Egypt, and as having still further intentions on that country, bringing up, as proof of this, the mission of Sebastiani and my vague allusions made to Lord Whitworth. Russia, having resolved upon a rupture with me, warmly seconded the representations of England. Brune was unable to destroy these prepossessions, and returned to France without having obtained my formal recognition, and also without any positive refusal; he left Ruffin at Constantinople, and I hastened to confirm his appointment, in order to leave the way open for a reconciliation.

**THE POPE AT PARIS.**—In the mean time Pope Pius VII. had given his consent to come to Paris, in order to agree upon such points as had been left undecided by the concordat. I wished to profit by this visit for my coronation and consecration. I hoped, by the solemnity given to this august ceremony by the Holy Father, to remove from the eyes of the vulgar every thing that might appear improper in my ascension to the throne. The venerable pontiff, grateful for the peace which I had given to the Church, and hoping to obtain the restoration of the provinces which had been detached from his states, did not hesitate, notwithstanding his great age, to cross the Alps, to act the part of Stephen III. in 754, by placing the crown of the sons of Meroveus on the head of Pepin, the father of Charlemagne. chief, like me, of a new dynasty. It was the only example of this kind which the vicar of Jesus Christ has ever given to Christian kings.\*

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\*The following is Napoleon's letter to the Pope inviting him to the coronation. It is urgent, but perfectly dignified:

*"Most Holy Father:—*

*"The happy effect produced upon the morality and the character of my people by the reëstablishment of religion induces me to beg Your Holiness to give me a new proof of your interest in my destiny and in that of this great nation in one of the most important conjunctures presented by the annals of the world. I beg you to come and give, to the highest degree, a religious character to the anointing and coronation of the first Emperor of the French. That ceremony will acquire a new lustre from being performed by Your Holiness in person. It will bring down upon yourself and our people the blessings of God, whose decrees rule the destiny alike of empires and of families.*

*"Your Holiness is aware of the affectionate sentiments I have long*

This coronation was delayed till the expression of the national will on the *senatus-consultum* could be formally received. The result of this imposing *plebiscitum* was presented to me, on the first of December, by a deputation of the Senate. Out of four millions of active citizens, more than three millions and a half had voted in favor of my being raised to the imperial throne; Henry IV. had not reigned in France by a public will so unanimous. I was the next day consecrated by the Pope in the church of Notre-Dame. After the sacerdotal benediction, not wishing to hold the crown as the gift of the Pope, I placed it on my head with my own hand. A deputation from each corps of the army assisted at this imposing ceremony, already made brilliant by the presence of the great constituted bodies of the state—ministers, ambassadors, senators, legislators, and prefects. Never had Paris witnessed, even under Louis XIV., any thing to eclipse the pomp of this great day; fine weather was the only thing wanting.

**POLITICAL DECLARATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY.**—I now felt it necessary to exhibit pacific sentiments. At the opening of the legislative body, December 25th, I solemnly declared that I had no desire to add to the territory of the Empire; that I would maintain its integrity; that I had no wish to augment my influence, but that I was determined to sustain what I had already acquired. My minister of foreign affairs declared to the Chamber that England would eventually discover her error; that she would see the uselessness of her efforts against us; that she would lose in a war without any object; in fine, that her cabinet would return to different sentiments toward us when it should be found that France would not concede to her the right of breaking treaties whenever she pleased, and that we would never consent to peace on any other conditions than those of the treaty of Amiens.

**NAPOLEON OFFERS PEACE TO THE KING OF ENGLAND.**—A few days afterward I resolved to write directly to George III. in order to propose peace, and to prove that another coalition would only tend to increase the continental influence of France. Not only did the mental alienation of this prince preclude the possibility of an answer, but the ministry declared these direct appeals to the sentiments of the king as opposed to the

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borne toward you, and can thus judge of the pleasure that this occurrence will afford me of testifying them anew.

"And hereupon we pray God that He may preserve you, most Holy Father, for many years, to rule and govern our mother, the holy Church.  
 "Your dutiful son,  
*Napoleon.*"



fundamental maxims of the English government. Lord Mulgrave, therefore, addressed an insignificant reply to Talleyrand. It was necessary, he said, before replying to these overtures, to consult with the continental powers on the means of stipulating engagements capable of providing for the security of Europe, and to ward off the threatening dangers. We shall soon see what where the *means* proposed by England to the Emperor of Russia, in a note dictated by Pitt, at the very time when I wrote my letter.

ORGANIZATION OF THE GRAND ARMY.—Having terminated the *fêtes* of the coronation, I directed my attention to more serious preparations for a descent upon England. My army had been encamped for two years on the shores of the Channel, wholly occupied in military exercises: never was there any thing finer or more martial. I had employed this leisure in perfecting its organization; experience had shown the necessity of adopting a system more strong than the isolated divisions which had been employed during the Revolution. I therefore organized *corps-d'armée*, of three divisions each, commanded by marshals. This number was sufficient to sustain the first shock against one entire army. I could then consider each one of these corps as a wing, and could reinforce a part of my line with facility, by carrying there one or two of these corps: moreover, this concentration simplified the transmission of orders and the movement of the forces.

I formed powerful reserves of cavalry, and gave one light brigade to each corps of infantry; I gave cuirasses and elegant uniforms to my heavy cavalry, which before had been more like mere *gens-d'armes* of police. An officer proposed, at this epoch, to form lancers, but he was ridiculed by the others, because our hussars had always been able to overcome the Austrian uhlans; but I afterward had reason to regret that more attention was not given to this project. Lancers had not been properly appreciated, because they had been usually employed at outposts, or fighting as individuals. But, in charges in closed lines, lancers are equally formidable against infantry, which they can more easily reach, and cavalry armed with sabres, which can not stand against them.

Nevertheless, in this organization I committed one great fault in disorganizing the staff-corps. In Italy many of my adjutants-general had done little else than grumble; this had prejudiced me against their comrades. I gave the death-blow to this body, which ought to have been the soul of the army. In order to induce the best captains in the staff to go into line, I suppressed

the grade of *chef-de-bataillon* of staff, thus depriving the captains of all chance of promotion to the grade of colonel. I afterwards restored the grade; but the evil had already been done: the best subalterns had left. The higher grades of the staff had not been affected. I then attached but little importance to the subalterns of the staff, supposing that my own movements would increase in proportion to the increase of my forces, and that they would be mere couriers, for conveying my orders. This might have been well enough if I could have been everywhere at the same moment; but in thus destroying this nursery for the staff I disorganized the means of supplying my place on any part of the theatre of war where I myself could not be present. After-reflections convinced me that this circumstance contributed not a little to our reverses. Berthier, who was of the ancient school of staff, instead of defending a corps of which he was the natural chief, thought to make favor with me by subjecting it to every possible humiliation.

I gave the command of the several *corps-d'armée* to men tried in many battles. On ascending the throne, I had appointed sixteen marshals, selected from generals who had already been commanders-in-chief of armies: all were not at first assigned to my army.

Bernadotte had the first corps; he was a man of shrewdness, and a brilliant exterior: the plans of operation drawn up by him while minister of war prove that he was better qualified for a lieutenant than for a general-in-chief.

Marmont, formerly my *aid-de-camp* and general-of-artillery, commanded the second corps, although he had not yet been made marshal. I have since had too much reason to complain of the conduct of this officer to be an impartial judge: I leave that task to posterity.

Davoust was placed at the head of the third corps. This man had received a good education, had a well-regulated mind, and very correct ideas of war. His rude manners, and a character at the same time distrustful and harsh, have created him many enemies, and, in the grave circumstances in which he was placed, party spirit had acted against him with great injustice. Severe, but just, toward his subordinates, he could maintain better order and discipline than any one else among his soldiers; no one of my marshals required more of his subordinates, and no one made them serve with more exactitude.

The fourth corps was given to Soult. This general, of a masculine frame, and a mind capacious, laborious, active, inde-



fatigable, had given proof in Switzerland, and at Genoa; of superior talents; he was reproached with being too ambitious.

Lannes had the fifth corps. Covered with glory and wounds, this brave man was wanting only in a knowledge of the principles of the art of war; but he supplied this deficiency with an admirable judgment, and on the field of battle he yielded to no one of his colleagues.

Ney commanded the sixth corps. He is too well known throughout Europe to make it necessary to say much respecting his character. If, drawn on by a fatal destiny, in the difficult circumstances in which he was placed, he was not the *chevalier sans reproche*, he was incontestably the *chevalier sans peur*. Lannes was perhaps as brilliant as he, in bold attacks; but the strength of mind which Ney displayed in the great disaster of 1812, where he successively commanded all the corps of the army, assigns to him the first rank among the brave men of modern times. Like many of his colleagues, he did not understand war on the maps, but on the field nothing equaled his boldness, his *coup-d'oeil*, and his *aplomb*.

The seventh corps, under the orders of Augereau, was formed later at Brest. Its chief had carried off the palm at Castiglione; an imposing personal appearance and soldier-like manners had made his fortune; but if he acquired a little *éclat* at the battle of Arcole, he never afterward justified his reputation.

Murat was placed at the head of the reserves of cavalry. His position as my brother-in-law and sovereign duke of Berg (which he afterward became) placed him among my lieutenants destined to command several corps. This cavalry officer, who, from his fine appearance, his courage and activity, had the honor of being my *aid-de-camp* and my relative, never equaled the colossal reputation which I have given to him. He had natural sprightliness, brilliant courage, and great activity; but he has shown that while such a star may appear bright in the second, it becomes eclipsed in the first rank.

A man of very different stamp was placed at the head of the army of Italy. His victory at Zurich had entitled him to the command of a separate army. Masséna had received from Nature every thing that can make an excellent warrior; endowed with great character, tried courage, and a *coup-d'oeil* which inspired him with resolution the most prompt and the most happy, he can not be denied a distinguished place among modern captains. Nevertheless it must be confessed that he shone more in the fight than in the council.

Brune, Mortier, and Bessières were also of the number of the

elect. The first had his peculiar merit; he was, however, all things considered, a tribune general, rather than a redoubtable military man. The second, less brilliant, was more solid; his calmness and *sang-froid*, become proverbial among the soldiers, availed him more than success; he was one of those who was capable, under my direction, of commanding a corps. Bessièrès had served me in the army of Italy as commandant of my mounted guards. He had a known valor, a spirit of order; he was methodic, but excessively timid in council.

Lefébyre, Duke of Dantzic, was a true grenadier. Child of Nature, he owed every thing to his natural *esprit*, to his great bravery, and to his simple and naïve character. He knew how to make himself beloved by the soldier, and to lead him to his proper position; this was all his merit.

Jourdan had been commander-in-chief of a great army. Victorious at Fleurus, under the most decisive circumstances, he owed to Fortune a great part of his reputation. A good administrator, laborious, a man of order, instruction, and integrity, he would have made a good chief-of-staff of a great army under a general who well directed it.

Moncey, Perignon, and Serrurier, not having afterward fought under me as emperor, it is not necessary to describe them here; the two former had commanded in chief in the Pyrenees, and their operations in 1794 and 1795 gave indications of talent. Placed in the rank of senators, they no longer figured at the head of troops, except at the crisis when the enemy was under the walls of Paris.

Macdonald and Lecourbe, having commanded armies, had claims to the baton of marshal; but the first had maneuvered so badly at the Trebia, that I deemed it best to postpone his promotion. Lecourbe had also permitted himself to be beaten in 1799, at Phillipsbourg; nevertheless he had shown so great an aptitude for mountain war in Switzerland, and afterward taken so important a part in the victories of Moreau in 1800, that he had deserved it more than some others. But he had made some malevolent remarks against me at the time of Moreau's trial, and I was not yet in a position to employ my enemies.

It is seen by this portrait of my generals, that, with the exception of Masséna, Soult, and perhaps Davoust, there were none to whom I could entrust the command of a separate army. (The Viceroy, Saint-Cyr, Suchet, and Oudinot were promoted only at a later period.) I thought, however, that these three were more than necessary at that period, when I myself could direct the



*ensemble* of the grand operations, and had more need of valiant lieutenants than of able colleagues.

Notwithstanding the little defects which have been noticed, the military constitution of the Empire was the best in Europe; for the other powers had not yet made the same progress as they did afterward, by imitating and in some things surpassing us.

**THE ARMY PREPARES TO EMBARK.**—The first corps occupied Hanover; the second was at the camp of Ziest in Holland; the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth, from Ambleteuse to Montreuil; the seventh, at Brest. One hundred and twenty thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry, eight thousand dragoons (to be mounted in England), four thousand artillerymen, four hundred and fifty field-pieces, seven thousand horses, were ready to embark, and actually did embark several times; two thousand two hundred bateaux, shallops, and pinnaces, armed with more than five thousand cannon, divided into as many little squadrons as there were sections in the army, were prepared for the transport of the troops, at the moment that our fleets should either clear the Channel, or at least call away for a time the enemy's forces.

All the *matériel* for this expedition was on board, and the immense extent of these preparations is sufficient proof that, if I was not deterred by the difficulty of this enterprise, I at least did not fail to appreciate the duties it imposed. Our *embarquement* consisted of fourteen millions of cartridges, ninety thousand cannon charges, thirty-two thousand extra muskets, one million five hundred thousand rations of biscuit, one million three hundred thousand flints, thirty thousand tools and utensils for engineers, eleven thousand saddles and sets of harness, four hundred and fifty cannon, seven thousand four hundred horses, in stable-boats; and one hundred and sixty thousand men of different arms. The perfect order which reigned in this immense flotilla, the frequent exercises by which I habituated the troops to embark and debark in less than an hour, at an appointed signal, the care with which each man was instructed in his particular duty—in a word, every thing had been provided that could secure success to this grand operation.

**NAPOLEON'S PROJECT COMPARED TO THAT OF CÆSAR.**—It is unnecessary to stop here to refute the parallel which some have wished to draw between the expedition of Cæsar and my project of descent; an absurd parallel, since there was nothing common in the two cases, except the starting-place; but the place of debarkation resulted from geographical positions, and depended in no way on the combinations of the general.

Cæsar, conqueror of the Gauls, attacked with Roman legions the barbarous and divided people of Britain; he had a fleet superior to the miserable barks of the Britons, both in number, in strength, and in skill. He was certain of arriving at port, and certain of his means of retreat; more still, he went to certain victory. I, on the contrary, was to attack the most industrious and the proudest nation on the globe; a nation that ruled the seas with one hundred and forty heavy ships of war, armed with fifteen thousand cannon; a nation presenting a population of fifteen millions of inhabitants; a nation that in a little time could oppose to me, even deducting Ireland, at least two hundred thousand men, unwarlike and inexperienced, it is true, but animated by a love of country. The expedition of Cæsar was child's play; mine, the enterprise of the Titans; this is the only comparison that can be made. It is true that I was not, like Cæsar, going to subjugate and occupy proud Albion, but to ruin her shipyards, her arsenals, her manufactures, then to return to France and present myself to Europe in the attitude of a conqueror, which would enable me to dictate terms of peace.

However great my fears respecting the course of Russia, I confess that I was deceived respecting the pacific attitude of Austria, especially after her formal recognition of the French Empire. If she had persisted, like Russia, in a system of neutrality which was so profitable to her, there was nothing to oppose to the execution of my project. But even should Austria determine upon hostilities, I deemed that she would require considerable time for preparation, and would wait for the arrival of the Russians. But three weeks was time enough for me to effect my descent, enter London, ruin the shipyards, and destroy the arsenals of Portsmouth and Plymouth. If I should succeed, would not this success be sufficient to prevent a continental war? Even under the most unfavorable supposition, could I not levy a double conscription to supply the place of the absent troops, and place my army in condition to make head against the enemy on the Rhine and on the Adige? The rapidity with which I hoped to strike the important blow, and to return to France, was the principal circumstance upon which I based my hopes of success; I overlooked neither the rashness nor the difficulty of the enterprise; my genius consisted in embracing rapidly, and with the same *coup-d'oeil*, both the obstacles and the means of surmounting them.

#### CONCERTED MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH FLEETS.

—Encouraged by so many motives, I gave orders to the navy department to prelude my descent by the union of our maritime



forces. To do this successfully, it was necessary to appoint a distant rendezvous for our different squadrons of Toulon, Cadiz, Rochefort, and Brest. I resolved to direct them to Martinique, whence they would return to raise the blockade of the fleet of the Ferrol, and to advance together to the Channel, to favor our expedition. Our measures were very skillfully arranged for this object; for they not only tended to secure the junction of the seven or eight squadrons now dispersed at Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, but still more to give the alarm respecting the English establishments in the two Indies, and thus to entice away the greater part of the English naval forces, at the very moment when we were to appear on their coast. We were to profit by this departure of the British fleets, to throw troops into the colonies. General Lauriston was to recapture Surinam and the Dutch establishments on the American continent, where it was important to prevent the English from getting a footing; Reille was to get possession of St. Helena, in order to intercept the navigation to India, and favor our cruisers against the commerce of the East India Company; he was then to endeavor to throw a French garrison into the Cape of Good Hope. Other detachments were to sweep the waters of the Antilles, and recapture St. Lucia, Tobago, St. Pierre, etc., which places had already fallen into the power of the enemy.

**THE FLEET AT ROCHEFORT.**—Admiral Missiessy sailed from Rochefort, the fourth of January, with five vessels and some battalions of troops; but encountering a storm a few days afterward, he had to contend with the elements for thirteen days; he reached the Antilles, but not without damage. The beginning of February he landed at Martinique some succors of men and munitions, and then made General Lagrange attack Dominique, which he entirely reduced except Fort Rupert; he dismounted several batteries of the Roseau, and not wishing to spend time in a siege, he reëmbarked, after treating in the same way the isles of St. Christopher, Nevis, and Montserrat. He received orders to return to Europe, inasmuch as the squadron of Toulon had been forced, by the storm, to return to that port. Nevertheless, he went *en route* to raise, for a moment, the blockade of the city of Santo Domingo, the last post of our troops in that island, and where General Ferraud defended himself with a bravery worthy of a better fate. Missiessy had not executed my orders as I wished, and I replaced him in the command of the squadron of Rochefort by Rear-Admiral Lallament, who received orders to put to sea.

**THE TOULON SQUADRON.**—Admiral Villeneuve had not contended against the storm with the same constancy as Missiessy. He sailed from Toulon on the eighteenth of January, with eighteen vessels and frigates, and encountered the storm, in which he had one vessel dismantled and three frigates forced to take refuge in Corsica, which inspired him with the fatal resolution to return to port. He refitted, and again set sail on the thirtieth of March, at the very time that the Rochefort squadron was on its return voyage; a circumstance, as will be seen, fatal to my plan. Arriving before Carthage, he wished the Spanish squadron of seven vessels, which was there, to join him; but the Spanish authorities replied that this squadron had a different destination. He then sailed to Cadiz, where he found only five English ships, which hastened to retire. Villeneuve here was reinforced by a small number of vessels, and then set sail with fourteen ships and six frigates for the Antilles, and anchored at Martinique on the fifteenth of May. He was there joined by four other Spanish ships, which had sailed from Cadiz immediately after his passage, under the orders of the brave Admiral Gravina.

**THE BREST SQUADRON.**—Admiral Gantheaume, who was to have left Brest for the same destination with twenty ships, was blockaded by Admiral Cornwallis with superior forces, and did not profit by the effects of the storm to secure a sortie from port. It now became necessary, for greater security, to direct Villeneuve to return and effect a junction near Brest, and to raise the blockade of that port: orders to this effect were dispatched by Admiral Magon, who sailed from Rochefort with two ships.

**NELSON SAILS FOR EGYPT.**—Nelson, hearing of the departure of the Toulon squadron, was persuaded that it was destined for Egypt. The concentration of the corps of Saint-Cyr, at Tarentum, at the extremity of the *presqu'île* of Naples, and the troops embarked on board the squadron, rendered this conjecture more probable than any other. Nelson each time directed his course to the mouths of the Nile. He was not a little surprised to learn that Villeneuve had raised the blockade of Cadiz, and continued his course in the ocean.

**VILLENEUVE AT THE ANTILLES.**—Although he had destroyed but ten ships in a cruise of two years, the English admiral made sail for Lisbon, as soon as the wind permitted him to pass the straits, and certain, from what he heard there, that the French had sailed for the West Indies, he resolved to follow on the eleventh of May, the very time that Villeneuve was at anchor at Mar-



tinique. But this officer knew not how to profit either by the start he had of the enemy, nor by the troops I had given him: he did nothing but attack Diamond Rock, where the English had established a *dépôt* for their cruisers in the Antilles. This rock, however important as a secondary post, was not sufficient to attract the entire attention of the admiral and his forces; as there was no place for landing troops, its capture was difficult. Colonel Boyer, who commanded the troops charged with this enterprise, creeping along from grotto to grotto, and from rock to rock, and drawing after him his *tirailleurs* with ropes, at last succeeded in capturing this little Gibraltar and one hundred and fifty prisoners. This perilous and difficult escalade is one of the finest feats in this maritime war.

**HE RETURNS TO EUROPE.**—After having uselessly waited three weeks for the Brest fleet, Villeneuve decided to attack the English islands, and for this purpose drew reinforcements of troops from Guadeloupe and Martinique; he then received the order, by Rear-Admiral Magon, June sixth, to return to Europe and unite with the squadrons of Ferrol and Rochefort to raise the blockade of Brest, where Gantheaume, with twenty-one vessels, had received orders to take position in the roadstead preparatory to taking part in the battle, if any should occur. Hearing at the same time of Nelson's arrival at Barbadoes, Villeneuve set sail on the tenth of August, without even taking time to land the troops which I had directed him to leave at Martinique, to push forward with success the war in the Antilles.

**NELSON ALSO RETURNS TO ENGLAND.**—Nelson, having learned of his departure, and supposing that he would attack Trinidad, sailed to the assistance of that island. Finding himself deceived in this, he sailed to Antigua; he some days after learned that Villeneuve had returned to Europe, and set sail himself for Cadiz, giving warning to the several stations and to the admiralty; then seeking in vain for further news of our squadron, he returned with two vessels to England, sending the other nine to reinforce the fleet of Cornwallis before Brest, satisfied soon afterward that the union of all our forces at the same place had been our only object.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE WAR OF 1805, OR THE CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ.

Origin of a new Coalition against France—Pitt's Project to reduce her to the Limits of 1792—He negotiates with Russia—Napoleon assumes the Iron Crown of Italy—Alliance between Russia and England—Hesitation of Austria—Napoleon in Italy—His Fortifications and Camps of Maneuver there—His Coronation at Milan—Return of the French Fleets to Europe—Villeneuve at Ferrol and Cadiz—Consequences of his multiplied Faults—Austria accedes to the new Coalition—Mission of Nowosiltzof—First Project of the Allies—Their Definitive Plan—Their Efforts to induce Germany to join the Coalition—The Austrians enter Bavaria—The French march from the Coast of the Channel to the Danube—Organization of the Grand Army—Passage of the Rhine—Direction of the French Masses on Donawerth—Mack awaits them on the Danube—Napoleon turns his Right and falls upon his Rear—His Confusion—Napoleon Maneuvers to cut him off from Bohemia—Murat's Faults—Mack attempts to Escape—Combat of Haslach—Napoleon returns to the Danube—Operations of the Austrians—They burn the Bridge of Elchingen—Ney's Operations—Battle of Elchingen—Investment of Ulm—Ney's Attack—Murat pursues Werneck—Mack summoned to Surrender Ulm—Conditional Capitulation—Defeat of Werneck—He Surrenders—Surrender of Mack—Fate of the Wreck of Mack's Army—Russia threatens to join the Coalition—Napoleon directs his Forces on the Inn—Passage of the Inn, the Salza, and the Traun—Remarks on Napoleon's March on Vienna—The Emperor Alexander at Berlin—Masséna's Operations in Italy—His Instructions—Passage of the Adige, and Battle of Caldiero—Retreat of the Archduke Charles—Napoleon at Lintz—Propositions for an Armistice—Operations of Murat and Davoust—Kutusof passes the Danube at Krems—Affair of Dirnsteln—Napoleon approaches Vienna—State of that City—Murat Captures the Bridge on the Danube—Critical Situation of Kutusof—Unskillfulness of Murat—Combat of Hollabrunn—Kutusof effects his Junction—Napoleon at Schönbrunn—General Plan of Campaign—The French Army at Brunn—Operations in the Tyrol—New Attempts at Negotiation—Movements of the Allies—Napoleon's Disposition for their Reception—The Allies' Plan of Battle—Napoleon's Grand Attack on their Center—Soult's Success—Check of the Enemy's Left—Success at the Center and French Left—Napoleon and Soult attack the Enemy's Left—He is cut off from Olmutz and thrown on Hungary—Inter-



view between Napoleon and the Emperor Francis—Remarks on the Battle of Austerlitz—Napoleon returns to Vienna—Treats with Prussia—Also with Austria—Operations in Hanover—The Dynasty of Naples ceases to Reign—Napoleon's Orders to Villeneuve—Nelson returns before Cadiz—Mutiny of the two Fleets—Battle of Trafalgar.

**NEW COALITION.**—The departure of such considerable naval forces from our ports, and the presence of one hundred and sixty thousand brave men opposite and within twenty leagues of her harbors, were well calculated to inspire England with real alarm; she felt it necessary to get rid of this threatening danger at all hazards. No sooner was Pitt replaced at the head of the ministry, than this indefatigable enemy of France sought, in every court in Europe, allies to oppose us. The veil which covers the origin of this third coalition against France has as yet been but partly raised: Russia appears to have given the impulse; some attribute it to the Cabinet of London; be that as it may, both could not be long in coming to an understanding, after the Russian ambassador had left Paris, without gaining satisfaction on the several points of his complaint, and after the Swedish ambassador had followed his example.

The Cabinet of St. James worked with all its power to excite these hostile feelings; Prince Czartorinski, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, having given the English ministry to understand the dispositions of the Emperor Alexander to oppose, by force of arms, any ulterior encroachments on my part, Pitt seized with avidity this overture, and a negotiation was entered upon immediately to bring about a formidable coalition, the only means of warding off the storm which was ready to break on England. It has been said that these communications of Czartorinski were a maneuver concerted beforehand by men whose attachment to England was no secret. It was not enough for our implacable enemy to impose limits to the French power; he wished even to contest those which had been sanctioned by treaties, and to force us back within the limits of 1792. Without that, how could Austria be promised an aggrandizement sufficient to induce her to go to war? Without that, how could Prussia be persuaded to abandon her neutrality?

**PITT'S PROJECT.**—The famous note of the sixteenth of January, which proposed to Europe the partition of our spoils, is a curious document, and one that fully justified any measure on my part to put France in a condition to resist such projects. Pitt proposed that Lombardy be given to Austria, that the King

of Sardinia should not only recover Piedmont, Savoy, and Nice, but that the republic of Genoa should be given to him, in order to strengthen him against France. Prussia was to obtain Belgium, so as to separate us from Holland, and to cut that country off from French influence. The small states on the left bank of the Rhine which had been ceded to us, both at Campo-Formio and Lunéville, were to be given to Prussia, Austria, or to such other German princes as would take part in this league.

It was natural enough that the great powers should arm to prevent my ulterior aggrandizement; and in the same degree was it unjust and impolitic to wish to reduce us to the limits of 1792. This would have been well enough if the other states had returned to limits which they had occupied at that epoch. But since that period, had not Russia, Austria, and Prussia divided Poland between them? Had not England acquired half of India? France, on the contrary—had she not lost her family alliance with Spain, Austria, Sardinia, and Naples? Her allies in India—had they not become British provinces? The ruin of St. Domingo—had it not destroyed our supremacy in the Antilles? In fine, had not our relative condition become inferior, by one half, to that of 1792? *To descend, while all her enemies were ascending in the scale of nations, ought not to be the fate of a great state, victorious for the last ten years! To attempt to subject me to such an ignominy, was to place me under the necessity of dying, arms in hand, or of subjugating Europe.* The fear of my ascendancy and of my enterprising genius may explain the adhesion of the continental powers to this project of the Cabinet of London; but the fear of seeing myself incessantly exposed to the same danger ought also to explain the course which I pursued, to render myself the dominant power in Europe in order to escape this danger. Thus a reciprocal fear, carried to excess, often becomes the cause of the most violent political contests, and urges men beyond the bounds of reason, especially after revolutions.

NEGOTIATION WITH RUSSIA.—However unfavorably disposed the Russian cabinet might be toward me, it nevertheless could not fail to regard the project of Pitt as extravagant; but a new incident removed all these scruples. I had felt that Italy could not exist under a republican form by the side of my empire; it would have been preposterous. But I could not yield the reins to another, since Europe had conceded them to me, and especially as this peninsula was requisite to my maritime projects.



**ASSUMPTION OF THE IRON CROWN OF ITALY.**—The Italian deputation which had come to assist at my coronation was constituted in a *consultum of state* under the presidency of Melzi, and after some weeks' debate, it presented me, on the seventeenth of March, a constitutional act, forming the Italian Republic into a hereditary kingdom, and offered to me the crown. To satisfy Europe, at least for the time, I at first proposed it to my brother Joseph, hoping by this apparent separation to diminish the unfavorable impression which so great an increase of my power might produce. But Joseph showed some scruples about accepting a tributary throne, and presumed to dictate to me the abolition of treaties which subjected Italy to an annual contribution of thirty millions of francs, or the support of thirty thousand French troops necessary for its protection. I easily consoled myself for these scruples, which were incompatible with my projects, and got over them, by placing on my own head the iron crown of the Lombard kings, which had once been worn by Charlemagne, but which for centuries had been buried among the relics of the palace of Monza. To reply in advance to the reclamations of my enemies, I promised, nevertheless, to place this crown on the head of an adopted son, and to separate it from France, as soon as England should surrender Malta, and Russia evacuate the Republic of the Seven Isles; which would permit me also to evacuate the kingdom of Naples, and give to Lombardy a kind of independence. In fact, whether I was president for life or king was of little importance to Europe; the essential thing was to have the crown of Italy separated from that of France, either during my life or at least at my death. This was all that Austria wanted; moreover, she preferred having on her frontier a kingdom, rather than a democratic republic.

I repaired to the Senate, on the eighteenth of March, to announce this important change. This offered an opportunity of exposing to Europe my political views, which I did in the following terms:

"The genius of evil will seek in vain for pretexts for involving the continent in war. Whatever has been united to our empire by the constitutional laws of the state will remain so. *No new power will be incorporated in it*; but the laws of the Batavian Republic, the act of mediation of the nineteen Swiss cantons, and this first statute of the kingdom of Italy, will be constantly under the protection of our crown; and we will never suffer any attack to be made upon them. Under all circumstances, and on all occasions, we will show the same moderation, and we hope that

our people will have no longer need of displaying that courage and that energy which they have always shown in the defense of their legitimate rights."

**ALLIANCE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.**—What I regarded as moderation did not appear as such to the rest of Europe. The Emperor Alexander, on receiving this news, negotiated with England on Pitt's project of the sixteenth of January. Deciding upon war, he signed, April 11th, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with the Cabinet of London. Nevertheless, he wisely entered into no stipulations respecting Belgium and the Rhenish Provinces, confining the question to the evacuation of Naples and Holland, the restitution of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia, and the independence of Switzerland. He engaged to send one hundred and fifteen thousand men immediately into the field, and, in order to provide for their support without embarrassing his finances, England stipulated a subsidy of fifty millions. By a subsequent article, the promised forces were increased to one hundred and eighty thousand combatants. Although these first steps were taken with the utmost secrecy, I could not be deceived respecting the hostile dispositions of Russia; but as Austria had made no declaration, how could I anticipate hostilities from a country from which I was separated by great powers and an interval of five hundred leagues impossible to pass?

**HESITATION OF AUSTRIA.**—Possibly I might have warded off the storm, if I had consented to purchase the neutrality of Austria, by leaving the Italian Republic independent; but, I repeat, this would have been preposterous in the present organization of Europe, and after it had chosen a monarchical form of government, it was necessary either to assume the crown myself, or to see it on the head of a foreign prince; it was not to dispose of it in this way that we had conquered it. Besides, who could guarantee that my moderation would not be regarded at Vienna as a proof of weakness? This cabinet had exhibited too much malevolence for me to trust it; and I deemed that I had done enough in engaging for its conditional separation, by the solemn act of which I have just spoken.

In truth, most of the ancient dynasties were frightened at seeing me on a throne. Notwithstanding the polite assurances which had passed between us, they considered me still as a dangerous adversary; for I reigned only in virtue of a system which struck at the root of all the authority which time had built up for them. I was the offspring of the Revolution, and its



representative. The Empire troubled them as much as the Republic; for they feared it even more, because it was more vigorous. With moderation and time I might have tranquillized them; but the unfortunate necessity under which I was placed of closing Naples, Holland, and Hanover against the English, created the alarm against me. It was in vain that I protested that these were merely defensive measures; they refused to believe me, and the great powers persuaded themselves that it was policy to attack me as soon as possible, and before I could consolidate my power. Austria, nevertheless, hesitated for some time, either because she feared the issue of this contest, or wished to avoid the first blows, or desired time for preparation. Persuaded that there was no need for precipitation, but that, on the contrary, it was best to await for the most opportune moment, the Cabinet of Vienna was inclined to make demonstrations, and to obtain a delay by means of negotiations; besides, it did not fully agree with England respecting the organization to be given to the continent.

**NAPOLEON GOES TO ITALY.**—At the moment when my squadrons made sail for Martinique, to secure there a more easy and advantageous junction than they could in European waters, I resolved to repair to Italy in order to be crowned at Milan, as I had been at Paris. This journey accomplished several objects equally important. The first was to augment the feeling of security of the English and to completely deceive them respecting my project; the second, to impose on Austria by my presence on her frontier; the third, to excite the public spirit of the Italians by appearing among them with a pomp unknown there, and well calculated to excite in them a love of glory and of country. In going to Lyons, I made a detour in order to visit Brienne, the cradle of my French education; I felt for it the gratitude it deserved. This place was yet to be the scene of one of my bloodiest reverses. Lyons received me with more enthusiasm than ever; the luxury with which I had surrounded my court was a pledge of the further prosperity of her manufactures; interest and glory were combined in the acclamations of the brave Lyonnais.

**FORTIFICATIONS AND CAMPS OF MANEUVER.**—In passing Alexandria I directed immense works which, in a few years, would render that place the most formidable in Europe, and the key of Italy. Twenty millions of money were to be applied to this important project. Situated in the southern basin of the Po, at an equal distance from Turin, Genoa, Milan, Placentia, and Parma, Alexandria was destined to become the refuge of a

grand army in case of reverse, and an offensive base for all our operations in northern Italy. Perhaps Pavia or Cremona had been better situated for operations against Austria, and for commanding the line of the Po; but in a political sense, Alexandria better suited my views. Sixteen regiments of infantry assembled in a *camp de manœuvre* near Marengo, to form a *simulacrum* of the battle we had just gained, reminded Austria of our superiority over her armies. Another camp of seventeen regiments assembled for the same object at Castiglione gave the Cabinet of Vienna to understand that I was ready to measure arms with her as soon as she pleased.

**CORONATION OF NAPOLEON AT MILAN.**—My coronation took place at Milan, on the twenty-sixth of May, with all the solemnity worthy of the magnificent cathedral in which the ceremony was performed. Never, even in the days of Charlemagne, was such pomp seen by the Italians. After the consecration by the archbishop, Cardinal Caprara, I took the iron crown of the Lombard kings and placed it on my head. Milan was enthusiastic almost to intoxication, and Lombardy partook of the same feelings still more frankly, as the clergy had there praised me to the clouds as the restorer of the altars. The Pope, who traveled two days with me, had scattered his benedictions upon the people subject to my power, and had thus added to the *éclat* of my laurels in the eyes of the multitude. Fame, with her hundred voices, can never fully describe to posterity my activity during this journey, in organizing the new Italian monarchy, in dispatching orders to the expeditionary army at Boulogne; in giving instructions for my squadrons crossing the ocean; in regulating the internal affairs of France; in directing negotiations with Europe; and in maturing the project for the reunion of Genoa to my empire. One of the most eloquent writers of the present century, who only wants more decision in his opinions to equal the greatest historians of antiquity, has traced out an interesting picture of these operations, which posterity will place by the side of the finest compositions of Livy.\*

In leaving Milan I placed the reins of the government of Italy in the hands of Eugene,† with the title of Viceroy; this young

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\*The author here alluded to is Matthieu Dumas.

†Eugene Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, Prince of Eichstädt, Duke of Leuchtenberg, etc., was born at Paris, September 3, 1781. He was the son of Viscount Alexander Beauharnais and Josephine. He entered the army at the age of twelve, and served under his father and afterward under Hoche. He was next sent to Saint-Germain-en-Haye, and passed several years in this school. He then accompanied Napoleon in Italy and into



prince was, in every respect, worthy of my confidence; he became the most faithful of my friends, and one of my ablest lieutenants. A short time afterward the sovereignty of Lucca was given to my sister Eliza Pacciocchi.\* I repaired to Genoa, of which I took possession in great state and with a pomp which made the Genoese forget for a time the change which was to result in their position by the act of annexation of the fourth of June. When I deemed the moment had arrived for the approach of the fleet of Admiral Villeneuve to the Channel, I left Turin in the midst of a parade, and repaired, in the utmost secrecy, in three days to Paris, and then to Boulogne, where all was ready for my embarkation.

#### RETURN OF THE FRENCH FLEETS TO EUROPE.—

While I was thus laying, at Milan, Turin, Alexandria, Mantua, and Genoa, the foundations of the most vast designs, Admiral Villeneuve was returning to Europe in compliance with his orders. This return, for which the English were not at all prepared, was calculated to trouble them: they had only ten ships, under Ad-

Egypt. He was made *chef-de-bataillon* at nineteen, colonel at twenty-one, general-of-brigade at twenty-three, and Viceroy of Italy at twenty-five. He early proved himself one of Napoleon's ablest generals. At twenty-eight he commanded the army of Italy, and at thirty-one gained great glory in the Russian campaign at the head of the fourth *corps-d'armée*. After the departure of Napoleon and Murat, he was left commander-in-chief of all the forces. He died at Munich, February 21, 1824. His son, the Duke Augustus, succeeded him. His eldest daughter, Josephine, is now Queen of Sweden. His second daughter, Hortensia Eugenia, married the Prince of Hohenzollern-Hechingen in 1826. His third daughter, Amelia Eugenia, married the Emperor of Brazil in 1829.

"Prince Eugene, under a simple exterior, concealed a noble character and great talents. Honor, integrity, humanity, and love of order and justice were the principal traits of his character. Wise in the council, undaunted in the field, and moderate in the exercise of power, he never appeared greater than in the midst of reverses, as the events of 1813 and 1814 prove. He was inaccessible to the spirit of party, benevolent and beneficent, and more devoted to the good of others than his own.—*Encyclopedia Americana, Biographie Universelle*.

\*Bacciocchi (Marie-Anne-Eliza Bonaparte), sister of Napoleon, was born in Corsica in 1777. She married Captain Bacciocchi in 1797, in compliance with the wishes of her mother, but in opposition to those of Napoleon. Her husband was a man of little ability, and acted a very subordinate part in the great events in which he lived. She was a woman of great talents, and her administration as Princess of Lucca and Piombino, and as Grand Duchess of Tuscany, is marked by many important improvements. She patronized the arts, and was always the generous friend of distinguished talent. Boufflers, Laharpe, Chateaubriand, and Fontanes, were among those who sought her society, and on whom she conferred particular obligations. Her life was distinguished for charity and benevolence, as well as for taste in poetry and the fine arts, and great ability in the administration of affairs. She died in August, 1820, at Trieste.—*Encyclopedia Americana, Biographie Universelle*.

miral Calder, before Ferrol, where there were eighteen French and Spanish ships. There were only five, under Admiral Sterling, before Rochefort, where we had six ships and as many fine frigates, which soon found an opportunity to get to sea under the orders of Admiral Lallement. Villeneuve, having more than fifteen days the start of the English dispatch-boats, it seemed very easy to surprise Calder before Ferrol, to give him chase and rally the combined fleet of this port, to reach Rochefort, and advance to Brest with forty ships. But, by an inconceivable fatality, the English dispatch-boats, favored by the heavy winds, made the voyage with such rapidity as to arrive in time to give information to their stations; that of Rochefort was ordered to join Calder without delay; this prevented us from effecting the projected junction without a battle. In fact, Calder, finding himself in command of fifteen ships and three frigates, met, on the twenty-second of July, off Cape Finisterre, Villeneuve, who had nineteen ships and eight frigates. Foggy weather prevented them from seeing each other very distinctly; both formed in line and fought, ship to ship (*bord à bord*), one of those battles in parallel order, where skill is of no avail. The Spanish ships, disabled, fell into the midst of the English, and were captured; in other respects this battle was marked by no important results.

**VILLENEUVE ENTERS FERROL.**—Villeneuve gave chase the very next day to the enemy's squadron, which effected its retreat and raised the blockade of Ferrol to go and join the fleet before Brest; but the stormy weather decided him, on his side, to enter the Bay of Vigo, being unable, on account of the wind, to reach the port which he sought. He nevertheless reached there a few days later, and, after being joined by five French and ten Spanish ships, made sail with his thirty vessels for Vigo on the thirtieth, and thence to Cadiz, where he arrived the twenty-first of August, the very time that he was expected to appear before Brest, and that Gantheaume was maneuvering to favor him.

Admiral Collingwood had resumed the blockade of Cadiz, but he had only half of his force, and one would think that Villeneuve might, at least, have profited by this circumstance to surprise and beat him, by placing him between the fires of the coast and of our own fleet. He, however, did nothing, and limited himself to entering the port. He had become so confused by the heavy responsibility that weighed upon him, that he even forgot to leave at Vigo instructions for Admiral Lallement, who was seeking him with six fine French ships from Rochefort, and who,



for this purpose, appeared at Vigo two days afterward. But, ignorant of Villeneuve's course, this admiral was unable to join him, and cruised in the ocean between Ireland and the Bay of Biscay.

As soon as Cornwallis learned of the junction of our fleets, he sent Calder with twenty ships to Cape Finisterre to either observe or fight them. Not finding them any longer at Ferrol, the English admiral pushed forward to Cadiz and formed a junction with Collingwood. This circumstance would have completely secured the execution of my project, if Villeneuve, in obedience to my instructions, had sailed toward Brest. He could then either have met Calder, or have passed him on the way; in the first case, having thirty-eight ships against twenty, he must have beaten him, which would have forced Cornwallis to raise the blockade of Ganteaume to assist him; in the second case, Villeneuve, passing Calder, would have appeared before Brest and surprised Cornwallis, with forces inferior to ours by a half, which would have been the most probable and the most desirable.

VILLENEUVE'S FAULTS.—Deviating, on the contrary, from my plan, Villeneuve, instead of appearing in triumph before Brest, shut himself up, with a fleet of thirty-three ships and an army of ten thousand men, in the extremity of the Spanish peninsula, away from all the interests of France. Thus failed, through the pusillanimity of a single man, and the fortuitous circumstance of a rapid passage of two dispatch-boats, the most profoundly conceived of all my plans; for I am quite certain that, notwithstanding his want of energy, Villeneuve would have fully executed his mission, if, instead of finding at Cape Finisterre the two squadrons of Calder and Sterling prepared to receive him, he had surprised before Ferrol the single one of Calder in position of rendezvous and unprepared for fighting. The direction of Villeneuve on Cadiz ruined all hopes of effecting the descent, for this campaign, since the English, now seeing our designs, would be prepared to oppose them. Moreover, the reports which I had just received from my ambassador at Vienna, informing me of the threatening preparations of Austria, induced me to direct upon the continent the blows which I had flattered myself would, if not overthrow the English government, at least prevent it from ruling the seas and dictating laws to the universe.

AUSTRIA ACCEDES TO THE NEW COALITION.—In fact, my journey to Italy had decided Austria, who had been actively negotiating with England and Russia for renewing a coalition. General Winzingerode, *aid-de-camp* of the Emperor Alex-

ander, was its most active agent. We have said that the Cabinet of Vienna inclined to try an armed mediation, before openly decided upon a rupture. This is usually the language of those who wish to gain time; Austria showed us at Prague what she understood by *mediation*!

MISSION OF NOWOSILTZOF.—Nevertheless, either to please Francis II., or to himself attempt some pacific arrangements, the Emperor Alexander resolved to send M. de Nowosiltzof to Paris. This negotiator got as far as Berlin, when the news of the reunion of Genoa to France caused him to be recalled. This reunion had, in fact, removed all chance of an adjustment of differences; for this territory was really the only one which the Allies could give to the King of Sardinia in place of Piedmont. Moreover, how could they hope to make me renounce the crown of Italy, when I had just united to my empire a country whose independence was proclaimed at Lunéville? War was now inevitable.

Writers in the pay of England have sought to throw all the blame of this war on me, as though the project of taking from us Belgium and the provinces of the Rhine was not of itself a declaration of war. However, of all the acts of my policy, the most difficult of explanation is this reunion of the republic of Genoa. The time was not opportune; I was about to leave Italy in all haste for Boulogne to prepare the embarkation of my army to be ready to take advantage of Villeneuve's coöperation in the Channel, as soon as he should present himself. It was for my interest to spare hostilities with Austria, in order to paralyze the hostile intentions of Russia. After the Cabinet of Vienna had recognized me as President of the Italian Republic, I had reason to hope that she would also recognize my title as King, which would in no respect change matters, if the crown was to be separated from France at my death. But the reunion of Genoa to France, by effecting the destruction of a republic which had been consecrated by treaties, was calculated to cause suspicion of intentions upon the rest of the Italian peninsula; and to provoke a general coalition, at the very moment that I was directing my efforts toward the Thames. The epoch of the tacit adhesion of Austria to the treaty of St. Petersburg of the eleventh of April is not known: but by the middle of July she was combining a plan of operations for the contingency of her armed negotiation not accomplishing its object; she gave in her formal adhesion to it on the ninth of August, with the exception of certain changes which she had proposed for the reorganization of the continent.



**FIRST PLAN OF THE COALITION.**—The first plan of the coalition was to send four hundred thousand men to the field; viz., two hundred and fifty thousand Austrians, one hundred and fifteen thousand Russians, and forty-five thousand Swedes, or other smaller states subsidiary to the English. Austria deemed these troops insufficient to act effectually in Italy and against the formidable barrier of the Rhine. She replied by a memoir, well drawn up, in which she estimated the military power of France at six hundred thousand men, and deemed it necessary to augment the active forces. *The difficulty being to cause the Russians to arrive before I would anticipate them, and fall upon the Austrians; they deemed it indispensable to act with the principal mass in Italy, and to remain on the defensive in Germany.* The proposition was correct, but the inference was absurd: it was precisely because the reunion of the Russian forces in Germany was the Gordian knot, that rendered it necessary to place the mass of the Austrian forces upon the line of operation where this junction was to be effected; a line which was, moreover, for me the shortest and the most important. The Cabinet of Vienna was blinded by its own egotism; it went to war merely to reconquer Italy, and it came to the false conclusion that it must direct its efforts there. Austria also exaggerated the forces which I could bring to the field. She supposed that she would have to oppose the whole of our military forces, which was not possible, as we had so many coasts to guard; I could never oppose to her in the field over two hundred and fifty thousand men.

The Cabinet of St. Petersburg sent General Winzingerode to Vienna to discuss and fix upon a definite plan. He observed that from Brody to Braunau the Russians would have to march two hundred and eighty-four leagues, and from Boulogne to Braunau the grand army would have two hundred and seventy-four leagues. So that, deducting the time required for me to receive the news of the entrance of the Russians into the Austrian territory and to put my forces in motion across France, the Russians would have time enough to reach the Inn, and even the Iser, before I could. Alexander promised to have his reserves in readiness, to a number even exceeding the specified contingent.

**FINAL PLAN OF THE COALITION.**—It was at length agreed with Austria:

1st. That she should act in Italy with one hundred and thirty thousand infantry and thirteen thousand five hundred horse; in Tyrol with fifty thousand men and two thousand horse; in Germany with sixty-six thousand infantry and twenty-three

thousand horse; in detached corps with twenty-eight thousand men and fifteen hundred horse; making a total of two hundred and seventy-four thousand infantry and forty thousand horse.

2d. That Russia should bring one hundred thousand men into Germany, one half of which should arrive by the twentieth of October; that she should dispatch a corps from Corfu to debark at Naples, there form a junction with the English and the Neapolitans, and march in concert on the Po. A third Anglo-Russian corps would descend upon Hanover and Pomerania, and form a junction with the Swedish army under the orders of King Gustavus IV.; finally, a fourth Russian army assembled on the Bug, at the gates of Warsaw, should threaten Prussia, either to keep her in check, or to force her into the coalition.

GERMANY AND THE COALITION.—Nevertheless the allied cabinets failed to change the firm will of Frederick William, who wished at any price to preserve his neutrality. The Allies demanded a passage through the Polish portion of his states, and he replied by assembling on the Vistula forces sufficient to compel respect to his territory.

I did not, till some time afterward, know positively the intentions of the coalition, but as early as July I saw indications of its existence, by the collection of Austrian forces in Italy and the Russians on the Bug. These last would not have troubled me, if Austria had remained neutral in my contest with England. I directed Talleyrand to demand explanations; Cobentzel gave very poor ones. I then signified to the Cabinet of Vienna that it must withdraw its troops from Italy, or I should regard these armaments as a declaration of war. In the mean time we were preparing on both sides for the combat.

Austria, appreciating the influence of Bavaria, used every effort to bring her into the alliance, but she did not succeed: the Elector Maximilian Joseph remembered too well the part played by his ancestors, and the recent pretensions of the Cabinet of Vienna to aggrandize itself at his expense; he was, moreover, personally attached to France, and, being certain that I would arrive in time to succor him, this prince resolved to take part with us, if the imperial troops should invade his states. The Elector of Würtemberg inclined for the coalition, as also did the Elector of Baden, their family relations with Russia rendering this course very natural, but their proximity to Strasbourg and Mayence caused them to fear lest they should be made victims; this circumstance gave weight to the efforts of my ministers to attract them to our ranks.



**THE AUSTRIANS ENTER BAVARIA.**—The Austrians opened the campaign more *maladroitly* than ever. They thought to take me by surprise. This was fatal to them. I was prepared to strike on the Thames, if the continent remained quiet, or on the Danube, if the continent provoked me to hostilities, and to renounce my grand enterprise against England. I set out from Paris for Boulogne, announcing to Cobentzel that I only desired a continental peace, and that, full of confidence in the pacific protestations of his master, I was going to give the finishing stroke to my preparations for the descent. I had directed frequent *simulacra* of embarkation, in order to habituate the troops to execute it in the shortest possible time; we had become able to put one hundred and fifty thousand men on board ready for sailing, in half an hour; the *matériel* had already been embarked for a long time; I now ordered these *simulacra* to be redoubled, and an embargo put upon all the ports. An advanced guard of Ney's corps sailed from Montreuil along the coast, to unite at the camp of Boulogne. Soult's entire corps had been embarked for two days; my equipages were also embarked. These measures deceived Cobentzel; he announced to Vienna that in eight days I would be at sea. The Austrians believed him, and immediately inundated Bavaria with eighty-four thousand men, without waiting for the Russians. They thought, by this measure, to force the Elector to join their party, which would have reinforced them with twenty thousand men, and moreover enabled them to carry the theatre of war to the Rhine; but in reality this step was calculated to postpone their junction with the grand Russian army, and thus increase their difficulties. Their calculation failed in both respects: Maximilian Joseph, knowing the enemy's projects, prepared to leave Munich, and as soon as the Austrians passed the Inn, he retired to Wurtzburg with his whole army and his court. The Austrians, nevertheless, continued their march, which had now become a mere extravagance without object. After traversing Bavaria, and crossing the Iser and the Lech, they established themselves on the Danube and the Iller. The Archduke Ferdinand had the nominal command, but he had orders to follow entirely the advice of Mack, whom all Germany believed a great general, although he had already given proof of incapacity in Flanders and in Naples. The Archduke John, with forty thousand men, occupied the Tyrol. Another army of one hundred thousand men, under the orders of the Archduke Charles, advanced on the Adige, ready to invade Italy.

**MARCH TO THE DANUBE.**—The news of the hostile prep-

arations of the Cabinet of Vienna and its menacing movements in Bavaria and Italy reached me almost at the same time as the news of the naval battle between Calder and Villeneuve, and the retreat of the latter on Vigo. Even had the English expedition been my only object, it was now necessary to renounce it. In twenty-four hours my army, ready in every thing, faced to the right, and commenced its march to Germany, an embargo was upon the mail, and our columns, by six days' forced marches, were passing through Lorraine at the time that it was still thought at Paris they were only at their embarkation. But as I would not leave my immense flotilla exposed to the expeditions of the English, I organized a *corps-d'armée* at Boulogne, with the *bataillons-de-dépôt* of the grand army, and gave the command of it to Brune. Another corps, under Collaud, guarded Antwerp and Flushing; finally, four camps of reserve were established at Strasbourg, Mayence, Juliers, and Alexandria. Marshals Lefébvre and Kellerman organized at Mayence the conscripts destined to the corps of the grand army, and, while waiting to prepare them for the line, formed them into divisions of reserve and of garrison. Independently of these movable forces, it was necessary to secure our other ports from danger, and also to defend all the coasts of France and Holland, and to prepare secondary means in order that all our energy might be directed to the exterior. I caused the establishment of the important institution of national guards, reserving to myself the right of organizing them, and of determining the time and numbers to be called into service. This means might, in case of need, furnish us one hundred thousand men for the defense of the interior: this was much. A conscription of eighty thousand men was decreed as a timely provision for recruits and to keep the active corps up to the complement. Considerable steps were taken to organize, at Strasbourg, transports of artillery, with horses and drivers hired in Alsace, Switzerland, and Lorraine.

Thinking that the English and Russians might resume their project of descent on Holland, or that, at least, they might take possession of Hanover, and, using it as a base, attack the Bavarian Republic, I proposed to Prussia to occupy this electorate, which Bernadotte left to march against Austria; and, uncertain what course she might pursue, I charged my brother Louis with the command in Belgium and Holland.

Masséna, with fifty thousand men in Italy, had to oppose the double forces of the Archduke Charles. Saint-Cyr went to take possession of Naples and disband their army, before the Eng-



lish and Russians could anticipate him; but a treaty of neutrality having been signed, on the twenty-seventh of September, with the Duke of Gallo, the minister of the King of Naples, for securing the states of his master from the English and the coalition, Saint-Cyr had then to evacuate the kingdom in all haste, and march to the Adige, in order to reinforce Massena.

**ORGANIZATION OF THE GRAND ARMY.**—I reserved myself for the head of the grand army, to punish Mack for the temerity with which he exposed himself to my attacks. The following is the state of this army.

Bavarians; two divisions, Wrede and Deroi.

1st corps, Bernadotte; Drouet's and Rivaud's division of infantry; and Kellerman's (the younger) cavalry.

2d corps, Marmont; divisions of Boudet, Grouchy, and Dumonceau; Guerin's cavalry.

3d corps, Davoust; divisions of infantry of Bisson, Friant, and Gudin; Fauconnet's cavalry.

4th corps, Soult; divisions of infantry of Saint-Hilaire, Vandamme, and Legrand; Margaron's cavalry.

5th corps, Lannes; divisions of Suchet, Gazan, and Oudinot, combined grenadiers.

6th corps, Ney; divisions of Dupont, Loison, and Malher; Colbert's cavalry, foot-dragoons, commanded by Baraguey d'Hilliers.

7th corps, Augereau; divisions of Desjardins and Mathieu.

Reserve of cavalry, Murat; cuirassiers, divisions of Nan-souty, and D'Hauptoult; dragoons, divisions of Klein, Walter, Beaumont, and Bourcier; light cavalry, division of Triellard.

Guards, Mortier; eight battalions of foot-guards; Bessières, horse-guards, fourteen squadrons.

Suchet's division at first belonged to Soult's corps, and was afterward detached. A new corps was afterward formed for Mortier, and composed of the divisions of Dupont, Gazan, and Dumonceau.

**PASSAGE OF THE RHINE.**—The several columns of this army flew to the Rhine with the greatest rapidity. The reserves of cavalry under the orders of Murat, sustained by the corps of Lannes, passed this river at Kehl, on the twenty-fifth of September. They thus threatened the debouches of the Black Forest, deceived the enemy, and masked the maneuvers for turning his right. The twenty-sixth of September, the corps of Ney, Soult, and Davoust also effected their passage; the first debouching opposite Carlsruhe, directed his march on Stuttgart. The Elector

of Würtemberg refused to permit them to pass his head-quarters at Louisbourg, and the electoral troops, without orders, having closed to him the gates of Stuttgart, Ney advanced his artillery to force them. General Pfuhl thought it more prudent to open them, and was reprimanded by his master. Soult crossed the river at Spire, directing his course on Heilbronn; and Davoust at Manheim, directing himself on Necker-Els. Marmont passed at Mayence and marched on Wurtzburg, where he found the corps of Bernadotte, coming from Hanover, united with the Bavarian army of about twenty-five thousand men.

While these preparatory movements were being executed, I took care to attach to myself the Elector of Würtemberg, who was a little exasperated at the manner in which Ney had forced his way into his capital. Soon after my arrival at Louisbourg, I concluded with this prince a treaty which secured me an auxiliary corps of eight thousand men. I had already, some three weeks since, made a similar treaty with the Elector of Baden, for a corps of four thousand men. That of Hesse-Darmstadt had promised me the same number. These troops took no part in the war, but they served to guard my communications, which was much better than having them in the ranks of the enemy.

**MARCH ON DONAWERTH.**—The total force of my troops on the right bank of the Rhine, including the Bavarians, amounted to one hundred and eighty thousand. I resolved to profit by this superiority to destroy the enemy's army, by throwing myself on his rear, thus cutting off his communications with the Russians, who were approaching by Moravia. The corps of Ney, Soult, and Lannes, the cavalry of Murat, and my guards were directed toward Donawerth and Dillingen; the corps of Davoust and Marmont marched to Neuburg; and Bernadotte and the Bavarians were directed on Ingolstadt. The two last crossed in their march the principality of Anspach, the possession of Prussia, who prided herself on her neutrality. This circumstance, to which I attached no importance, considering what had occurred in 1796 and 1800, was near embroiling us with Prussia. In 1796, it will be remembered, Jourdan and the Archduke Charles passed over several parts of the territory made neutral by the Prussians; in 1800, Starray and Augereau fought also near Nuremberg, on the same territory.

Augereau, who was coming from Brest with the seventh corps, having a greater distance to march, was destined to cover our right on the side of the Grisons, and to guard the space between the Rhine and the upper Danube.



**MACK ON THE DANUBE.**—If the Austrians had committed a grave fault in taking the initiative too soon, they were at least excusable from their hope to force Bavaria into their party; but when the departure of this court from Munich and its army for Wurtzburg had destroyed this hope, it is difficult to understand why they continued their march to Ulm and stopped there. If they had any information of the rapidity with which my columns flew from Boulogne to the Rhine, they were unpardonable for having compromised the success of the campaign by engaging, in partial combat, forces whose union alone could secure success to the coalition; if they were ignorant of the march of my troops, the thing was still more absurd, for it was known to all France and Germany.

**NAPOLEON TURNS THE RIGHT OF THE AUSTRIANS.**—I lost no time in punishing Mack for this blunder. We were established on the Danube, just as we had been, in 1800, on the Po. The conduct of Mack assisted us wonderfully. This famous disciple of Lascy knew not how to take a decisive part. He flattered himself that he could cover the line of the Danube by carrying his right toward Rain under General Kienmayer, his center to Gunzburg, and his left under the cannon of Ulm. He thus found himself in battle facing the Rhine, at the very moment that we were debouching on its extremity, in order to assail him in rear. Kienmayer was too weak to prevent us from passing the Danube. On the sixth of October, Vandamme, sustained by the other divisions of Soult, got possession of the bridge of Donawerth; the next day, Murat, with his cavalry, passed to the right bank and pushed forward as far as Rain, after having forced the passage of the Lech. Kienmayer fell back upon Aicha. Davoust and Marmont debouched by Neuburg in the same direction. On the eighth Soult moved directly from Donawerth to Augsburg. Ney ascended the left bank of the Danube from Dillingen to Gunzburg; Murat, followed by Lannes, ascended the right bank of the river. Arrived at Wertingen, he found there a corps of twelve battalions which General Auffenberg brought from Innspruck, and which Mack had sent, too late, to succor Kienmayer. Our cavalry, assisted by the grenadiers of Oudinot, dispersed this corps and captured three thousand prisoners. On the other side, Kienmayer did not venture to give battle, but fell back on the Iser. On the ninth Soult reached Augsburg, and Marmont marched there also. Davoust moved by Aicha. Murat with his cavalry established himself at Zumarshausen. More than one hundred and twenty thousand men

were thus poured like a torrent on the enemy's communications with Vienna.

**MACK'S CONFUSION.**—Mack, blinded by his confusion, did not at all comprehend our maneuvers; he thought to withdraw himself from the difficulty by a change of front to the rear: he extended his right toward Memmingen, his centre between the Iller and Gunzburg, and maintained his left under the cannon of Ulm, without any fixed project for warding off the chances which threatened him.\* I made my dispositions accordingly. Bernadotte and Davoust received orders to march upon Munich, in order to follow Kienmayer, and to check the Russian army, which was coming to his assistance, and had already passed Lintz. Soult moved by Landsberg to Memmingen in order to cut Mack off from the Tyrol. I myself moved on Ulm by the right bank of the Danube, with the cavalry of Murat and the corps of Lannes and Marmont.

**MANEUVER TO CUT HIM OFF FROM BOHEMIA.**—But it was not enough to cut Mack from his base on the Inn, and from the great road to Vienna by Munich; the object of this general being to effect his junction with the Russians, he could easily gain Bohemia, by filing from Ulm by the left of the Danube on Nordlingen and Mannheim. This movement was the more to be feared as the enemy, by directing himself on our rear, would have taken all our parks our *dépôts*, and trains; and by destroying the bridges of the Danube have run no risk from us. I had provided against this by reinforcing Ney with Gazan's division, Baraguey d'Hilliers' foot-dragoons, and Bourcier's division of cavalry. He was directed to ascend the left bank of the Danube with forty thousand men, for the triple object of covering our communications, of cutting off those of the enemy, and of masking Ulm, the only *debourch* of the Austrians. However, not to entirely deprive myself of the coöperation of so considerable a force, I directed Ney to get possession of the bridges of the Danube, and to pass over his advanced guards, who would cover them, and at the same time keep the marshal advised of events on our side, so that he could come and take part in the decisive battle, if it should take place within his reach. He had, on this occasion, a fine affair at Gunzburg, where he succeeded in gaining possession of the bridge; he also occupied those of Elchingen and Leipheim. His right under Dupont was established at Al-

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\*Jomini says that, the Austrians having published nothing respecting the disasters of this campaign, it is impossible to know the object of Mack's operations and of his combinations.



beck. The arrival of Murat at Burgau contributed to secure his success, by taking in reverse the troops which were opposed to him.

**FAULTS OF MURAT.**—Although we were superior in number, these multiplied movements had somewhat scattered my army; and, remembering the hot work at Marengo, I thought to avoid its repetition by giving to Murat the corps of Ney and Lannes, and the reserves of cavalry, in order to give more compactness to my detachments. This measure would also allow me to go in person to meet the Russians, if they should debouch on Munich before I could destroy Mack. I had reason to repent this choice: Murat did not comprehend the motives of my instructions to Ney; he thought that the enemy was concentrating in rear of the Iller, in order to base himself on the Tyrol, and ordered the marshal to entirely abandon the left bank of the Danube, so as to advance from Gunzburg and Elchingen on the Roth, and thence on Ulm and Wiblingen. This was to completely expose the road to Bohemia and our own communications. Fortunately, Ney took upon himself the responsibility of partly disobeying Murat's order; he directed the division of Loison to move from Elchingen to the Roth, and prepared to join him by Leipheim at Kissendorf; but he left Dupont and Baraguey d'Hilliers on the left bank of the Danube, notwithstanding the orders of the Grand Duke of Berg. I was not informed of this particular till afterward; it gave me a high idea of Ney's military talent. I have since learned that the idea was due to one of his officers.

**MACK'S ATTEMPTS TO EXTRICATE HIMSELF.**—Mack, at length recovered from the stupor into which our bold and rapid maneuvers had plunged him, felt that it was time to seek an issue. A council of war was assembled, and, after stormy deliberations, it was decided, they say, that the Archduke Ferdinand should put himself at the head of a corps of the *élite* of twenty thousand men, to open for himself a passage by the route of Heidenheim and Nordlingen. Mack held Ulm with the rest of his forces, so as to favor this movement, flattering himself, undoubtedly, that he would afterward be able to throw himself into the Tyrol. If it be true that the Austrian generals adopted this plan of eccentric retreat, *à la* Bülow, this resolution was a suitable climax to all the folly they had already committed. It was only by throwing four thousand men into Ulm and concentrating all their other forces that they could now hope to reach either Bohemia or the Tyrol, and not by dispersing their troops in all directions. To act thus was to ruin their army in detail.

COMBAT OF HASLACH.—Be that as it may, a corps of twenty-five thousand men left Ulm by the left bank, the same day that Ney, in consequence of Murat's foolish orders, had recalled the division of Loison from Elchingen to the Roth, and had himself left Gunzburg with the division of Mahler to join it; my generals thus seemed to open to the enemy an issue which they could no longer hope to force. As a further addition to these blunders, Baraguey d'Hilliers, charged with effecting a junction with Dupont near Albeck, neglected to do so. Dupont, reaching the village of Haslach alone, on the eleventh of October, with six battalions and three regiments of cavalry, exposed himself to the whole *corps-de-bataille* of Mack. Fortune repaired his faults. The Austrian general thought to extend his wings so as to envelop our little troop; his numerous cavalry moved too far to the left, while Dupont united his efforts on the centre at Jungingen. This village was taken and retaken six times. The Ninth light which at Marengo had won the name of *incomparable*, and the brave Thirty-second, the honor of the old army of Italy, immortalized themselves on this occasion. Thanks to so much valor, Dupont pierced the first line of the enemy, enveloped and captured an isolated column, maintained his position until night, retreated before day on Albeck, carrying away with him near three thousand prisoners. He, indeed, left on this bloody field of battle one third of his division, and the cavalry in his rear carried away nine pieces of cannon and his equipages; but he had triumphed with seven thousand men over twenty thousand, and had arrested the enemy's movement; he returned covered with glory and loaded with trophies. Baraguey d'Hilliers, who was to have assisted him, basely halted at Langenau, under the pretext that he would compromise his troops; a strange way of flying to the assistance of his colleague! The next day Ney, led into error by Murat, who always pretended that the battle was to be fought on the Iller, had recalled Dupont to Gunzburg, in order not to compromise him alone on the left bank.

NAPOLEON REPAIRS TO THE DANUBE.—I learned at Augsburg, on the twelfth, the movements which Murat had ordered Ney to make; I had at first intended to march with Davoust on Munich, where they feared the approach of the Russians and of the Archduke John; but I felt that without my presence on the Danube they would only commit blunders. I therefore proceeded in all haste to Pfaffenhofen, and directed my guard on Gunzburg. Marmont marched on the Iller; Lannes was to guard Weissenhorn and Pfuhl; Soult fell back from Landsberg on Memmingen,



to cut the road to the Tyrol. I received, on the morning of the thirteenth, an account of the unequal combat sustained by Dupont; there was no time to be lost; I hastened to Kissendorf, the head-quarters of Ney, to whom I had already sent orders by Berthier to resume his position at Elchingen, not understanding what motives had induced him to abandon it. This marshal had just left for Fallheim, to retake the bridge of Elchingen, where was heard a brisk cannonade.

**THE AUSTRIANS OCCUPY ELCHINGEN.**—Mack, learning, on the twelfth, of Dupont's disappearance, caused the corps of Werneck to pursue him to Albeck. The corps of Laudon was to advance to Elchingen, in order to mask this debouch. The Austrian general knew not which way to turn; no sooner had he disposed of Dupont, than he learned that Soult had fallen on his extreme right at Memmingen, to invest the division of Spangenberg in that city, and drive the troops of Wolfskehl on Ochsenhausen. He sent General Jellachich from Ulm, on the thirteenth, to cover this route, and if possible to deliver Spangenberg. He was now too late; surrounded by twenty-five thousand men in a city inclosed by walls and an old parapet, destitute of provisions and munitions, Spangenberg surrendered, on the thirteenth, with about seven thousand Austrians. The idea of pushing Werneck on Heidenheim, while Jellachich moved toward Biberach, is proof enough of the character of the enemy with whom we were engaged.

**THEY BURN THE BRIDGE OF ELCHINGEN.**—The Austrian divisions of Laudon and Riesch, encamped on the heights of Elchingen, were to protect the march of Werneck and also, without doubt, that of the army which was to follow him. This was their advanced guard, which, at the moment of my arrival at Kissendorf, caused to be attacked, on the thirteenth of October, the bridge of Elchingen, where General Malher had only one regiment; the officer who commanded there caused one of the arches to be cut in order to protect himself against superior forces, and fell back on the right bank. Ney, seeing realized every thing that he had predicted to Murat, hastened to assemble the division of Mahler on this point, and marched there himself with that of Loison. The Austrians, threatened in their turn by the approach of these forces, could do no better than burn the remainder of the bridge, which, however, they executed only in part.

**NEY REPAIRS THE FAULTS ALREADY COMMITTED.**—Ney made every preparation to repair this bridge, so as to force a passage and return to the left bank, where he had been three

days before. I, therefore, found on my arrival all the evil repaired, and my dispositions anticipated and perfectly executed. I had now only to combine the means of causing the rest of the army to conform to them. Lannes, who occupied Pfuhl and Kirchberg opposite Ulm, was to prepare to sustain Ney if necessary; Marmont received orders to relieve Lannes, and to put him in a commanding position on the Iller. Soult, as soon as he could force the surrender of the Austrians whom he had enclosed in Memmingen, directed himself toward Achstetten, in order to cut the road to Biberach. Dupont, receiving orders to move again from Brenz on Albeck, would favor Ney in the attack of Elchingen. Every thing was thus arranged for the entire investment of the enemy. Whatever course he might take, his loss was certain after the fourteenth of October.

**BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN.**—For several days the weather had been frightful; we were in mud up to our knees; the Danube had overflowed its banks; the bridge, partially burned, had been but partly repaired. On the morning of the fourteenth of October the weather cleared up a little: Ney passed, *en grand tenue*, at daybreak, with the voltigeurs of the Sixth light, and the grenadiers of the Thirty-ninth. The village of Elchingen rises in an amphitheatre on a small hill at some distance from the Danube; it is surrounded by gardens enclosed with walls which successively command each other; a vast convent crowns the summit. It is one of the most formidable posts that can be imagined. It was necessary to get possession of the first houses in order to protect the passage and the formation of the troops; afterward to drive the enemy from house to house, as our platoons debouched. Such an operation, executed in the face of fifteen thousand men and forty pieces of cannon, required all the intrepidity of Ney, who never exhibited a more brilliant courage.\*

After several undecisive attacks, the Sixth light carried the convent by escalade, and the whole division established itself on the plateau, gaining the left of the enemy by the Chapel of St. Wolfgang. Here was fought a pitched battle; Ney saw that it was necessary to effect a change of front in order to save himself from being driven into the Danube, and to clear the passage; but in extending his right on the heights it was necessary to secure his left, the decisive point which the Austrians held

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\*Jomini says that Ney had a warm altercation with Murat respecting the orders of the latter; "and as if to defy Murat in the exhibition of bravery. Ney on this occasion put himself in full uniform at the head of his column and directed each battalion himself; present wherever danger was to be found, he seemed to seek death; but death fled from him."



by means of a wood, and whence they might recapture Elchingen. The intrepid Sixty-ninth regiment is directed to carry this wood, which is to become the safeguard of our new line. It rushes in with enthusiasm; terror precedes its steps, and death accompanies them; every resistance is overthrown. At the same time the cavalry of Colbert and Bourcier makes brilliant charges, sustained by the infantry of Loison; soon the division of Malher passes the bridge and enables Ney to follow up his success. The enemy is pierced and driven by Kesselbrunn on Haslach in the direction of Ulm, with a loss of twenty cannon and three thousand prisoners: a detached corps only succeeds in gaining the road to Albeck, where every thing leads us to believe that the division of Laudon is intending to retire in order to follow Werneck. Ney, learning the presence of an enemy's corps on the right, deems it unsafe to pass the night near Haslach; and, for the better protection of the bridges, he returns to the heights of Albeck, where he establishes his head-quarters. While Ney is gathering his dearly bought laurels, General Dupont is fighting between Albeck and Languenau against the infantry of Werneck, who seems desirous of renewing the offensive.

INVESTMENT OF ULM.—On the morning of the fifteenth the armies are still in presence of each other, but in such a position that the ruin of the enemy is inevitable. Mack, with his left now become his right, occupies the heights of Lahr and Mohringen before Ulm; Werneck extends to the north from Albeck toward Nerenstetten. The rain, which had ceased on the fourteenth, begins again worse than ever; notwithstanding the unfavorable weather, our troops redouble their ardor. Ney directs the two divisions of Loison and Malher on Haslach; the cavalry of my guard sustains him. Dupont, who is still isolated, finds himself between Albeck and Languenau, opposed to superior forces. Lannes passes the bridge of Elchingen; and seeks to reestablish that of Thalfingen, in order to second Ney: Marmont replaces him on the heights of Pfuhl and at the bridge of Kirchberg, on the Iller; Soult continues to approach Ulm from the south by the road to Biberach; finally, Murat with the cavalry also debouches from Elchingen on the heights of the left bank. It may be seen from these positions that the Austrians, turning their backs to the Rhine, have taken the place of my army, which in turn seems to have come from Vienna and to have taken the place of the Austrians. It was a repetition of Marengo, with still greater chances in our favor. The combat was not long; Mack, giving up all hope of holding out in advance of Ulm, re-

tired within the place. His rear guard was closely pressed, and every where the frightened enemy fled in disorder. Ulm, surrounded by a well-bastioned *enciente*, and ditches full of water, is situated in the bottom of a valley commanded by the heights of Michelsberg and Tuilerie. Kray had established there, in 1800, a strong entrenched camp, the only system by which the place can be made susceptible of a long defense. Since then the exterior works had been destroyed: Mack had begun to rebuild them, but the work was only just commenced. Ney threw himself at the head of Malher's division on Michelsberg; the redoubt was carried; Loison followed up this advantage; Suchet carried the work on the height of the Tuilerie.

NEY'S ATTACK ON ULM.—Being now master of Michelsberg, from which he commanded the city, and seeing some Austrians still on the outside, Ney pushed forward the Fiftieth regiment against the Stuttgart gate. His object was to terrify the enemy and then summon him to surrender, no disposition being made to sustain this attack. The brave Fiftieth, piqued at having had no part in the affair of Elchingen, attacked the enemy with great impetuosity, penetrated pell-mell with him to the gate; a battalion threw itself even into the intrenchments on the right. Suchet, seeing this attack, sent the Seventeenth light to sustain it, without knowing what was Ney's object. This regiment seconded the efforts of the Fiftieth at the gate; but the Austrians, seeing from the top of the rampart that the effort was isolated, took courage, captured the first platoons which had entered, and closed the portcullis. Ney, satisfied with this demonstration, sent an officer to summon Ulm, and threatened Mack with a more serious attack.

MURAT MARCHES AGAINST WERNECK.—During these audacious attempts, Dupont found himself pressed between Albeck and Languenau by Werneck. It is not known whether, being cut off from Ulm by the combat of Elchingen, he sought to effect a junction with Mack, or wished to get possession of Languenau to secure his retreat. I at first could hardly believe the report of Werneck's operations. Seeing the actual state of things, and that the enemy was decidedly cut in two, I ordered Murat to march by Albeck with three divisions of dragoons to second Dupont. I took every disposition to reinforce the posts of Gunzburg and Donawerth by the foot-dragoons, and I attached myself more particularly to the destruction of that half of the enemy's army which had taken refuge in Ulm, satisfied that the other could not escape our squadrons. The Archduke Ferdi-



nand had entered there with Mack; but this prince, seeing the fate which would inevitably befall the wreck of his army, resolved to put himself at the head of his remaining cavalry and throw himself by Geislingen on Aalen, to rejoin the infantry of Werneck, and with him to gain Bohemia.\*

**MACK SUMMONED TO SURRENDER.**—The next day, the sixteenth, I caused some shells to be thrown into Ulm; I then sent Colonel Segur to summon Mack to surrender, threatening him with the assault and destruction of his garrison. I offered him six days. Mack demanded eight; he pretended to be sustained by the Russians, whom he believed to be at Dachau; he boasted to the messenger that he was firmly resolved to eat up his three thousand horses rather than surrender; this was a confession that he was in want of provisions, and I had calculated that his invasion had been too rapid to allow him to collect large magazines. All that he had brought with him, or had levied in the country, was hardly sufficient for the fifteen days that he had laid idle on the Iller. Segur was sent to Ulm on the seventeenth; Berthier soon followed him, and, after some parleys. Mack sent the Prince of Lichtenstein to my head-quarters to complete the arrangement. I had painted to him in the darkest colors his desperate situation; I spoke to him of the horrors of an assault, reminded him that at Jaffa the obstinacy of a scheik had forced me to destroy four thousand Turks; he returned fully convinced that they had no alternative but to capitulate.

**CONDITIONAL CAPITULATION.**—Certain that Munich was occupied by Bernadotte, Wrede, and Davoust; that the Archduke Ferdinand was pursued on Nordlingen by superior forces; and that the Russians could not yet think of passing the Inn; in a word, seeing that it was absolutely impossible for him to be succored, the Austrian marshal consented to give up the place on the twenty-fifth of October, if he were not succored before that time: in the meanwhile he surrendered one gate to Marshal Ney. I instantly detached the corps of Lannes on Aalen to second Murat in his pursuit of the Archduke.

**DEFEAT OF WERNECK.**—Hardly had twenty-four hours elapsed since this shameful transaction of Mack, before we received news of the signal advantage gained by my brother-in-

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\*Jomini says there is still an uncertainty respecting this resolution of the Archduke, and as the Austrians have published no account of the affair, he is obliged to trust to general rumors. Some say that the council of war was called just after the affair of Gunzburg on the tenth; others that it was called on the night of the fourteenth and fifteenth, after the combat of Elchingen.

law over the troops of the Archduke Ferdinand. Indefatigable in success, Murat first overtook the rear guard of Werneck, at Langenau, on the sixteenth. To discover it, and, in concert with Dupont, to charge and overthrow it, was for him an affair of an instant. Two thousand prisoners fell into his power. He started again before day in pursuit of the principal corps on the road to Neresheim. Embarrassed by a convoy of five hundred carriages of artillery and equipages, Werneck could not fail to be overtaken by our soldiers, who flew on the wings of victory; forced to receive a disadvantageous engagement, he lost another thousand men. The Archduke, despairing of escaping with his infantry, again separated from it with his cavalry, and took the road to Nuremberg.

**HE SURRENDERS.**—Being assailed on the eighteenth, at Trochtelfingen, near Nordlingen, cut off and surrounded on all sides, with his forces scattered and destitute of every thing, Werneck capitulated with about eight thousand men. The public opinion accused these old warriors, illustrious in many battle-fields, of having thus laid down their arms before forces about equal in number: the fact is, cavalry, inferior in numbers, can not envelop good infantry, supplied with cannon. The great convoy which had filed to the left was taken the same day at Topfingen by a brigade of dragoons.

**SURRENDER OF MACK.**—Informed of these successes the same evening, I saw the advantages I could draw from them. It was important for me to accelerate a *dénouement*; the corps which were investing Ulm were in want of every thing. We had made our rapid marches without any magazines; in truth, we passed over so vast an extent of surface, and through a country so very rich, that our troops had been in want of nothing while on the march; but in position, with concentrated masses, the case was very different. Moreover, I was impatient to march to the Inn, for fear that Bernadotte and Davoust would be alone exposed to the approach of the Russian army. I invited Mack to my head-quarters, and he was polite enough to come. I informed him of the capture of Werneck; I demonstrated to him that Bernadotte and Wrede had driven Kienmayer beyond the Inn, taking from him two thousand prisoners; that Soult, having passed the Danube above Ulm, had occupied in force all the roads to the Tyrol and the Voralberg; finally, I proposed to him to surrender me the place, without waiting a delay which had now become useless and without object. The poor man had so lost his senses that he fell into the snare. He forgot that he had just published a



proclamation threatening the first man who dared to speak to him of capitulation, and that he had boasted that he would eat his last horse before he would surrender. Blinded by the captious proposition of leaving at Ulm the entire corps of Ney, estimated sufficient for the blockade, he thought to save his honor and his reputation by a ridiculous combination by which the lowest of his soldiers could not have been duped. He therefore consented to surrender Ulm the next day. Under the pretext of paralyzing Ney's corps at Ulm, Mack anticipated the period of his capitulation by six days, thus rendering disposable the corps of Soult, Marmont, and the guard, and also leaving me at liberty to direct my attention elsewhere; he seemed impatient to put the seal to his humiliation.

In consequence of this additional article, thirty thousand Austrians filed before me on the morning of the nineteenth, conducted by sixteen generals; they laid down their arms to be transported to France. Many of these soldiers, exasperated, threw away their arms on leaving the city, rather than surrender them in form, thus showing what indignation the blunders of their leaders had excited in the men. Forty colors, sixty cannon, three thousand cavalry horses, were additional trophies of this great event. Among the number of the generals who were taken prisoners were Klenau, Giulay, Gottesheim, and the two princes of Lichtenstein, whose valor and talents are attested on every page of our history.

I had already within the last ten years gained many brilliant successes; but never had I enjoyed a triumph like that of an entire army defiling before me and laying down their arms, their colors, and their cannon. Placed on an eminence which commands the city and all the basin of the Danube, I could contemplate at my ease the spectacle which promised me such high destinies. Mack took position near me with his generals. While their columns were filing past, I consoled them on the vicissitudes of war; I deplored the blindness of the cabinet which had sent them to their destruction for the interest of England alone. Entirely devoted to my projects of making a descent on England, I asked nothing of Austria; it was vessels, colonies, commerce that I wanted. What interest then could Austria have in shielding from my blows a power which caused all the troubles of the continent? So far it was well enough, but, drawn on by my subject, I accompanied these remarks with some indirect threats against this imperial house: "Every empire," said I, "has its end, and the Emperor may have reason to fear that the time of

the House of Lorraine has already come." I had good reason to speak proudly after events so glorious, which were entirely due to the skillfulness of my combinations; but this sentiment had no suitable place in my discourse. I wished to give the alarm at Vienna and to dictate peace. I have always been full of confidence in my superiority, but I was never blinded by pride. Nevertheless, this sortie, made for a pardonable object, gave offense by its phraseology, and I felt that it might as well have been omitted.

**FATE OF THE WRECK OF MACK'S ARMY.**—Of Mack's entire army, the corps of Kienmayer, the Archduke Ferdinand, with three thousand horse, and the division of Jellachich, had alone been able to avoid destruction; this last division, having escaped from Ulm on the road to Fussen, and, stopping to guard these defiles of the Tyrol, was also soon surrounded. The Archduke, after having abandoned Werneck to his fate, followed at first the road to Nuremberg, then fell back on Altmühl and Donawerth, to gain the road to Cham. He directed his rear guard to take the road to Nuremberg in order to deceive Murat; he thus succeeded in effecting his escape, and reached Bohemia with two or three thousand horse.

Posterity, more enlightened than we are respecting the combinations of Mack and of the Cabinet of Vienna, will assign to each the blame which properly belongs to them. It has been said that Mack had in his army a party more powerful than himself, and that he was opposed and disobeyed, and his army scattered in spite of himself. This is all very possible; but a general-in-chief should never consent to become the instrument of the destruction of his army; when placed between dishonor and glory, between the safety of the state and the loss of his army, he should be capable of taking a part worthy of himself. Mack, after being shut up within Ulm, might at least have attempted a sortie to follow Jellachich toward Fussen; it is always shameful to capitulate without an effort to escape.

An army of eighty thousand men was thus destroyed at a single blow without any great battle, and without its having cost me six thousand men. This commencement of the campaign was truly brilliant, but nothing could be decisive until we had beaten the Russians, who were approaching by forced marches to the assistance of their allies. Even before Mack had surrendered Ulm, I directed Soult to march for Landsberg and Munich; Lannes and Murat took the same direction immediately after the defeat of the Archduke Ferdinand.



**PRUSSIA THREATENS TO JOIN THE COALITION.**—Notwithstanding all our successes, my position was becoming more complicated. The King of Prussia, who, on the eighth of September, had ordered out sixty battalions and as many squadrons to make demonstrations against the Russians on the Vistula, had just received the news of the violation of his territory of Anspach by our troops. The policy of the last ten years is instantly abandoned; a general cry for vengeance is raised in all his monarchy. The Prussian cabinet orders the formation of four corps at Hof, Hildesheim, Münster, and the reserve at Berlin. One division enters Hanover, now abandoned by the troops of Bernadotte, and reestablishes there the government of the Elector; at the same time notes are addressed to me demanding satisfaction for the violation of neutral territory. Nevertheless, the entire destruction of Mack's army suspends for a moment this warlike order of Prussia. I rather expected this result; I felt certain of the success of my operations as soon as Mack had taken position near Ulm, and I thought, in authorizing the march of my troops, that I should have plenty of time and means to satisfy Frederick William, should my plan succeed.

**NAPOLEON DIRECTS HIS FORCES ON THE INN.**—To scatter the storm which was gathering about us, it was more urgent than ever to profit by the immense advantages which I had just gained, and the ascendancy which they were calculated to give me over the first Russian army, which, by the disaster of Mack, was to be exposed in the same manner to our blows. In fact, Kutusof had just arrived with forty thousand men at Braunau on the Inn, where he formed a junction with the corps of Kienmayer which Bernadotte and Wrede had pursued and cut up in two combats. General Merfeldt had joined it with some reinforcements and taken the command. The first movement of the enemy was to advance on Haag; but the news of the capitulation of Ulm did not long leave them under the comfortable illusion of being able to resume the offensive. I had no sooner finished the directions for sending our prisoners to France, and for fortifying Augsburg sufficiently to secure it against an attack, with a good *tête-de-pont* on the Lech, than I left post-haste, on the evening of the twenty-fourth, for Munich. After remaining here three days, I hastened to the Inn with the well-founded hope of treating Kutusof as I had done his predecessor. Of course I expected a greater resistance, but the disproportion of the means was such that I could not doubt the result. Soult and Marmont had also taken the road to the Inn. Lannes, whom the sur-

render of Werneck had rendered disposable, soon fell back on Bavaria, and Murat, although he had gone to Nuremberg in pursuit of the wrecks of Prince Ferdinand, threw himself with his usual activity by Neumarkt on Ratisbon, and arrived, almost as soon as I did, on the Inn.

PASSAGE OF THE INN, THE SALZA, AND THE TRAUN.  
—Angereau had passed the Rhine at Hunigen on the twenty-sixth of October; I left to this marshal and Ney, in concert with the Bavarian division of General Deroi, the task of destroying the corps remaining in the Tyrol. Every thing being prepared for the passage of the Inn, we advanced, on the twenty-eighth of October, in three columns. Bernadotte, sustained by Marmont, passed at Wasserburg, and directed himself on Salzburg, whose defense had been assigned to the corps of Merfeldt. Davoust found the Russians at the bridge of Mühldorf, which they had burned; he restored it and reached the Salza at Burghausen; but, having no bridge for passing this river, he was obliged to stop and repair the one which had been destroyed; this gave the Allies two days' march the start of him. The reserve and Soult followed the same road. Lannes, at the left, marched from Landshut on Braunau. Everywhere the enemy, seeing the danger to which he would be exposed by a general engagement, retired before our columns, after exchanging a few rounds of cannon. He evacuated, without resistance, the post of Braunau, whose bastioned *enciente* had not even been armed, so confident had the Austrians been of invading France, instead of seeing us at Vienna. Braunau was an excellent post for securing a base on the Inn, in concert with Salzburg, which also was respectably fortified, although its works were commanded by the surrounding heights. We might then regard the Salza and the Inn as an excellent base of operations, since Bavaria, Ulm, Ingolstadt, and all the interval to the Rhine was within our possession or in our favor.

Having passed the Salza and the Inn, Murat took the lead of the pursuit with his cavalry; on the twenty-ninth, he had an engagement at Ried with the rear guard of Kienmayer; the thirty-first, a more serious affair took place at Lambach; we here found ourselves engaged, for the first time, with the Russian infantry; a corps of four thousand men wished to keep their possession on this side of the Traun, in order to give their equipages time to pass this defile. The division of Bisson assailed them; the Seventeenth of the line wished to avenge itself for the affair of Trebia, and it did so with glory; it nevertheless found worthy adversaries; it was only after a severe fight, in which Bisson was



wounded, that the enemy, while beginning the retreat, saw himself driven back with great loss.

**NAPOLÉON'S MARCH ON VIENNA.**—I resolved to pursue my march on Vienna. Certain critics have blamed this; they think I should have rested on the Inn till I could collect new forces; they do not hesitate to pronounce my march on Austerlitz an extravagance. The principal reason given for this opinion is that a Prussian army was threatening to move on the upper Danube. For the satisfaction of these critics, I will say that I always fully considered these movements. Time was requisite for an army to come from Berlin to Ulm, especially as this army had begun to move against the Russians on the Vistula, and, benumbed by ten years' peace, was incapable of immediately taking the field. The rule of war the most indisputable is, to strike an enemy who is unprepared. Kutusof had exposed himself to my blows, and it was necessary to punish him. By remaining on the Inn, I should have permitted the Archduke Charles, Ferdinand, Kienmayer, and Kutusof to unite in upper Austria with the army of Alexander, and two hundred thousand men, well provided with every thing, would then have been opposed to me; without including the Prussians, whom my position on the Inn would not have prevented from advancing to the upper Danube. Might they not as well have advised me to return to Strasbourg? In fact, if I had remained at Passau, there was nothing to oppose the march of the Duke of Brunswick by Nuremberg on Ulm. To prevent such an operation it was necessary either to retreat behind the Rhine, or to anticipate the enemy by attacking the Russians; the one course was disgraceful, the other glorious; there could be no hesitation. I judged more wisely than my critics in deciding that it was for my interest to fight successively those distant corps. I was superior in battles; I ought therefore to seek them. If I lost a battle, I might then fall back to the Danube or submit to the mediation of Prussia, whom I should then render arbiter of negotiations.

By occupying Vienna, I would intimidate Berlin; I would profit by the immense resources of Austria; I would destroy all concert between the Russian army and that of the Archduke Charles; I would become master of all the movements. It requires a very strong desire for aspersion to draw conclusions as false as those who have censured me for this project. If the Prussians marched into Swabia, the Archduke Charles into upper Austria, and the Emperor Alexander on the Danube, to take position on the Inn was to select a point such that all these three

masses might concert their actions and from some common object. Grant that this position had been advisable, if the motive had been to secure ourselves from being turned by the Prussians; but then we should have been turned on the Inn, as well as at Vienna, after the enemy had placed himself on the upper Danube and on our communications with France. Besides, when I decided to march on Vienna, I did not yet know what part Prussia would take. She had talked very loud, but when one wishes to go to war, he makes less noise about it; moreover, I knew that Prussia really wished to obtain her object by threats. I intended to offer her reasonable satisfaction; but there was still time enough, for it was not till the middle of November that she appeared seriously disposed to join our enemies.

#### THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER REPAIRS TO BERLIN.—

The Emperor Alexander, informed of the sensation produced at the Court of Berlin by the affair of Anspach, thought proper to repair in person to that city, certain of engaging, by his seducing manners, a prince who had resisted all the seductions of his diplomacy. A treaty was signed, on the third of November, between these two powers; but I did not know of this before the arrival of Count Giulay at my head-quarters at the gates of Vienna.

We will return to my movements on this capital. I followed, with the mass of my forces, the right bank of the Danube. Two corps marched by the mountains, as much to cover the march as to turn the large rivers that intersect this route. We pressed the enemy so close that, in spite of his excellent position on the Traun, he did not arrest our march for a single moment, but abandoned to us the city of Lintz with its fine bridge over the Danube. It was not difficult to see the advantages to be derived from this. I immediately resolved to send across a corps of twenty thousand men commanded by Marshal Mortier,\* with orders to descend the left bank, so as to threaten the Russians with the loss of their communications with Moravia, and thus force them to surrender to us without opposition the strong positions which defended the approaches to Vienna. Should they persist in maintaining their position, this corps would get possession of their bridges, cut them entirely from Moravia, and thus complete their investment. To make sure of this operation, Captain Lostanges, of the navy, was directed to form a considerable

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\*This corps, as has already been said, was composed of the division of Dupont, detached from Ney's corps, that of Gazan, from Lannes' corps, and the Batavian division of General Dumonceau, detached from the second corps.



flotilla of boats on the Danube, and descend this river at high-water.

**MASSÉNA'S OPERATIONS IN ITALY.**—While my vast designs were developing themselves with a success that even astonished myself, my army in Italy was no less fortunate, and had accomplished with the same precision the task which had devolved on it. The Austrians had committed three capital faults in their plan of campaign; the first, in engaging offensively their weak point; the second, in remaining inactive in Italy with their strong force; the third, in employing an army in the Tyrol, where it remained, waiting its turn, a mere spectator of the defeat of the others. The Archduke Charles had above one hundred thousand men, without including the garrisons and the corps of the Tyrol. It is probable that this army was not prepared at the beginning of the campaign; otherwise it would be difficult to see why it did not cross the Adige the very day that Mack passed the Inn. Perhaps the Archduke waited for the junction of Kutusof and Mack on the Lech; this would have been a no less false combination. *In war it is always necessary to act wherever you are better prepared and stronger than your enemy.* The Archduke, by taking the initiative, had thrown Masséna behind the Mincio, and perhaps behind the Po. If this success had not saved Mack, even if it had increased the distance which this prince had been compelled to pass over to come to the assistance of the threatened monarchy, it would nevertheless have made a happy diversion by the beginning of October, and the Archduke, informed by the Tyrol of the disaster of Ulm, might have fallen back on La Carinthia more at his ease, and without being pressed, as he actually was. But instead of taking the initiative, they gave this advantage to Masséna. The armies were separated by the Adige, which, since the treaty of Lunéville, had formed the boundaries between the two empires; the city of Verona was cut in two parts; we occupied that on the right bank, and the Austrians the other half, with the strong castles. They had cut two arches of the bridge.

**INSTRUCTIONS TO MASSÉNA.**—At the moment of the passage of the Rhine by my army, I thought that Mack would either be destroyed or driven back on the Inn, and that, sooner or later, the Archduke would be forced to make a retrograde movement. To deprive him of the passage of the Adige, or at least to be better prepared ourselves for an attack, I had directed Masséna to get possession of that part of Verona which belonged to Austria, to rebuild the bridges and establish himself at St. Michel, in a position closed in by the Adige and the mountains,

where the numerical superiority of the enemy would be of little advantage to him; at least so that he would not venture to pass the Adige lower down; to do this would have been one of those audacious movements, which we were not accustomed to see on his side. Masséna acquitted himself perfectly in the delicate task; he got possession of Verona and the bridges, on the seventeenth of October, and debouched conformably to my orders. The Archduke, more occupied with his own security than with the conquest of Italy, had covered with intrenchments the celebrated position of Caldiero and Colognola, formed, as is known, by the spur of the Tyrol mountains, which blocks up the road to Vicenza, and slopes down insensibly to the Adige. These heights, bristling with vines, trees, rocks, and redoubts, seemed impregnable: Masséna remained before them from the eighteenth to the twenty-ninth of October; and the Archduke, seeing that the events in Swabia took away all hopes of success in Italy, thought it unnecessary to sacrifice his men in driving him beyond the Adige.

**PASSAGE OF THE ADIGE AND BATTLE OF CALDIERO.**—Masséna, hearing, on the twenty-eighth, of the capitulation of Ulm, and the destruction of Mack's army, applied himself to the execution of my orders, which he accomplished with as much audacity as skill. Fearing that the Archduke might gain a march or two of him by means of the formidable position which he held, Masséna drove in his outposts on the twenty-ninth, and ventured to attack him there the next day. Convinced that all hopes against the centre would be useless, he thought to turn the left by throwing across the Adige the division of Verdier,\* reinforced near Zevio, while, at the opposite extremity, Molitor† gained the mountains. Masséna, with the divisions of Duhesme and Gardanne, attacked Caldiero; the division of Serras at the extreme left was guarding Rivoli and the space between Lake Garda and the Adige. To assail eighty thousand men in their entrenchments with forty thousand was more than rash; neverthe-

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\*Jean Antoine Verdier was born at Toulouse in 1767, and entered the French army at the age of eighteen. He served with distinction in all of Napoleon's campaigns, and was noted for being wounded in nearly every battle. He was promoted through the different grades to the rank of lieutenant-general, and in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 commanded the Franco-Italian *corps-d'armée* under the Viceroy Eugene. He was always conspicuous for his bravery.

†Gabriel Jean Joseph Molitor was born at Huningen in 1770. He first entered the army as a volunteer, and was made captain in 1791. He rose to the grade of general at the age of twenty-nine. He served with distinction in most of Napoleon's campaigns, and rose to the rank of lieutenant-general. He won the baton of marshal in the campaign of 1813, in Spain.



less it was near proving successful. Verdier could not execute his passage; Molitor was forced back after heroic efforts. Our soldiers, electrified by the news from Ulm, wished to show that they were in no way inferior to the grand army. The center fought with fury. The Austrians debouched offensively between their works with a strong mass of the *élite*. Masséna attacked the head of the column with grape, and assailed it in flank; exposed to cruel losses, without being able to penetrate the ranks of our braves, it was forced to retreat, and very much cut up: the carnage ended only with the approach of night.

The next day Verdier was more successful in effecting his passage; but isolated in the midst of the enemy, he considered himself very fortunate in effecting a junction with Duhesme, but not without being vigorously assailed and harassed by the left of the Austrians. On the thirty-first there was a repetition of these bloody scenes—scenes glorious to both sides, but without any results proportioned to the devotion and the animosity of the combatants. Our troops slept, as it were, during these three days, at the foot of the enemy's ramparts. This affair had cost us more than six thousand men; the Austrians had lost at least as many, for at the centre their column had cruelly suffered; two thousand prisoners had been taken.

**RETREAT OF THE ARCHDUKE.**—The Archduke had sent away his *impedimenta*; he began his march on the first of November, leaving Frimont to cover his retreat. To favor this operation they pushed forward the brigade of Heister from the heights of Colognola in the direction of the forts of Verona. As soon as Masséna perceived the movement of retreat, he made dispositions to profit by the sacrifices he had made so as not to let the enemy escape. Frimont was cut to pieces and driven back behind the Brenta. The brigade of Heister, which had exceeded its instructions in advancing to the fortress of Verona, was surrounded and taken prisoners to the number of four thousand men.

Whatever may be the numerical superiority of the army in retreat, the duties of the rear guard are none the less difficult; for it is always singly exposed to all the efforts of the enemy; as the army seeks to accelerate its retreat, it is never disposed to delay its movements to come to the assistance of its engaged corps. The Brenta, the Piave, the Tagliamento, the Isonzo, facilitated the retreat of the Archduke, who finally reached Laybach without having been very seriously cut up, but always hemmed in so close that he could not move with all the celerity demanded by the circumstances. The only serious trouble that he experienced was

that the corps of his right, engaged in the mountains of Sette-Comuni and in the gorges of the Brenta, were for a moment cut off, and had to throw themselves by Belluno and Primolan to gain the valley of the Drave. A very lively combat of the rear guard took place, on the twelfth of November, at the passage of the Tagliamento. The Archduke halted there to decide whether he should march by Tarvis and Villach in order to join the Archduke John, and move with him on Salzburg; but the news of our impetuous march on Vienna had decided him to take the road to Laybach. The Archduke had thrown into Venice a strong garrison, which, by its advantageous position, might give much trouble to Masséna. The corps of Saint-Cyr coming from Naples to the Adige fortunately supplied him with the means of observing this place, and of continuing his march. The grand army pursued its march with an ardor which seemed to redouble with its fatigues, although the cold had now become pretty severe, and from Laybach the ground and the roads were covered with snow.

**NAPOLEON AT LINTZ.**—I stopped at Lintz two days, for several motives: the first to dispatch Mortier across the Danube with his corps; the second, to await the Elector of Bavaria. We had moved with so much velocity that this respectable prince, a refugee, as it were, at Wurtzburg, had not been able to meet me on his return to Munich. He now came to congratulate me on the triumphs I had gained, and to which he had contributed his share, and at the same time to concert with me respecting future operations. I engaged him to unite some detachments for observing the western frontier of Bohemia, in concert with Baraguey d'Hilliers.\* The division of Deroy, charged with the reduction of Kufstein, was afterward to take possession of the Tyrol conjointly with Ney. A point more delicate claimed all my solicitude. The Russians, English, and Swedes had just landed in Hanover, and Prussia, instead of covering us on that side, was assuming a menacing attitude. We had in those countries merely the single garrison of Hameln, and it was to be feared that Holland might become the object of the coalition. I announced with great formality the organization of an army of the

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\*Louis Baraguey d'Hilliers was born at Paris in 1764. He was an officer at the breaking out of the Revolution, and served as brigadier-general under Custine and Menou, but afterward fell into disgrace. In 1796 he joined the army of Italy, and in 1797 was made a general-of-division. In 1804 and 1805 he commanded the cavalry of the reserve, and distinguished himself in the brilliant operations of the campaign of Ulm. He afterward served in Italy, Spain, and the campaign of 1812, in Russia, but died during the retreat.



North, under my brother Louis, which was to be composed of six divisions, independently of the corps of Augereau, who would leave Swabia to march to the Low Countries by Mayence. I even circulated the report that I myself was going to Amsterdam, and had directed a palace to be prepared for my reception.

PROPOSITIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE.—While at Lintz, I also received a message from the Emperor of Austria; this prince, informed by Count Giulay of what had taken place at Ulm, and my conversation with Mack, and of the demoralization of his armies, and the disasters caused to the country by the war, sent this general to me to demand an armistice and to propose peace. The Emperor himself came to Molk to accelerate negotiations. This step might be sincere, but I had reasons to doubt it. How could I grant a suspension of arms which would allow the Allies to unite their three armies on the Danube, and give Prussia time to enter Bohemia or Bavaria? How could I trust to the sincerity of a pacific overture under such circumstances? To inspire me with a confidence so blind, there was only one means: that of giving by the armistice certain pledges, by agreeing immediately upon the preliminaries of peace, and by sending away the armies whose reunion might become threatening to me, if I did not profit by the advantages of my position to prevent it. I required that the Russians should return to Poland, that Austria should disband the *levées-en-masse* in Hungary, and yield to me Venice and the Tyrol; otherwise I should be forced to continue my operations on Vienna. Great astonishment was manifested at these propositions, as though I had left my camp at Boulogne to fly with one hundred and fifty thousand men to the Inn and destroy a powerful Austrian army, and then return just as I had come, without gaining the slightest advantages. Certainly, if Austria had been willing to instantly quit the enemy's ranks and place herself among the number of my allies, and renew the treaty of 1756, with only such alterations as the change of circumstances required, I should have been unjust to strip her of her territory; I ought, under such circumstances, to have left her the Tyrol and Venice. But such was not the case; Austria left the enemy's ranks merely to gain time and to recruit herself, until a more opportune moment for recommencing the war. Perhaps I might have joined to the demand of these two provinces the proposition of afterward increasing the territory of Austria, if she had consented to the alliance. In fact, these conditions, though not at all out of proportion to my success, appeared rather hard to the Cabinet of Vienna, which was expecting the assistance of,

the grand Russian army, and of the armies of the Archdukes Charles and John, without including the support which Prussia was promising to the coalition. Nevertheless, this negotiation did not retard our march for a single moment.

OPERATIONS OF MURAT AND DAVOUST.—The enemy had abandoned to us the Ems; Murat, Lannes, and Soult pushed him lively on Amstetten. Here the Prince of Bagration\* made an obstinate stand, on the sixth of November, in order to give Kutusof time to file past. A combat took place in the woods, hand to hand, between the Russian grenadiers and those of Oudinot. Our soldiers, more intelligent, more impetuous, more alert, and better armed, triumphed over the bitter obstinacy of their valiant adversaries; these, being forced to retreat, were overthrown by the hussars, who cut off several hundred prisoners. On the seventh Murat pushed them on as far as Molk, which place the Emperor of Austria had but just left.

The valley of the Danube, closed in at the south by the mountains of the Tyrol and Styria, offers only one great road below Lintz; this road runs along the river at a greater or less distance from the stream. A lateral road runs by the foot of the mountains on Steyer and Waydhoffen; but here it turns to the left toward St. Polten and rejoins the great road so as to avoid the terrible chain of the Wilde-Alpen, a spur of which forms the Wiener-Wald, a woody chain which cuts the valley transversely between St. Polten and Vienna, extending quite to the Danube. The first of these cities is therefore situated this side of the Wiener-Wald, and at the mouth of the defiles; a sharp angle, closed in by the river Trasen, offers to an army the best position for covering Vienna on this side. I had every reason to believe that the enemy would receive battle here, especially as the second Russian army could here effect a junction by Krems. In order to turn this position, I directed Davoust, Marmont, and Bernadotte on the road from Steyer; but, on learning the difficulty of the route and the scarcity of provisions for an army in so wild a country, the latter returned to the valley of the Danube; Marmont received orders to descend from Steyer to Leoben, and Davoust to continue his march as far as Lilienfeld in order to descend on Vienna. This marshal ascended with great dif-

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\*Prince Bagration was of Georgian origin, and first distinguished himself under Suwarrow, of whom (in the words of that marshal) he afterward became the right arm. He won great reputation in the campaigns of 1806 and 1807. In 1812 he commanded the second corps of the Russian army. He was wounded at the battle of Moskwa, where he was greatly distinguished, and died soon after from the effects of his wounds.



ficulty the rocky mountains which separate the St. Gaming from Mariazell, a real chamois country, which name it bears; his advanced guard fell unexpectedly upon the columns of Merfeldt, who had undoubtedly taken the road to Leoben for fear of falling near St. Polten into the midst of my army. To fall on this column, cut it in two, drive one part on Neuhaus, and capture three thousand prisoners, was for the braves of the first corps but the work of an hour. The wreck of Merfeldt regained Neustadt in the greatest confusion.

**KUTUSOF PASSES THE DANUBE.**—The battle which I expected at St. Polten did not take place. Kutusof,\* whose troops were cut up and reduced to thirty-five thousand men, thought, and most correctly too, that by passing the Danube at Krems he would get rid of a hot pursuit which daily cost him some of his brave troops, and besides would shorten some four days the distance he had to march in order to reach Brunn. He, therefore, recrossed the river at Mautern, the ninth of November, on a fine wooden bridge of twenty-eight arches, the only one existing between Lintz and Vienna, and this he burnt after his passage. Murat, finding no enemies before him, moved on with still greater ardor beyond St. Polten, and pushed, on the tenth to Burkersdorf, to within four leagues of Vienna. Soult, who had received no orders to pass St. Polten, allowed himself to be drawn on to Sigartskirchen. I had remained at Molk with my guards. Bernadotte, returning from Steyer, had reached St. Polten.

**AFFAIR OF DIERNSTEIN.**—Kutusof, having rid himself of us for a moment, went to fight Mortier, who, as will be remembered, was moving along the left bank of the river below Lintz. Here the chances were in favor of the Russian general, for he knew that he was going to attack with the mass of his forces an isolated corps whose rapid march had considerably separated its troops. Mortier, wholly occupied with cutting off the enemy when he should pass the Danube to take the road to Moravia, promptly debouched, on the eleventh of November, from the de-

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\*Kutusof, Prince of Smolensk, was born at St. Petersburg, in 1745, and entered the Russian army in 1759. He distinguished himself in the wars against Poland and the Turks, and after the storming of Ismail, in 1789, was made lieutenant-general. He served in several campaigns against the French, and in August, 1812, after the resignation of Barclay de Tolly, was made general-in-chief of the Russian army. He displayed excellent judgment in his dispositions, but was inactive in his pursuit of the retreating enemy. He was opposed to prolonging the war, and died in 1813. Kutusof had a fine education, and was regarded as one of the most accomplished soldiers in the Russian army.

files of Diernstein, whose castle is made memorable by the detention of Richard Cœur-de-Lion; he had with him only the division of Gazan and a brigade of dragoons; the division of Dupont was following at an interval of a march, and the Dutch still farther in rear. After having passed Diernstein, Mortier encountered the advanced guard of Miloradowich, whom he drove quite to the gates of Stein; but this success, which produced him a few hundred prisoners, was almost fatal; for at this moment the division of Doctorof, led on by General Schmidt, the ablest of the Austrian chiefs of staff, descended by the mountains behind Diernstein, and closed the gate of this terrible defile, at the same time that General Essen reinforced Miloradowich with his reserves and threw himself in front on the plateau of Loiben; nothing but a miracle could now save Mortier. He had gone to meet the division of Dupont, ordering it to accelerate its march; on returning to the division of Gazan, he found it completely hemmed in by the enemy, and had great difficulty in cutting his way, sword in hand, to rejoin it. Placed in the alternative of cutting a way out or of dying there, he decided to force an issue. But this was no easy matter; the road from Loiben to Diernstein passes between two high walls which occupy a part of a very deep defile formed by the mountains and the Danube; the battalions of Doctorof, collected in this gulf in very deep columns, offered no means of forcing his way through; it was exceedingly difficult to pass either to the right or to the left, on account of the mountains and the river. Major Henriod, at the head of the One Hundredth regiment, threw himself against the head of the enemy's column; they fought with the bayonet; two of our pieces charged with grape swept the whole length between the walls, and did the greater execution as the Russians had not been able to bring a single cannon with them, and now had no other arm than the bayonet. General Schmidt was killed by one of these discharges. Doctorof was not a man to allow himself to be easily taken; but the brigade which he has detached up the Danube to secure his own communications in this *coupe-gorge* is soon attacked by the division of Dupont. Doctorof now finds himself between two fires, in the same situation in which he thought to place Mortier; he has but a few minutes to escape through the very ravine that he had followed in descending from the mountains; for if Dupont penetrates as far as the entrance to this ravine, it is all over with the Russian column, which has no artillery. It retreats in all haste; Mortier drives back his rear guard with a facility that surprises him, and hardly has he passed Diernstein than, instead



of the enemy, he encounters the column of Dupont. One can easily imagine the electric effect produced on our soldiers by the sight of their comrades and liberators. Those who have, in war, been placed in similar situations, can alone fully appreciate the scene. This junction enables Mortier to repel Essen and Miloradowich, who are pressing him in rear. After this warm work, being in want of provisions, munitions, and artillery, my lieutenant deems it prudent to repass the Danube at Spitz by means of our flotilla; considering himself fortunate in escaping with the loss of fifteen hundred men. The Allies lost as many, and suffered still more sensibly in the death of General Schmidt, the friend and companion-in-arms of the Archduke Charles; he fell as a brave man in the attack of Loiben.

**NAPOLEON ENTERS VIENNA.**—This affair of Mortier in no respect changed the state of things. I had in some measure foreseen it; for, on arriving at Molk, I arrested the march of Murat and Lannes, who, exceeding my instructions, rushed on toward Vienna more rapidly than I wished. I even made Soult retrograde from Sigartskirchen to Mautern; Bernadotte remained at Molk; but after I had learned at St. Polten, on the twelfth, the issue of this affair and Mortier's return to the right bank, I promptly took such measures as were then required. The advanced position of Murat on Vienna, and the certainty that none of the enemy's corps covered the approaches to that city, gave me hopes of effecting an abrupt entrance, of surprising the great bridges of the Danube, and of debouching by the road to Moravia, before Kutusof could reach there from Krems.

I was the more stimulated to this course by the return of Count Giulay to my head-quarters on the twelfth; instead of bringing me the adhesion of his sovereign to the conditions which I had offered, he came to announce that Prussia had finally decided, on the third of November, to make common cause with Russia and Austria. I well knew the tardiness and irresolution of this cabinet; I was prepared to strike an important blow, and to spread terror through Europe, by the capture of Vienna; this of itself would suffice to allay the storm. Moreover, the possession of this capital would force the Archduke Charles to march toward Hungary, and thus open my communications with Masséna; I would then have no further trouble about our communications in Swabia, if they should be threatened by the Prussians. For the success of this bold design it required the concurrence of unusual circumstances; fortune exceeded my hopes. I removed my head-quarters to Burkersdorf, on the thirteenth;

Murat and Lannes arrived before Vienna, conformably to my instructions.

STATE OF THAT CITY.—Built in the superb basin formed by the Styrian Alps on the south, the Crapack mountains on the east, and on the west by Mount Bisamberg, the chain of Bohemia and the secondary mountains of upper Austria, Vienna is perhaps, next to Constantinople and Naples, the most agreeably situated capital in Europe. Having long served as the barrier of Germany against the kings of Hungary and the Turks, it had always been a military post, and well fortified. Taken by the Hungarians in the middle of the thirteenth century, it had afterward resisted all its enemies; every one knows the famous siege it sustained in 1683 against the Turks, when, notwithstanding the bravery of its defenders under Count Stahremberg, it must have eventually fallen before the Vizier Kiuperli, if the Poles, under the great Sobieski, had not gone to its assistance, and entirely defeated the Ottoman army in a great battle under the very walls of the city. For this event, which saved Europe from the Crescent, as Charles Martel had delivered it from the Moors on the plains of Tours, the Poles deserved no little gratitude on the part of Austria. The old *enceinte* of Vienna was well bastioned, even on the side next the Danube; it contained about one hundred thousand inhabitants; but the city had outgrown these walls, and the immense suburbs, covering a space of eight thousand toises, contained double the population of the old town. These exterior portions had been covered with intrenched lines as a security, probably, against the invasion of the Turks; but these lines, having only a slight relief and an insignificant ditch, were incapable of defense; the *enceinte* of the place, however, required a regular attack; my whole army could have made no impression upon it without siege artillery. Vienna, with Prague, was the grand arsenal of the Austrian monarchy; and, with the exception of some of the English arsenals, was the largest in Europe. It contained two thousand pieces of brass cannon, six hundred of which were of siege caliber, one hundred thousand firearms, etc., etc.

MURAT SURPRISES THE GREAT BRIDGES OF THE DANUBE.—The corps of Merfeldt had crossed the city in order to reach the left bank of the Danube; his rear guard held the bridge with every thing prepared for its destruction. If this rear guard and the militia of Vienna had raised the drawbridges of the fortifications and armed the ramparts, we should have been under the necessity of passing the Danube somewhere else, and



of renouncing these immense captures; moreover, this passage would have been no easy thing, and have required time and means which we did not have at hand. The Emperor Francis, in leaving Molk, had passed through Vienna on his way to Presburg, and, after having closed there the session of the Hungarian Diet, he departed for Brunn in order to join the Emperor Alexander, whose army was to concentrate at that place. The Austrian monarch had recommended the inhabitants of his goodly city to Count Wurbna, his grand chamberlain, whom he left there as governor; instead of inciting the inhabitants of Vienna to imitate their ancestors, this good courtier preached to them submission, and even threatened to punish any who by partial resistance should disturb the good order of the city. Moreover, the greater part of the nobility had taken refuge in Hungary. The tender solicitude of a prince for his capital and its inhabitants is certainly very commendable; but is this the highest of his duties? Were these pathetic homilies of M. Wurbna well-timed, when a resistance of ten days might have saved the monarchy?

With such dispositions we could encounter no very great obstacles, for the Regency, without even waiting for our summons, hastened to send Count Zinzendorf to meet me with proposals for the surrender of the city. Murat had already received orders to accelerate his march. At break of day on the morning of the thirteenth, at the approach of the dragoons of Sebastiani, the gates were opened; our astonished soldiers traversed this superb city: the grenadiers of Oudinot followed; the enemy hastened to the bridge; the staff made signs to the artillery officer who was stationed with a piece in the middle of the bridge, for defending its approach, and giving, at the proper time, the signal for its destruction. A report of the pacific mission of Count Giulay had been circulated; this officer and the Prince of Auersberg believed that a parley had taken place and an armistice been signed; our soldiers approached them and surrounded the officer and his troop; our column was on the bridge. Prince d'Auersberg, undecided, had now other resource but flight, and our soldiers, still more astonished at the easy capture of this magnificent bridge of two hundred and fifty *toises* in length than at that of Vienna itself, rushed across it in pursuit of the enemy. Prince d'Auersberg was tried by a council of war, but his carelessness had caused an irreparable evil. Hearing at Burkersdorf of this strange event, I hastened, at midnight, to examine the bridge and determine what course I should now pursue; I bivouacked there for the night; I hastened the arrival of my troops; I threw Murat

by Stockerau on the road to Znaim, and returned with my guard to establish my head-quarters in the beautiful palace of Schönbrunn, the Versailles of Austria.

**CRITICAL SITUATION OF KUTUSOF.**—Kutusof, having left Krems on the thirteenth, in order to gain the great road to Moravia, heard the next day of the passage of the Danube and the march of Murat. He thus found himself engaged between the two roads that lead from Vienna and Krems to Znaim, a situation the more difficult as I had ordered Mortier and Bernadotte to cross the Danube at Mautern by means of the flotilla, to harass his rear. The Russian general had but little hopes of reaching, before Murat, the direct road to Hollabrunn, and even if he did, Mortier might still force his march and arrive by Schrattenthal at Znaim as soon as the enemy. Kutusof decided with promptness; he threw Bagration with a corps of the *élite* on Hollabrunn with orders to defend it to the last extremity, and he himself crossed directly on Schrattenthal. To maintain himself with nine thousand men against Murat and Lannes, two days' march in advance of the army, was a difficult task; as a climax of embarrassment, General Nostitz, who covered the retreat of the Austrian corps on Znaim, summoned by Murat to separate himself from the Russians, under the pretext of an armistice, was so inconceivably simple as to open the road to our cavalry columns, which appeared suddenly and unexpectedly before Bagration; they were soon supported by the grenadiers of Oudinot; a most terrible combat ensued; the Russians were forced to retreat on Schöngraben.

**NEGOTIATION OF MURAT.**—Murat, who was hurrying to reach Znaim before Kutusof, since on this might depend the fate of the war and the ruin of the Russian army, thought to neutralize Bagration as he had Auersberg and Nostitz; he therefore sent him a messenger, but this time the ruse turned against himself. Kutusof was particularly distinguished for his great finesse: hearing of the arrival of a French messenger, he thought to save his army by sending General Winzingerode\* to Murat to enter into

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\*Baron Winzingerode was born in 1769, in Würtemberg. He first served in the Austrian army, but afterward joined the Russian army, and, being a great favorite of the Emperor, he was rapidly promoted. He, however, was never greatly distinguished as a general. Being a bitter enemy of France, he had much influence in shaping the policy of the Russian government, and in negotiations with foreign powers, against Napoleon. In the campaign of 1812 he attempted to enter Moscow after this city had been occupied by the French, being still ignorant of such occupation. On seeing the mistake, his command deserted him and fled, and he was surrounded and captured. He displayed a white handkerchief and claimed to be the bearer of a flag of truce. For this attempted violation of the laws of war in regard to a flag of truce, he was placed under guard and sent to Metz for confinement, but was rescued while on the way. He died in 1818.



negotiation and conclude an armistice. Winzingerode was *aid-de-camp* to the Emperor Alexander; he took upon himself to stipulate in the name of this prince. The Russian army was to retire into Poland by easy marches; the French, on this condition, were to suspend their march on Moravia; the respective armies were to remain in position till I should ratify the arrangement! Murat thus fell into the same snare which, within three days, he had twice set for the enemy; Kutusof could not save Bagration, who was in sight of our videttes, but he pushed forward his army by a forced march while the courier flew to Schönbrunn to obtain my approval. Better advised than my lieutenant, and certain that he had been deceived, I reprimanded him severely, and ordered him to attack instantly.

**COMBAT AT HOLLABRUNN OR SCHONGRABEN.**—Soult's corps having joined Murat, the destruction of Bagration seemed inevitable; on the evening of the sixteenth our columns rushed forward to the attack; Oudinot, Vandamme,\* Murat's dragoons, vied with each other as to which should have the honor of being first on the field. The right of the Russians was turned and the centre pierced, in spite of the most honorable resistance; they fought hand to hand amid the smoking ruins of the village of Grund. The enemy's left was cut off; nevertheless, by means of the night and a surprise, they succeeded in effecting a passage through our columns, and escaped, leaving us, as a trophy, a village filled with dead and a few hundred prisoners. One third of the corps of Bagration had fallen in this contest, which continued until eleven o'clock at night; but he had the glory of carrying off the remainder, safe and sound, from the midst of forty thousand men by whom he was in a measure surrounded.

**KUTUSOF EFFECTS HIS JUNCTION.**—Having rejoined Murat, we arrived at Znaim on the seventeenth. Kutusof had already departed for Brunn, and no further obstacle preventing his junction, he effected it on the nineteenth at Wischau. Sebastiani pushed the enemy's rear guard, and captured many stragglers.

**MEASURES TAKEN AT SCHÖNBRUNN.**—I had passed

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\*Dominique Joseph Vandamme was born at Cassel in 1771. He entered the army when very young, and in 1793 was made a brigadier-general. He was made general-of-division in 1799. He was afterward promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general and made peer of France. He died in 1830. Vandamme was regarded as an excellent officer, and served with distinction in most of Napoleon's campaigns. In addition to his military promotion, he was highly honored by the Emperor, and received important commands and employments.

two days at the palace of Schönbrunn, but this delicious abode had not been a Capua for me; many imperious motives had retained me there, and never had I displayed more activity than during these two days. I was not merely waiting for definite information of Kutusof; I had yet to regulate the administration of Austria, and provide for the future wants of my army. A contribution of one hundred millions was levied for this purpose. Moreover, I caused Marmont to reconnoiter the road to Styria, to gain information of the armies of the Archduke Charles and of the Archduke John. I had also to provide for the security of Hungary, a powerful kingdom, whose Diet had just ordered great levies: I pushed Davoust on Presburg to hold this country in check. Mortier, with the eighth corps, occupied Vienna. Bernadotte, passing the Danube at Mautern, marched on Bohemia with the first corps and the Bavarian division of Wrede; they advanced on Iglau to check the Archduke Ferdinand, who had again collected twelve or fifteen thousand men. This apparent dissemination of my forces will astonish tacticians who preach concentration of masses; it was, nevertheless, indispensable, and a proof of my familiarity with war. I knew that it would require ten or twelve days for Kutusof to join the Russian army and recover from the fatigues of so difficult a retreat. To show my *corps-d'armée* at Presburg, at Iglau, and at Leoben was to act at the same time on the *morale* of the Hungarian nation, on the Archduke Charles, who was coming from Italy, and on the Archduke Ferdinand, who was defending Bohemia; I could afterward recall my corps when it should be necessary to strike. The sublimity of the art consists in knowing how to divide, to pursue, to act on minds, to intimidate, to deceive the enemy, and to unite when necessary to fight! Never has any general pushed this art as far as I have. To be convinced of the rapidity and impetuosity of my system, it is enough to remember that on the eighteenth of October I was at Elchingen treating with Mack for the surrender of Ulm, and one month after I found myself at Brunn, having crossed the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, the Enns, and the Danube, having fought at Amstetten, at Mariazell, at Krems, at St. Polten, and at Hollabrunn.

My combinations perfectly fulfilled their object; not only did Davoust receive from the Hungarian deputies the assurance that this kingdom should not trouble the combinations of my army, if I would not overrun the territory beyond Presburg; some even went so far as to propose to declare the independence of



Hungary, if I would afford them protection.\* Bernadotte explored the road to Iglau, and satisfied himself that the enemy was not in condition to trouble us on that side. Marmont made a useful diversion in favor of Massena, and facilitated his operations by occupying Bruck; I knew very well that he was not in sufficient force to contend with the Archduke; this was not the object; my purpose was to show to this prince a strong head of column in the mountains of Styria, and to turn him from a direct march on Vienna to the longer but securer road to Hungary. I thus increased the interval which separated him from the Russian army; I very much retarded the epoch when they could act in concert; this was employing a detachment to a good purpose; finally, when the time should arrive, Marmont would again return to Vienna, uniting there with Mortier, and permit me to mass my forces between the Danube and Brunn, and to act as I might wish on the two armies, or to choose my line of retreat. In the mean time Davoust was to carry one of his divisions to Neustadt, in order to sustain the second corps if it should be obliged to fight in the gorges of Sommering.

**REMARKS ON THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.**—I more and more appreciated the wisdom of my resolution to push on to Vienna and afterward to ascend into Moravia. This second movement was a consequence of the first; for, to be successful, it was necessary to increase the interval between the two allied armies, and to enlarge my base of retreat, by rendering it more easy on Passau. Prussia was not yet prepared to act immediately: 1st, because she was awaiting the troops with which she had formed the cordon of the Vistula; 2d, because she preferred to accomplish her objects by negotiation rather than to engage in the war. The Cabinet of Berlin was very formal; and notwithstanding the Emperor Alexander's visit to the tomb of Frederick at Potsdam, King Frederick William had made only a conditional engagement. He wished to try once more to make an arrangement with me.

**THE FRENCH ARMY AT BRUNN.**—On the twentieth I removed my head-quarters to Brunn. On arriving at this city, I was utterly astonished to find that the Austrians had not even put the smallest garrison in the citadel, a well-fortified place, which could be taken only by a regular siege. I am willing

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\*For this proposition to take up arms for the independence of his country one of the most distinguished of the Hungarians was, after the peace, condemned by the Austrian government to twenty-one years' imprisonment.

to admit that too many fortifications enfeeble active armies, and cannot of themselves save an empire; but under the present circumstances the occupation of Brunn was too important not to have left there a garrison of two or three thousand men; they could not have been better employed. It is true that the place was not in a complete state of defense, for it was not expected that it would be so soon surrounded by our battalions. Nevertheless we could only have blockaded it, and it was strong enough to hold out a week, which was sufficient to accomplish its object. The corps of Lannes, Soult, and Murat cantoned between this city, Austerlitz, and Wischau. We here had some days' repose, the first which my troops had enjoyed since they left Boulogne. In three months we had flown from the coasts of England to the confines of Moravia, destroyed an army, and captured the capital of proud Austria. Our soldiers had found wine and provisions, but their shoes were in a horrible condition; they marched with their naked feet in the snow. This repose was demanded both to recruit my troops and by the situation of the respective forces. We will profit by this moment of respite to look back to what had been passing around me within the last month; for, drawn on by the rapidity and increasing interest of my march, I have deferred speaking of the operations of the secondary corps which I left in our rear.

**OPERATIONS IN THE TYROL.**—While I advanced with so much impetuosity on Vienna, Ney and Augereau had obtained no less success in the Tyrol. It is known that this mountainous country, forming, as it were, a bastion which commands both Italy and Germany, has always been regarded by the Austrians as the key of those two countries. They thought that the mountains rendered them masters of the plain; and if this axiom be true in tactics, it was reserved for me to show its falsity in strategy. Five principal roads debouch from the Tyrol into Germany, cross the chain of the Alps, and are closed by the same number of forts at Feldkirch, Reiti (Fussen), Scharnitz, Leiten, and Kufstein. The Archduke John here commanded, at first, forty-five or fifty thousand men. A part of these had been withdrawn to second Mack in Swabia, on the one side, and the Archduke Charles in Italy on the other. Nevertheless, he still had, including the militia, thirty-five thousand men. Ney, leaving Ulm, with only ten thousand, presents himself toward Scharnitz, on the fifth of November. A Bavarian division threatens Kufstein, or rather observes this fort and covers Bavaria; Augereau, who has just crossed the Rhine at Hunninguen, advanced by the



Black Forest on Kempten, where he finds himself in presence of the division of Jellachich, who left Ulm the evening of the combat of Elchingen, and sought safety in the Voralberg. Ney, unaccustomed to count the number of his enemies, attacks the bastioned fort of Scharnitz, which closes the gorge; he is repulsed. one of his columns climbs the rocks, turns and carries the little fort of Leutasch, descends to Seefeld in rear of Scharnitz, which is closed only on the side toward Germany, forces the garrison to seek safety in flight, captures five or six hundred prisoners, and then audaciously advances to Innspruck, into the very centre of the enemy's corps.

The Archduke John concentrated his forces on the Brenner to cover the retreat of Jellachich and the Prince of Rohan, one of whom was at Meran and the other in the Voralberg; he ordered them to fall back in all haste on Botzen. They were too late. Jellachich, surrounded at Dornbiren by Augereau, was obliged to lay down his arms with five thousand men, and was taken back to Bohemia on condition of not serving again for a year. The Prince of Rohan, more fortunate, at first drove back the posts of Loisen at Botzen, on the nineteenth of November; but, after having passed this city, he found the debouches on La Carinthia occupied by the French troops; the Archduke John, fearing for his own rear, which the retreat of the Archduke Charles had left entirely exposed, thought best to abandon Brenner on the night of the fifteenth, in order to retreat by Villach and Klagenfurth on Cilly, where he effected a junction with his brother. Rohan, isolated in the midst of the Tyrol mountains, still hoped to effect his escape on the side toward Italy, by passing in rear of Massena and reaching Venice; he descended by the gorges of the Brenta on Bassano. Saint-Cyr, who was blockading Venice, attacked and defeated him at Castel-Franco. The Prince of Rohan, seeing no further resources, surrendered on the twenty-fourth of November with about five thousand men. Massena, who was at this time on the Isonzo, detached in haste his reserve of grenadiers to second Saint-Cyr in this operation; but every thing was decided before their arrival. After these events, Augereau placed himself near Ulm to observe Prussia; Ney turned the Tyrol over to a Bavarian division and marched to Salzburg.

**NEW ATTEMPTS AT NEGOTIATIONS.**—We will return to my army, which we kept cantoned, from the twenty-second to the twenty-eighth of November, between Wischau and Brunn, within two or three leagues of the Russian army, which was waiting, under Olmutz, the arrival of its guards and reserves. I had

profited by this interval to send, on the twenty-fifth, General Savary, to the Emperor Alexander, less to carry him new proposals of peace than to learn from him what conditions the Allies would agree to. The Austrians sent me in return MM. Stadion\* and Giulay to learn from me what were my pretensions; they hoped that the adhesion of Prussia, the march of the Archduke Charles on Vienna, and the union which had finally been effected between the Russian and Austrian forces, would make me abate the conditions which I had proposed at Molk. Never, however, were we further from an agreement, for the Allies demanded nothing less than the famous project of Pitt; they merely allowed me to infer that possibly they might deign to leave me Belgium, but that I must certainly evacuate all Germany and Italy; on the other hand, I determined not only to keep what I had, but I also demanded of Austria, Venice for the kingdom of Italy, and the Tyrol for the Bavarians. Cannon alone could bring us to an agreement. I, however, proposed an armistice; the envoys of Austria having observed that it depended on the Emperor of Russia, and that they were not authorized to agree to it, I induced them to repair to Vienna, where they could continue the negotiation.

The next day, the twenty-eighth, Count Haugwitz, the Prussian minister, arrived at my head-quarters; he brought me the complaints of his master, which I had seen for a month in all the gazettes of Germany; he demanded satisfaction for the violation of his territory, and the entire evacuation of all the German soil. These conditions contained nothing objectionable, since they made no question of Italy and Holland; but the other Allies would not agree to them.

We were engaged in this discussion when it was announced to me that the Russian army had just broken up its camp at Olmutz, and carried the post of Wischau, which covered my cantonments. I showed Haugwitz that it was necessary for me to leave him to provide for the security of my army, that very prob-

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\*Count Jean Philippe Stadion was born at Mayence in 1763. After receiving a most liberal education, he repaired to Vienna and obtained employment in the diplomatic corps under Prince Kauntz, who was then prime minister. From that time forward he took a prominent part in all the diplomatic discussions in Europe till the fall of Napoleon. In 1813 he was made minister of finance, which office he continued to hold till 1818, when he was sent as the representative of Austria to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. He then retired to private life, and died in 1824. His elder brother, Count Frederic Stadion, born in 1761, also filled several diplomatic offices, and the two are often confounded. The latter represented Mayence and Württemberg at the Congress of Rastadt.



ably we should be engaged in a fight, and that our affairs could be better arranged at Vienna, with Talleyrand, than in my bivouacs; I persuaded him to go to this capital, assuring him that I was ready to do every thing calculated to lead to an adjustment of our difficulties. I prepared to give him a more categorical answer from the field of Austerlitz.

**MOVEMENTS OF THE ALLIES.**—The Russian guards and reserves, under the orders of the Grand Duke Constantine, having arrived on the twenty-fifth, the enemy's army commenced operations on the twenty-seventh, and easily carried our advanced post of Wischau. We were not ready for them; for the difficulty of supplying so large an army in position had induced me to defer as long as possible the concentration of all my forces. Besides, it was important, as has already been said, to keep Bohemia and Hungary in check, and I had calculated that by means of Brunn I should always have three days for drawing to me the corps of Bernadotte and Davoust; I had made every preparation by directing them to echelon toward me so as to diminish the distance. I accordingly ordered Murat, Lannes, and Soult to break up their cantonments and assemble in the rear of Brunn; but so as to cover that place. Bernadotte received orders to leave the single Bavarian division at Iglau, and to join me by forced marches. Davoust was to move in all haste on Nicolsburg; Mortier was to give Vienna to the division of Dumonceau (of Marmont's corps), and also to direct himself on Brunn; Marmont himself had been instructed to leave Neustadt to approach Vienna. The forces which I had in hand on the twenty-ninth did not exceed fifty thousand men; the Allies had eighty thousand, and it was, therefore, for their interest to push me closely in order to force me into battle. It is true, that by means of the good positions of the fortified place of Brunn and its environs, which the enemy had so generously surrendered to us, I should not have fallen back very far; nevertheless, it was for the interest of the enemy to seek either to cut me up or to force me to battle; in war every thing ought to be attempted that conforms to military principles; Fortune does the rest.

I was not without anxiety respecting the course which the enemy might pursue; the reputed obstinacy of the Russians gave some apprehensions; they had fought at Hollabrunn as they had in the time of Frederick at Zorndorf; but the Emperor Alexander, having no experience in war, distrusted both himself and his generals, most of whom had fought only against the Turks; he was now merely the auxiliary of the Austrians; these latter under-

stood their own country better than he did, and he depended on them to guide him. Nothing could be more fortunate for me; at the head of their projectors was the same Weyrother whom I had used so admirably at Roveredo, Bassano, and Rivoli, and over whom Moreau had gained so cheap a victory at Hohenlinden. The reports of Savary and the conversations of an *aid-de-camp* whom the Emperor of Russia had just sent to me with him, had already given me the measure of his councillors; I saw that they were disposed to do many foolish things, if I would only afford them an opportunity.

After they had taken their first steps, they deceived themselves respecting the state of affairs. The retreat of my advanced guard induced them to believe that, instead of venturing to give battle, I only thought to escape by retreating on Vienna. Acting under this impression, instead of attacking us boldly, they amused themselves with extended movements by their left, and by throwing themselves into the cross-roads in order to cut off our retreat on Vienna. This was a gratuitous fault; for a little reflection should have convinced them that I would not retreat in the direction of the Archduke Charles, where I might find the bridges of the Danube destroyed, while I had in my rear Bohemia, a fertile country, through which passes the most direct road to Bavaria. It is true they had some interest in maneuvering in the direction of Hungary to prepare a junction with the Archduke; but it was too soon to do this; that prince was still in Carniola, and the Russian army was waiting the corps of Essen at Olmutz; it was therefore not the time to abandon this road to throw themselves inconsiderately on that of Göding.

**NAPOLEON'S DISPOSITIONS FOR THEIR RECEPTION.**  
—On the twenty-ninth the enemy made a short march of two leagues and a half from Wischau to the heights of Kutchreau. This march, though short, indicated a determination to direct themselves toward Auspitz; but with them the plan of the evening was never the plan of the following morning. Renouncing the project of maneuvering strategically in order to entirely gain our right, they again moved directly on us. But they still advanced timidly. On the thirtieth they bivouacked at Hogieditz. I spent the day in riding over the environs; I saw that I had only to support my right and frustrate the enemy's project by occupying in force the plateau of Pratzen from the Santon to Kresenowitz to check them in front. But this would only lead to a contest with equal chances; I wished something better than that. The inclination of the Allies to gain my right was manifest; I



thought I could strike a decisive blow by allowing them to extend their left, and therefore placed on the heights of Pratzen only a detachment of cavalry.

On the first of December the enemy, debouching from Austerlitz, took position opposite us at Pratzen, his left extending toward Aujest. Bernadotte arrived from Bohemia, and entered into line; Davoust reached the Abbey of Raigern with one of his divisions; that of Gudin bivouacked at Nicolsburg. The reports which reached me from all directions of the march of the enemy's columns confirmed me in my opinion. At nine o'clock in the evening I passed along the whole length of my line, for the double purpose of judging the direction of the enemy's forces, and of animating my troops. I had just made them a proclamation, not only promising them victory, but even explaining to them the maneuver by which I was to obtain it. This is undoubtedly the first time that a general ever confided to his whole army the combination by which he expected to secure a victory; I had no fear that the enemy would be informed of it; if he had been, he would not have put any faith in it. The news of my presence before the front of the *corps-d'armée*, passing from one to the other like electricity, reached the extremity of the line with the rapidity of lightning; by a spontaneous movement all the divisions of infantry, raising bundles of blazing straw on the ends of long poles, gave me an illumination whose imposing and novel appearance had in it something majestic. It was the first anniversary of my coronation!

The aspect of these fires reminded me of the vine faggots with which Hannibal deceived the Romans, and the bivouacs of the camp of Liegnitz, which had saved the army of Frederick by deceiving Daun and Laudon. As I passed before each regiment, the cry of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" made and repeated far and near by each corps, carried to the enemy's camp proof of the enthusiasm which animated our soldiers. Never did any scene on the field of battle present a pomp so august and imposing; every soldier partook of the confidence with which these proofs of devotion inspired me.

The line, which it took me till midnight to pass, extended from Kobelnitz to the Santon. Soult's corps formed the right, placed between Sokelnitz and Puntowitz; he was opposite the enemy's centre; Bernadotte bivouacked behind Girschwitz; Murat at the left of this village, and Lannes in a position commanding the road to Brunn; my reserves were established in rear of Soult and Bernadotte. By placing my right under the orders of Soult,

it was evident that on him would fall the greatest weight of the battle. But in order that his movement should produce the promised result, it was necessary to begin by removing the enemy's troops which debouched toward Blasowitz and by the road to Austerlitz; it was probable that the Emperor's and the general head-quarters would be found there, and that it would be necessary to strike there first and then fall on their left by a change of front; this, moreover, was the way to cut off their left from the road to Olmutz. I therefore determined to second at first the movement of Bernadotte's corps on Blasowitz with my guards and the reserve of grenadiers, to turn back the enemy's right and then turn against the left, which would find itself so much the more compromised as it had advanced past Telnitz. My project had been determined on the night before, as I announced it to my soldiers; the essential point was to seize the right moment. I had passed the night in bivouac; the marshals were assembled about me to receive my final orders. I mounted my horse at four o'clock in the morning; the moon had gone down, and the night was cold and dark, though the weather was fair. It was important to know whether the enemy had made any movement during the night which might derange my plan. The reports of my guards confirmed the opinion that the movement had been from the enemy's right toward his left; his fires appeared to extend further in the direction of Austerlitz. At the break of day a light fog slightly obscured the horizon, especially in the valleys; suddenly this fog disappeared, the sun begins to gild with his rays the tops of the hills, while the valleys are still enveloped in a vapory cloud. We see very distinctly the heights of Pratzen, recently covered with troops, and now abandoned by the enemy's left; it is evident that he has followed out his plan of extending his line beyond Telnitz. I readily discover another mass marching from the centre toward the right in the direction of Holubitz. It is now perfectly certain that the enemy's center, stripped of its forces, is exposed to the blows which it may please me to strike. It was now eight o'clock in the morning; Soult's troops were concentrated in two lines of battalions in column of attack in the valley of Puntowitz. I asked this marshal how long it would take him to gain the heights of Pratzen; he promised to do it in less than twenty minutes. "We will wait then," I replied; . . . "when the enemy is making a false movement, we must be careful not to interrupt him." Soon the firing begins more lively in the direction of Sokelnitz and Telnitz; an *aid-de-camp* comes to announce that the enemy debouches in large forces. I was only



waiting for this; I give the signal; Murat, Lannes, Bernadotte, Soult, ride at full gallop for their respective corps. I also mount and ride toward the center; in passing before the troops I incite them anew, telling them: "*The enemy has just imprudently exposed himself to your attacks; close the campaign by a clap of thunder!*" Cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" attest that I am understood, and become the true signal for the attack; before describing this, we will notice what has occurred in the army of the Allies.

**DISPOSITION MADE BY THE ALLIES FOR THE BATTLE.**—If we are to believe the disposition projected by Weyrother, their design was to act tactically on the same plan which they had first wished to execute by strategic maneuvers; that is, to act with their reinforced left so as to gain my right, cut me off from the road to Vienna, and throw me back beaten on Brunn. Although my fate was not connected with the road to Vienna, for, as has been said, I proposed that to Bohemia, nevertheless, it must be confessed that this plan offered to the Allies some chances of success; but to give it success required something more than the action of this isolated left; it was essential to support it successively by the center and the right, which would have been prolonged in the same direction. Weyrother, as he had done at Rivoli, maneuvered by both wings, or at least such appears to have been his project.

The left, under Buxhowden, composed of the advanced guard of Kienmayer and of the three Russian divisions of Doctorof, Langeron, and Pribichefski, numbered thirty thousand men; it was to advance in three columns from the heights of Pratzen by Aujest on Telnitz and Sokelnitz, to cross the little stream which forms two lakes at the left, and fall back on Turas. The fourth column, under the orders of Kolowrath, with which the head-quarters moved, formed the center; it was to advance by Pratzen toward Kobelnitz a little in the rear of the third; it was composed of twelve small Russian battalions under Miloradowich, and fifteen Austrian battalions newly levied. The fifth column, formed by eighty squadrons under Prince John of Lichtenstein, was to leave the center, in rear of which he had passed the night, and to second the right by marching toward the road to Brunn. The sixth, on the extreme right, composed of the advanced guard of Bagration, numbering twelve battalions and forty squadrons, was destined to attack on the great road to Brunn the heights of the Santon and Bosenitz. The seventh, composed of the guards under the Grand Duke Constantine, formed the reserve of the right wing, on the road to Brunn.

It is evident that the enemy wished to turn my right, which he supposed to extend to Melnitz, while my army was collected in mass between Schlapanitz and the road to Brunn, ready for any event.

In accordance with this plan, Buxhowden, already more advanced than the rest of the army, commenced this movement before the other columns; moreover, the cavalry of Lichtenstein had moved from the centre to the right, so that the heights of Pratzen, the key of the whole field of battle, were left defenseless.

**NAPOLEON'S GREAT CENTRAL MOVEMENT.**—The moment I give the signal, all my columns move. Bernadotte crosses the defile of Girschwitz and advances on Blasowitz, sustained on the left by Murat; Lannes moves with equal rapidity on both sides of the Brunn road; my guards and the reserves follow some distance in rear of Bernadotte, ready to move on the center, if the enemy carries his forces in that direction. Soult moves like lightning from Kobelnitz and Puntowitz, at the head of the divisions of St. Hilaire and Vandamme, sustained by the brigade of Levasseur. Two other brigades of Legrand's division are left as flankers to mask and dispute the defiles of Telnitz and Sokelnitz against Buxhowden. As it is evident that he will force them, Marshal Davoust receives orders to move from Raygern with Friant's division and General Bourcier's division of dragoons, to check the heads of the Russian columns till we can engage them more seriously.

**SOULT'S SUCCESS.**—No sooner has Soult ascended the heights of Pratzen than he makes an unexpected attack on the column of Kolowrath (the fourth), which was marching to the center in rear of the third, and which, deeming itself secured by the one which preceded it, was advancing in column of route by platoons. The Emperor Alexander, Kutusof, and his staff are with it. Every thing that occurs unexpectedly at the head-quarters astonishes and disconcerts; Miloradowich, who is in front, hardly gets time to bring the battalions into combat as they are formed; he is overthrown, and the Austrians who follow him experience the same fate. The Emperor Alexander shows much coolness, and exposes himself in rallying his troops, but, thanks to the ridiculous dispositions of Weyrother, there is not a single disposable division to serve as a reserve. The allied troops are driven toward Hostiradeck. Kamenski's brigade, which belongs to the third column, assailed on its right flank, succeeds in reëstablishing their affairs for a moment; but this succor can not resist the combined efforts of St. Hilaire, Vandamme, and Levas-



seur; the line of Kolowrath, threatened to be thrown into the marshy valley of Birnbaum, falls back on Waschau, as was prescribed by the disposition. The artillery of this column, stuck fast in the half-frozen mud, is abandoned to us, and the infantry, deprived of cannon and cavalry, can do nothing against the victorious Soult.

**CHECK OF THE ENEMY'S LEFT.**—At the same moment with this decisive blow, the two columns of the right of Buxhowden are crossing each other and becoming entangled about Sokelnitz, from which place they debouch, notwithstanding the efforts of Legrand's division; Buxhowden himself also debouches from Telnitz, four battalions alone being insufficient to arrest him. Davoust now arrivés from Raygern, and Friant's division drives back on Telnitz the enemy's advanced guard; as the contest is taking a more serious turn toward Sokelnitz, Davoust leaves only the dragoons of Bourcier before Telnitz and ascends the stream as far as Sokelnitz with the division of Friant. A combat of the warmest kind takes place at this point; Sokelnitz, taken and retaken, remains a moment in possession of the Russians. Langeron and Pribichefski even debouch against the heights of Marxdorf; our troops, disposed in crescent form, charge several times on their flanks with success. This bloody contest being, however, only an accessory, it is enough to check the enemy without repelling him; indeed, there would result no inconvenience even if he should advance still further.

**SUCCESS OF THE CENTER AND FRENCH LEFT.**—While things were taking such a favorable turn on our right, we were no less fortunate at the center and left. The Grand Duke Constantine and the Russian guards here met precisely the same fortune as had already happened to the head-quarters and to the fourth column; they were to have been in reserve, but were the very first engaged. Bagration extended by the right toward Dwaroschena in order to turn and attack the position of the Santon. The cavalry of Lichtenstein, called from the center to his assistance, was crossed in route by the other columns, so that the Grand Duke and the guards arriving first near Krug, found themselves in the first line the moment when Bernadotte advanced on Blasowitz and Lannes on both sides the road to Brunn; the fight soon became hot. Having at last arrived, after a long march, on the right of the Grand Duke, the Prince of Lichtenstein was beginning to form, when the uhlans of the Russian guard, drawn on by their hot valor, threw themselves between the divisions of Bernadotte and Lannes in order to reach the light cavalry

of Kellerman, who fell back before them. Victims of their own ardor, they were charged by the reserves of Murat, overthrown and driven under the fire of our two lines of infantry, where half of them were destroyed. In the mean time our progress in the direction of Pratzen had forced Kutusof to recall Lichtenstein to the assistance of his center; and this prince, equally threatened on the right and left, knew not to whom to listen or where to render his first assistance; he hastened to send four regiments of cavalry, which arrived in time to witness Kolowrath's defeat. General Ouwarof was established with thirty squadrons between Bagration and the Grand Duke; the remainder of the cavalry was placed on the left. On his side the Grand Duke, seeing the French columns of infantry penetrate into Blasowitz and debouch from that place, determined to descend from the heights and meet them half way. This movement seemed to him necessary as well for his own security as to relieve the center, for which they began to have fears.

While a furious combat of infantry takes place between the Russian guards and the division D'Erlon, the Grand Duke's mounted guards (a regiment of cuirassiers) charge the right flank of this division, which is formed by the fourth regiment of the line detached from the division of Vandamme in order to cover the interval. The Russian cuirassiers fall upon this regiment, overthrow one battalion, but pay dearly with the lives of their braves for the honor of carrying off the battalion eagle. This hot contest, being isolated, was not dangerous; nevertheless, as it was possible that the enemy might send other forces to sustain it, I determined to direct on this point Marshal Bessières with the cavalry of my guard. It being necessary to end the matter, I ordered him to charge. The Russian line, after the most honorable defense, was obliged to yield to the united efforts of Bernadotte and Bessières. The infantry of the guards, incapable of a longer resistance, fell back on Kresenowitz. The mounted guards, which arrived at this instant from Austerlitz, attempted in vain to reestablish affairs; this regiment of the *élite* could do nothing more; being itself charged by my mounted grenadiers, which I advanced under the orders of Rapp, it was overthrown, and all the center then took the road to Austerlitz. In the mean time Murat and Lannes had attacked with success the corps of Bagration and the cavalry of Ouwarof, which sustained it. Our cuirassiers had overthrown the left of this wing pressed by the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli. Every where victory crowned our combinations.



## NAPOLEON UNITES HIS RESERVE WITH SOULT.—

Certain that Bernadotte, Lannes, and Murat would be more than sufficient to dispose of the enemy on this side, I fell back to the right with my guards and the reserves of Oudinot, to aid Soult in destroying the left wing, which was now taken in reverse and compromised among the lakes. It was two o'clock when Soult, incited by our approach, united the divisions of St. Hilaire and Legrand to take Sokelnitz in reverse, while the troops of Davoust assailed it in front; Vandamme threw himself on Aujest; my guard and the grenadiers followed in rear, to reinforce, in case of need, these different attacks.

The division of Pribichefski, surrounded in Sokelnitz, lays down its arms; a few fugitives only escape to tell this disaster. Langeron, pushed in his turn, is not more fortunate, and only one half of his troops succeed in joining Buxhowden. The latter, who had spent five or six hours with the column of Doctorof in a useless skirmish near Telnitz, instead of falling back at ten o'clock on Sokelnitz, at last thought it time to provide for his own security; he put himself in march between two and three o'clock to return to Aujest and escape from the trap, by moving along the valley between the lakes and the heights. He was debouching from the village in column when Vandamme threw himself with impetuosity on his flank, penetrated into Aujest, and cut his column in two. Buxhowden, not being in condition to turn to the assistance of the others, continued his retreat with the two leading battalions to rejoin Kutusof; but Doctorof and Langeron, with the twenty-eight other battalions, found themselves inclosed in the gulf between the lakes and the heights crowned by St. Hilaire, Vandamme, and my reserves. The head of the column on the side toward Aujest, escorting the artillery, attempted to escape across the canals formed for draining the lake; the bridge broke under the weight of the cannon. These brave men, hoping to save their pieces, now sought to cross the extremity of the lake, which was frozen over, but the ice, cut up by the fire of our batteries, broke under the weight of this mass, engulfing both men and cannon; more than two thousand were drowned. Doctorof had no other means of escape than to march along the shore of the lake to Telnitz under our fire, and to gain the dike which separates the lake of this name from that of Melnitz. He succeeded, but not without enormous losses, in gaining Satschann under the protection of Kienmayer's cavalry, which made the most praiseworthy efforts. They together took the road to Czeitsch by the mountains, hotly pursued by us. The few pieces

of artillery which the enemy had saved from the center and left were abandoned in this retreat, made by horrible roads, which the rain of the night before and the thaw rendered almost impassable.

**THE ENEMY, CUT OFF FROM OLMUTZ, IS THROWN ON HUNGARY.**—The position of the enemy was exceedingly difficult; I had gained the road to Wischau, which his troops could no longer reach. He was therefore forced to take the road to Hungary; but Davoust, one of whose divisions had reached Nicolburg, could, by a flank march, first reach Göding, while we were warmly pressing him in rear. The allied army, weakened by the loss of twenty-five thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners, and one hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, besides a quantity of stragglers, was in the greatest disorder.

**THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA ASKS AN INTERVIEW.**—The Emperor of Austria was unwilling to trust the fate of the monarchy to a final battle, which might lose all. He sent to me Prince John of Lichtenstein to ask an interview; it took place the next day in a bivouac, on the bank of a ditch. We had no difficulty in coming to an understanding; I had strong reasons for ending the matter; the Archduke Charles was approaching the Danube; Hungary, incited by his presence, might rise; the enemy's reserves were approaching from Olmutz; the Archduke Ferdinand was driving from Iglau the Bavarian division of Wrede; Prussia was threatening to debouch from Saxony into Franconia with one hundred thousand men. In truth, all these were but distant difficulties, while I had in hand trophies certain and immediate. I convinced the Prince of Lichtenstein that, in consenting to an armistice, I was forgetful of the interests of the victorious soldier to prove my desire for peace. I also persuaded the Emperor of Austria of this, showing him that it would have been better to have permitted me to pursue my project against England than to have troubled its execution. The armistice was concluded, by which the Russians were immediately to retire to Poland, and negotiations were to be resumed at Presburg to treat for a definitive peace.

**REMARKS ON THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.**—Never was there a more brilliant success, and, I venture to say, never was there one better deserved. Victory had been announced the evening before; it was certain after ten o'clock in the morning, for Soult was then master of Pratzen, and Bernadotte of Blasowitz. Undoubtedly it was facilitated by the blind obstinacy with which Buxhowden marched to meet him according to the plan;



without allowing himself to be turned aside by the attacks on the center. If, on hearing the thunder of the cannon in his rear, he had immediately directed his sixty battalions on Kobelnitz by the left of the rivulet, we should have been a little embarrassed; nevertheless, concentrated about Schlapanitz, we should have received battle with the advantage of concentrated forces over a divided enemy; victory would not in that case have been so brilliant: but I should nevertheless, in all probability, have gained the field of battle. It would, however, be absurd to attribute to Buxhowden a reverse which was due only to the faulty disposition projected by Weyrother—a disposition which left the army without a center, and which placed the head-quarters in the first line, and in the interval where was the decisive point of the whole field. The Allies had but two means of assailing me with any possibility of success: one was to successively sustain the attack of the left by the rest of the army, renouncing the road to Olmutz and basing themselves on Hungary, which could have been done without violating the rules of strategy, since the Archduke Charles was approaching in that direction; the other was to close the left on the rest of the army in order to preserve the road to Olmutz in their rear. To effect this, Buxhowden should have debouched by Sokelnitz and Kobelnitz on Marxdorf, instead of extending so far toward Telnitz.

Such was the famous day of Austerlitz; of all the pitched battles which I have gained, I pride myself most on this, both on account of the enemy over which I triumphed, and on account of the perfect success of all my combinations; this success was as perfect as though I had commanded the two armies and the maneuvers had been previously agreed upon. Ulm, Marengo, Jena, Ratisbon, were victories as brilliant, but they were the result of strategic maneuvers and a series of combats. The most remarkable of my tactical battles are those of Austerlitz, Rivoli, and Dresden.

**NAPOLEON RETURNS TO VIENNA.**—After the armistice, I hastened my return to Vienna, to accelerate negotiations and to put in order the internal affairs of my army; I had also an answer to give M. de Haugwitz.

Angereau was still in Bavaria; Ney's corps, after leaving the Tyrol to a Bavarian division, had gone to Salzburg. Massena and Marmont were debouching on Vienna. The army which had conquered at Austerlitz also approached the capital; I was thus about to find myself fully prepared to strike heavy blows, if the coalition should take a fancy to continue the war.

They still possessed powerful means; but they were scattered. The Archduke Charles was too far off to act effectively with an army demoralized by its long retreat, and by the defeat of the other forces of the monarchy. He would, moreover, be exposed at the same time to the whole of my victorious army, reinforced by Masséna, Marmont, and Mortier; the Russians were for a certain time out of reach. The Prussians—we will not anticipate their disaster, but for a moment consider their negotiations which were interrupted by the events of Austerlitz.

**TREATY OF VIENNA WITH THE PRUSSIANS.**—Haugwitz now felt that the time for menacing me was past; I proposed to him to overlook the violation of a territory which in 1796 and 1800 had been no better respected by either belligerent, offering him the electorate of Hanover in exchange for Anspach, Cleves, and the principality of Neufchâtel. Prussia would, by this arrangement, gain too much for her minister to hesitate; moreover, it was the most honorable way for her to replace the sword which she had drawn too late from its scabbard. Haugwitz accepted it unhesitatingly, happy to carry to his master the news of an aggrandizement instead of a formidable war; I also gained by it, since I avoided a war with a natural ally, and compromised Prussia with England.

**TREATY OF PRESBURG WITH AUSTRIA.**—This treaty, signed on the fifteenth of December, and that with Austria concluded at Presburg the twenty-sixth, put an end to the third coalition against France. Austria paid pretty dearly for it; I demanded of her the Venetian states to reinforce my Italian kingdom and my maritime system; she also yielded the Tyrol and the Innviertel to Bavaria. In order to attach to myself irrecoverably these brave allies, I erected Bavaria and Würtemberg into kingdoms, and the margraviate of Baden into a grand duchy. The Pays de Salsbourg, ceded to the Grand Duke of Tuscany by the peace of Lunéville, was accorded to Austria. The Grand Duke of Tuscany obtained Würtemberg, which put him more in my dependence. In exchange for Wurtzburg and the duchy of Berg, which the Elector yielded to me, Bavaria received Anspach, in addition to the Innviertel of the Tyrol. I, at the same time, proposed peace to the Russians, but Alexander refused it; this refusal was noble, for in accepting it he would have accepted the humiliation of his allies. In refusing, he exhibited firmness in reverses, and confidence in fortune; this refusal showed me that the fate of the world was dependent on us two. Nevertheless, we



could no longer carry on war, for we were separated by neutral countries. The Russians returned to their homes.

**OPERATIONS IN HANOVER.**—While I was directing the thunderbolts into the ranks of our enemies, they were amusing themselves with a ridiculous war in the North. To turn to account the knight-errant humor of Gustavus IV., King of Sweden, and to induce him to direct his forces to the continent, Russia and England had given him the command of an army, to which he added fifteen thousand Swedes. After uniting in Pomerania with Tolstoy's corps of about ten thousand men, he passed the Elbe near Lauenburg and advanced into Hanover. At the same time the Hanoverian troops and some English battalions debouched under General Don near Stade, and Lord Cathcart with another English corps soon followed. These forces, which amounted to more than forty thousand men, after having swept Hanover, where I had only the garrison of Hameln, were intended to operate against Holland. Although I had foreseen this danger, sending my brother Louis to this latter country with the *cadre* of what I called the army of the North, it required no less than the victory of Austerlitz to ward off the storm, for the still doubtful attitude of Prussia complicated matters. Happily, the folly of Gustavus came to my assistance. Furious against his allies, who reproved his impolitic and threatening tone toward Prussia at the very moment that the Emperor Alexander was at Potsdam treating with this power, the King of Sweden returned to Pomerania, threw up the command of the army, and thus destroyed the entire operation. After a discussion of three weeks, Gustavus went to Lauenburg; but there Tolstoy's corps was put at the disposition of the King of Prussia, who negotiated to take charge of the security of the north of Germany. This separation gave new displeasure to Gustavus, and Tolstoy went into Mecklenburg, whence he departed to return to Russia, when peace with Prussia had rendered his presence in Hanover wholly useless. The English also reëmbarked, and Gustavus, to complete his romantic operations, sent his troops back into Pomerania, leaving only five hundred men to guard Lauenburg.

**THE DYNASTY OF NAPLES CEASES TO REIGN.**—The Court of the Two Sicilies had given, by its inconceivable conduct, the measure of its hatred toward me. I had concluded, on the twenty-first of September, a convention of neutrality with the Marquis of Gallo, the Neapolitan minister at Paris; this treaty, which was to remove far from his country the scourge of war and to put at my disposition Saint-Cyr's corps of occupation—a

treaty advantageous to both parties—was ratified by the King on the eighth of October. This transaction, which seemed well calculated to save the kingdom of Naples, put its government in a false position. Before it was signed, Queen Caroline had moved heaven and earth to interest England, Russia, and Austria in her fate; the plan of the Allies had stipulated the landing of twelve thousand Russians and six thousand English, to unite with twenty-five thousand Neapolitans, in order to advance on the Po for the deliverance of Italy. These forces appeared about the middle of November at the roadstead of Naples. To receive them, in violation of the engagements recently entered into with me, was to expose himself to my just anger; to repel the Allies after having solicited them, was no less disloyal. Ferdinand, as usual, hesitated, and the malignant feelings of the Queen prevailed; not satisfied with receiving the Allies, she did all in her power to induce Ferdinand to unite his army to their troops. A plan of operation was formed to carry these combined forces into Tuscany, and to take in reverse my army in Italy. Eugene, in order to oppose this new enemy, was obliged to collect what he could of the Franco-Italian troops and national guards of the kingdom, on the frontiers of the march of Ancona.

Thus drawn on by a blind hatred, the Queen sacrificed her people, her family, her crown, for the single hope of injuring me. Every impartial man will agree that by this conduct she authorized, in advance, whatever I might please to decide respecting her fate. If I had been beaten, this unexpected hostility had given me great embarrassment in Italy; victorious, I was not vexed at having a good pretext for ending the matter by getting rid of this implacable enemy, and of thus procuring a crown for one of my brothers. The kingdom of Naples ought to enter frankly into the system of France and Spain, as it had done at the epoch of the family pact of the Bourbons. As the Queen was the only obstacle to the adoption of this system, it was necessary that she should suffer the consequences of her course of conduct. The very next day after the treaty of Presburg, December twenty-seventh, I hurled my decree of anathema on this inconsiderate court; *I declared that it had ceased to reign*. Massena had already received orders, immediately after the armistice, to increase St.-Cyr's corps to thirty thousand men, and to direct it on Rome; after the peace, I ordered him to reinforce this corps and to take the command himself. We will leave him to his easy triumph and direct our attention to the maritime war, whose operations had not been less decisive than on land, but in a sense directly the reverse.



**NAPOLÉON DIRECTS ADMIRAL VILLENEUVE TO RETURN TO TOULON.**—It will be remembered that Villeneuve, leaving Ferrol at the head of thirty-three ships, had returned, contrary to my instructions, to Cadiz, instead of making sail for Brest, and that this circumstance, in connection with the continental war, had decided me to renounce the descent. Being very justly dissatisfied with the conduct of this admiral, I ordered him to be replaced by Rosily, and the combined fleet to immediately set sail for the Mediterranean, to raise the blockade of Carthage, to capture the small English station before Naples, to land the ten thousand men it had on board to reinforce St. Cyr at Tarentum, and to thus enable him to conquer Naples. Villeneuve was afterward to return to Toulon, to take in supplies and refit; then to send his cruisers in all directions in the Mediterranean and the ocean. I especially directed that one be established at St. Helena in order to capture the return ships from India. Little did I then anticipate the misfortunes that awaited me on this rock! I hoped, by thus exciting the fears of England respecting Egypt, to force her to keep large squadrons in the Mediterranean. This system was well calculated to form good sailors, to paralyze the enemy's forces, and to injure his commerce; it, moreover, was particularly suited to the supposition that continental affairs might, for many years, force me to renounce the project of a descent. A proof of its advantages is the success obtained by Admiral Lallemand. It will be remembered that this brave seaman, being unable to effect a junction with Villeneuve, had cruised between Ireland and the Bay of Biscay till the end of December, and had then entered Rochefort in triumph, with one captured ship-of-the-line, a great number of prizes, and twelve hundred prisoners—a success the more remarkable as it had been gained in the very waters of England, and on a sea crossed in every direction by the merchant vessels of that nation.

Nevertheless, it must be confessed that this system exposed our naval forces to partial combats; perhaps it would have been preferable to leave our fleet at Cadiz, which is a favorable port for a sortie, and very difficult to blockade, as in a heavy sea, produced ordinarily by southwest winds, the blockading forces are exposed to all the fury of the waves on a dangerous coast. Thirty vessels in Cadiz would have cost the enemy dearly, and they would have been more free to act in all directions than when at Toulon. The excessive expense which they would have occasioned us in one of the dearest ports of Europe, and the objection to spending so much money in a foreign port, were the motives

for directing the departure of the fleet. My orders being imperative, it was the duty of Villeneuve to leave; nevertheless, if he was blockaded by twenty-nine ships, it was optional with him either to leave or to remain at Cadiz; he chose the former course.

**NELSON'S RETURN BEFORE CADIZ.**—While, by a too literal execution of this order, he was going to his own destruction, the English admiralty, informed of his return to Cadiz, had ordered Nelson to leave Portsmouth in all haste and take the command of all the British forces in these waters. He was not a man to delay, and he left instantly with two or three ships which he found ready. This great sailor joined on the seventeenth of October the fleet of Admiral Collingwood and took the command.

**MEETING OF THE TWO FLEETS.**—Villeneuve set sail on the nineteenth, with thirty-three ships and nine frigates. It is probable that he thought he was opposed only by the twenty-one ships of Collingwood and Calder; it is said he had been informed the night before of Nelson's arrival, but that, following the advice of a merchant captain, he did not believe it. As I had blamed pretty strongly his want of activity at Martinique, and as he wished to wash out the recollection of his inaction at Aboukir and his return to Cadiz, he undoubtedly thought he would be forever dishonored if he did not give chase with superior forces. Full of this idea, and knowing that the grand operations in the Channel no longer depended on the course he might now pursue, he decided to fight. Every circumstance seemed to conspire against us; the same admiral who had feared to advance toward Brest to fight an inferior and divided enemy, now, by a misplaced and untimely energy, was about to engage with equal forces against the best sailor of the age; if he deemed himself authorized to deviate from my orders in an operation as delicate as that of a junction with the fleet of Brest, why should he not venture to interpret them, when acting in a single sortie without any essential object to be accomplished?

**BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.**—The fatal *rencontre* took place on the twenty-first of October, off Cape Trafalgar, a little southwest of Cadiz. Villeneuve might still have repaired his fault, if he had taken the proper measures to secure a victory; but reposing on his order to all his captains to come into action, and obstinately pursuing the old errors of forming in parallel order, he waited for his adversary to treat him as he had already treated the squadrons of Brueys at Aboukir. When one violates his instructions, he ought at least to know how to maneuver, and to



conquer or die. Nelson,\* more skillful than his adversary, took advantage of the northwest wind which was blowing at the time, formed in two columns, cut the centre with fourteen ships, separating it from the right, while thirteen others defeated the left by successively passing along the line; this was sufficient to secure certain success; our fleet was totally defeated; sixteen ships were lost, in one of which Villeneuve was taken prisoner; the others made sail for our ports; but four of these, under Dumanoir, surrendered to equal forces under Admiral Strachan near Rochefort. Nelson, more fortunate than I, fell dead in the arms of victory. Gravina died of his wounds; he was a man of genius and deserved all our regrets. Villeneuve,† sent back to France on parole, fearing the results of a trial by a council of war, committed suicide at Rennes.

This battle, which was more fatal to us than that of the Hogue, and which perhaps decided the empire of the world, if that empire depended on England or France, cost the victors only sixteen hundred men killed and wounded; a remarkable example of the difference of war on sea and on land. The smallest combats of an advanced guard, between 1805 and 1815, cost more lives than this naval victory. In the battles of Eylau and Moskwa thirty thousand men were sacrificed, without giving any other advantage than the possession of the field of battle—that is, a few acres of ground.

After this epoch, our fleets were no longer able to show them-

\*Horatio Nelson was born in Norfolk in 1758, and entered the navy at the age of twelve as midshipman. In 1779 he was promoted to the rank of post-captain, and distinguished himself in the Gulf of Mexico, and afterward in the Mediterranean, losing an eye at the siege of Calvi. For the victory off Cape St. Vincent, in 1797, he was raised to the rank of rear-admiral. For the victory of Aboukir he received the title of *Baron Nelson of the Nile*, with a pension of two thousand pounds. At the battle of Trafalgar he received a musket-shot in the back, and shortly after expired.

His career in the navy was characterized by energy, boldness, good judgment, and great bravery. As a man, his reputation was tarnished by his cruelty at Naples and his disgraceful conduct with Lady Hamilton.

†Pierre Charles Jean-Baptiste Sylvestre Villeneuve was born at Valensoles in 1763, and entered the navy at the age of fifteen. His promotion was rapid. In 1793 he was made captain of a ship; in 1796, rear-admiral; and in 1804, vice-admiral. He was a brave man, and prior to the battle of Trafalgar was regarded as one of the most promising officers in the French navy. After the defeat and on his return from England after his release as a prisoner of war, he reported to the minister of marine. The reply was said to be so mortifying to the unfortunate admiral that he committed suicide, his body being found next morning in his room, pierced with six wounds inflicted by his own hand. He died at the age of forty-one.

selves at sea, and the remainder of my reign was spent in making preparations for a new contest with the English leopard. I received this news during our march on Vienna, and all my astonishing success at Ulm and Austerlitz was requisite to console me for this disaster, which forced me to adopt a system of policy entirely new.



## CHAPTER IX.

## THE WAR OF 1806, OR CAMPAIGN OF JENA.

Napoleon returns to France—Crisis of the Bank—Relations with England—Progress of the English Power in India—Disastrous Maritime Expedition of the French—Continental Means of opposing England—Difficulty of forming Alliances with the Great Powers—System of Federate States—Reasons for the successive Additions to the French Empire—Death of Pitt—Blockade of Ports by a mere British Order in Council—New Difficulties with Prussia—The Cabinet of Berlin perverts the Treaty of Vienna—Motives for this Step—Negotiations of Haugwitz—A New Treaty—Discussion with Austria, for Cattaro and Wurtzburg—A Federation substituted in place of the German Empire—Napoleon crowns the different Members of his Family—Joseph, King of Naples—Louis, of Holland—Eugene, Heir to the Throne of Lombardy—Murat, Grand Duke of Berg—Military Operations in Naples—Siege of Gaeta—Diversion in Calabria—Confederation of the Rhine, with Napoleon as Protector—Francis abdicates the Crown of Germany, and is proclaimed Emperor of Austria—Sensations at Berlin—Prussia entitled to the Presidency of the Confederation—Interior State of the French Empire—Mechanism of Napoleon's Government—The Public Credit restored—Conscription regulated—Monuments—Internal Improvements—Military and Maritime Works—State of Prussia—Negotiations with England—Treaty signed, but not ratified, with Russia—Mission of Sebastiani to Constantinople—Attack of the English on Buenos Ayres—Rupture of the Negotiations with England—Prussia abruptly decides on War—Her extraordinary *Ultimatum*—First Movements of the French Army—The Position and Plan of Operations of the Prussians—Napoleon's Plan of Operations—Faults of the Prussians—Their Generals—Views of the Duke of Brunswick—Napoleon cuts off their Communications—His decisive Maneuver—Battle of Jena—Battle of Auerstädt—Extraordinary Results of these two Victories—Combat of Halle—March on Potsdam and Berlin—Visit to the Cabinet of the Great Frederick—Entrance into Berlin—Operations of Hohenlohe—Fall of Spandau—Dispositions against Hohenlohe—Combat and Capitulation of Prenzlau—Fall of Stettin—Blücher retires on Mecklenburg—Capitulation of Custrin—Measures for taking possession of the Country between the Rhine and the Oder—Armistice with the Saxons—Blücher driven to Lübeck—Fall of Lübeck—Capitulation of Blücher—Taking

of Magdeburg—Napoleon at Berlin—The celebrated Berlin Decree—British Orders in Council—Armistice with Prussia, not ratified—Napoleon advances to the Vistula—Immense Results of this Seven Weeks' War.

**NAPOLEON RETURNS TO FRANCE.**—As soon as this double peace with Austria and Prussia had reestablished the repose of Europe, at least for a time, I hastened to return to France, where cares not less important required my presence. My return to Munich was a real triumph: ever since the wars of the brave Charles Theodore, the ally of Louis XIV., and since the project of Austria, in 1778, to get possession of their country, the good Bavarians had nourished an inveterate hatred against the ambition of the Cabinet of Vienna; they received me with acclamations so sincere and touching that never did I experience sentiments more grateful. The nation, appreciating what it was to gain in power and consideration by the royal crown which I placed on the head of a prince cherished for his virtues, could well see how different were these benefits from the designs of Austria. Some old cannon, taken from the electoral troops in 1703, which we found in the arsenal of Vienna, sent by my direction to Munich with a goodly number of Austrian pieces, taken in expiation, were conducted back with all possible military pomp. A patriotic excitement seemed to electrify the Bavarians from one end of the kingdom to the other. The national colors were unfurled by all the citizens with an enthusiasm that reminded me of the first days of 1790.

I profited by these dispositions to strengthen our relations by a family alliance. Prince Eugene, the Viceroy of Italy, married the Princess Amelia, eldest daughter of the King of Bavaria; and Berthier, whom I had just placed in the rank of sovereigns, by giving him the principality of Neufchâtel, married a niece of the King. My sojourn at Munich was celebrated by *grand fêtes*: public joy was at its height. I did not expect so warm a reception at the Court of Würtemberg, whose Elector, a prince of noble character, did not profess the same sentiments toward us. He had merely yielded to force in joining me, at the beginning of the campaign; but from his being the maternal uncle of the Emperor Alexander, and from the position of his states, I felt obliged to treat him in the same way as I had Bavaria: I hoped, by elevating him to a throne, to attach him to me irrevocably. I was not deceived in this calculation.

My return to Paris was a succession of uninterrupted



triumphs; the spectacle of the bridge of Kehl was particularly imposing, from the immense concourse of people on both banks of the Rhine, drawn together to see my passage. Louis XIV. had once pretended that there were no more Pyrenees between him and Spain; with more truth might I now say that there was no longer the barrier of the Rhine between France and Germany. I had been preceded in the capital by the deputation of the Senate, which had come even to Vienna to congratulate me on two victories unparalleled in the annals of France, and which washed out so gloriously the bloody defeat our navy had just sustained at Trafalgar. They were preparing for me at Paris a most brilliant reception; but I returned in the night in order to escape ceremonies which wearied me, but of which I could give a striking example when it suited my projects.\*

**CRISIS OF THE BANK.**—New cares awaited me at the Tuileries. The first which I had to attend to resulted from an event entirely unexpected: at the moment when I was founding the power and glory of France on a basis apparently immovable, the state was near being overwhelmed by an unexpected bankruptcy. Barbé-Marbois had taken it into his head to improve the funds of the treasury by exchanging one hundred and forty millions for

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\*Napoleon had previously sent home the flags captured in this war. Thiers thus describes the reception of the colors sent to Paris by Napoleon:

"These colors passed through Paris on the fifteenth of January, 1806, and were borne triumphantly along the streets of the capital, to be placed under the roofs of the edifices which were to contain them. An immense concourse collected to witness this spectacle.

"The cool and unimpassioned Cambacérès himself says, in his grave "Memoirs," that the joy of the people resembled intoxication. And wherefore, indeed, should they rejoice, if not on such occasions? Four hundred thousand Russians, Swedes, English, and Austrians were marching from all points of the horizon against France, two hundred thousand Prussians promising to join them, and all at once, a hundred thousand French, starting from the coasts of the ocean, traversing in two months a great part of the European continent, taking the first army opposed to them without fighting, inflicted redoubled blows on the others, entering the astonished capital of the ancient Germanic Empire, passing beyond Vienna, and going to the frontier of Poland, to break in one great battle the bond of the coalition; sending back the vanquished Russians to their frozen plains, and chaining the disconcerted Prussians to their frontiers; the dread of a war which might be expected to last long, terminated in three months; the peace of the continent suddenly restored, the peace of the seas justly hoped for; all the prospects of prosperity given back to France, delighted and placed at the head of the nations—for what should people rejoice, we repeat, if not for such miracles? And as at that time none could foresee the too speedy end of their greatness, or yet discern, in the too fertile genius that produced it, the too ardent genius also that was destined to compromise it, one sympathized in the public happiness without any mixture of sinister presentiments."

Spanish bonds on Vera Cruz, which could not be realized. He was forced to have recourse to the bank to meet the expenses of the government; the bank was in its turn embarrassed, and its notes, which had braved all the revolutionary storms, lost their credit to such a degree that a panic-stricken multitude besieged its doors to get them exchanged for specie. Never was there a financial crisis more singular or more inopportune. Arriving at the Tuileries at nine o'clock in the evening, I passed the night in examining the accounts of the treasury, and at eleven o'clock the following morning a council of finance was convoked to devise means to remedy the evil. I had at this time no secret treasure in the vaults of the Tuileries; some resources were requisite to meet our immediate wants; we happily succeeded in obtaining them; confidence was gradually restored, and all Paris recovered from the panic. This crisis proved to me that the credit of a state is not always equal to its wants, and made me sensible of the necessity of providing a special fund ready for future events.\*

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\*Napoleon's manner of dealing with the *United Merchants*, whose speculations had so embarrassed the public treasury, is thus described by Thiers:

"Napoleon instantly summoned a council to the Tuileries, and desired to be furnished with a detailed report of the operations of the company, which were still obscure to him. He required the attendance of all the ministers, and also of M. Mollien, director of the sinking fund, whose management he approved, and whom he thought to possess in a much higher degree than M. de Marbois the dexterity necessary for the administration of funds on a great scale. He sent an authoritative order to Messieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouvrard, and to the clerk who was accused of having deceived the minister of the treasury, to come to the Tuileries.

"All the persons who attended were intimidated by the presence of the Emperor, who did not conceal his resentment. M. de Marbois began reading a long report which he had drawn up relative to the subject under discussion. He had not read far before Napoleon, interrupting him, said: 'I see how it is. It was with the funds of the treasury and those of the bank that the company of *United Merchants* calculated on providing supplies for France and Spain. And, as Spain had nothing to give but promises and piastres, it is with the money of France that the wants of both countries have been supplied. Spain owed me a subsidy, and it is I who have furnished her with one. Now Messieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouvrard must give up to me all they possess; Spain must pay me what she owes them, or I will shut up those gentlemen in Vincennes and send an army to Madrid.'

"Napoleon appeared cold and stern toward M. de Marbois. 'I esteem your character,' said he, 'but you have been the dupe of men against whom I warned you to be upon your guard. You have given up to them all the effects in the portfolio, over the employment of which you ought to have been more watchful. I regret to find myself obliged to withdraw from you the administration of the treasury, for, after what has happened, I cannot leave it to you any longer.' Napoleon then ordered the members of the company who had been summoned to the Tuileries to be introduced. Mes-



RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND.—To this crisis succeeded new political difficulties; the great events which had marked this campaign of 1805, both on land and sea, had entirely changed the respective situation of the two rivals who were disputing the commerce and influence of the world. The battle of Trafalgar had given the sovereignty of the sea to the English; it was necessary to adopt some new system to counterbalance these deplorable effects. It is an old adage that *he who is master of the sea is also of the land*. However paradoxical this may seem, it will not be denied that it has in it some truth, when we reflect upon the importance acquired by some of the smallest states, by the great extension of their navy, and the rapid increase of the Roman power as soon as it got rid of the rivalry of Carthage. The discovery of America and the invention of the compass doubled the importance of the navy, and the power which it successively gave to the Dutch, Spanish, and English had daily given force to this prejudice. I fully appreciated the influence due to this empire of the seas; but I nevertheless thought, with reason, that the principal cause of this influence was due to the divisions of the continental powers, and that the adage would become false, if ever these powers should come to a proper understanding. Fully convinced that France could never reach the apogee of her prosperity and power if she remained inferior to England on the seas, I resolved to do every thing in my power to build up our navy and to find, in the results of the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz, the means of saving America, of delivering India, of freeing Europe from a yoke which would ruin its commerce.

PROGRESS OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA.—The English power in India had increased three-fold since the time of my expedition to Egypt; the fall of Tippoo, and the successive defeats of

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sieurs Vanlerberghe and Desprez, though the least reprehensible, melted into tears. M. Ouvrard, who had compromised the company by hazardous speculations, was perfectly calm. He endeavored to persuade Napoleon that he ought to permit him to wind up himself the very complicated affairs in which he had involved his partners, and that he should bring over from Mexico, by way of Holland and England, considerable sums, and far superior to those which France had advanced.

"It is probable that he would have managed the winding up of these affairs much better than any other person; but Napoleon was too much incensed, and too impatient to get out of the hands of speculators, to trust to his promises. He left M. Ouvrard and his partners the alternative of a criminal prosecution or the immediate surrender of all they possessed, whether stores, paper securities, immovables, or pledges received from Spain. They submitted to this cruel sacrifice.

"This was sure to prove a ruinous liquidation for them, but they had rendered themselves liable to it by abusing the resources of the treasury."

Schindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, at Delhi, at Lassavary, and at Assey by Lake and Wellesley, and the submission of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, and of Holkar, had increased the subjects of the English company to forty millions, and their disciplined forces, including Sepoys and Europeans, to two hundred thousand men! Here was a power threatening the subjugation of Asia. All Europe took up arms to prevent the union to France of some valleys of the Apennines; but no one troubled himself about the progress of the English power in the East and in the Gulf of Mexico!

To obtain my object, required time and peace; but an honorable peace: one that would not deprive France of the means of accomplishing her ends. This could hardly be hoped for, when we think of the violent hatred against me breathed by the English journals, whose inevitable result was to embitter my feelings of hostility. I had not, like Hannibal, sworn in my infancy eternal war against the enemies of my country, but I had to avenge myself for the numerous personal attacks which had been instigated by the English government. I felt that their attacks were directed against my person as much as against France; that I had to prepare for a contest without end; in a word, that I must make my cause triumph or die; the future grandeur of France was not less interested in it than my own honor and my repose.

**MARITIME EXPEDITIONS OF THE FRENCH.**—Not being able to contend with her either by great fleets or by means of a descent, I determined to strike England wherever I could reach her. Encouraged by the operations of Villeneuve in the Antilles, I ordered to sea one half of our fleet at Brest in two squadrons; the first, under Vuillaumez, was to go to the assistance of the Cape of Good Hope, and to throw in there a garrison of French troops; the second, under Leissegues, was to do the same at Santo Domingo, where General Ferrand had alone sustained, for three years, all the efforts of the blacks and mulattoes. After doing this, these two squadrons were to cruise for prizes. The last reached its destination and landed the troops; but, attacked by Admiral Duckworth in the roadstead where the ships were repairing, it was taken *en flagrant délit*; the superb ship *Imperial*, of one hundred and thirty guns, assailed by three hostile ships, was defeated; to prevent her being taken, they ran her aground. The *Diomède* suffered the same fate; three others fell a prey to the English.

Vuillaumez, hearing, during his passage, that the Cape of Good Hope had fallen after eight days' attack into the power of



Popham and Baird, who had landed there, made sail for Martinique: my brother Jerome served with him as *capitaine de vaisseau*. Soon afterward, chased by the three squadrons of Warren, Strachan, and Lewis, Admiral Vuillaumez detached the *Vétéran*, commanded by my brother, to return to France to inform me of his position and the loss of the Cape. This ship made rich prizes off the Azores, but was overtaken by a part of the enemy's cruisers on the coast of Brittany, near L'Orient. Vuillaumez's squadron encountered a violent storm and was dispersed; the admiral reached Havana with his ship; three others were captured or burnt, and only one returned to our ports.

More fortunate in the Indian seas, Admiral Linois there captured rich prizes, and for a long time sustained the Isle-of-France. But in returning to Europe after the capture of the Cape of Good Hope, he fell, by night, into the midst of a squadron of the enemy and was taken, after a brave defense, with the *Marengo*, which he commanded.

**MEANS OF OPPOSING ENGLAND ON THE CONTINENT.**—The unfortunate issue of these last naval operations confirmed me in the opinion that it was necessary to resort to more powerful means against England. It was necessary to find on the continent the means of striking her power and her commerce; in subjecting to my influence the coast countries, I might some day have sailors and ships; and in the mean time by the possession of these coasts I would close all access to the monopoly of my enemies. The surest means of effecting this was by close alliance with the continental powers; but how could I hope to effect this, with any unanimity, against the commercial interests of some and the ambition of others? The latter, humiliated by our victories, sought only for vengeance; the former prospered only by their maritime relations and the benefits of their neutrality. This want of unanimity rendered necessary the alliance of at least one of the powers of the first rank. I had just acquired proof that we could not grapple with the British Colossus, without some continental counterpoise against the coalitions which the Cabinet of St. James plotted against us, every time that it saw itself seriously threatened. It was only by this counterpoise that I could make auxiliaries of our continental forces, and direct a great part of the population and revenues of France to a maritime war.

**DIFFICULTY OF FORMING ALLIANCES.**—The alliance of 1756 with Austria had been formed by Louis XV. for this special object; and the family treaty with Spain, so creditable to

M. Choiseul, and soon extended to the reigning houses of Naples and Sardinia, had perfected the federal system of France. The treaty with the Cabinet of Madrid had been renewed; it was also essential to renew that with Austria. But could we attach to ourselves this power, beaten in a hundred combats and stripped by us of her preponderance in Germany and Italy? Had not the war of the Revolution established between these two ancient allies a rivalry, if not eternal, at least of long duration? Ought I to end this rivalry by stripping France of the fruits of her victories, in order to enrich a rancorous power whose interests might have been the same as those of Louis XV., but whose principles and views were now so much opposed to ours? Russia, on whom England could inflict much injury, feared also the more immediate ascendancy with which I threatened Europe, and armed herself against me; I could not now seek her alliance, for we were at war. Prussia, enriched by her neutrality, hoped to see all the storms pass around her without being herself exposed to them; moreover, she alone would not have been sufficiently powerful to form the desired counterpoise. With her seven millions of inhabitants we could not oppose both Austria and Russia, without also employing all the resources of France; but this would not accomplish my object. Although this power as an ally was utterly insufficient to secure the continental equilibrium in a maritime contest with England, yet in my contest with the North, as will be shown hereafter, Prussia was the most desirable ally to render us arbiters of Europe. The situation of France in the two cases was entirely different, as also was the influence to be exerted by Prussia.

**SYSTEM OF FEDERATE STATES.**—What course then remained for me to take? By surrounding France with many small states of the second order, united in a federation and interested by benefits received from us to fight for our cause, she would acquire a sufficient preponderance on the continent to render Austria and Russia less disposed to run risks of war; this would eventually enable me to direct all my power against England alone, and all my influence against her commerce.

**ADDITIONS TO THE FRENCH EMPIRE.**—Such were the true causes of the successive additions to my empire, and of the kingdoms given to the members of my family. It was not increase of territory that I desired, but the elements of power to oppose the power of the English and of their allies. In proportion as the British squadrons destroyed our fleets, or captured some colony in the two Indies, in the same proportion did I declare



the reunion of some province, to convince England that she would gain nothing by prolonging the war, and that each of her acquisitions would only tend to the increase of mine. This system was undoubtedly contrary to the principles of international law, as understood by publicists, which forbid conquests except where successions or marriages give legitimate claims; but it was not I who first set at nought these rules; Frederick the Great and Catherine had, forty years before, shown how they regarded the matter; and many others had done the same before them. Moreover, the English claimed the right to do on the sea whatever Europe could not prevent. As the most abusive force was the only public law which they acknowledged, why was I not entitled to reprisals on the continent? If the sea belonged exclusively to the power that had the greatest number of ships, why should not the land belong to the power that possessed the greatest number of battalions, and knew best how to use them for the general interest of nations?

In accordance with the considerations here given, I resolved to profit by my great success in the campaign of 1805, to give a marked preponderance to my federate system! The kingdoms of Naples and Holland and the Confederation of the Rhine were the result.

DEATH OF PITT.—At the moment that I was laying the foundations of these new systems in consequence of the treaty of Presburg, I learned, on returning to Paris, the sudden death of the celebrated Pitt (January 23d). It has been said that the end of this great man was accelerated by the disappointment caused by the news of the battle of Austerlitz, which promised long prosperity to the empire which he had flattered himself would be overthrown. Be this as it may, the selection of his successor by the King proved that England required a change of system. Fox was placed at the head of the new administration. The choice of this orator, the well-known advocate of peace, was a good augury, although the position and individual opinion of a statesman is not always a sure criterion to judge of his conduct as a minister. Louis XII. once said that the King of France did not avenge the injuries of the Duke of Orleans; a minister taken from the ranks of the opposition would be unworthy to hold the reins of government, if he could say that the opinions of the orator at the tribune should be those of the chief of the administration. Pitt had also figured on the benches of the opposition before taking the helm of affairs. Nevertheless, the colleagues

given to Fox (Erskine and Grey) were also reckoned among those who had constantly inclined toward peace.\*

**BLOCKADE BY A SIMPLE ORDER IN COUNCIL.**—However moderate might be the views of these new ministers, they were, nevertheless, English; and by their side sat Grenville, Windham, and Moira, whose sentiments were very different. One of their first measures was to declare, by an order in council of May 16th, the blockade of the ports of the Channel from Antwerp to Havre. This new idea of blockading ports by a simple order in council was absurd; it was the more untimely as I then had no forces on this coast. I should have ordered immediate reprisals for this Algerine legislation, if new negotiations with the Cabinet of St. James had not determined me to postpone my vengeance.†

**NEW DIFFICULTIES WITH PRUSSIA.**—The state of the continent was not so pacific as was thought; indications of a new storm, though distant, were seen at all points of the horizon. I had already received at Munich the unexpected news that the

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\*Charles James Fox was born in 1748, and was the second son of Lord Holland, so long the rival and opponent of the Earl of Chatham, father of William Pitt. It is a little singular that the second sons of these great parliamentary leaders should have inherited the talents, rivalry, and distinction of their fathers, while the elder sons, who inherited the titles and estates, were men of inferior ability. Fox was carefully educated and entered Parliament in 1768, before he was of legal age. In 1770, he was made one of the lords of the admiralty, and the next year a commissioner of the treasury. His early parliamentary efforts gave little promise of his future career; but in the debates on the war with America he displayed the highest talents, both as a statesman and orator. From that time to his death, he acted, both in Parliament and in the ministry, as one of the great party leaders.

William Pitt was born in 1759, eleven years after his great rival. He was carefully educated and entered Parliament very young. At the age of twenty-three he was appointed chancellor of the exchequer, and at twenty-four was made prime minister. He continued from this time to his death one of the party leaders, both in and out of Parliament.

Pitt died on the twenty-third of January, 1806, and his rival, Fox, on the fifteenth of the following September.

†This British order in council was not only a violation of international law, as determined by the publicists of Europe, but was in direct contradiction to the definition of a blockade given by Great Britain in her treaties with foreign powers. In the convention of 1801 with Russia, it was stipulated that a blockaded port must have ships stationary or sufficiently near to constitute "*an evident danger in entering.*" The same definition is implied in treaties previously made between Great Britain and the Baltic powers, and with the United States; and in 1804 the board of admiralty instructed the naval commanders and judges of the vice-admiralty courts in the West Indies, not to consider a port as blockaded unless it was *actually invested*.—*Halbeck's Int. Law*, ch. xxiii., § 7. *Wheaton's Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv., ch. iii., § 28.



King of Prussia was unwilling to ratify the treaty of Haugwitz, without exceptions which totally destroyed its character. It was true that, by an excess of excusable zeal, Haugwitz had acted contrary to his instructions, and perhaps had misinterpreted the orders of his master. The position of the King was very critical; he had just formed with England an agreement to protect her troops in Hanover, on condition that they would assist him if he should be attacked by France; this convention was even posterior to the treaty of Vienna, the latter having been signed on the fifteenth of December, and the former concluded at Berlin on the twenty-second. Haugwitz did not reach Berlin with his treaty till the twenty-fifth, three days after the convention. The Emperor Alexander proposed to the King to place at his disposal all the Russian army, as had been agreed upon at Potsdam. To throw himself into my alliance, in violation of engagements just made, was not worthy of the character of Frederick William; he, therefore, gave Haugwitz a cold reception; but state interest overcame his scruples; it was necessary to decide either to accept the treaty or to sustain all alone the weight of my anger.

THE CABINET OF BERLIN CHANGES THE TERMS OF THE TREATY.—Influenced by his counsellors, the King took one of those intermediate courses which, instead of arranging matters, usually make them worse. He ratified the treaty on condition that he should temporarily occupy Hanover until peace; but that he would not yield his three provinces till England should sanction this acquisition. This was so unexpected that I had already ceded Anspach to Bavaria as an indemnity for the duchy of Wurtzburg, which had been exchanged with the Grand Duke of Tuscany for Salzburg, the latter having been given to Austria. It would have been better to wait for the ratification at Berlin before disposing of the ceded provinces; but the evil had already been done, and there was no remedy. In giving to the King a rich electorate for small provinces detached at a great distance from his monarchy, I had given to him three times the population and revenues which he had given to me; he would be no longer in contact with our frontiers, and thus exposed to be drawn into any new war which we might have with Germany or Russia. This certainly was the most ample reparation which I could possibly offer him for the violation of his territory. Could I have done better had I punished Bernadotte for obeying my orders? Was it necessary that I myself should go to Berlin with a rope about my neck, as formerly the emperors of Germany went to make the *amends-honorable* to Rome? It seemed to me

more simple for us to say, "We are natural allies; Hanover belongs to me by right of conquest; in yielding it to Prussia, I shall aggrandize her at the expense of my most bitter enemies, the provokers of all coalitions; the interest of the monarchy and of France were in this case the same, and it was better to accept such satisfaction than for Prussia to expose herself to my victorious army, at a time when Austria was incapable of rendering her assistance, and the Russians too distant to act in time."

**MOTIVES OF THIS STEP.**—The moral reasons of Frederick William for refusing to accept the spoils of George III., with whom he was in the state of alliance rather than of war, were creditable to him. It was also evident that this acquisition could not be permanent, unless sanctioned by England at the declaration of peace. *Occupation is the result of conquest; but the possession is made legitimate only by treaties or by long and undisputed occupation.* The country which Frederick William was to receive for his three provinces was certainly the most valuable; but then he might not be able to obtain an undisputed title, and might thus involve himself in permanent hostilities with England.

**NEGOTIATIONS OF HAUGWITZ.**—This disagreeable alternative resulted from the fault of Haugwitz, who, blinded by the apparent advantages of his treaty, had not given sufficient care to drawing it up. He should have stipulated that if the cession of Hanover became a positive obstacle to the conclusion of a general peace, and the welfare of Europe required its retrocession to England, an equivalent indemnity should be given to the King of Prussia. This clause having been neglected, the King might still have proposed it to me, and it is probable that I should have accepted it. If, on the contrary, I had refused it, the King would have had the option between war with me and the uncertain chance of having it with the English. If he had adopted the first course, he ought instantly, but silently, to have sent a negotiator to St. Petersburg to recall the Russians into Silesia, and to have treated with the Austrians; if he adopted the second, he should have accepted the treaty as it was, observing to me that if this determination brought on war between Prussia and England, the Cabinet of Berlin, decided to run all chances with me, would conclude an alliance offensive and defensive, which would secure to it a part of these chances if they should be favorable. But it was unable to decide, and of all parts it chose the one most objectionable to me and least advantageous to Prussia.

By a caprice still more incomprehensible, at the very moment when this cabinet was, by this conditional ratification, involving



its position toward me, it entered Hanover with one part of its army, and reduced the remainder to the peace complement, thus disbanding half its forces. It thought to arrange every thing by sending Haugwitz to me at Paris, to plead a cause which could not be sustained either in appearance or in reality. If the refusal which he brought me had been accompanied by a declaration of war, I should have understood it; but to accept the odium of an invasion of Hanover, and, notwithstanding this, to put every thing in question with me, was a proceeding which the most acute would find it difficult to explain. This incident, taken in connection with the progress of the anti-French party at Berlin, and the credit enjoyed by Hardenberg, a well-known partisan of England, whose subject he was (being a Hanoverian), and a thousand other circumstances, convinced me that, notwithstanding the noble character of Frederick William, I ought hereafter to be on my guard with Prussia. Except the cabinet, every thing at Berlin took a hostile aspect; the army, ashamed, it said, of the silly part it was made to play, demanded war at all hazards; numerous groups of officers had insulted the hotel of the pacific minister who had preferred the aggrandizement of his country to an untimely war; lieutenants of hussars wished to decide upon the great interests of the state.\*

A NEW TREATY.—Far from allowing myself to be imposed on by this new event, I saw instantly the use I might make of it in my present situation and that of Europe, to strike a master blow; it was requisite that Prussia in fifteen days should enter into my new system and under my direct influence, or fall before

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\*Christian Henry Charles, Count of Haugwitz, was born in Silesia in 1758. He early engaged in diplomatic affairs, and succeeded Hertzberg as minister of foreign affairs and president of the Prussian cabinet. He was greatly distinguished as a diplomatist, but retired from public life after the battle of Jena, of which he was a witness. He died in 1828, after having been blind for some years.

Charles Augustus, Prince of Hardenberg, was born at Hanover in 1750. In 1778 he was made privy councillor, and in 1790 minister of state. In 1795 he signed the treaty between Prussia and the French Republic. From that period till Haugwitz retired from public life, these two statesmen were at the head of parties: the latter, of that which favored an alliance with France; and Hardenberg, of that which opposed it. After the overthrow of Napoleon, he represented Prussia in the Congress of Paris, and the Congress of Vienna, in 1814 and 1815. He was created a prince, and made president of the Council of State. He was present in 1818, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle; in 1819, at Carlsbad; in 1820, at Vienna, at Troppau and Verona. Although opposed to the liberal party in Prussia, and in his latter years considered as "the active agent of the Holy Alliance," he nevertheless deserved much credit for the abolition of feudal privileges in Prussia. He died in 1822.

my attacks. It was evident that the treaty of Vienna, mutilated of ten lines which destroyed its character, was null and void; I declared to Haugwitz that his cabinet had destroyed itself, and that matters must be submitted to a new negotiation. I required the instant surrender of the provinces which Prussia had given me in exchange, as I had already ceded Anspach; I obliged her to renounce the cession of twenty thousand inhabitants which Bavaria was to make her; finally, I forced the Cabinet of Berlin to close its ports to the English.

The same ministers who had rejected the treaty of Haugwitz negotiated between equal powers with reciprocal advantages, having no longer an army in hand, were too happy to treat even with these onerous conditions. I expected this result, for I had seen at a glance the position into which these weak counsellors had precipitated the King; I, nevertheless, was surprised at their eagerness to commit this new act of condescension: I had constantly found Frederick William pursuing a course of wise policy; although the treaty of Potsdam had abruptly followed the hostile demonstrations of the Prussians on the Vistula, still there were sufficient motives for it in a violation of their territory, thus giving it the appearance of a well-marked policy; it even denoted a decision of character strong enough to promise a rupture instead of a *dénouement* so favorable to my views; this victory of the pen in the treaty of Vienna had surpassed all my hopes. I had taken Europe without its cuirass, and the question now was to profit by this circumstance; an occasion soon presented itself.

CATTARO AND WURTZBURG.—Hardly had the new treaty of February 15th been ratified at Berlin (eight days after), than new difficulties, resulting from two grave events, were likely to embroil me with Austria; the Cabinet of Vienna, in ceding to me the Venetian Dalmatia, had engaged to give me the important port of the mouths of the Cattaro; it had merely withdrawn its own garrison from this place, and the Russians of the fifteenth division, stationed in the Seven Isles, having thrown in there a detachment reinforced by Montenegrins, so that we could get possession of it only by a resort to force. I demanded that Austria should put me in possession of this port; and, as I could not go by land from Venice to Dalmatia without passing by Trieste and Croatia, I claimed the right of passage which Austria had always given to the Venetians. An event of a different nature in Germany was near embroiling us; the Austrians had sent their troops to take possession of Wurtzburg, which had been ceded to



the Grand Duke of Tuscany, not to the Cabinet of Vienna. This movement might have suited the ancient usages of the German Empire, but it did not at all agree with my projects for Germany. I ordered the march of the prisoners who were crossing Swabia to be suspended; I incorporated in my army the battalions of the *dépôts* which formed the corps of reserve of Lefebvre and Kellerman,\* which increased it above the complement; I directed the Prince of Neuchâtel (Berthier), whom I had left in Bavaria, not to turn over Braunau to the Austrians, and to capture such of their battalions as should dare to enter Wurtzburg after receiving notification to retire.

#### A FEDERATION IN PLACE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

—My course was decided; certain of the alliance of Prussia, I wished to throw myself at the head of two hundred and fifty thousand men on Austria, who was now without an army, or to profit by my attitude to force her to execute her treaties, and, at the same time, to renounce the German Empire.† The firmness of my attitude and the completion of all the corps of my army imposed on her so much the more as hers was in the greatest disorder, and she had vainly waited for the arrival of the prisoners of Mack's army to effect its reorganization. The weak condition of this power, and the declaration of war by Prussia against the English rendering me master of Germany, I determined to profit by circumstances which might never again occur so favorable, to secure my ascendancy on the continent and to furnish me with the means of triumph in my maritime quarrel.

NAPOLEON CROWNS SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY.—I had already given the prelude of this system in placing my brothers on thrones which would at the same time increase the luster of my family and place the neighboring states in a more direct dependency. The imperial throne was hereditary in my family; it also commenced a new dynasty which time must consecrate as it had legitimated all the others; for since the time of Charlemagne no crown had ever been given with so much solemnity. I had received it by the voice of the people and the sanction of the church. My family, being called to reign, ought not to remain in the ranks of society; this would have been a contradiction. We were rich in conquests, and it was necessary to connect these conquered states intimately to the system of the Em-

\*The elder Kellerman, or Duke of Valmy.

†Jomini says that Napoleon was perfectly right in requiring Austria to execute her treaty in relation to the Cattaro, but that he carried matters unnecessarily far in demanding her renunciation of the German Empire.

pire, in order to incline the continental balance on our side. It is paradoxical to pretend that people are bound by any other ties than those of common interest. History is filled with proofs against such opinions; it abounds with examples of treaties made for the single interest of the governing families. This becomes a great misfortune where the general interests of the people are not those of their chiefs; but this is no new thing; how many princes and even republics have made treaties which were opposed to the general interest of the country? Undoubtedly the freedom of the seas at which I aimed was desired by all states, and more especially by those bordering on the seas; but the smaller states were unwilling to submit to be for a long period deprived of their commerce for the vague hope of obtaining this general maritime freedom. Under this point of view their monetary interests, as well as that of their reigning dynasties, were opposed to us, since we would not allow their connection with England. It was not within my power to change this situation of things, but I could do much by substituting for a hostile administration, a government interested in our success. This was the only means by which we could induce those people who were indifferent to battle for our cause; this was the only way of making them endure, in spite of themselves, long sacrifices whose fruits were beyond the reach of their short-sighted judgment.

JOSEPH, KING OF NAPLES.—I accomplished these objects by placing my family on the vacant thrones. The first which presented itself was that of Naples. This unhappy country required a master to save it from anarchy and civil war: my brother Joseph ascended this throne, which Masséna had just conquered.

LOUIS, KING OF HOLLAND.—Holland had long since lost the energy necessary for a republic; she was no longer capable of playing such a part; she had shown this at the time of the expedition of the Duke of York. The grand pensionary Schimmelpenninck, was expected to live but a short time; *and I could not leave to the caprices of an elective system the chances of an alliance with a people so necessary to my projects against England.* I had reason to suspect that the nation might recall the House of Orange, after what had passed in 1787. Holland therefore seemed to require a sovereign, and I gave to her my brother Louis.

EUGENE MADE HEIR TO THE THRONE OF LOMBARDY.—The iron crown of the Lombard kings was already on my head; it would have been imprudent to give it to another; the example would have been dangerous. Austria, the power most interested in the fate of Italy, had recognized me as king; but, to



calm her fears and the fears of the rest of Europe, I appointed Eugene Beauharnais viceroy, securing to him at my death the heritage of this crown.

**MURAT MADE GRAND DUKE OF BERG.**—I gave to Murat the grand duchy of Berg. My sister Pauline Borghese had the principality of Guastalla; Eliza Bacciochi was proclaimed Princess of Lucca, of Piombino, and of Massacarara; Berthier, as has already been mentioned, had the principality of Neuchâtel, which had been ceded by Prussia.

**MILITARY OPERATIONS IN NAPLES.**—Carried away by the course of my recital, I have disposed of the crown of Naples without saying any thing of the events which put it in my power. It will be remembered that after the peace of Presburg I had directed Masséna to take revenge for the bad faith of this court in violating its treaties. This general crossed the Garigliano on the eighth of February, and marched in three columns on Gaeta, Capua, and Itry. The Neapolitan troops disappeared in every direction, without making the slightest resistance. The court fled to Sicily, terrified at my proclamation of the twenty-seventh of December. Joseph entered Naples on the fifteenth of February. The deputies of the regency had already surrendered Capua; never was a conquest more easily made. It seemed as if some snare had been laid for us, so slight was the resistance made to our taking possession. The Prince of Sicily had collected in Calabria a nucleus of a Neapolitan army of about eighteen or twenty thousand men under the Prince of Rosenheim and Count Damas, flattering himself that the Calabrians would rise *en masse* to second him, as they had done under Cardinal Ruffo in 1799. General Saint-Cyr was charged with reducing Apulia and Abruzzo as far as Tarentum; Reynier was directed to overrun Calabria; Masséna was employed in the defense of Naples and the siege of Gaeta. Reynier having completely routed the division of Damas at Campo-Tenesa, while Duhesme pushed on by the Basilicata against the division of Rosenheim, the Neapolitan army dispersed; the princes embarked at Reggio with only two thousand men. My brother received, while in Calabria, the decree giving him the crown of Naples. This news was received in the capital with every demonstration of joy; there appeared to be no regret at the change; they had become wearied with an odious administration; they hoped every thing from a better future. Nevertheless, the joy manifested by our partisans was troubled by the sudden appearance of Sidney Smith, who, having taken command of the English squadron, might possibly add

a bombardment to the illuminations and public *fêtes* in celebration of this event! But, as little inclined to burn a palace, which would have been useless to his cause, as he had been eager to burn our arsenal at Toulon, this admiral was content to frighten the Neapolitans, and then carry by a *coup de main* the island of Capri, notwithstanding the heroic defense of a company which occupied it.

**SIEGE OF GAETA.**—But the position of Joseph at Naples was not yet without its difficulties. Gaeta still prolonged its defense. This place, situated on a rock, connected to the land only by a hill of four hundred toises perfectly fortified in amphitheatre, offered only a single front of attack, and this was exceedingly difficult to be reduced. The Prince of Hesse-Philipstadt, a Hessian officer, full of courage and energy, was in command. The garrison, daily supplied by sea, was disposed to assist him. The siege was commenced near the end of May under the direction of Generals Campredon and Vallongue; Dedon commanded the artillery.

**DIVERSION IN CALABRIA.**—During the four months that Reynier had occupied Calabria, the Court of Sicily had had time to foment an insurrection there. When every thing was ready, and the English thought they could, with advantage, fall upon a weak and isolated corps, General Stuart made a descent at the head of nine thousand Anglo-Sicilians, in the Gulf of St. Euphemia. Reynier, having hastily collected a division of six thousand men, marched to meet the enemy and attacked him, the fourth of July, on the heights between Maida and the sea; but he was vigorously repulsed and forced to retreat on Crotona. This check became the signal for a general revolt. The Calabrians, assembled at the tocsin, fell on our isolated detachments; every where our soldiers were either murdered or forced to cut their way sword in hand.

In the mean time Massena was pressing the siege of Gaeta. Vallongue, general of engineers, who had directed the preparatory works and established the grand breaching battery, was killed on the fourteenth of June by a musket ball. The works of attack had been pushed forward till the twenty-eighth with a rare constancy, for the place had for the past two months fired incessantly upon our troops, without their returning a single shot. Finally, on that day (the twenty-eighth) the batteries which General Dedon had armed with fifty pieces of thirty-three-pounders, and twenty-four mortars of the largest caliber, opened their fire, all at the same time, in presence of the King. The Prince of Hesse



returned it with great tenacity, but on the tenth day he received a severe wound in the head, which forced him to resign the command. A breach was opened near the citadel; a second, still more difficult, was made in the three-tier bastion which commanded the front. Masséna had formed two thousand five hundred grenadiers for an assault when the place capitulated. The garrison, seven thousand strong, were permitted to go to Sicily. The place had fired in three months one hundred and seventeen thousand shot and twenty thousand shells.

As soon as Masséna, by the reduction of this important place, had removed all fear of a hostile descent, he left Naples to join Reynier, and, at the head of fifteen thousand men, to reduce Calabria. After having completely beaten the insurgents at Coccozza, he dispersed without difficulty, but not without some fighting, this swarm of barbarians who had been incited by their priests. General Stuart, unwilling to expose the honor of the British flag by trusting too much to their assistance or by advancing too far into the interior of the country, deemed it best not to risk a battle with superior forces, and reëmbarked for Messina on the fifth of September. The insurrection, by a wise union of vigor, energy, and clemency, was gradually extinguished; and, by his paternal administration, Joseph might now consider himself firmly seated on the throne of Ferdinand IV.

CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.—It now only remained for me to regulate the affairs of Germany, more important than all the others for the execution of my grand federative project. The German Empire had received rude shocks by the Reformation, the thirty years' war, and the peace of Westphalia; by the wars of Charles Theodore against Leopold, and of Frederick the Great against Maria Theresa; and lastly by the campaign of 1799. If we add the scission introduced by the neutrality of the North, the manner in which Hanover had been treated by me, and Pomerania by her own sovereign, and lastly, the erection of Bavaria and Würtemberg into monarchies, it will be seen that this political mummy, completely mutilated, would necessarily fall at the slightest breath; it required but one more blow to finish its destruction. My army was still on the Danube; Soult was still in possession of Braunau. I caused to be signed, on the twelfth of July, a treaty by which Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau renounced all connection with the Roman Empire, in order to form a confederation of the Rhine, under the presidency of Baron D'Alberg, arch-chancellor, who took the title of *Prince Primate*; the statutes conferred on me the title of *Protector*.

Apart from these last two clauses and all that might concern me personally in this important transaction, it accorded perfectly with the new situation of Europe, and with the special interest of Germany. To be convinced of this it is only necessary to look back on the part which this country has played in Europe for the last two centuries; if the internal strength of Germany was nothing, her external influence was still less. Banded about between the preëminence of Austria, the opposite influence of Prussia, the influence of France and Russia, its relations with England formed through Hanover, and its connection with Sweden through Pomerania, Germany, like Italy, had become a mere geographical figure to be learned by school-boys; but as for a separate power and a separate nation, they no longer existed: such is the inevitable fate of all federate and elective states when surrounded by neighbors sufficiently strong and sufficiently adroit to control them. This state of things, which only required the application of the rule *to divide and conquer*, was well suited to the France of the eighteenth century, which was then weaker than Austria; but since the partition of Poland, victorious France was interested in reconstituting Germany, making it independent of Austria and Russia. To give a common center to sixteen millions of Germans was for our interest as well as theirs; for, being unable to maintain themselves without our assistance, their interest would for a long time be intimately connected with ours. On the other hand, they would constitute a separate *nation* having their own alliances and interests, independent of the House of Austria: in a word, they would form a real Germany. The project was certainly excellent; but there was an error in its execution. I ought to have given to this federation a German chief, selected from one of the most powerful houses, and have satisfied myself with connecting it to France by treaties offensive and defensive, without assuming a title which wounded the German pride and added nothing to my power. As it was, this confederation did not suit my empire; I ought to have rendered it useful to France, to Germany, and to the rest of Europe.

**FRANCIS ABDICATES THE CROWN OF GERMANY AND IS PROCLAIMED EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.**—This treaty was sent to Vienna to receive the sanction of Austria. I also sent it to Berthier and to the Minister Otto at Munich, in order that they might exchange its ratification, or, in case of the refusal of Austria, that my army might instantly take position on the Inn. The Cabinet of Vienna, having received it at the same time with the news of the treaty signed by D'Oubril, deemed it



unwise to risk a war, without an army and without allies, in defense of a title which had been utterly vain for the last century. It appeared preferable to abdicate a throne which had caused it more than one ruinous war without equivalent advantages; to renounce a pompous but not hereditary title, and to satisfy itself with that of hereditary Emperor of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia. Francis II. therefore abdicated, by his declaration of August 6th, the German crown, which he had received in 1792, and commenced, under the name of Francis I., the series of Emperors of Austria. This even surpassed my hopes; I almost expected to be obliged to seek this sanction at the gates of Vienna; undoubtedly the treaty signed by D'Oubril contributed very much to this result.

**SENSATION AT BERLIN.**—This event, announced at Berlin immediately after the nomination of my brother Louis to the throne of Holland, and of my brother-in-law Murat to the grand duchy of Berg, threatened Prussia with new collisions which she had hoped to escape. The counsellors of Frederick William could sound the abyss half opened beneath their feet: they now regretted that they had not either adhered frankly to the first treaty of Haugwitz, or to that of Potsdam with Prussia; but, the opportune moment being past, could they now fight alone? was it for their interest to do so? There seems no doubt that the negative was the true answer to these questions. Prussia, it is true, played a second part in the German Confederation; it was important to preserve this, in order to augment her federative system and cover herself with neutral provinces; but her religion prevented her from taking the first part in the Roman Empire, and she could easily console herself for its fall, if she should succeed in forming a counter-confederation at the north, by allying to herself Saxony, the Elector of Hesse, Pomerania, the Dukes of Mecklenburg, and the Dukes of Brunswick—countries already subject to her influence, and which she might place still more under her protectorate. This would increase her in proportion to my aggrandizement, and preserve the relative position of the two provinces. Frederick William chose this course in preference to war; he negotiated this confederation, treating with its members rather as equals than as dependents, whereas I had vassals rather than allies, and acted by decrees rather than treaties.

**PRESIDENCY OF THE CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.**—It would perhaps have given my work a more solid basis if I had given the presidency of the Confederation of the Rhine to Prussia instead of a feeble prince whose heir, loaded

with my favors, so ill recompensed me for them. The nation and court of Prussia, gained over by such a favor, would probably have become frankly attached to my destinies. I should then have had faithful allies from the Rhine to the Niemen; and, supported on such a base, I might have undertaken any thing. It may be said that this was uselessly destroying the power of Austria to erect another in its place equally formidable. Nothing is less true. Austria alone had twenty-four millions of subjects, exclusive of the German Empire; Prussia, on the contrary, had only ten millions, Hanover included; but the presidency of a federation of kings of hardly ten millions of subjects would not have added to the strength of Prussia in the proportion of its own positive power. Moreover, Prussia would have been indebted for this grandeur to me, whereas Austria was indebted to me only for having opposed her; this would have made a great difference in the sentiments of the two powers. Prussia, raised to an empire at the expense of Austrian influence, would have been an eternal rival to the Court of Vienna: she would have been under our influence for the next century. If ever my policy had been interested in doing so, a word from me would at any time have been sufficient to make these provinces of the confederation the adversaries of their president.

**INTERNAL STATE OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE.**—But external policy did not occupy all my thoughts; it was necessary to consolidate my work by giving to France institutions suited to the new social order which she had adopted; as has been said by one well qualified to judge:

“It was necessary to create my age for me, as I had been created for it. It was necessary to be a legislator, after having been a warrior. It was not possible to carry back the Revolution, for that would have been to again subject the strong to the weak, which was contrary to Nature. It was necessary to accommodate to it an analogous system of legislation. This system will survive me, and I have left to Europe a heritage which it can not reject without falling into barbarism or anarchy.

“There was really in the state only a vast democracy, led by a dictatorship. This kind of government is well suited for execution; but it is of a temporary nature, inasmuch as it could only last during the lifetime of the dictator. I was to render it perpetual by creating durable institutions and corporations and by placing them between the throne and the democracy. It was useless to attempt any thing with the old lever of habitudes and illusions; I was obliged to make every thing a reality. It was



therefore necessary to found my legislation on the immediate interests of the majority, and to create my corporations with these interests, because interests are certainly the most real and tangible things in this world.

"I made laws whose effect was immense, but uniform. They had for their principle the maintenance of *equality*. This is so strongly stamped on these codes that they alone will be sufficient to preserve it."

I resolved at this epoch to establish an intermediate class. It was to be democratic, inasmuch as any one could enter it, and at any time; it was to be monarchical, inasmuch as it could not die, and would serve as a barrier against this same democracy; it was to be strictly national, inasmuch as it would include all who had rendered eminent services to the state. But public opinion was not yet prepared for the execution of this project, and I was obliged to defer it till a more suitable opportunity. In the mean time, the same message of March 30th, to the Senate, announcing the distribution of states to my family, and of the interior *régime* imposed on France, also announced the establishment of twenty-one grand fiefs of the Empire in Italy. Bernadotte was indebted to his relationship to my brother Joseph for the principality of Ponte-Corvo. Talleyrand had the duchy of Benevento. These titles, followed shortly after by those given to my generals and grand functionaries, by the several classes of the Legion of Honor, and the senatorship, gradually destroyed the ideas of equality and the leveling of ranks; but the *equality of rights*, which is the only reasonable one, was preserved.

**MECHANISM OF NAPOLEON'S GOVERNMENT.**—After the disorders of the Revolution, it was important to reestablish order, for this is the test of its strength and durability. Administrators and judges are essential to a state, for on them alone depends the public order—that is, the execution of the laws. I associated them to the movement which animated the people and the army, and even to their own recompenses: I had instituted an order which would honor the administrators, for it had already received its character from the soldiers who had entered it; I made it common to all who would serve the state, because the first of virtues is devotion to country. Those who did not understand my motives have reproached me for this. They said that illustrious warriors, conquerors in a hundred battles, should not be decorated with the same cordon as an administrator who, at ease, in the bosom of repose, makes his fortune, even though he has managed the public finances with perfect probity.

Far from disputing the necessity of having an order purely military, I afterward wished to reestablish one, by instituting the *Trois-Toisons*. But the Legion of Honor had a double object, which I should not have accomplished if I had confined it to the military. It served to unite all classes of the nation, for in it none were subordinate or excluded. It formed around me an intermediate corps, a kind of notability composed of the *élite* of the nation, which would be attached to the imperial system by its vocation, its interests, and its opinions; in a word, the cross of the Legion of Honor was to France what the Ring of the Knight was at Rome. This numerous body, although clothed with civil and military power, was popular with the people, inasmuch as it was drawn from their ranks. They had confidence in it, for its interests were connected with their own.

The Empire was based on a strong organization. The army was formed in the school of war; it had learned to fight and to suffer. The civil functionaries were accustomed to strictly execute the laws, for I allowed nothing arbitrary or latitudinarian in their interpretations. They were formed with promptness and exactitude. I had given everywhere a uniform impression, for throughout the whole Empire there was but a single command. Thus moved this great governmental machine within the limits which I had formed for it. I had at one time the grand idea of rendering all public employments irremovable, except for offenses tried before a tribunal and with a formal judgment. I saw in this a great moral advantage and a pledge of stability. A man who holds a public employment for life thinks twice before he risks its loss. The state in this way secures more faithful men for its servants, and the public employees are no longer exposed to arbitrary dismissals; there is much less chance for intrigue and favoritism.

I put a stop to defalcations by centralizing, on a single point, the entire fiscal machine. Nothing in this department was left vague and undefined; all half responsibilities of the provinces were superseded, for experience had proved that this system only tended to enrich petty speculators at the expense of the treasury, the people, and the public welfare.

**THE PUBLIC CREDIT RESTORED.**—I had restored the public credit, by not using, and by establishing, certain sinking funds. To the abuse of loans which paralyzed France there had succeeded a system of imposts which relieved her finances. Nevertheless, it was possible for me to give a wider base to our *credit de bourse*. The fear of abuse had prevented me from making any



farther use of loans, a valuable resource which should always be managed with great care. I proscribed stock-jobbing, by forbidding all action of the treasury on the public funds. We frequently had much more specie in deposit than was requisite to raise the value of these funds above par. But I always opposed any resort to such measures, and by these scruples deprived myself of great resources.

**THE CONSCRIPTION REGULATED.**—I perfected the system of conscription by a law rigorous, but grand, and the only one worthy of a people who cherish glory and liberty; for such a people should trust its defense to no one but itself. So true is this, that nothing else can be substituted for it, and it is still preserved by those who sought to render it odious.

**PUBLIC MONUMENTS.**—I added several great monuments to those which France already possessed. The four most important are not yet completed; viz., that of Mont Cénis, the Triumphal Arch of the Simplon at Milan, the Arc de l'Etoile, and the Temple of Madeleine at Paris. They will serve as witnesses of my glory, and will tend to elevate the souls of our descendants; the people value these noble images of their history. The column of the Place Vendôme will live as long as that of Trajan. My throne was brilliant not merely by the glory of arms. The French love grandeur, even in appearance. I decorated the palaces; I collected there a numerous court; I gave to it an austere character; no other would have been suitable. It has been said by some that my court was neither amusing nor amiable, and that the ladies detested me. It is true that they played but a pitiful part in comparison with that under Madame Dubarry, and they were made subordinate to the grandeur of the state. Louis XV. would, perhaps, have suited them better, but with the exception of the dowagers of the Faubourg Saint-Germain, and those women who renounced all the duties of their sex to make themselves celebrated at any price,\* I believe that the French ladies rendered

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\*This seems intended for Madame de Staël and women of her character. Madame de Staël was the daughter of Necker, the minister of finance under Louis XVI. She was born in 1766, and married the Baron de Staël-Holstein in 1786. She afterward separated from her husband and lived with a young French officer named Rocca. Her marriage to this officer was not known till after her death. She at first manifested a great admiration for Napoleon and sought to gain him over to her views in regard to the independence of Switzerland, but, failing in this and other political projects, she formed for him a strong aversion. Napoleon disliked female politicians, and while he showed much attention to Necker, he avoided the society of his daughter. She did not fail to resent this by

me justice, at least prior to 1813. They amused themselves at my court in a manner more serious than at the Parc-au-Cerf and in the orgies of the Regency; nevertheless, they did amuse themselves.

**INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.**—I did not limit all my cares to these monuments, symbols of power and glory; I directed equal attention to all commercial and industrial establishments. Of course I did not forget those of a military character. Many new communications were opened to commerce; I connected Italy with France by four magnificent roads through the Alps. I here undertook works whose execution had before seemed impossible. The roads of the Simplon and Mont Cenis, and that of the Corniche, which runs from Nice by Genoa to Florence, are lasting monuments of my genius. I afterward learned in my exile that Austria and Sardinia have followed with giant steps the career which I opened to them; imitation is not difficult when we have living models before our eyes. We must nevertheless render justice to governments which can learn something; there are so many which never learn any thing!

I encouraged the progress of agriculture by promulgating laws for the protection of property, and by distributing equally the public burdens. The canals of St. Quentin, Burgundy, and of Alsace have united the Seine and the Saône to the Rhine and to the North Sea; the latter secured to us outlets for our agricultural produce into Holland and to the Weser, especially when the coast trade was interrupted; the former secured to us a communication with Belgium. All kinds of manufactures were encouraged, both by premiums and by laws protecting them from foreign competition.

**MILITARY AND MARITIME WORKS.**—My activity redoubled with my solicitude for whatever concerned our system of fortifications. The works ordered at Alexandria were calculated to secure us a permanent establishment beyond the Alps; some thought that it would have been better to have established a good

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sarcastic remarks upon the Emperor, which were repeated even in the salons of Paris. She died in 1817.

Her mind was of a masculine character, which was exhibited in all her writings. Although her style is irregular and has too much pretension, we find in all her works original and profound thought. She had a lively imagination, which naturally led her to exaggeration, and often caused her to give a false coloring to facts. While her writings are valuable and interesting, her statements are not always reliable. Although she wrote much upon literary subjects, her taste evidently ran to politics, in which she was less successful. "Corinne" is the most brilliant and popular of all her works.



fortified place at Pavia or Cremona; the question is too long to be discussed here. With the same hand that projected the works of Buderich to secure the Weser by both banks of the Rhine, and to complete the general system of defense of this superb barrier, I traced the plans for fortifying Cassel and Kehl, which had just been ceded to us by the Grand Dukes of Baden and Darmstadt. I employed a portion of the contributions of Austria to establish a *tête-de-pont* on the Lech; I at the same time constructed good temporary fortifications for the security of Dalmatia.

Antwerp, and Venice especially, were not forgotten. The description of the immense works ordered for these two forts would itself fill a volume. The country of the Morosini, the Albiani, and of the Dandolo, might, under my care, one day arise from its ruins, if not as the capital, at least as the great *place-d'armes* and *entrepôt* of the Levant. The superb arsenal, the only heritage which Venice had preserved of her empire of the seas, was beginning to resume all its wonted activity; the vast forests of Illyria and of Macedonia would supply us with timber; Hungary with copper; commerce could procure us canvas and cordage; Dalmatia and Albania would supply us with good sailors. Who could say that Greece with her fifty isles would not one day furnish us a nursery of intrepid sailors?

At the same time that I rebuilt these great ports, I ordered the defenses of Brest, Cherbourg, and Rochefort to be augmented. I was at the same moment carrying on the most important negotiations; the great works of engineering, of civil architecture, of arsenals, of canals; the internal administration and legislation of France. Not of France alone; all Europe seemed too small for my ardent imagination, and for my love of toil, which seemed to increase in proportion as difficulties multiplied. I asked no other panegyric on my reign than the publication of my correspondence with the chiefs of the army and of the several ministries, and of the projects submitted to my council.\*

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\*The following extract from Allison gives a more complete account of the interior condition of France about this time:

"Though completely despotic, the imperial government had one incalculable advantage: it was regular, conservative, and systematic. The taxes were heavy, but the government expenditure was immense, and enabled the people to pay them with facility; no forced loans or arbitrary confiscations swept off, as in the time of the Republic, the accumulations of years by one fell exaction; no uncertainty as to enjoying the fruits of industry paralyzed in any branch of employment the hand of the laborer. Every thing was orderly and tranquil under the imperial sway; the Emperor demanded indeed more than half their sons from his subjects of every degree, but a boundless career was opened to the conscripts; and visions of

But we will now turn our attention from my labors to elevate France as high as it was possible without a commercial marine, to the affairs of Germany, where the Confederation of the Rhine seemed likely to again endanger the peace of Europe.

**AFFAIRS OF PRUSSIA.**—Frederick William received with grief the news of the overthrow of the German Empire, upon which I had not consulted him. Even those of his counsellors who had pardoned Haugwitz for the acquisition of Hanover could

a marshal's baton or a general's staff danced before the eyes of many a youthful aspirant, who was destined to an early and unheeded grave in the field of battle, or amidst the horrors of the hospital. The stoppage of all external commerce, combined with the vast and constantly increasing expenditure of government, produced an extraordinary degree of vigor in domestic industry and internal communication; the roads, the canals which connected the provinces with each other, were covered with wagons or boats laden with the richest merchandise; the cultivators everywhere found an ample market for their produce, in the vast consumption of the armies; the manufacturing cities vied with each other in activity and enterprise; and even commercial wealth, reviving from its ashes under the firm rule of the Emperor, exerted its energies on internal traffic, and turning inward, promoted internal circulation through the great arteries of the Empire. Beet-root was largely cultivated as a substitute for the sugar-cane, and though the saccharine matter obtained from that useful vegetable was inferior in sweetness and richness to that which the West India islands yielded, yet it was superior in clearness and delicacy, and, as a native production, was justly admired. Lyons, Rouen, and the Flemish cities again resounded with the activity of the artisan; their ruined fabrics were restored, the empty warehouses replenished; and the vast internal consumption of the Empire, deprived of all foreign competition, rapidly raised from the dust the prosperous manufactures of the monarchy, which the confiscation of the Revolution had to all appearance irrevocably destroyed.

"Much as this extraordinary flood of internal prosperity was owing to the rapid circulation of wealth, occasioned by the great expenditure, exceeding thirty millions sterling, which was drawn from the ordinary revenue of the Empire, more still was to be ascribed to the enormous sums which were extracted from one half of Europe in the shape of subsidies, contributions, or the maintenance of the imperial armies, which were all expended, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of the French people. The immense sums, amounting to about twenty-four millions sterling, have been already mentioned, which were extracted from Prussia, and the countries between the Elbe and the Vistula, in two years subsequent to the irruption of the French armies into their territories in October, 1806. But exorbitant as this was, it constituted but a part of the great system of foreign plunder which formed so important an element in the general system of the imperial government. We have the authority of the able and impartial biographer of Napoleon for the assertion, 'that since their departure from the heights of Boulogne two hundred thousand French soldiers had been constantly fed, clothed, paid, and lodged, at the expense of foreign states; above four hundred millions of contributions (£18,000,000) had, in addition, been levied in money or goods, from the countries occupied by the imperial troops; the treasury had received part of this sum, and the remainder, expended on the services of the army, had reduced by one-half the amount required from the French exchequer for its support.' A



see in this new movement only a manifest attempt on the interests of Prussia. They contended that as it was my interest to extend my influence in Germany, so was it the interest of Prussia that Germany should remain an independent power between her and my great empire. Nevertheless, the peace party once more carried the day; Frederick recognized the league of the Rhine, and endeavored to establish that of the North. He did not succeed in this as easily as he anticipated; England and Russia

few years before, Louisiana had been sold by the First Consul to America, to obtain a supply for the pressing wants of the treasury; on his return from the campaign of Austerlitz, the Emperor found the treasury exhausted, and the bank on the eve of insolvency; but the campaign of the next two years gave him a year's revenue in advance in the coffers of the state, besides a large reserved treasure in the vaults of the Tuilleries. When such extraordinary supplies were obtained by foreign plunder for the French treasury, it is not surprising that a very great degree of prosperity should have pervaded all the departments, and in an especial manner made itself felt at the metropolis; and, in truth, all the great and splendid works thenceforward undertaken by the Emperor, and which have shed such an imperishable luster round his name, were carried on by funds wrung, directly or indirectly, from the suffering inhabitants of his subject territories.

"And these works, undertaken under the imperial government, were really such as to justify the enthusiastic admiration of a people even less passionately devoted than the French to public splendor. They were thus noticed in the report of the minister of the interior, in August, 1807, when Napoleon met the chambers after his return from Tilsit; and after making every allowance for the exaggerated style of such state papers, much remains to attract the admiration of succeeding ages, and demonstrate the great objects to which, in domestic administration, the ambition of the Emperor was directed:

"Thirteen thousand leagues of public roads have been kept in order or repaired; the two greatest works undertaken for centuries, the roads of Mont Cénis and of the Simplon have, after six years of labor, been completed. The road from Spain to Italy is in progress; the Apennines are the theater of a series of works which will unite Piedmont to the shores of the Mediterranean, and complete the union of Liguria to France; eighteen rivers have seen their navigation improved or prolonged beyond hitherto impassable barriers by means of locks, dikes, or towing-paths; four bridges have been erected during the last campaign; ten others are in full progress; ten canals, almost all commenced during the present reign, are in full activity. Nor do the maritime harbors offer fewer prodigies. Antwerp, so recently insignificant, has become the center of our great maritime preparations; for the first time that part of the Scheldt sees vessels of seventy-four and eighty guns floating on its bosom; fourteen ships of the line are on the stocks within its walls; many are finished, and have descended to Flushing; that harbor has seen its docks deepened, its entrance improved, and it is already capable of containing a squadron; at Dunkirk and Calais piers have been constructed; at Cherbourg two vast breakwaters erected; at Rochefort and Marseilles equally important maritime improvements are in progress.

"The existence of our cotton manufactures being secured, investigations are in progress for the discovery of places suited to the culture of

opposed it, because it included Hamburg and the Hanseatic towns, and I, because it included Saxony, for I had intended this country for the Confederation of the Rhine; its geographical position made it the key of the Elbe; it would be an ally equally precious against Prussia or against Austria; moreover, the House of Saxony had been from time immemorial the friend of France, and its alliance with the Prussians since 1792 had not yet effaced the enmity that had sprung up from the seven years' war. It served my purpose to insinuate to Saxony that she ought to remain firm, and to Prussia that she must not employ threats or force, if her alliance should meet with opposition. In addition to the dissatisfaction which these obstacles gave to Prussia, the English, on the closing of the ports, had captured three hundred Prussian vessels; the ports were blockaded by Anglo-Swedish squadrons; the commercial class was in consternation, the military vociferated more and more; statesmen deplored the loss of

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that important article; the improvement of the linen fabrics has been the object of constant solicitude; veterinary schools have been established, and already fill the army and the fields with skilled practitioners; a code is preparing for the regulation of commerce; the school of arts and mechanics at Compiègne flourishes, and has been transferred to Châlons; others on a similar plan are in the course of formation; Italy opens an extensive mart for our industry; the war, changed into a contest for commercial independence, has become the greatest stimulant to French industry; every one of our conquests, while it is a market closed to England, is a new encouragement afforded to French enterprise. Nor has the capital of this great empire been neglected; it is the Emperor's wish that that illustrious city, become the first in the universe, should befit by its splendor so glorious a destiny. At one extremity of Paris a bridge has been completed, to which victory has given the name of Austerlitz; at another a second is commencing, to which Jena will afford a still more glorious appellation; the Louvre advances to its completion, marking, in its matured progress through centuries, the successive ages of Francis I., of Henry IV., of Louis XIV., restored to life by the voice of Napoleon; fountains without number flow night and day in all parts of the city, testifying, even to the humblest classes, the care which the Emperor bestows on their most trifling accommodations. Two triumphal arches are already erected, or founded: one in the center of the palace inhabited by the Genius of Victory; the other at the extremity of the most beautiful avenue of the finest city in the world. The tomb of Dessaix has been erected on the summit of the Alps, whose rugged precipices are not less startled at the monument of our perfection in the arts, than they were at the passage of the artillery drawn by the arms of valor. The fine arts in France are occupied almost entirely in tracing on marble or canvas the glorious exploits of our armies, while the mind of the Emperor, ever meditating fresh triumphs, has selected for his antagonist the Demon of Ignorance; and, by the establishment of twelve colleges for the study of law, and gratuitous schools for the teaching of medicine in all the principal cities of the Empire, has laid the foundation of the extension of general knowledge in the most essential subjects of public instruction."



Germany. If the government had attempted to stifle all the germs of discontent, it would have needed the revolutionary tribunal of Fauquier Tinville. Frederick William opposed to this torrent a firm and unshaken will; he could do nothing more. A single spark in this mine was sufficient to cause its explosion: this spark was soon furnished by my negotiation with England.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENGLAND.—While laboring to enlarge the basis of my power, I did not lose the hope of consolidating so many glorious works by a maritime peace, without which which my edifice could have no durable basis. The first overtures were the result of a fortuitous event, which was a good augury. One of those monsters who spring from civil wars; one of those wretches who think that the spirit of party or of sect justifies any crime; in a word, a French fanatic, ventured to propose to Fox to assassinate me, and for this purpose to purchase a house on the avenue of St. Cloud, where I passed daily in a carriage. Fox, more generous than the instigators of Georges Cadoudal, expelled this man from the kingdom, and notified me of his infamous proposition. The resulting correspondence led to reciprocal explanations. There was much difficulty at first respecting the form of negotiating, England wishing to treat in concert with Russia; but it seemed to me improper to introduce a third power, with whom I had no particular difficulties to settle, especially as that power might throw its whole weight in the negotiation against me; I therefore declined the proposition; an intermediate course was agreed upon, by the Emperor Alexander's consenting to send, on his part, a negotiator to Paris. He sent me D'Oubril under pretext of an exchange of prisoners.

In the mean time, Fox had demanded the release of Lord Yarmouth, who had been detained at Verdun in consequence of reprisals for French vessels seized before the war, and whose cargoes (not military) had been detained. In passing through Paris on his return to London, Talleyrand manifested to him the desire which we all had for peace; he told him, among other things, that we demanded nothing of the English, and that they could hope nothing of real interest from a war. Lord Yarmouth returned with instructions, and conferences were opened. It seemed that an arrangement would be made; the English themselves proposed the state of *uti possidetis*, and appeared satisfied with keeping Malta and the Cape of Good Hope;\* they exhibited a disposition to give up the rest of the captured colonies. Unfor-

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\*This place was taken from the Dutch by Admiral Popham and General Baird, on the 8th of January.

tunately, Fox was taken sick; Lord Spencer took the portfolio, and under pretext that Yarmouth had indiscreetly divulged the contents of his instructions, they added Count Lauderdale to the legation. The negotiation immediately began to retrograde. It was pretended by the English that in the first conferences the state of respective possession had been admitted, with the exception of Hanover, which was to be restored to England. If the question had been settled in this way, I should have left every thing to the English; Malta, the Cape, Surinam, Demarara, Berbice, Tobago, and moreover, have restored Hanover, without obtaining any thing in return! I declared these conditions incompatible with my honor; and as I had just placed my brother on the throne of Holland, I could not begin his reign by stripping the Dutch of all their colonies. The case of Joseph was similar; I might as well recall him from the throne of Naples as to deprive him of Sicily, the gem and the granary of that kingdom.

I confess that I did not sufficiently appreciate what England would have to sacrifice in recognizing the basis of *uti-possidetis* of both France and her allies. I at length yielded the question of the colonies and of Hanover; but in exchange I insisted on Sicily. Perhaps I committed a grave error. I might have taken the English at their word of *uti-possidetis* except Hanover; and have immediately sent a skillful negotiator to Berlin to propose to the King to second me in the desirable work of peace, by accepting a compensation. It would have been sufficient that England promised not to interfere in the arrangement of this continental affair, provided her electorate were restored. But Lord Lauderdale would certainly have found some pretext for withdrawing the proposition when he found it accepted with so much haste on my part; indeed, he found sufficient excuse for contestations in the interpretation to be given to the basis of *uti-possidetis*. There was reason to believe that an attempt might be made to confine it to the French Empire, properly so called, excluding all the states dependent on France. In fact, the English negotiator, in a moment of indiscretion, when discussing the affair of Sicily, said that so far from yielding this country, he had orders to demand the restoration of Naples to Ferdinand IV.\*

**TREATY WITH RUSSIA.**—In the mean time M. D'Oubril had arrived at Paris to treat in the name of Russia; as we had no

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\*Mr. Allison attempts to give to these negotiations a character and coloring essentially false. The published correspondence is very far from supporting his assertions, which seem to spring from his own prejudice, rather than a just appreciation of the facts of history.



colonies for mutual cession, it was not difficult for us to agree; I demanded the restitution of Cattaro, which belonged to me, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Seven Isles; I promised the evacuation of Germany. A secret article authorized the exchange of Sicily for the Balearic Isles. The treaty was signed July 20th.

The Emperor Alexander strongly reproved the conduct of his negotiator; D'Oubril was disgraced; the Council of the Empire declared that he had exceeded his powers, and the Emperor refused his ratification, without alleging any other motives. This refusal wounded me, for it disappointed my hopes. My journals made loud complaints. These are instruments used for producing momentary effects. It would be absurd to judge of my sentiments from the paragraphs of the gazettes; it is not in newspapers that history is written.

If I had formed vast projects for the grandeur of France and of my empire, I was not so simple as to expect that these projects could be executed without exciting the enmity of my neighbors, who were interested in opposing the part which I wished to play. We have accused each other of ambition and exaggerated pretensions: this was a matter of course; but now, as the interest of the moment is past, it is well to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. I doubt not, the Emperor of Russia in my position would have acted as I did; had I been in his place I should unhesitatingly have opposed the projects of the French Empire on Germany. It was, perhaps, the establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine that caused the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to refuse its sanction on the twenty-fourth of August. This pact had been formed on the twelfth of July, but it had not been published when D'Oubril signed his treaty on the twentieth. It was not till the first of August that a notification of it was given at Ratisbon.

The Emperor Alexander judged correctly that, although we had no provinces for retrocession, he nevertheless could not remain indifferent to the fate of states with which he was intimately connected. *If the first duty of a state is its own security, the second is the security of neighboring powers whose existence is necessary for its own preservation.* This rule is true, whatever may be the opinion of old writers on international law. The Emperor of Russia had, like me, guaranteed the acts of the deputation of the empire in 1803; he had been the guaranteeing power for the integrity of this empire since the treaty of Teschen in 1779; it could therefore hardly be expected that he would ratify a treaty concluded after the destruction of this empire, and therefore giving to

that act his implied sanction. Moreover, on the twentieth of June I had placed my brother Louis on the throne of Holland, and the Russian policy might see in this something opposed to its future interests. It would be impossible to deny that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was interested in the independence of these northern traders who had so many relations with its ports, especially if the commerce of neutrals should ever again be respected. Besides, Russia had no particular interest in making peace, as war could not reach her.

It has been said that D'Oubril declared that he signed the treaty of peace to save Austria, who was threatened with danger. I had ordered Berthier, on the sixteenth of July, to march my army on the Inn, if Austria should refuse to ratify the Confederation of the Rhine. It appears that this order, secret as it was, came to the knowledge of the Russian negotiator; but, what is not less remarkable, the treaty which he signed, reaching Vienna at the same time as the act of confederation, contributed not a little to produce the abdication of the Emperor of Germany; it therefore had for me all the advantages of a real peace—an effect directly the opposite, undoubtedly, to what was anticipated. The motive of D'Oubril, as has been alleged in his justification, was wholly new; it certainly was a singular method of delivering Austria from immediate danger, by binding the Russians for a certain time so as to prevent them from marching to her assistance. There is a mystery connected with this which time alone can clear up.

MISSION OF SEBASTIANI TO CONSTANTINOPLE.—Before the conclusion of this treaty and before knowing what decision might be taken at Vienna and at St. Petersburg relative to the Confederation of the Rhine, and under the apprehension of a new general conflagration on the continent, I had seen the advantage of opposing to Russia a powerful diversion on the Dniester. The thing did not seem easy; for it will be remembered that our relations with the Porte were near being compromised at the event of my coronation, and that Marshal Brune had returned from Constantinople without being able to obtain an open recognition of me as emperor. The corruption of the Divan, the recollection of our expedition into Egypt, and English influence had raised up obstacles which time alone could remove. Nevertheless, the campaign of Austerlitz had very much increased our credit with the Porte, and given a high idea of what they might undertake with our support. Selim III. loved France; he was more enchanted with our success, if possible, than the French



themselves, and resolved to send me an ambassador to congratulate me on my ascension to the throne.

Anxious to learn what advantage could be drawn from this disposition, I sent as envoy to Constantinople, General Sebastiani, an adroit, skillful, enterprising man, whose agreeable manners perfectly fitted him for a negotiator, and who, in the quality of a military officer, might be doubly useful in this mission if Turkey should eventually be drawn into the war. I, nevertheless, recommended to him great prudence, and gave him instructions respecting his negotiation. These instructions, wholly pacific, directed him, however, to use his address to obtain the dismissal of the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, who were mere agents of Russia. I considered this not only the first step toward the restoration of our influence at Constantinople, but one well calculated to lead to war. I had no reason to repent it, for Sebastiani perfectly accomplished this part of his mission, and the treaty of D'Oubril having been rejected, it procured me the desired diversion more happily and completely than I had anticipated. The clause of the treaty which guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire contributed, without doubt, to give him more credit than his predecessors, and he deserved it.

The occupation by Marmont's corps of the little republic of Ragusa, a tributary to the Porte, was directed at this epoch; it was necessary for the occupation of Venetian Dalmatia and the mouths of the Cattaro, and to secure us from the attacks of the Greek population of Montenegro, incited by the Russian division of Corfu to take up arms against us; Marmont received orders to cause it to be occupied by the division of Lauriston. This step was represented by our enemies as a new act of hostility against the Porte; but it affected that power too indirectly, and was of too little importance, to be weighed against the advantages to be derived from an alliance with me.

**ATTACK OF THE ENGLISH ON BUENOS AYRES.**—During these negotiations the maritime war was still going on; but the English, who had no rivals on the ocean after the battle of Trafalgar, made no very important enterprises this year. That of Admiral Popham against South America, without the orders of the ministry, was not carried on by means sufficient to produce any results. After the reduction of the Cape, Popham, having first received some reinforcements at St. Helena, landed Beresford at Buenos Ayres. This key of the River La Plata surrendered without resistance, on the twenty-seventh of July, and the English captured some rich prizes; but two Frenchmen, in the service

of Spain, organized the inhabitants, and, in concert with some royal troops which had retired into the environs, assailed the English in the city and forced them, after a rude combat, to capitulate on the twelfth of August. Popham, two months afterward, attempted to take revenge by attacking Montevideo, but was repulsed.

#### RUPTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENGLAND.—

The news of these events had not yet reached Europe when the negotiations with England were broken off. As soon as Lauderdale ascertained that Russia had refused to ratify the treaty, he demanded his passports, certain of having me embroiled with Prussia respecting Hanover, and perhaps with Spain for the Balearic Isles. The discussion on some of the accessories was continued till the end of September. Fox died on the thirteenth. Had he lived, it probably would not have changed the face of affairs, for I was placed, by the Confederation of the Rhine, on grounds where I could no longer hope to treat without making more concessions than had at first been demanded.

Notwithstanding all the fine hopes to which it had given rise, never, probably, was there a negotiation more fallacious and more incomprehensible than this. Any one will be convinced of this by examining with a little attention what had preceded it, and what followed.

The grand project of Pitt which had set Europe on fire in 1805, looked, according to the diplomatic notes themselves, at nothing less than the reduction of France to the limits of 1792. This was nearly the same as that proposed to me at Châtillon in 1814, when the enemy was at the gates of Paris. The battles of Ulm and Austerlitz had undoubtedly defeated this grand project, and changed the state of affairs on the continent; but, on the other hand, the battle of Trafalgar had placed England in a position relatively as advantageous as before. How then can we believe that the state of *uti-possidetis* could possibly enter into the head of an English minister, only one year after this famous project, which in twenty lines disclosed the entire policy of the Cabinet of St. James for twenty years? A government at the head of which figured Grenville and Windham, which in 1805 had refused to allow me the limits of the treaties of Amiens and Lunéville—did that government propose, in good faith, to recognize the annexation of Piedmont and Genoa to France? Did it consent that Holland and Naples should become, though not an internal part of my empire, yet subject to it like grand feudatories, whose sovereigns were not only members of my family, but



also high dignitaries of the French Empire, and in that quality subject to its jurisdiction? Finally, did they recognize the crown of Italy on my head, they who had wished to discuss the smallest changes made in 1800 in this peninsula? No, they never intended this in good faith!

If any one has the least doubt on this subject, let him recollect the treaty of Bartenstein, signed in April, 1807, between Russia and Prussia, and participated in by England. I had then in my power the entire monarchy of Frederick; I was in an attitude more formidable still than in 1806, and yet Russia and Prussia, allies of England, agreed never to lay down their arms till Germany should be delivered from my forces and my influence, and the crown of Italy placed on some other head. It is true that Fox thought neither as the minister of 1805, nor as those of 1807, for at this last epoch it was Canning who directed the department of foreign affairs; but Fox could not make a peace against the wishes of the whole English nation: he treated neither for himself only, nor by himself alone.

Notwithstanding these views and motives of England, the truth of which can not be contested, I frankly confess that I managed my part of this negotiation unskillfully; even at the risk of giving but the half of Naples to Joseph, and of restoring the whole of it to Ferdinand, I ought, if possible, to have procured from Russia and England the recognition of my empire and of the establishments bestowed on my other brothers. I acted ill toward Prussia, by pronouncing several times on the fate of Hanover without even consulting her. Accustomed to success, I had no fears of a war with her; and, to tell the truth, the Confederation of the Rhine appeared to me so important and the moment so opportune, that I was determined to brave the efforts of all Europe rather than renounce it. The English would perhaps have declined all question relative to the recognition of our establishments in Italy, as they had already done at the peace of Amiens; but, I repeat it, this would have been a more just cause for continuing the war than the demand made for Sicily.

**PRUSSIA ABRUPTLY DECIDES ON WAR.**—Although the propositions relative to Hanover had no results, they nevertheless produced at Berlin an explosion like powder. The Queen, Prince Louis of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick, and Baron Hardenberg had been, since the treaty of Potsdam, at the head of the war party. They now had no difficulty in influencing the King, who had been able to calm public opinion only by the advantages of the acquisition of Hanover in exchange for all the vexations which he had suffered.

They profited by these appearances of felony to incite all minds against me, without inquiring whether I would really demand back Hanover, and if, even supposing that I did, I would not have given Prussia ample compensation. They pretended to see in me only an ally of bad faith, who took back with one hand what he had bestowed with the other; a violator of territory, who arbitrarily disposed of what did not belong to him. They went even so far as to publish that I had bribed D'Oubril, and that, to induce his master to make peace, and to recognize me as emperor, I had proposed to him the partition of Prussia, giving Warsaw to the Grand Duke Constantine!

It was not necessary to resort to such absurd stories to completely turn heads which for a whole year had been in ebullition. Suddenly the Prussians recollect that they are the depositories of the glory of the great Frederick: the government which had restrained these impulses now sets the example. The King can see in this apparent loss of Hanover only the real loss of his monarchy, of the last pledge of his security, of the personal honor of the King himself. It only remained for him to fall gloriously, or become disgraced as a coward. The general cry, "*To Arms!*" is heard from Potsdam to Königsberg; war is decided on without even waiting for the coöperation of Russia. An alliance is negotiated with her, but they were unwilling to wait for her troops, as a war of honor allows of no delay.

**HER EXTRAORDINARY ULTIMATUM.**—This long torpor is followed by romantic rage. General Knobelsdorf, who has replaced Lucchesini as ambassador at Paris, remits me an extraordinary *ultimatum*, wanting in the proper respect due to a great power. They summoned me: 1st, to evacuate Germany, commencing on the day when the King could receive my answer and continuing without interruption; 2d, to detach Wesel from my empire; 3d, to send my answer before the eighth of October to the head-quarters of the King!

Assuredly Scipio before Carthage would not have held more imperious language to the conquered! Any one would have thought that this was the day after the battle of Rosbach!

The Cabinet of Berlin acted the more foolishly toward me in this matter, inasmuch as its interest was to gain time. If it had demanded, in suitable terms, the evacuation of Germany within a reasonably stipulated period, it would have acted rightly, and thrown on me all the odium of the aggression. In attacking me when I was engaged with the Russians and Austrians, the Prussians could have done me much injury; but to thus, unreasonably and alone, declare war against me, was so extraordinary that



I could not, for some time, believe it. Nothing, however, was more true, and it became necessary to prepare for the campaign.

**FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMY.**—I knew that the Russian army, cantoned on the Niemen, would be an inevitable auxiliary; but this required time, and I might reach Berlin before it could; moreover, I hoped that Sebastiani would succeed in inciting Turkey to war; for a treaty signed between England and Russia had given to the latter Moldavia and Wallachia, as the price of the efforts which she would make against France. But I was not a man to wait for the uncertain coöperation of Selim III. before falling on my adversaries, who were now fully exposed to my attacks; I ordered the assembling of my army, and departed for Mayence. The sixth of October I arrived at Bamberg. My army was one hundred and eighty thousand strong. The main body, composed of the five corps of Bernadotte, Davoust, Soult, Ney, Lannes, and the cavalry of the Grand Duke of Berg, assembled at Coburg and at Bamberg; my guard, under Lefébvre, took the road to Bamberg; Augereau left Frankfort to threaten the road to Cassel and then to incline to the right; Mortier assembled the eighth corps on the confines of Westphalia; my brother Louis, with fifteen thousand Gallo-Batavians, took the direction of Wesel; Marmont remained in Illyria with the second corps, charged with covering Ragusa, occupying the Cattaro, etc.

**POSITION AND PLAN OF THE PRUSSIANS.**—The Prussians had advanced into Saxony and induced the Elector to unite his troops with theirs. The Elector of Hesse-Cassel prepared to do the same. They posted themselves on the northern side of the forest of Thuringia. The corps of Ruchel of twenty thousand men formed the right at Eisenach. The principal army, of fifty thousand men, commanded by the King, and under him by the Duke of Brunswick, took position in the environs of Erfurth. The army of the left, commanded by the Prince of Hohenlohe, of about fifty thousand Saxo-Prussians, was concentrated on Blankenhayn; a corps of this army was detached under the orders of Tauenzien, in order to cover the extreme left at Schleitz.

**NAPOLÉON'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS.**—There were only three plans by which we could operate against Prussia: the 1st, by my left, debouching from Mayence and Wesel on Westphalia; but this would have been absurd; the 2d, to act in mass at the center by the road to Eisenach on Cassel or Leipsic; the 3d, to throw myself in mass by my right, to turn the enemy's left and cut off the Prussians from Berlin by Hof and Gera, as I had cut off Mack from Vienna by Donawerth, and Melas by Marengo. It

was evident that this last was not only the best, but the only feasible plan.

**FAULTS OF THE PRUSSIANS.**—To avoid the catastrophe, there remained to the Prussians only two courses: that of falling, by the middle of September, on my cantonments which were scattered through Franconia, or of awaiting me defensively, with their forces concentrated on the upper Saale, supporting their left on the frontiers of Austria. I might have beaten them in front; but then they would have had a secure retreat on Dresden and Silesia. They could have united with the Russians on the Oder, and thus have saved their monarchy. On the contrary, they pushed forward their right to Eisenach, set down their center under Erfurth, and permitted their isolated left to remain in the environs of Schleitz. This was precisely what I desired.

**THEIR GENERALS.**—The King, in putting himself at the head of his army, had exhumed, as it were, the old generals of the seven years' war to serve him as guides; the Duke of Brunswick and Mollendorf were to lead the army to victory. The former, a vanguard general under his father, the great Ferdinand, had never, since that period, fought, except at Kaiserslautern against Hoche, where he had bravely defended his camp. A good administrator, valiant in combat, but timid in council, he had learned nothing during the past fifteen years, although these years had been rich in lessons for every military man capable of profiting by them. Mollendorf, not less brave, was equally unskillful; age had paralyzed within him those qualities which had formerly given him so great a reputation, but age had not given him genius; genius is never the fruit of age or of experience. The Prince Hohenlohe and Massenbach, his right arm, had just enough mind and knowledge to select the false in war. In a word, there was not, in all that brilliant circle of the counsellors of Potsdam, a single individual who sufficiently comprehended my system of war to judge of the three simple hypotheses which I have mentioned, and to conclude that it was by Coburg and Hof that I would turn my army, if they ventured to cross the Saale. They ran to their own destruction with a presumption that can hardly be described.

Plunged in a lethargic sleep for the last ten years, they were so certain of driving us back to Mayence, that they made no preparations for putting in a state of defense the fortifications of their first line, not even those situated within a few marches of our cantonments; while I was piling up bastion upon bastion



at Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel, they did not plant a single palisade at Magdeburg, nor put in battery a single cannon at Spandau!

On the other hand, their army was fine, well armed, and admirably disciplined; the artillery was excellent, the cavalry had not yet forgotten Seidlitz and his immortal lessons; the staff was well instructed, but instructed in details, to the neglect of principles; so that, in fact, this army, so superb in appearance, was a body without a soul.

**VIEWS OF THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.**—The Duke of Brunswick, in pushing forward his army to Eisenach, hoped to hurry along the Elector of Hesse, who had already assembled a contingent of twenty thousand men to reinforce the army. His project was afterward to cross the debouches of Franconia on three points so as to fall on my line of the Main, where he imagined I would remain on the defensive. This was judging very singularly of my character, my position, and my former practice. How was it possible for him to suppose that a captain, who had thrown himself, with the rapidity of the eagle, before the united forces of Austria and Russia, would go to sleep in rear of the Main, when opposing the isolated forces of a power of the second rank, especially when there were such strong motives for acting vigorously before the arrival of the Russians, and before the Austrians could be aroused to action?

At the news of my first movements on Coburg, the Duke recovered from an illusion which proved all his simplicity of character; he renounced the offensive, and resolved to concentrate his army near Weimar in order to await us in front. This concentration was wise, but it should have been made on the left of Hof, instead of drawing this left wing to the *corps-de-bataille*, and thus opening the road which led directly to my object.

**NAPOLÉON SEIZES THE ENEMY'S COMMUNICATIONS.**—My plan was very soon decided on when I arrived at Bamberg and learned what had taken place about Erfurth. An ordinary general in my place would have been satisfied with defeating the enemy; I carried my views still further, and resolved to effect their total destruction. I arranged my plan to cut off their army from the heart of the Prussian monarchy, to turn them by the left, and establish myself between them and the Elbe. It was true that in acting thus on their communications I should somewhat expose my own; but this could be done without danger, since we were superior in numbers, and by inclining from Gera to the west, I could cover the roads of Hof, Nordhalbein, and Coburg, which in case of reverse would carry me to Franconia.

My army penetrated Saxony on three routes: at the right, Soult, Ney, and a Bavarian division marched from Baireuth by Hof on Plauen; at the center the Grand Duke of Berg, Bernadotte, and Davoust marched from Bamberg by Cronach on Saalburg; at the left, Lannes and Augereau, setting out from Schweinfurt, took their direction by Coburg and Groffenthal on Saalfeld. The first engagement took place on the eighth of October. A Prussian detachment which attempted to defend the Saale at Saalburg was driven away by the Grand Duke of Berg; the next day my column of the center, pursuing its way, found at Schleitz the corps of Tauenzien. Bernadotte attacked it, gaining a decided victory. My left also began with success. On the tenth, Lannes attacked, at Saalfeld, the advanced guard of the army of Hohenlohe, commanded by Prince Louis of Prussia. The enemy was beaten and lost a thousand men and thirty cannon. Prince Louis, a young man of great promise, not wishing to survive the shame of a defeat, preferred being slain: he had lived as a valiant knight, and he died like a hero. After having been my admirer this prince became my sworn enemy, because he deemed me dangerous to Prussia; his patriotism carried him astray, and notwithstanding what he did against me, I am happy to do him justice.

I had expected greater resistance. The recollection of Frederick, of Seidlitz, of Leuthen, of Prague, had given me the highest opinion of this army, and I had remarked to one of my officers at Mayence, that this campaign would not be like that of Ulm; *that we should have earth to move in this war.* These first victories undeceived me; they were a good augury for the campaign. I then felt that I could cheaply dispose of the Prussian army, which did not exhibit sufficient consistency to sustain the weight of a great reverse.

**DECISIVE MANEUVER.**—By these first movements we had succeeded in turning the enemy's left by anticipating him on the twelfth at Gera; it was now my object to cut him off entirely. For this purpose my left served as the pivot for a grand change of front of the whole army. The thirteenth we occupied the following positions: Davoust, Bernadotte, and Murat, with his light cavalry only, moved on Naumburg, where he captured considerable magazines intended for the Prussian army; Soult was in march from Gera on Jena; Ney at Roda; Lannes at Jena; Augereau at Kahla; a Bavarian division flanked my right by establishing itself at Plauen.

Before leaving Gera on the twelfth, I wrote a letter to Fred-



erick William to offer him peace. I intrusted this letter to an officer of staff, Montesquiou, with directions to take it to the King. This step was ill-judged; Montesquiou, if we are to believe Prince Hohenlohe, was arrested on the night of the thirteenth, by the outposts, traveling alone and without the usual precautions of a flag of truce; the Prince took him for a spy, and retained him near himself, sending the letter to the King, who did not receive it till the battle. It must be confessed that it was now rather too late, and difficult to avoid war. I nevertheless had two chances in writing this letter; either the King would make peace by subscribing to all my conditions, or he would persist in the resolution taken on leaving Berlin, to conquer or die. In either case it might serve to keep him in suspense on the night of the thirteenth, and the morning of the fourteenth, so that he might not having time to decide on making a forced march by night to avoid being taken in reverse. This was a justifiable *ruse-de-guerre*. I appeared the friend of peace while advancing to my object. This letter was not the worst maneuver of the campaign; if the King had received it as I had supposed, it would not have prevented him, whether he accepted peace or not, from marching with all his army on Freiburg. It then depended on him to save himself militarily and politically. The date of this letter written at Gera was sufficient to tell him to hasten his retreat and escape from the embarrassment by answering it.

BATTLE OF JENA.—The enemy, concentrated in the environs of Weimar, had no apprehension of my maneuvers till after their success; but at last, seeing that we were already masters of the road from that city to Leipsic, and of the magazines of Naumburg, he resolved to retreat in order to reach the Elbe before us. On the evening of the thirteenth, the King and the Duke of Brunswick, with the principal army, moved toward Sulza. The Prince of Hohenlohe, charged with covering this march, remained near Cappellendorf on the height of Jena; he was supported by the corps of Ruchel, which fell back to Weimar. I took care not to give the enemy time to escape. Already in possession of his communications, I resolved to secure his ruin, by giving him battle. Although the defile of Jena, through which we had to debouch, was difficult, it was not an obstacle to us who had crossed the St. Bernard and passed the rock of Bard; Lannes, in pursuing the advanced guard of Tauenzien toward Jena, had had the audacity to climb the mountains of Landgrafenberg, and to place himself on the summit opposite the Prussian army, which I myself discovered encamped on three lines. I did not know

that it was divided; I believed that it would fight in one body according to the system of Frederick. I hurried the march of my guard, and made it climb, at ten o'clock in the evening, a very steep path to the plateau of Closwitz, which it was important for us to occupy as a kind of *lête-de-pont*, to enable us to ascend the mountain and debouch from this chasm; Soult followed near by; he arrived during the night on my right, and Angereau on my left; Ney bivouacked at Roda.

Supposing the entire army of the King to be collected on this point, and that his left extended in the direction of Apolda, I ordered Bernadotte to march to Dornburg, and Davoust to move from Naumburg by the left of the Saale on Apolda, in order to fall on the extremity of the enemy's line and take him in reverse. Murat joined me at Jena with his light cavalry. These dispositions were good for the position I supposed the enemy to occupy; but if I had foreseen that the King of Prussia would attempt to pierce by Naumburg, and that Bernadotte had already reached there, I should not have exposed Davoust alone to sustain the shock of the mass of the enemy's forces, and have sent Bernadotte away to Dornburg, where he was equally useless to me and to Davoust.

On the fourteenth, at break of day, the combat began. The night had been cold; a thick fog obscured the horizon; we could hardly see two steps before us: this was a double good fortune to us, since the enemy could not discover whether we were yet in readiness on the plateau. I mounted my horse at eight o'clock, and, riding in front of Suchet's division, I exhorted his battalions in these words: "Soldiers! This proud Prussian army is turned, like that of Mack at Ulm; it will now fight only to find means to retreat; the corps which shall allow it to escape will be dishonored!" The advanced guard of Prince Hohenlohe was driven back by Lannes, from the defiles of which it still held the head; we possessed Lutzerode and Closwitz. At the noise of this combat, Hohenlohe raised his camp of Capellendorf and advanced to meet us on Vierzehnheiligen. For two hours I satisfied myself with this feeble success, merely keeping up the combat till the arrival of my cavalry and the three corps which I was expecting. Ney, by a deplorable excess of zeal, dissatisfied at being in reserve in rear of Augereau, attacked alone, with three thousand men of the *élite*, the whole Prussian line of Vierzehnheiligen; he suffered for an hour the whole fire of the enemy, and forced me to sustain him by Lannes. This premature attack vexed me the more, as I still supposed that we were dealing with the entire



army of the King, concentrated on this point. At length, the columns of Soult and Augereau having at last debouched, as also the main body of Ney's corps, I renewed the attack: the Duke of Dalmatia threw himself on the left of Hohenlohe, Ney and Lannes on the center toward Vierzehnheiligen, and Augereau on Iserstedt.

The victory was not for a moment doubtful; the whole Prussian line was completely routed. Ruchel, arriving from Weimar with the reserve, out of breath, had not sufficient *coup-d'oeil* to perceive that affairs were in too bad a state for him to repair them with his twenty thousand men. Instead of limiting himself to covering the retreat of Prince Hohenlohe, he had the imprudence to engage himself against the main body of my army, and being unable to take us in flank he met us in front. His troops were defeated and he himself severely wounded. His defeat only added to the enemy's losses. The flying foe was closely pursued and thrown beyond the Ilm, which they passed below Weimar. This city was occupied by our troops the very night of the battle, though situated six leagues from where it had commenced.

**BATTLE OF AUERSTADT.**—While we are gaining the victory at Jena, Davoust obtained at Auerstädt a no less signal success against the army of the King. The latter had put himself in march the night before to gain Naumburg and Freyburg. The division of Schmettau, which led the march, advanced to Gerstädt, and his reconnoitering parties, pushed into the defile of Kosen, made prisoners of a similar reconnoitering party sent out by Davoust. The Duke of Brunswick, being informed of the presence of this marshal's corps at Naumburg, persisted in the opinion that it was merely a detachment of partisans; instead of pushing forward Schmettau to Kosen the same night, he left him in position and caused to bivouac the two other divisions and the reserve between Eberstädt and Ranstet; the head-quarters were at Auerstädt. It may be inferred how little the King expected the fate that awaited his army, when it is known that the Queen even remained there, with an inconceivable security; he had great difficulty in inducing her to return to Weimar.

In the mean time the Duke of Brunswick, informed of the existence of a corps of our troops at Naumburg, and knowing that there was a road from the plateau of Kosen directly to Freyburg on the Unstrutt, hoped to reach that city without being obliged to fight his way through our troops. He ordered, for the next day, Schmettau's division to establish itself on the heights

of Kosen, and to protect the march of the four other divisions which would defile in its rear. This was very well for his escape, if Davoust had remained immovable at Naumburg; but even supposing the King's army had thus effected its escape, what must have become of Hohenlohe's corps of fifty thousand men, thus deserted in the midst of our army? If they had wished to steal away, ought not Hohenlohe to have been directed to march in the night on Sulza with his infantry in order to effect a junction there with the King and to render the operation more certain? This was the only means by which the army could be saved from impending ruin. The division of Tauenzien and all the cavalry of Hohenlohe should have remained in the camp of Capellendorf to mask the march, and even if the ten battalions should be compromised alone, they ought still, at daylight, to have taken the road to Erfurth, or even have followed the King by that of Eckartsberg. It is evident, however, that the Duke of Brunswick understood much better how to get an army into difficulty than to devise the means of extricating it.

The King's army moved at break of day; the fog, of which we have already spoken, retarded its march. Nevertheless, the division of Schmettau, arriving near Hassenhausen, encountered the division of Gudin which Davoust had sent during the night to secure his debouch from the defile of Kosen. An hour more, and it would have been too late; our troops, crowded into the defile, would have never been able to effect a debouch, but would have been roughly handled. Davoust, having reconnoitered the ground the night before, and having received my orders at two o'clock in the morning, proposed to Bernadotte to march with him by Kosen on Apolda, and even offered him the command of the two corps. The order of the Prince of Neufchâtel to Davoust was to the effect that if the first corps had already joined him, they should march together; but this phrase had not been repeated to Bernadotte. The latter insisted on the literal wording of *his* order, to march on Dornburg. All that his colleague could say to convince him was useless; he in fact took the road by Camburg. This obstinacy, which it is difficult to explain, was very near compromising the corps of Davoust and preventing the success of the battle, as we shall soon see.

The King of Prussia had repaired in person to the division of Schmettau, and, impatient at the fog which prevented him from seeing what was going on around him, he directed Blücher to advance with two thousand five hundred horse and charge the troops which had debouched on the plateau. Gudin had just



arrived with his column near Hassenhausen; our light cavalry opposed itself to the superior cavalry of Blücher and was forced back; but the brigade of Gauthier now had time to form its squares; the King ordered them to be charged; but the artillery placed on the road, and sustained by the infantry, rendered vain all the efforts of Blücher and his squadrons.

This unexpected resistance frightened the Duke of Brunswick; he wished to put his army in battle array and wait the clearing up of the fog. The old general, Mollendorf, pretended that we had there only a flying corps, and that it ought to be driven back into the ravine of Kosen. The King, being of the same opinion, ordered the divisions of Wartensleben and the Prince of Orange to cross the ravine of Auerstädt. It was a great fault that, after having resolved to take the initiative, they did not cause this defile to be passed during the night; the Prussian army would have then reached, in good order, our columns while in march. Wartensleben, who debouched on the first, formed on the right and attacked the left of Gudin. At the same time Blücher, having advanced on Pücherau, found himself in rear of our right flank, and charged it with as much vivacity as the fog, which had begun to clear up, would permit. The moment was decisive. Davoust, placing his squares checkerwise, assisted by Gudin and the heroic firmness of his infantry, repelled several successive charges. Blücher had his horse killed under him; his squadrons, finding in all directions a barrier of iron and a murderous fire which strewed the ground with their brave men, took in disorder the road to Eckartsberg. The arrival of Friant's division on the right secured our success on this point. But Gudin was soon assailed on the left by the troops of Wartensleben; Schmettau, who had already lost half his men, was sustained on the two flanks by the Prince of Orange.

It was now nine o'clock; the Duke of Brunswick resolved on a general attack on our left; he put himself at the head of the division of Wartensleben. The immovable Gudin held firm against this new effort, notwithstanding the great disparity of numbers. The attack was not very vigorous, though courageously made; the Prussians sought too much to preserve their lines and distances, as though they were on parade. Our soldiers, squatting behind the hedges, the little ditches, the willows, and the gardens which surrounded Hassenhausen, poured into them a murderous fire of musketry. Several battalions fell back, and the Duke of Brunswick, in endeavoring to rally them, was mortally wounded; Schmettau experienced the same fate; Wartensleben had his

horse killed under him. Deprived of its chiefs, the Prussian line hesitated and halted, but did not fall back. Gudin was likely to be defeated, when the division of Morand appeared on the plateau, and directed itself to our left. This powerful reinforcement of fresh troops, ardent for the fight, was decisive. The Prussians, having been driven out of Hassenhausen and unable to make a stand in rear of that place, the King resolved to make another charge of cavalry like that of Blücher in the morning. Prince William executed with courage several charges against the troops of Morand, arranged in squares by battalion and disposed check-erwise. The devotion of this prince, carried to obstinacy, failed against the formidable front presented by our brave infantry; arrested in his progress by the close array of our bayonets, and exposed to a murderous musketry and the grape of our batteries, the Prince, himself being wounded, was unable to check the disorder of his squadrons; a part fled on New Sulza and a part on Auerstädt.

Friant, on his side, penetrated as far as Tauchwitz, turned the left of Prince Henry and the extremity of the enemy's line. No sooner was Morand clear of the enemy's cavalry than he threw himself on Rehausen. The King was found in the hottest of the strife; one horse had already been killed under him; showing great courage and *sang-froid*, he himself directed a part of his reserve against our left, but, beaten in flank by the artillery and infantry with which Davoust had crowned the Sonnenberg, it was impossible for him to restore the combat and prevent Morand from carrying Rehausen. Disorder and confusion were beginning to appear in the Prussian infantry.

Davoust judged that this was the moment to strike the decisive blow: the heights of Eckartsberg commanded the enemy's left; the possession of this gave us at the same time the tactical and strategic point of the field of battle, since it secured the direct road to Freyburg and closed the enemy's only line of retreat. Gudin's division marched there by Tauchwitz and Gernstädt; that of Friant, by Lisdorf. Nothing could resist the impetuosity of their attack. The aged Mollendorf, being wounded by a ball, gave the command to Kalkreuth; but, as the last remaining portion of his reserve had been unable to check the attack on Eckartsberg, there was now not the slightest hope of restoring the combat; his troops passed in disorder the deep ravine of Auerstädt.

The King, ignorant of Prince Hohenlohe's defeat, ordered the retreat on Weimar; the ruin of his army would have been



complete if Bernadotte had executed even one half of what there was for him to do. Leaving Naumburg at three o'clock in the morning and arriving at Camburg toward six o'clock, he could still debouch from that place on Sulza, attack the King, and completely cut off his retreat; he preferred to continue his march on Dornburg, where the ravine of the Saale is much more difficult, so that he did not reach the environs of Apolda till night. Nevertheless, his unexpected appearance on these heights, which at a distance flanked the road to Weimar, and the rencounter of the stragglers of Hohenlohe's corps, completed the despair of the Prussian troops, who fled in all directions. The King received in the midst of this catastrophe the letter which I had sent him on the twelfth from Gera, by M. Montesquiou, to avoid the war. A glimmer of hope seemed for a moment to animate his torn heart; he sent me Count Denhof, his *aid-de-camp*, to propose an armistice; but I could not now stop in my victorious career; the war, begun with a thunderbolt, would place Prussia at my feet, and I could treat only at Berlin.

Such was the issue of the celebrated battle of Auerstädt. Frederick William could say with Francis I: "*All is lost save honor.*" Although beaten by a corps inferior by one half, he could attribute it only to the inexperience of his troops and of his generals. Three hundred and twenty-four officers slain or wounded, ten thousand men *hors-de-combat*, the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal Mollendorf, Prince William, Generals Schmettan and Wartensleben wounded or slain, proved that if they maneuvered badly, they nevertheless fought heroically. The division of Gudin had alone three thousand five hundred men and one hundred and thirty officers *hors-de-combat*, an enormous loss, being one half the force present. No better proof can be given of the intrepid countenance which it opposed to the successive efforts of the enemy; Davoust and all his other soldiers rivaled them in glory; they won indisputable claims to the admiration of posterity. No battle in all the wars of the Revolution offers a contest so disproportionate, with a success so brilliant. I could hardly believe the reports, which I regarded as very exaggerated, but which the Prussian accounts proved to be moderate. Davoust had purchased this victory with the blood of seven thousand brave men; but happily a good number of them were only slightly wounded, and more than half returned to the ranks.\*

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\*Allison, in giving an account of this battle, with his usual disregard of facts, and readiness to accuse Napoleon of falsehood and meanness, says: "Napoleon's official account of this battle of Jena, in the fourth bulletin of the campaign [it was the fifth bulletin], is characterized by that

## EXTRAORDINARY RESULTS OF THESE VICTORIES.—

The night following this double battle was not less fatal to the Prussians than the battle itself. The army of the King, taking, in disorder, the road to Weimar, met near Butteltstedt the fugitives of the army of Hohenlohe, and the confusion was then at its height. Prince Hohenlohe had reached Wipach almost alone. Nothing had been provided for the retreat. To make no provisions for the case of a retreat is one of the greatest faults which a general can commit; even where one can gain battles as I did, this neglect is hardly pardonable. Undoubtedly he ought not to render these dispositions public, but he ought to prepare a rallying-point for a corps which may be momentarily cut off.

The two chiefs were *hors-de-combat*, the third in flight; there was no one to remedy the evil. The different corps crowded upon each other, mingled together, and then dispersed; never was there so deplorable a scene, except the night after the battle of Waterloo. Some took the road to Erfurth; others to Colleda, the main body reached Sommerda, but in horrible confusion. Blücher, coming from Colleda to Weissensee with six thousand horse, found himself anticipated there by Klein's division of dragoons; but he saved himself by declaring that an armistice had

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extraordinary intermixture of truth and falsehood, and increasing jealousy of any general who appeared to interfere with his reputation, which, in one who could so well afford to be generous in that particular, is a meanness in an especial manner reprehensible." After pointing out his meanness, jealousy, and neglect of Davoust, he quotes the bulletin itself as proof of these charges, thus: "On our right the corps of Marshal Davoust performed 'prodigies.' Not only did he keep in check, *but maintained a running fight for three leagues,*" etc., etc. Now what will the reader think of Mr. Allison's veracity when he finds that not only are his charges in this case utterly untrue, but that he has falsified the language of Napoleon in order to give plausibility to his malignant accusations? The sentence which he translates, "but maintained a running fight for three leagues," etc., is in the original, "*mais mena battant pendant plus de trois lieues,*" etc. Instead of treating Davoust with neglect, he mentioned him with unqualified praise in his short and hasty bulletin, placing his name before all the other marshals, made him Duke of Auerstädt for his heroic conduct on that occasion, and to honor him still more, designated him as the first to enter the Prussian capital—thus showing to the whole army his right to the precedence. Moreover, a few days afterward, in reviewing his troops on the road to Frankfurt, he called Davoust and his officers around him and addressed them in terms of the highest respect and admiration. Davoust, deeply affected by the approbation and generosity of the Emperor, replied: "Sire, the soldiers of the third corps will always be to you what the Tenth Legion was to Cæsar." Both he and his corps showed in many a hard-fought field how much they were gratified with the manner which Napoleon had taken to prove his "falsehood," "unceasing jealousy," and "reprehensible meanness," and we doubt that there was a man in the whole army who would not have been delighted at similar proofs of *neglect*.



been concluded. Kalkreuth, hotly pressed at Greussen by Soult's corps, tried to use the same stratagem, but he was attacked and defeated; he gained Sondershausen in a deplorable state. Hohenlohe there rejoined the remains of his forces. Mollendorf, who had taken refuge at Erfurth with six thousand men and eight thousand wounded, was there surrounded by Murat and Ney. The governor of this place, susceptible of a good defense, capitulated the next day, and even surrendered the two citadels which commanded it.

The operations of a single day had decided the fate of the Prussian monarchy; we already had in our hands sixty colors, two hundred pieces of field artillery, and twenty-five thousand prisoners. But to give the enemy no time to reorganize his forces, it was necessary that we should not give him a moment's rest; I took my measures accordingly.

Although the Duke of Brunswick had manifested the design of concentrating his forces, he had either not done so, or had begun to do it so unskillfully that his army had been taken *en flagrant délit*. While one half of his army had fallen at Jena and another had fought in retreat on Freyburg and Naumburg, two other corps under the Duke of Weimar and General Winning were marching on the other side of the forest of Thuringia and to Eisenach; a fourth corps of fourteen thousand men formed a reserve under the Duke of Würtemberg, at Halle. The thunderbolt which had just struck the Prussian army, thus situated, would have consequences the more grave as there was no chief, and the King himself had not a moment to lose if he hoped to regain the capital and the Oder; each of his corps had to save itself as well as it could. Here Bülow could have found a fine model of eccentric retreat! Hohenlohe and Kalkreuth saved themselves by Hartz on Magdeburg. The first was there to take the command in chief, rally all he could find, and march on the Oder toward Stettin; but he was forced to describe the arc by Magdeburg, and, as we held the chord of this arc, we could have anticipated him at any point, had it not been for the difficulty of passing the Elbe. While Murat, Soult, and Ney followed him on Nordhausen, where his rear guard was cut to pieces, I took, with Bernadotte, Lannes, Davoust, Augereau, and my guard, the road to Dessau, in order to pass the Elbe at that place, to direct myself on Berlin, to cut off the enemy from the Oder, and at the same time to seize on the enemy's capital and communications. The result of these marches, well combined, and rapid as lightning, ought to find favor even with the detractors of my glory;

but how can we expect that blind men should appreciate my system of war, when even the Duke of Brunswick could not understand it?

**COMBAT OF HALLE.**—Bernadotte encountered, at Halle, on the seventeenth of October, the corps of reserve under the Duke Eugene of Würtemberg. This prince had just received indirect news of the battle of Jena, with circumstances so terrible that he could not believe it. He was waiting for two thousand men of his corps who were on the march from Magdeburg on the left bank of the Saale by Sandersleben; whether he was surprised, or whether he could not venture to cut the bridge on the Saale before the junction of this detachment, he was so abruptly driven back by Dupont's division that he had not time to complete his dispositions to gain Magdeburg as he had intended. To assail the battalions left at the bridge of the Saale, to enter pell-mell with them, was, for our troops, the work of but fifteen minutes; the main body of the Prussian corps, encamped in rear of the city, committed the foolish act of attempting its recapture; a very warm combat ensued. Dupont debouched by the Leipsic gate, sustained by Rivaud and the cavalry of Tilly, which attacked the enemy in the direction of Neumarkt, and gained possession of the road to Magdeburg. The enemy could not long hold out against the superiority of Bernadotte, who, to complete the victory, endeavored to cut off the road to Dessau; the Duke exerted himself to save this last communication; he succeeded in doing so, and put himself in retreat, closely pursued by the columns of Dupont and Rivaud. He passed the Elbe at Dessau, and, after having imperfectly burned the bridge, reached Magdeburg, weakened by the loss of thirty pieces of cannon and five thousand men. The regiment, which was approaching by the left of the Saale, completely surrounded in the defile of Krollwitz by Drouet and the cavalry of Tilly, were made prisoners.

This contest of twelve thousand Prussians against the superior forces of Bernadotte was favored by the excellence of the post, but the result did no great honor to its defenders. The Duke would have done much better by sending to the absent regiment an order to save itself at Magdeburg as best it could; he could then have destroyed the bridges of the Saale, and retaken, untouched, the road to Dessau and Wittenberg. This would have retarded our march for two or three days, and have saved the corps of Hohenlohe and Blücher, and the place of Stettin.

**MARCH ON POTSDAM AND BERLIN.**—At the same time Davoust, who had entered Leipsic on the eighteenth, took the



direction to Wittenberg, and my head-quarters followed to the same place. Considerable captures of English merchandise were made in this rich city. Lannes marched to Dessau; Bernadotte descended the Saale as far as Bernburg and Achersleben, and received orders to throw a bridge across near Zerbst, so as to cut off the corps which he had just beaten, but which had already taken refuge under Magdeburg. Lannes caused the bridges of Dessau to be restored, and Davoust, followed by Augereau, entered Wittenberg, on the twenty-third, without resistance. A feeble Prussian detachment found there had the *mal adresse* to set fire to the bridge without burning it. We immediately directed our march on Potsdam, and entered this place on the twenty-fourth.

#### VISIT TO THE CABINET OF FREDERICK THE GREAT.

—It would be difficult to describe my feelings in ascending the steps of the palace of Frederick, and in visiting, at Sans-Souci, the places immortalized by the great king. For seven years he had resisted the attacks of half of Europe; in fifteen days his monarchy had fallen before my eagles: thus move the affairs of nations, according to circumstances and the men who preside over their destinies. I found in his cabinet his music-desk, and another on which was the "Art of War" by Puiségur. The book was open at the chapter entitled *du port de l'épée*: it was here, undoubtedly, that Frederick had been reading. My surprise was extreme at finding here the gorget, the sword, the belt, and the grand-cordon of his orders, which he had worn in the seven years' war. Such trophies were worth a hundred flags, and to forget them is proof of the disorder and stupor which reigned throughout Prussia on hearing of the disaster which had befallen their army. I sent them to Paris to be deposited in the Hotel des Invalides; many of these old soldiers were contemporaries of the disgraceful defeat of Rosbach; I was proud to send them these proofs of the signal vengeance I had taken for that defeat.\*

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\*The following is Thiers' description of Napoleon's visit to Potsdam and Sans-Souci:

"Having waited to allow his *corps-d'armée* to get the start of him a little, Napoleon set out on the twenty-fourth of October, and passed through Kropstadt on his way to Potsdam. Performing the journey on horseback, he was caught in a violent storm, though the weather had continued very fine ever since the opening of the campaign. It was not his custom to stop for such a reason. However, he was offered shelter in a house situated amid woods, and belonging to an officer of the hunting establishment of the court of Saxony. He accepted the offer. Some females, who seemed from their language and dress to be of elevated rank, received, around a great fire, this group of French officers, whom, from fear as much as out

On the twenty-fifth of October, Davoust entered Berlin, where we found a superb arsenal and immense stores of provisions. Our march had been so impetuous that the capital had not received a single courier from the army, and was in nearly the same state as when the King departed. They had carried off the archives, but they had left all the instruments of war. The same day the fortress of Spandau, which they had been so imprudent as to leave unarmed, surrendered to Marshal Lannes. They found eighty pieces of cannon in the arsenal and one thousand two hundred men as the garrison. I marched at the head of my guards

of politeness, they treated with much civility. They seemed not to be aware who was the principal of these officers, around whom the others respectfully ranged themselves, when one of them, still young, seized with a strong emotion, exclaimed, 'That is the Emperor!' 'How came you to know me?' asked Napoleon, dryly. 'Sire,' she answered, 'I was with your majesty in Egypt.' 'And what were you doing in Egypt?' 'I was the wife of an officer, who has since died in your service. I have solicited a pension for myself and my son, but I was a foreigner, and could not obtain it; and I am come to live with the mistress of this house, who has kindly received me, and intrusted me with the education of her children.' The countenance of Napoleon, who was displeased at being recognized, stern at first, all at once assumed a soft expression; 'Madame,' said he, 'you shall have a pension; and as for your son, I charge myself with his education.'

"The same evening he took care to affix his signature to both these resolutions, and said, smiling, 'I never yet met with an adventure in a forest, in consequence of a storm; here is one, however, and a most agreeable one.'

"He arrived in the evening of the twenty-fifth of October, at Potsdam. He immediately went to visit the retreat of the great captain, the great king, who called himself 'the philosopher of Sans-Souci,' and with some reason, who seemed to wield sword and scepter with a jeering indifference, as if in mockery of all the courts of Europe, one might venture to add, of his own people, if he had not taken so much pains to govern them well. Napoleon went through the great and little palace of Potsdam, desired to be shown Frederick's works, crowded with Voltaire's notes, sought to discover in his library on what books he was accustomed to feast his great mind, and then went to the church of Potsdam, to inspect the modest tomb where rests the founder of Prussia. At Potsdam were kept the sword of Frederick, his belt, his order of the Black Eagle. Napoleon seized them, exclaiming, 'What a capital present for the Invalides, especially for those who have formed part of the army of Hanover! They will be delighted, no doubt, when they see in our possession the sword of him who beat them at Rosbach.' Napoleon, in seizing these precious relics with so much respect, most assuredly offered no affront either to Frederick or the Prussian nation. But how extraordinary, how worthy of meditation is that mysterious concatenation which binds, blends, separates, or brings together the things of this world! Frederick and Napoleon met here in a very strange manner. That philosopher king, who, unknown to himself, had been from his elevated throne one of the promoters of the French Revolution, now lying in his coffin, received a visit from the general of that Revolution, become emperor and conqueror of Berlin and Potsdam! The victor at Rosbach received a visit from the victor at Jena! What a sight! Unfortunately, these reverses of fortune were not the last."



to Charlottenburg to sustain Lannes; I remained there the twenty-seventh, in order to direct measures for the pursuit of the corps of Hohenlohe.

NAPOLEON ENTERS BERLIN.—I made my entrance into Berlin on the twenty-eighth; I had already made a triumphal entrance into Milan, Cairo, and Vienna; but nowhere had I been received with so much *empressement* as by these Prussians who had so much declaimed against me without taking the trouble to examine the causes of these complaints. They received me rather as a liberator than as a conqueror. In truth the *bourgeoise* class, so numerous and respectable in the German states, regarded me as the defender of the principles which had triumphed in the Revolution; jealous of the pretensions of the nobility, this class had taken no part in those petty and absurd stories that had provoked the war.\*

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\*Thiers, speaking of Napoleon's sojourn at Berlin, says: "There was in Berlin Prince Ferdinand, brother of the great Frederick and father of Prince Louis, as well as the Princess his wife. There was also the widow of Prince Henry and two sisters of the King, one lying-in, the other ill. Napoleon went to visit all these members of the royal family, with all the signs of profound respect, and touched them by testimonials coming from so high a personage, for there was not then a sovereign whose attention had so great a value as his. In the situation to which he had attained, he knew how to calculate his slightest tokens of kindness or severity. Exercising at this moment the right belonging to all generals in time of war, that of intercepting correspondence, to discover the movements of the enemy, he seized a letter from the Prince de Hatzfeld, in which he appeared to inform Prince Hohenlohe of the position of the French army around Berlin. The Prince de Hatzfeld, as head of the municipal government established in Berlin, had promised upon oath not to attempt any thing against the French army, and to attend solely to the quiet, safety, and welfare of the capital. It was an engagement of loyalty toward the conqueror, who suffered an authority which he could have abolished to subsist for the benefit of the conquered country. The fault, however, was very excusable, since it proceeded from the most honorable of sentiments, patriotism. Napoleon, who was apprehensive that other burgomasters would imitate this example, and that, in this case, all his movements would be revealed from hour to hour to the enemy, resolved to intimidate the Prussian authorities by an act of signal severity, and was not sorry that this act of severity should fall upon one of the principal members of the nobility, accused of having been a warm partisan of war, but accused falsely, for the Prince de Hatzfeld was of the number of the Prussian nobles who had moderation because they had understanding. Napoleon sent for Prince Berthier, and ordered Marshal Davoust, on whose severity he could reckon, to form a military commission, which should apply to the conduct of the Prince de Hatzfeld the laws of war against *espionnage*. Prince Berthier, on learning the resolution adopted by Napoleon, endeavored in vain to dissuade him from it. Generals Rapp, Caulaincourt, and Savary, not presuming to hazard remonstrances which seemed misplaced from any other lips than those of the major-general's, were alarmed. Not knowing to what means to resort, they hid the Prince in the very palace,

OPERATIONS OF HOHENLOHE.—The campaigns of Jena and of Ulm will some day serve as models to teach generals the art of concentrating their forces at the proper time, and then to divide them after the blow has been struck. The destruction of the Prussian army was so extraordinary that to explain it I shall be obliged to enter into details.

While I was marching on Berlin, Murat, Soult, and Ney had pursued the *débris* of the Prussian army on Magdeburg. The King, correctly judging their desperate condition, took the road to the Oder, and left the command-in-chief to Prince Hohenlohe, with the care of reorganizing the army under the cannon of this important place. The thing was impossible without his being besieged there; for Soult had followed with so much impetuosity that the rear guard had scarcely entered the camp under Magdeburg when Legrand's division threw itself on the enemy, driving every thing within the place, where there reigned the greatest confusion.

Prince Hohenlohe here learned the issue of the combat of Halle, and my march on Dessau and Wittenberg; he nevertheless

upon pretext of having him arrested, and then informed the Princess de Hatzfeld, an interesting person, and who was then pregnant, of the danger which threatened her husband. She hastened to the palace. It was high time; for the commission, having assembled, was applying for the evidence. Napoleon, returning from a ride in Berlin, had just alighted from his horse, the guard beating the march; and, as he crossed the threshold of the palace, the Princess de Hatzfeld, conducted by Duroc, appeared all in tears before him. Thus taken by surprise, he could not refuse to receive her; he granted her an audience in his cabinet. She was seized with terror. Napoleon, touched by her distress, desired her to approach, and handed her the intercepted letter to read. 'Well, madame,' said he, 'do you recognize the handwriting of your husband?' The Princess, trembling, knew not what to reply. Presently, however, taking care to cheer her, Napoleon added, 'throw that paper into the fire, and the military commission will have no evidence to convict upon.'

"This act of clemency, which Napoleon could not refuse after he had seen the Princess de Hatzfeld, was, nevertheless, a sacrifice for him, because it was part of his design to intimidate the German nobility, particularly the magistrates of the towns, who revealed to the enemy the secrets of his operations. He learned subsequently to know the Prince de Hatzfeld, appreciated his character and his understanding, and was glad that he had not given him up to military justice. Happy the governments that have discreet friends, who contrive to delay their severities! It is not necessary that this delay should be long, before they have ceased to purpose acts upon which, at first, they were most resolutely bent."

Allison's account of this affair is discolored by prejudice, and full of errors. He says that Napoleon ordered Prince Hatzfeld "to be seized and executed before six o'clock that evening." On the contrary, Napoleon ordered him to be *tried* by a military commission for violating the laws of war. Again, Allison says: "If the Prince had been shot, it would have been, like the death of the Duke d'Enghien and the bookseller Palm—an



hoped that the destruction of the bridges of the Elbe would give him time to reach Stettin before us. It has already been said that those bridges had fallen untouched into our power. He had now to choose between three plans: first, to remain and reorganize a force of fifty thousand men under the protection of Magdeburg, keeping the field as much as he could on the two banks of the Elbe, and waiting the effect of the arrival of the Russians on the Oder; even shutting himself up in the place, if he could do no better. For this plan there would have been necessary an abundance of provisions and munitions; but he had neither. The second, was to throw himself on Soult and open a road to Hanover so as to unite with the division of General Lecocq, and fight in Westphalia as long as he could. The third, was to lose not a minute in gaining Stettin; he chose the last, and, under the circumstances, the resolution was a very natural one.

Hohenlohe hoped to leave Magdeburg with sixty-eight battalions and one hundred and fifty-nine squadrons, including those which the Prince of Würtemberg had saved from Halle and destined to cover his march; the disorder was so great that Kalckreuth, instead of echeloning his numerous cavalry on the left bank, had sent them to canton on the right bank of the Elbe near

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*act of deliberate murder."* In his desire to abuse Napoleon, he entirely ignores the laws of war. The offense of which the Prince was accused was, by the laws of war, capital, and, if found guilty by the commission, the sentence of death followed.

It is said that Prince Hatzfeld, as the head of the magistracy, had taken the usual oath to the conquering power. But it makes little difference whether he had or not taken such oath. The obligation is implied by his submission. He could have fled with his government, or have resisted with arms in hand. In the latter case he would have been treated as a prisoner of war. To submit to the conqueror and accept his liberty, he was bound by the laws of war to communicate, during the military occupation, no information to the expelled government. By attempting to send such information to Prince Hohenlohe, he was guilty of military treachery, or what the continental writers denominate *military treason*.

Allson's attempt to justify the conduct of Hatzfeld by comparing it with the French ministers to Russia and Rome, is simply ridiculous. International law gives to diplomatic agents the right to collect and transmit such information. And for that very reason, diplomatic agents of an enemy are seldom permitted to exercise their functions in territories occupied by the opposing belligerent. But the case of a private citizen or a civil authority is very different. By being permitted to exercise their civil functions or to pursue their ordinary occupations, they incur the obligation to give neither aid nor comfort to the enemy of the occupying forces, although that enemy is their own legitimate government. Their allegiance to that government is, for the time, suspended, and they owe a temporary and limited allegiance to the conqueror.

This principle is well established, and the rules of law applicable to such cases are too well known to be misunderstood.

Sandau, and instead of leaving twenty-six feeble battalions to guard Magdeburg, fifty-two entire squadrons, through mistake, remained in the place.

There are two roads leading from Magdeburg to the Oder; the best and most direct is that by Brandenburg and Berlin; the other is to the north by Rothenau, Ruppín, Zehdenich, Prenzlów, and Stettin. The Prince could not take the first without encountering our columns which were debouching from Wittenberg on Potsdam; by taking the second he would approach his cavalry which was marching from Sandau on Neustadt, and would prolong the time when we could reach him. He could, in fact, take no other course; but he ought to have provided the best measures to execute this movement, and to have marched as compactly and rapidly as possible. The road to Stettin, which he followed, meets at Zehdenich with that of Oranienburg, which I had taken; he should have allowed neither delay nor rest till he had reached this city with the main body of his forces, or at least with his numerous squadrons. It was the more probable that he would arrive there before our troops, as Murat had followed in rear by Hartz, and just caused Magdeburg to be summoned by General Belliard. How was it possible for the French troops, scattered as they were between Halberstadt and Magdeburg, having to cross the Elbe, to arrive at Zehdenich before the Prince of Hohenlohe? This, however, actually occurred, Murat having reached Zehdenich by rapid marches, before the columns of Lannes, who led my march.

The Prince of Hohenlohe, leaving Magdeburg the twenty-third of October, marched in three columns on Rothenau at the head of twenty-eight battalions and thirty squadrons; the main body of the cavalry passed the Elbe lower down, and rejoined the rest of the army near Neustadt. Blücher took command of the corps of the Duke of Würtemberg, destined for the rear guard. Hohenlohe had, therefore, on the twenty-fifth, at his disposition, fifty battalions and one hundred and sixty squadrons; but instead of marching in a single compact mass and bivouacking on the road, making the inhabitants and the Prussian authorities furnish him with provisions, he took it into his head to distribute his troops in cantonments in the villages, thus fatiguing them by useless marches to and from the cantonments, and producing disorder and want of discipline by an absurd dispersion. The system was the more objectionable as they were likely to be forced to cut their way, sword in hand, and were not in a situation to make the slow marches required by magazines. In addition to all



these faults, instead of placing his numerous cavalry on his right to flank him in the direction that we were approaching, he threw it on the extreme left at Witstock, while the infantry marched on Neu-Rupin, and a feeble advance guard under Schimelpeninck on Zehdenich. This city, situated, as we have said, at the debouch of the road which I had taken, was therefore the decisive point which it was necessary to reach before us; and as the advanced guard arrived there, it is certain that the rest of the corps might very well have reached it, if the dispositions had been better made.

**FALL OF SPANDAU.**—The fall of Spandau, which took place the same day (the twenty-fifth), acquired so much the greater importance by the approach of Hohenlohe's corps. Bernadotte, who was informed of his march on Brandenburg, soon gave me advice of it, and advanced in the direction of Fehrbelin and Cremmen.

**DISPOSITIONS TO DESTROY HOHENLOHE.**—The Grand Duke of Berg, having nothing further to do in the environs of Magdeburg after the enemy had reached this fortress, received orders to turn rapidly toward Baldi or Dessau to pass the Elbe there; he marched with so much celerity that he arrived at Spandau at the moment of its surrender, and immediately directed himself by Oranienburg on Zehdenich. Lannes, who was to follow him, only reached Oranienburg on the twenty-sixth. I kept Angereau and Davoust in the environs of Berlin, to be prepared in case the enemy should escape the other corps and attempt to fall on our rear. The first guarded the important bridge of Neu-bruck on the Havel; the second was to throw his light cavalry as far as Oderberg.

The Prince of Hohenlohe, on the twenty-sixth, learning the presence of our troops at Oranienburg, took the tardy resolution to force his march, moving his infantry by Gransée on Zehdenich, and the next day Prenzlau, so as to gain the defile of Lacknitz near Stettin, on the twenty-eighth, where he would be safe. The cavalry took the same direction by Witstock and Woldeck. On his arrival at Gransée, Hohenlohe received the unexpected news that General Schimelpeninck had been beaten at Zehdenich by the cavalry of the Grand Duke of Berg, and had saved himself in disorder on Prenzlau. It was ridiculous to lose his direct communication in consequence of a skirmish of cavalry, when ten thousand Prussian horse were marching to Witstock without any object. Nevertheless, Hohenlohe, renouncing all hope of opening a passage, resolved to gain Boitzenburg-pres-Prenzlau, by making

a detour by Fürstenberg and Lychen, where he awaited Blücher and a part of the column of cavalry which he had ordered to join him in place of Schimelpeninck's troops. This idea was absurd, for as our troops held the direct and shortest road to Templin, the enemy must expect to meet them in column with the chance of being sustained the more easily by the *corps-d'armée* which arrived first at Berlin (Lannes and Davoust). Hohenlohe reached Lychen on the twenty-seventh, and in vain waited there for Blücher, who had been informed too late of this forced march, and had not yet passed Templin; not being joined by the expected cavalry, and as he had no time to lose, he continued his march on Boitzenburg.

Murat was not a man to allow himself to be easily passed. Informed, in his march from Templin on Prenzlau, of the direction taken by the Prussians, he moved with the divisions of Grouchy, Beaumont, and Lasalle on Wichmansdorf, where he attacked the *gens-d'armes* of the guard which flanked the march. To assail, turn, and overthrow this superb regiment of cuirassiers on the shores of the lake was the work of a moment. Some of the officers of this corps had insulted the French ambassador, in order the more surely to involve the King in the war; they expiated this conduct by the disgrace of being forced to capitulate in the open field, which cavalry should never do.

Hohenlohe, frightened at this news, formed his infantry and hesitated whether to enter Boitzenburg or take the cross-road between Prenzlau and Pasewalk; this last course was certainly the most prudent; but, on the report of a patrol, he decided to enter Boitzenburg for the night, and, the next day, to take the road to Prenzlau, where he would find provisions and forage for his troops.

**COMBAT AND CAPITULATION OF PRENZLAU.**—On the twenty-eighth, the corps advanced on Shonermarck and Gustow; it entered Prenzlau without any great obstacle; but the Grand Duke of Berg, arriving by the road to Templin, and not being able to occupy a city with his cavalry, he caused it to be turned by a detachment of dragoons, while he advanced with two divisions on the small stream of Golmitz, fell impetuously on the rear of the Prussian column, pursued it even to the faubourg, cut to pieces and captured the regiment of the King, cut off the rear guard of Prince Augustus, and forced him, after a good defense, to surrender with his battalion.

The Prussian infantry had passed Prenzlau and taken, for some unknown reason, the road to Pasewalk instead of that to Stettin. Murat summoned the Prince of Hohenlohe to surrender.



and Lannes, who had arrived there himself, although his corps was still distant, also summoned the enemy in order to deceive him. Convinced that he had no more hopes of gaining Locknitz, which he supposed to be in possession of our infantry, attacked in front by a division of cavalry and in rear by two others, the Prince laid down his arms with seventeen battalions and nineteen squadrons, amounting to not less than twelve thousand men.

**FALL OF STETTIN.**—The Grand Duke of Berg seemed almost omnipresent; no sooner had we obtained this brilliant success than Lasalle's division of light cavalry advanced on Stettin, whose imbecile governor surrendered to our hussars, with a garrison of five thousand men. Murat immediately directed himself on Passewalk, where the great column of Hohenlohe's cavalry had taken refuge on learning the disaster of its chief. Six regiments of cuirassiers and a brigade of infantry, fatigued, it is true, by forced marches, surrendered without the slightest resistance. A single brigade, cut off from Prenzlau the night before, presented itself at Stettin; the governor refused to open his gates, on the twenty-eighth, to his own troops, but the next day he opened them at the first summons of our advance guard. This brigade reached Anklam, where General Becker's division attacked it and forced it to surrender.

**BLÜCHER RETIRES ON MECKLENBURG.**—Of all this army, which a few days ago was so brilliant, there remained only Blücher and the old corps of the Duke of Weimar, commanded by General Winning, who, after having given the slip to Soult, had passed the Elbe near Sandau and gained Mecklenburg. Blücher, informed of the defeat of Hohenlohe, immediately inclined toward Neu-Strelitz, where he joined this corps, which now formed a little army of twenty-one thousand men. Before following his ulterior movements, we will return to my army.

**CAPITULATION OF CUSTRIN.**—Davoust, after remaining some days in advance of Berlin, took the road to Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and to Custrin. This place, which is situated on an island in the Oder, and which Major Heyden had heroically defended in the seven years' war, surrendered to our light troops, separated as they were from the place by the double channel of the river! Before we could take possession of the work, it was necessary that the garrison should furnish us with boats! Master of this important bulwark, and having no more enemies before him, Davoust took the road to Posen. Augereau occupied Frank-

fort; my guards remained at Berlin; Ney continued the blockade of Magdeburg.

**NAPOLEON'S MEASURES FOR SECURING HIS CONQUESTS.**—While my eagles crossed, with rapid flight, the space between the Rhine and the Oder, and conquered in three weeks the whole country between the two rivers, I neglected no means to consolidate my power and secure these possessions. Already Mortier, with the two feeble divisions of the eighth corps, had occupied the principality of Fulda. The Prince of Orange, to whom it had fallen at the peace of Lunéville, as an indemnity for the Stadtholderate, had just been fighting in the ranks of my enemies. I punished him for this, by seizing his states. Mortier afterward advanced on Cassel, in concert with the King of Holland.

The Elector, a vassal, in some measure, of Prussia, and one of my most bitter enemies, had left for England, carrying with him a considerable treasure, the fruit of the subsidies which his house had constantly received from England since the coalition of 1703, against Louis XIV. The twenty thousand men which he had organized to fight me laid down their arms and were disbanded by inferior forces. The King of Holland afterward advanced on Hanover with the Gallo-Batavian army, and, after some slight skirmishes, he invested the Prussian division of Lecocq in Hameln and Nieuburg, took possession, almost without opposition, of the whole electorate, the duchy of Brunswick, and the Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Hamburg. The Bavarian and Würtemberg contingents, after having taken possession of Bai-reuth, and covering the right wing of the grand army in its decisive march, directed themselves by Plauen on Dresden, and advanced toward the Oder in concert with Davoust; they formed the ninth corps. The contingents of the other petty princes furnished garrisons on our rear; that of Hesse-Darmstadt at Spandau and Stettin, and Nassau at Berlin.

**ARMISTICE WITH THE SAXONS.**—I also thought to attach to myself the Saxons; before the war I had already issued a proclamation, showing them that the projects of Prussia were tending to nothing less than their reduction to the condition of a Prussian province. I signed an armistice with the Saxon general who had been taken prisoner at Jena; the remainder of the contingent left the Prussian army at Balbi on the Elbe, and the Elector immediately opened negotiations with us.

**BLÜCHER PURSUED TO LUBECK.**—Informed of the junction of Blücher with the corps of General Winning, I directed



Bernadotte to follow this little army, while Murat cut it off from Stralsund and Rostock, and Soult prevented it from regaining the lower Elbe. Pursued in this way, it was difficult for him to escape. After a combat of the rear guard at Nossentin against Dupont, and quite a brilliant cavalry engagement near Criwitz, Blücher directed himself on Schwerin. It appeared that he first wished to take the road to Gustrow, undoubtedly for the purpose of embarking at Rostock, or of reaching Stralsund; but Murat having already arrived at Demnin, he inclined to the left toward Mecklenburg, with the intention of throwing himself on the lower Elbe and fighting his way into Hanover. Anticipated on all sides, he fell back on Gadebush-sur-Lübeck, where he arrived the fifth of November. Bernadotte marched there by Schönberg, and Soult by Ratsburg: they were sustained by the cavalry of Murat. Arriving by the north, Bernadotte learned that the remainder of the Swedish detachment which had so presumptuously occupied the Pays-de-Lauenbourg, had just embarked on the Trave at Lübeck. The course of this river is sinuous; the navigation to Travemund is difficult and slow; a brigade of Dupont's division, sent half way to Schlutup, captured a battalion of the guards and the remains of a rich convoy.

FALL OF LÜBECK.—Our columns, reaching Lübeck on the sixth, at break of day, immediately began the attack. Bernadotte assailed with Drouet's division the Mecklenburg gate and the adjacent bastion; the place was only a simple *enceinte*, much out of repair, but capable of resisting a *coup-de-main*; it was unarmed; the Prussians had hastily placed on the ramparts their field-pieces. It is said that two Prussian battalions imprudently placed in advance of the gate and overthrown by the brigade of Frère were the cause of our columns entering pell-mell with the enemy. The braves of the Twenty-seventh light and the Ninety-fourth of the line fell upon the enemy, carried the palisaded tambour of the gate and the nearest batteries, and, sustained by the rest of the corps, penetrated into the streets.

Blücher had just retired to his quarters when our soldiers penetrated the town and pursued after him; he had barely time to mount his horse; his staff was captured. The columns of Soult encountered greater obstacles in carrying the Hanover gate, and they had just succeeded in effecting an entrance when they met Rivaud's division. Blücher succeeded in effecting an issue by the Holstein gate with four or five thousand infantry, and joined his cavalry, which was cantoned on the left bank of the Trave; the rest, to the number of about eight thousand, were killed or taken

prisoners. A bloody contest was carried on from street to street and from house to house, in the public establishments. A soldiery influenced by cruel scenes is not easily restrained, and the inhabitants of this flourishing city had naturally to suffer all the horrors of a city taken by assault; but Soult and Bernadotte at last succeeded in restoring order.

**CAPITULATION OF BLÜCHER.**—The refuge which Blücher had sought behind the Trave could only save him for a single day, for the neutrality of Denmark left him no issue; he was forced to lay down his arms the next day with his remaining ten thousand men.

**FALL OF MAGDEBURG.**—The destruction of the Prussian armies was not the only result of the battle of Jena; the Prussians were so discouraged that they surrendered the most formidable bulwarks of the monarchy. To those already cited, we must add Magdeburg, which important place, with a garrison of eighteen or twenty thousand men and six hundred pieces of cannon, was surrendered by the aged Kliest, after a few hours' bombardment, to Ney, whose force did not exceed the garrison of the place! Hameln and Nieuburg also surrendered at the first summons of a Gallo-Batavian division under the orders of Savary.

**NAPOLEON AT BERLIN.**—While my lieutenants were pursuing in all directions the remains of the Prussian army, I had remained at Berlin, my presence being unnecessary in these various pursuits. I had to provide an administration for the great states which we had conquered, to urge forward measures necessary for our security, to review the corps which had just come to replace our losses and increase our force; in a word, to provide the means of profiting by so much success.

**THE CELEBRATED BERLIN DECREE.**—It was also at Berlin that I issued my formidable decree of reprisals against the British Order in Council which declared the ports of the Channel blockaded. In reality this paper blockade was rather insignificant, for England had not ships enough to carry it into effect; but it was the form and principle which was in violation of the law of nations.

Maritime law, in the full extent given to it by England, authorized the right of visit to ascertain that the vessel was really of the nation whose flag it bore, and that it carried nothing contraband—that is, naval stores. It also interdicted the entrance to ports blockaded strictly enough to render it dangerous to enter, and the vessels warned not to enter, should they attempt to do so by ruse, were subject to be seized. In order, therefore, to effect a real



blockade, it was necessary to have a sufficient number of vessels of war before each military or merchant port included in the blockade.

The Order in Council, declaring all the coast of France from the Seine to Antwerp in a state of blockade, arrogated the right of seizing all vessels sailing for these ports, whether they were really invested or not. It thus gave to a ministerial decree an artificial force more powerful than all the British squadrons together; for, admitting this principle for a hundred leagues of coast in 1806, England might very well extend it by a second decree to all the coast of France and her allies, and thus annihilate the commerce of Europe; which, in fact, she did not fail to do. A great nation, possessing, with its allies, more than two thousand leagues of coast, a hundred ships-of-the-line, colonies, and inhabitants with any blood in their veins, could not tolerate such legislation without disgracing itself. I was indignant at it, and my victorious position authorizing me to act, I in my turn thundered forth a decree which excelled that of the English ministry.

**BRITISH ORDERS IN COUNCIL.**—The Cabinet of London did not long remain my debtor: an order of January 7th, 1807, declared good prize any neutral vessel trading from one port of France to another, or to a port of her allies! Rome and Carthage never exhibited such animosity; their quarrels never extended beyond their own political power and that of the allies who were successively drawn into the whirlpool of their contest; they never attacked the prosperity of all that breathed on the two hemispheres!\*

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\*This and other British Orders in Council issued in regard to blockades, the preëmption of neutral goods, and trade with French colonies, were most disastrous to neutral commerce, and especially to that of the United States. Notwithstanding the specious arguments by which English statesmen and English judges attempted, at the time, to justify these measures, very few can now be found who will defend them. The publicists of the continent and America have almost unanimously condemned them, and even British writers, while defending them on the ground of political and military necessity, virtually admit that they were contrary to the established principles of international jurisprudence. But these violations of law and justice on the part of Great Britain did not justify the retaliatory decrees of Napoleon. Both were equally violations of the rights of neutrals.

The following are Thiers' remarks on Napoleon's Berlin decree and the British Orders in Council:

"England herself had just authorized all sorts of excesses against her commerce by taking an extraordinary measure, and one of the most outrageous that can be imagined against the most generally admitted right of nations, and which is called a *paper blockade*. As we have already explained several times, it is a principle with most of the maritime nations

**ARMISTICE WITH PRUSSIA NOT RATIFIED.**—While I was fulminating my decrees against the new maritime rights claimed by Great Britain, my armies had completed the destruction of the Prussian forces between the Rhine and the Oder. Murat, Davoust, and Lannes, had already passed the latter river to enter Prussian Poland. Winter was approaching; it was necessary to consolidate our astonishing successes. There were two means of doing this: the one, to complete the destruction of Prussia and divide the country among my allies; the other, to pardon her and attach her to my car by benefits which she could not fail

that every neutral—that is to say, every flag not a party in a war between two powers—has a right to sail from the ports of one to the ports of the other, to carry any merchandise whatever, even that of the enemy, excepting contraband of war, which consist in arms, munitions of war, and provisions cured for the use of the armies. This liberty ceases only in the case of a seaport blockaded by a naval force, so that the blockade be efficacious. In this case, the blockade being notified, the faculty of entering the blockaded place is suspended for neutrals. But if, in the restrictions imposed upon the freedom of navigation, we do not stop at this certain limit of the presence of an effective force, there is no reason why we should not lay an interdict upon whole tracts of coast, upon pretext of blockade. England had already sought to overstep the limits of the real blockade, by alleging that, with a few sail, insufficient in number to close the approaches to a sea-port, she had a right to declare the blockade. But at last she had admitted the necessity of a force of some sort against the blockaded port. Now she did not stop at this limit, already so vague, and, at the time of her momentary rupture with Prussia, occasioned by the occupation of Hanover, she had ventured to forbid all commerce to neutrals on the coasts of France and Germany, from Brest to the mouth of the Elbe. This was the abuse of strength carried to the utmost excess, and thenceforward a mere British decree was sufficient to lay under interdict all the parts of the globe which England was pleased to deprive of commerce.

"This incredible violation of the right of nations furnished Napoleon with a just pretext for authorizing the most rigorous measures in regard to English commerce. He devised a formidable decree, which, however excessive it might appear, was but a just reprisal of the violences of England, and which had moreover the advantage of completely answering the views which he had recently conceived. This decree, dated Berlin, the twenty-first of November, applicable not only to France, but to the countries occupied by her armies or in alliance with her—that is to say, to France, Holland, Spain, Italy, and all Germany—declared the British Islands in a *state of blockade*. The consequences of the state of blockade were the following:

"All commerce with England was absolutely prohibited;

"All goods, the produce of English manufactures, or of English colonies, were to be confiscated, not only on the coast, but in the interior, in the houses of the merchants by whom they should be harbored;

"All letters coming or going to England, addressed to an Englishman, or written in English, were to be stopped at the post-offices and destroyed;

"Every Englishman whatsoever, seized in France or in the countries



to value after her defeat, and then join with her in effecting the reestablishment of Poland.

The King of Prussia, having reached the Oder, sent to me the Marquis of Lucchesini to treat for an armistice or for a peace; he was accompanied by General Zastrow, whose noble and respectable character was the best guarantee of the sincere intentions of the King. Duroc treated with them at Charlottenburg. It was difficult to come to an understanding when they were every moment receiving news of the surrender of some new corps, or the fall of some new place. The negotiators saw that, by showing a desire for an alliance, they softened the rigorous terms of the treaty. One is always disposed to do more for an enemy who becomes your ally than for an adversary who signs a pure and

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under subjection to her arms, was to be declared a prisoner of war;

"Every vessel having only touched at the English colonies or at any of the ports of the three kingdoms was forbidden to enter French ports or ports under subjection to France, and, in case of false declarations being made on this subject, she became a lawful prize;

"Half of the produce of the confiscation was destined to indemnify French and allied merchants who had suffered by the spoillations of England;

"Lastly, the English who fell into our power were to serve for the exchange of the French or their allies who were taken prisoners.

"Such were these measures, assuredly inexcusable if England had not taken pains to justify them beforehand by her own excesses. Napoleon was fully sensible of their severity; but, in order to induce England to relinquish her tyranny at sea, he had recourse to a like tyranny upon land. He wished most especially to intimidate the agents of the English commerce, and principally the merchants of the Hanseatic towns, who, laughing at the orders issued respecting the Elbe and the Weser, distributed the prohibited goods throughout all parts of the continent. The threat of confiscation, a threat soon followed up, would make them tremble, and, if not close the outlets opened clandestinely to British commerce, at least render them very narrow.

"Napoleon, saying to himself that all the commercial nations were interested in the resistance which he was opposing to the unjust pretensions of England, concluded that they would submit to the inconveniences of a struggle which had become necessary; he thought that, these inconveniences falling particularly upon the speculators of Hamburg, Bremen, Leipzig, Amsterdam, and on smugglers by profession, it was not worth while to limit his means of reprisal, out of regard for such interests.

"The effect of this decree on the opinion of Europe was immense. Some regarded it as a revolting excess of despotism, others as a stroke of profound policy, all as an extraordinary act, proportioned to the conflict of giants maintained by England and France against each other, the one daring to seize the dominion of the sea, hitherto the common route of nations, and to interdict all commerce to her enemies, the other aiming at the entire occupation of the continent by force of arms, to reply to the closing of the sea by the closing of the land. Unheard-of spectacle, without example in the past and probably in the future, exhibited at this moment by the unchained passions of the two greatest nations of the earth."

simple peace and may immediately return to the ranks of your enemies.

I consented to an armistice which left to Prussia Magdeburg and all her states between the Elbe and the Niemen; she lost Hanover and all her states in Franconia, Saxony, and Westphalia. If an alliance should actually be formed, I might indemnify her for these losses.

But Magdeburg with twenty thousand men capitulated the same day that Duroc signed the convention of Charlottenburg; could I surrender this main bulwark of the monarchy for a simple armistice, subject still to the acceptance of a prince who was at Königsberg in the midst of the Russian columns which he had called to his assistance? It was necessary to make a new treaty; I left for Posen and could sign it only in that city; I could not rely much on its ratification, for the King of Prussia, after the conduct which his cabinet had induced him to pursue in the affair of Haugwitz, would have lost in the eyes of his contemporaries and of posterity if he had again abandoned the Russians, eighty thousand of whom were already on the Vistula and crossing his states.

**NAPOLEON ADVANCES TO THE VISTULA.**—In the mean time, my army, having found no enemy between the Oder and the Vistula, had advanced on Warsaw and Thorn. I had only to observe Stralsund and the Swedes in my rear, and to reduce the six fortresses of Silesia. I assigned the first to Mortier till I could relieve him by a new corps of observation on the Elbe. The reduction of Silesia was assigned to my brother Jerome; he had as yet no establishment; before providing him with one, I wished to give him an opportunity to distinguish himself. He had at first embarked in the Brest squadron, but, as he did not like the sea service, I appointed him to my army; Vandamme was his guide; he commanded twenty-five thousand Bavarians and Würtembergers, forming the ninth corps. To reduce Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, Neisse, Schweidnitz, and Glatz, whose garrisons formed a force as numerous as his own, was no easy matter, although his opponent, the Prince of Anhalt-Pless, was a man of neither head nor heart. Glogau fell without resistance, but the other places were better commanded and made much better defense.

**IMMENSE RESULTS OF THE SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.**—Thus terminated the war of seven weeks—very different from that of seven years. Never was there a victory with such results. In this short time my power had extended from the banks of the Rhine to those of the Vistula; a hundred thousand prisoners,



four thousand pieces of cannon, six great fortresses and many smaller ones—such were the trophies of a skillful maneuver, of the impetuous valor of my army, and of the inexperience of my adversaries. Whatever may be the opinion of the eloquent author of the "*Précis des événements militaires*," these successes were merely the result of a skillful application of the principles of war by us, and a total neglect of them by our enemies. To deny the existence and influence of these principles is to deny the light of the sun. My genius consisted only in applying these principles almost constantly, and in giving to this application its greatest possible extent. In this I exerted all the superiority of my judgment, the grandeur of my character, and the extent of my views. This is what distinguishes the great warrior from the mediocre general. But far from me be the thought of ever putting in doubt the existence of military principles, and their influence on the fate of armies!

## CHAPTER X.

## THE WAR OF 1807, OR THE CAMPAIGNS OF EYLAU AND FRIEDLAND.

Condition of the Enemy's Forces—Poland—Napoleon's Measure for securing his Rear—The King of Prussia rejects the Armistice—The Russian Army—Invasion of Moldavia—Position of the Two Armies—Napoleon takes the Offensive—Combat of Pultusk—Napoleon prepares for Winter Quarters—Measures for securing his Position—Continuation of the War between Russia and Turkey—Benningsen takes Command of the Russian Army—Affairs of Silesia—Benningsen attacks Napoleon's Left—Movements of the Latter—His Project accidentally Discovered by the Russians—Soult fights at Bergfried—Combat at Landsberg—Combat of Liebstadt—Battle of Eylau—The French Army resumes its Winter Quarters—Combat of Ostrolenka—Embarrassment of Napoleon's Position—Menaces of Spain—Austria offers her Intervention for Peace—The English threaten Constantinople—Passage of the Dardanelles—Sebastiani rouses the Turks to defend themselves—Retreat of the English—Napoleon's Firmness—Negotiations at the Camp of Finkensteint—Negotiations with England broken off by Perceval—Treaty of Triple-Alliance at Bartenstein—Operations in Pomerania—Negotiations with Sweden—Army of Observation on the Elbe—English Expedition into Egypt—Sieges in Silesia—Siege and Fall of Dantzic—Resumption of Hostilities—Danger and Escape of Ney—Napoleon Marches to his Assistance—Favorable Changes of Napoleon's Position—Battle of Heilsberg—Operations of Benningsen—Battle of Friedland—The Russians recross the Niemen—They propose Peace—Interview of the Emperors at Tilsit—The Peace Signed—Prussia—Conditions of the Treaty of Tilsit—Revolution at Constantinople—Projects on Turkey—Special Stipulations at Tilsit.

CONDITION OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES.—The King of Prussia had retired to Königsberg. Of all his army, there remained hardly twenty thousand men fit for service; but one hundred thousand Russians, coming to his assistance, were already advancing on the Vistula. I marched to meet them; on entering Poland a new theater was presented for our arms; here was the old land of anarchy, and of liberty crushed by foreign domina-



tion; the Poles only waited my coming to throw off the German yoke.

POLAND.—Not to recognize the advantages to be derived from Poland would have evinced ignorance of the eighteenth century; but in order that this country should serve as a barrier against Russia, and a counterpoise to Austria, required a complete reëstablishment of the Polish nation. This could only be brought about by a long and successful war: my ministers were not agreed on the policy of attempting this project; Talleyrand, old and worn out (*usé*), sighed for his hotel in Paris, and was vexed at the idea of a winter's journey to Poland: he opposed it. Maret approved the attempt, for he could see in it immense advantages, and some chances of success.

The promises of Dombrowski and Zayonscheck were encouraging. A formal deputation of Great Poland, presided over by Count de Zadinski, had nearly decided me by promising a prompt levy called the *Polish insurrection*, a kind of reserve in which each gentleman mounts his horse and leads to the field a certain number of his peasants. My orders had already been prepared, when a memoir drawn up by an officer attached to my person changed my resolution. It represented, in strong colors, the advantages to be derived from an alliance with Prussia, by generously pardoning her, and by aggrandizing her with Polish territory, which it would be possible to cede and still preserve to the Poles their nationality; thus obtaining the counterpoise so essential to my policy, without exposing me to an interminable war with Prussia, Russia, and Austria. This memoir particularly pointed out the fact that the reëstablishment of Poland would form an eternal bond of union between these three powers; that a rupture with Austria at this time might bring on our rear one hundred and fifty thousand men, which would render our position on the Vistula embarrassing, unless we could support ourselves on Prussia. It set forth also the advantage which would result to the Polish nation by its fusion with an enlightened and industrious people. It was a great plan.

I confess that these arguments nearly persuaded me to adopt this course; an armistice was already negotiated; but the inconceivable capitulations of Erfurth, Stettin, Prenzlau, Magdeburg, and Lübeck diminished my desire for an alliance with an army so demoralized. The conditions of the armistice were effected by these capitulations, and as I expected that the arrival of the Russians would cause them to be rejected, I resolved to try the Poles, notwithstanding the rigors of the season. In fact, it was prefer-

able to go to Warsaw to fight the Russian army in the midst of a population ready to join us, than to await it in the midst of the humiliated Prussians, who upon any reverse of my army would have gone over to the enemy.

Kosciusko, who for several years had been residing at Paris, was sent for; but he was unwilling to attempt any partial revolution. He demanded the formal and complete restoration of his country; but this I could not engage to do, as Austria was in possession of a third of the former kingdom of Poland. It would have closed the door against a reconciliation with Russia, and at the same time had involved us with Austria. I, therefore, contented myself with sending Dombrowski and Zayonscheck to Posen, to assure them of the interest that I would take in their country if they would assist me, and that I would soon follow them. I left Berlin on the twenty-fourth of November, and arrived at Posen on the twenty-eighth. I was received with an enthusiasm which surprised me, and which seemed a happy omen. They gave me *fêtes* which would have done honor to the most brilliant salons of Paris. I remained in this city a fortnight; the time was not lost, for I could still reach Warsaw as soon as my troops.

Notwithstanding the enthusiasm produced at Posen and Warsaw, the Poles had not entirely fulfilled my expectations. They are a passionate people, chivalric and light; they act from impulse, not from judgment. Their enthusiasm is great, but irregular and short-lived. Those who followed my standards exhibited admirable fidelity and valor; I here pay them the tribute of my gratitude; but as a nation, Poland should have done more. This was not the fault of the Poles; it was the inevitable result of circumstances. If Poland had had a more powerful and a more numerous *tiers-état*, she might have made a *levée-en-masse* for us. Perhaps by giving the Poles a plan, a system, and a *point-d'appui* more stable than the House of Saxony, they might, in time, have been able to maintain themselves. It was never a part of my character to do things by halves; I, however, pursued such a course with Poland; the results were not favorable. This course was forced upon me by my political relations; I could not act differently.\*

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\*Some of the liberal writers on this campaign have blamed Napoleon for not adopting more decisive measures for the restoration of Poland. There is no doubt that such measures would have been immensely popular in France; but it was thought by many that they would have been unsuccessful, on account of the unstable character of the Poles, and the powerful opposition of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. In speaking of this project,



**MEASURES FOR SECURING THE REAR OF THE FRENCH ARMY.**—I profited by my sojourn at Posen to sign a treaty of peace with the Elector of Saxony, and to strengthen, by this old ally of France, the system of the Confederation of the Rhine. A first contingent of eight thousand men took up their march to join me on the Vistula. I also completed the necessary measures for securing our rear.

On leaving Berlin and Meseritz, I had given Mortier directions for the disposition of his eighth corps. Since the troops of my brother Louis, under the orders of Savary, had reduced Hameln and Nieuburg, and completed the conquest of Hanover, their presence was no longer required there, and they returned to Holland to protect that country against the English. Mortier, after leaving Hesse, entered Mecklenburg, and was required to guard the coast of the North Sea and the Baltic, from Hamburg and the mouth of the Weser to Stettin, so as to observe the Swedes and the English.

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Allison says: "It would have been alike grateful to every lover of freedom, and important as forming a barrier against Muscovite aggrandizement in Europe. But was it possible to construct such an empire, to form such a barrier, out of the disjointed elements of Polish anarchy? This is the point for consideration; and if it was not, then the French Emperor would have thrown away all the advantages of victory, if, for a visionary and impracticable scheme of this description, he had incurred the lasting and indelible animosity of the partitioning powers. With the aid of two hundred thousand brave men, indeed, which Poland could with ease send into the field, he might, for a season, have withstood the united armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia; but could he rely on their tumultuary assemblies sustaining the steady and durable efforts requisite for permanent success? What made Poland originally fall a victim to the coalesced powers, once little more than provinces of its mighty dominion? 'The insane ambition,' as John Sobieski said, 'of a plebeian noblesse'; the jealousy of six hundred thousand electors, incapable alike of governing themselves or of permitting the steady national government of others. Was this fatal element of discord eradicated from the Polish heart? Is it yet eradicated? Was it possible, by reëstablishing Poland in 1807, to have done any thing but, as Talleyrand well expressed it, 'organized anarchy'? These are the considerations which then presented and still present an invincible obstacle to a measure, in other points of view recommended by so many considerations of justice and expedience. It is evident that the passions of the people, their insane desire for democratic equality, were so powerful, that if reëstablished in its full original extent, it would speedily have again fallen under the dominion of its former conquerors; the same causes which formerly proved fatal to its independence would, without doubt, again have had the same effect."

Thiers discusses this subject at very considerable length, and with his usual accuracy and eloquence. His remarks are too extensive for quotation, and a mere extract would not do full justice to his well-considered views upon the course of Napoleon toward Poland at this period of her history.

A vast system was indispensable for securing our power in the immense countries which we had just invaded with the impetuosity of a mad torrent, and where strong resistance might still be encountered. Already some troubles had manifested themselves in Hesse, where the partisans of the Elector profited by the absence of the eighth corps and the inevitable burdens of war, to stir up insurrection. I immediately gave orders for suppressing these movements. Movable columns sent from Mayence by Kellerman, from Münster by Loison, and from Magdeburg by General Michaud, completely restored order.

Kellerman organized at Mayence, into provisional regiments, the conscripts destined for the several *corps-d'armée*. This mode of centralizing the surveillance, and awaiting small detachments, which are always dangerous, gave to this multitude of isolated recruits the consistence and force of a respectable army. Four of these regiments had already reached Berlin, where they relieved the contingents of Baden, of Wurtzburg, and the Northern Legion, formed of Hessian and Prussian volunteers. These advanced between the Oder and the Vistula to cover our communications and observe Colberg. A division of cuirassiers, drawn from Italy and concentrated at Leipsic under General d'Espagne, moved toward Posen and Thorn. The grenadier division of Oudinot, reorganized at Berlin, marched toward Warsaw. Four other provisional regiments were formed at Mayence; and my army became thus secured in its recruits and in its communications. No one ever understood so thoroughly as I did the mechanism of this organization on the rear of an army, and of these successive levies, which served at the same time as means for periodically recruiting our regiments, and as reserves for guarding our line of operations.

**THE KING OF PRUSSIA REJECTS THE ARMISTICE.**—When the King received at Königsberg the armistice signed at Charlottenburg by MM. Lucchesini and Zastrow, he was the more indisposed to approve it, as he had, on the twentieth of October, signed at Grodno a convention with Russia, and the first Russian contingent had just entered the Prussian territory, under the orders of Benningsen. He therefore refused to ratify it, and the continuation of the war was the only course left for us both. We therefore were again to fight the Russians; and it was now the question whether it was best to await their coming, or to meet them on the way. The season was bad, but it was no better for them than for us. If I allowed them to advance, I deprived myself of the support and resources of Poland; they might induce



Austria to join in the war, for she hesitated only because the Russians were too far distant to come to her assistance: they might incite the Prussian nation, which, recovering from the shock of a first disaster, felt the necessity of doing every thing to reëstablish itself.

**THE RUSSIAN ARMY.**—The Emperor Alexander had shown great activity in repairing the losses of the campaign of Austerlitz; not only were all his regiments filled to the complement, but his army was augmented by thirty squadrons and fifty-one battalions of new formation. If his entire army had been directed against me, it would have been difficult for me to sustain the contest with my army, scattered from Hanover to Warsaw. Happily I was soon relieved on this point by the news that General Michelsen had entered Moldavia at the head of eighty thousand men.

The Russian army was at this time divided into eighteen divisions, each, except the guards, composed of six regiments of infantry or chasseurs, ten squadrons of light cavalry, one company of pioneers, two batteries of position, and three batteries of light and one of horse artillery; making for each division eighteen battalions, twenty squadrons, and the enormous quantity of seventy-two pieces of cannon; the artillery was fine and well-served; the cavalry, so mediocre under Suwarrow, had vastly improved since then. This army was distributed as follows;

1st. The division of guards and grenadiers, under the Grand Duke Constantine, numbered thirty-three battalions, thirty-five squadrons, and eighty-four pieces.

2d. The army destined to act in Prussia, including the first eight divisions under Osterman, Sacken, Prince Galitzin, Touczkof, Barclay de Tolly, Doctorof, and Essen, and also the fourteenth division, at first under Prince Gortschakof, and afterward under Count Kamenski; these together amounted to one hundred and forty-seven battalions, one hundred and seventy squadrons, and five hundred and four pieces.

3d. The army in Moldavia, under Michelsen, including the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth divisions, under Prince Wolkonsky, Müller, Zacomelsky, Miloradowich, Meindorf, and the Duke of Richelieu. They together counted ninety battalions, one hundred squadrons, and three hundred and six pieces.

4th. The intermediate corps, under Count Apraxin, including the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth divisions, under General Rtischef, Prince Labanof, and Prince Gortschakof, numbering fifty-four battalions, thirty squadrons, and one hundred and forty-four pieces.

The total of these forces was three hundred and twenty-four battalions, three hundred and thirty-five squadrons, and one thousand and thirty-eight pieces of cannon. But this did not include the corps of Georgia, of Finland, and the garrison battalions, which formed an army entirely distinct.

INVASION OF MOLDAVIA.—To understand the motives of this invasion, which appeared to be an error, it is necessary to recur to preceding events. Russia, certain of war between us and Prussia, thought to appear in it merely as an auxiliary, as she had done in 1805, for Austria; she thus flattered herself that she could extend the limits of her empire to the Danube, and that England had too much need of her alliance not to second her in her project. For this purpose it was necessary to have a legitimate pretext for a war against the Turks.

The influence of Sebastiani furnished one sufficiently plausible. The first care of my ambassador was to follow out my instructions in procuring the dismissal of the Hospodars of Moldavia, Ypsilanti, and Morusi, elected under the protection of Russia, and concentrated by the treaty of Yassi. Russia had a right to complain of this, and she did so warmly; the threats of Count Italinski, supported by those of the English ambassador, who spoke of nothing less than the bombardment of Constantinople by a powerful squadron, caused the restoration of the hospodars.

The Emperor Alexander, however, did not wait for this ratification, but immediately ordered Michelsen to invade the principalities, and to seize upon the Turkish places on the Danube. This general passed the Dniester on the third of November, and advanced without obstacle to the frontiers of Servia. We were reciprocally pleased with this event: Russia, because she thought to profit by it; and I, because it produced a powerful diversion in my favor. Moreover, the rapid fall of the Prussian monarchy, changing the face of affairs, placed all the advantages of this aggression on my side. This invasion had been planned and ordered before the news of the disasters of Prussia was received at St. Petersburg. Otherwise the Emperor Alexander would have been too prudent to undertake, at the same time, the double task of opposing us and of attacking the Turks.

POSITION OF THE TWO ARMIES.—When he received the first information of the march of the French on Berlin, he detached the corps of Benningsen and of Buxhowden to the assistance of the Prussians. Forty thousand Russians under the former arrived on the Vistula a few days before us, but fell back



on Pultusk to await the second army, which was approaching by forced marches. We therefore passed the river without obstacle. Davoust and Murat, who had entered Warsaw on the thirtieth of September, were not a little surprised at the sudden desertion of the post of Praga, and immediately sent over troops in boats to take possession of it (December 2d). Lannes sustained them, and my right wing established itself on the Bug; the left was not less fortunate: Ney, who was in possession of Thorn, debouched from this place, sustained by the cavalry of Bessières and followed by the corps of Bernadotte. At the center Soult and Augereau prepared, with great difficulty, the means of crossing the Vistula between Modlin and Wyssogrod. Leaving Posen on the sixteenth of December, I arrived at Warsaw on the eighteenth. I urged forward the passage of these two corps; Augereau, not being able to throw a bridge across the river, passed his troops over in boats near Zakroczin between the twentieth and twenty-second. Soult, not being able to succeed at Wyssogrod, fortunately found means of effecting a passage at Plonsk.

The Emperor Alexander had given the command of his army to Marshal Kamenski, an octogenarian, who, in the wars of the Empress Catherine, had shown energy and vigor; but these qualities had been destroyed by age. Nevertheless, on uniting his forces, he signalized his arrival at the army by an advance movement. He carried his head-quarters to Nasielsk and cantoned the four divisions of his first army between the Ukra, the Bug, and the Naréw. The second army was cantoned between Golymin and Makow, having one of his divisions on the left of the Narew. A Prussian corps, commanded by General Lestocq, encamped near the banks of the Dremontz, on the road to Thorn; he connected himself with the right of the Russians, who reinforced him with some troops.

**NAPOLÉON TAKES THE OFFENSIVE.**—Not wishing to be enclosed by the enemy on the Vistula, and feeling the importance of giving ourselves a wider sphere in advance of Warsaw and Thorn, I, at the same moment, took the offensive. Ney, Bernadotte, and a part of the cavalry which had passed the river at Thorn, directed their march on Soldau and Biezun, maneuvering by their right to isolate the Prussian corps and cut it off from the Russian army. Lestocq, learning that Bessières had nothing but cavalry at Biezun, attempted to enter there; but our brave squadrons threw themselves on his infantry, drove them back into the marshes, and captured several hundred prisoners. On the twenty-third of December, at two o'clock in the morning, I

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repaired to the bridge of the Bug; Davoust, having already crossed this river, threw a bridge over the Ukra, and maneuvered by his left to put himself in communication with Augereau, who was acting on Novemiasto, and Soult, who was moving on Plonsk. Lannes, on our extreme right, took the road to Sierock and Pultusk. Our concentric movement succeeded admirably; Augereau forced the passage of the Ukra at Kursumb after a combat in which the fourteenth of the line sustained the reputation it had won at Rivoli; he then advanced on Novemiasto. I moved with Davoust on Nasielsk, from which place we drove the division of Ostermann, notwithstanding the most strenuous resistance. Benningsen concentrated his troops on Stregoczyn. On all sides the enemy's generals put themselves in retreat. I resolved to turn them by their right, with the intention of cutting off their line of retreat to Rozan. For this purpose I directed Soult by Chiconow on Makow; Ney, resting on the right, followed him as a second line. Augereau and the main body of Davoust's corps were also to move on Makow, passing by Golymin. One of the divisions of Davoust, which marched from Nasielsk on Pultusk, and the corps of Lannes, ascending the Narew from Sierock on the same city, were destined to attack in front the enemy's army, which had taken that direction.

Old Kamenski, perceiving all the extent of the danger with which he was threatened, ordered a general retreat by Ostrolenka on Lomza. The winter was late; we had had continual rains; the low grounds bordering the Narew were vast marshes; movements were difficult. The Russian general, whose faculties had become enfeebled by age, feared that his retreat might be delayed by his materials, and ordered his artillery to be abandoned if such should be the case; he himself took the road to Lomza. The order for such a sacrifice, which should be thought of only when absolutely necessary for the salvation of an army, excited against him the generals of his command. Not thinking the danger so imminent, they hesitated to obey him. Benningsen, who commanded the first army, assembled his forces at Pultusk; Buxhowden, commandant-in-chief of the second army, collected his at Makow; a considerable corps, composed of detachments of the two armies, took post at Golymin.

**COMBAT OF PULTUSK.**—On the twenty-sixth, the corps of Lannes, reinforced by the division of Gudin, attacked the army of Benningsen at Pultusk. The combat was very warm; we gained some advantage over the advanced guard, but when we came to attack the principal position, the shock became more



severe; the Russians, profiting by the superiority of their artillery, repulsed the efforts of my lieutenant. I, however, did not attach much importance to this combat, for the decisive blows were to be struck at the left; Lannes, making it a point of honor to succeed, thought otherwise, and uselessly sacrificed many men. The same day I attacked Golymin with Davoust and Augereau, sustained by the cavalry of Murat. The Russians held their ground well; their first line, taken in flank by Augereau, yielded to us its position; they nevertheless maintained themselves at Golymin till night; this was more vexatious for us than the unsuccessful attack on Pultusk, although the retreat of Buxhowden during the night was not made in very good order, and a part of his cannon was abandoned to us in the mud.

But I did not yet despair of the success of my plan. I counted on Soult, who ought, by this time, to be before Makow and established on the rear of the Russian corps which had fought at Pultusk and at Golymin. Ney and Bessières were to sustain him by gaining Chicanow, and advancing, as a second line, in the same direction. I was deceived in this expectation; the weather was horrible, and the roads almost impassable; in a word, the whole country was deluged, and we were in the mud up to our necks. This circumstance saved the Russian army by delaying the movements of my left. Soult could not reach Makow, and the roads on Rozan remained open to the enemy; he profited by it to escape on Ostrolenka. It is said that this retreat was made against the advice of Benningsen; this general, too much occupied with what was passing under his own eyes, had entirely lost sight of the *ensemble* of the operations. In repulsing the attack of a corps inferior in numbers to his own, he thought he had conquered us, and demanded permission to profit by this pretended victory and resume the offensive; it was unfortunate for us that he was not allowed to do so; the treaty of Tilsit would, in that case, have taken place six months sooner. Ney, on his side, having received orders to rest on Chicanow, had pushed forward to Soldan in pursuit of Lestocq, whom he drove from this city. The Prussian general, seeing that he was opposed only by an advance guard, marched back in the evening and reentered the city; a terrible combat followed; at length the valor of the sixty-ninth regiment overcame all the efforts of the enemy and repulsed him with a loss of a thousand men. In this contest the Russians exhibited a courage to which we were not accustomed, and my Egyptians immortalized themselves.

THE FRENCH GO INTO WINTER QUARTERS.—As the Russians had escaped us, I had no desire to run after them, for the

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purpose of beginning a new campaign at a time of year so unfavorable to grand operations. The mud rendered transportation impossible; my battalions were hardly able to move, and the loss of ten thousand wounded in these secondary affairs caused me to think more seriously of the results of my enterprise. I had imagined that the remembrance of Austerlitz had broken the morale of my adversaries; their firmness surprised me, and they employed such a quantity of cannon that I deemed it necessary to restore the equilibrium by augmenting my artillery. It was therefore important, in every view of the subject, to give repose to my troops, who were much in need of it. I cantoned them between the Omulef, the Narew, and the Ukra; my head-quarters and my guards returned to Warsaw.

MEASURES FOR SECURING HIS POSITION.—To give a good base to this new theater of operations, I directed the repairs of the fortifications of Thorn and of the camp of Praga, so celebrated in the war of 1794. *Têtes-de-pont* were also planned at Modlin on the Vistula, and at Sierock on the Bug. Finally it was necessary to neutralize the advantages which the position of Dantzic gave to the enemy. The first Polish militia, levied by Dombrowski, joined to the contingent of Baden, and a French division, formed the tenth corps of at first ten or twelve thousand; it was afterward increased to fifteen thousand, and eventually to a much higher number. With this corps General Lefébyre was to observe the places of Dantzic and Colberg; the Hessian contingent, under General Rouyère, blockaded Graudentz. Great magazines were established at Thorn and Sierock; considerable preparations were made for hospitals; first at Posen and at Warsaw, then in all the small cities which afforded resources. Thirty thousand tents, captured in the Prussian arsenals, served as the first furniture for these establishments.

WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY.—After my return to Warsaw, I received, on the thirtieth of October, a courier from Constantinople, announcing to me the declaration of war between the Porte and the Russians: Czerni-George, with the Servians, had gained possession of the important fortress of Belgrade, and Michelsen advanced on Bucharest to act in concert with him. The news of the disaster of the Prussians now decided the government to withdraw a reinforcement of thirty-six battalions and forty squadrons from this army of Turkey. These troops directed themselves in haste on the Bug. It was important for me to profit by this diversion, especially in influencing the Cabinet of Vienna to take no part with Russia. I wrote



to this effect to Sebastiani, and the following orders were addressed to Marmont in Dalmatia:

"A courier, which left Constantinople on the second of December, arrived at Warsaw on the thirtieth; the Porte had formally declared war against the Russians; and the Russian ambassador left with all his suite on the twenty-ninth of November. At Constantinople there is great enthusiasm for this war; twenty regiments of janizaries have left Constantinople; it is said that twenty thousand more have left Asia for Europe. Near sixty thousand men are already collected at Hirssow. Passwan-Oglu has twenty thousand at Widdin. The courier assures us that in Turkey there is the best of feeling. My intention is that you send to Constantinople five officers of engineers and as many of artillery. Write to the Pashas of Bosnia and Scutari, in order that they may send you *firmans*, certifying the arrival of these officers. Send staff officers to the Pashas of Bosnia and Bulgaria, and assist them as much as possible in counsels, provisions, and munitions. Possibly the Porte may ask for a corps of troops, and this corps can have but one object, that of securing the Danube. I am not much averse to your sending twenty-five thousand men on Widdin, as you will enter into the system of the grand army, forming its extreme right; twenty-five thousand French, sustaining sixty thousand Turks, would oblige the Russians not only to leave thirty thousand men on the Danube, as they have done, but to send double that number; which will make a very formidable diversion to my operations; but all that is still only hypothetical. What you can do immediately, general, is to send twenty or thirty officers, if requested by the pashas; but send no troops, except it may be some detachments at five or six leagues from the frontiers, so as to favor any expedition that may be made. You can count on the Turks as real allies, and you are authorized to furnish them what you can in cartridges, cannon, powder, etc., if they ask you for them.

"A Persian ambassador, and one from Constantinople, have presented themselves at Warsaw, and by the time you receive this letter they will be at Vienna. These two great empires are at heart attached to France, because France alone can sustain them against the ambitious enterprise of their enemies. In this important circumstance the English hesitate and appear to desire peace with the Porte; the latter power has employed for this purpose the threat of transporting forty thousand men to the gates of Ispahan, and our relations are such with Persia that we can march to the Indus. *What was formerly chimerical, ceases to be so at*

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*this moment, when I frequently receive letters from the sultans; not emphatic and deceitful letters, but those which manifest great fear of the power of the Russians, and great confidence in the protection of the French Empire. Send some French officers to General Sebastiani at Constantinople, to correspond with him. The distance of Dalmatia from Warsaw is so great that you must take much responsibility on yourself. I have ordered General Sebastiani to send to Widdin an officer of his embassy, to serve as an intermediate correspondent with Constantinople; but this need not prevent you from sending one from your side to that city.*

“French officers should be sent to travel through the different provinces of Turkey. They will make manifest the good-will which I bear the Grand Seignior; this will stir up their pride, and at the same time obtain valuable information, which you will transmit to me. In brief, general, I am the sincere friend of Turkey, and desire only to benefit her; conduct yourself accordingly. I regard the declaration of war between Turkey and Russia as the most fortunate event that could occur in our present situation. I notice that, in these conjunctures of such great interest, you do not give sufficient attention to the affairs of the Pachas of Bucharest, Bosnia, and Scutari, with whom you ought frequently to correspond.”

**BENNINGSSEN TAKES COMMAND OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.**—These events in Moldavia increased my desire to give a little repose for my troops, for in the interval the diversions made by the Turks, if they were well-directed, would increase the chances of our success on the return of a favorable season. The Russians, on their side, cantoned in the environs of Lomza. The aged Kamenski had given up the command; he was replaced by Benningsen,\* whom, on his own report, they considered victorious, because he had repulsed an isolated attack.

**AFFAIRS IN SILESIA.**—Our affairs flourished still better in Silesia, a province doubly important on account of its numerous fortresses and its position with respect to Austria. The

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\*Baron Levin Augustus Benningsen was born in Hanover in 1745. He early entered the Russian service, and was distinguished in the war against Poland. In 1806 he was appointed to the command of the Russian army and fought the battles of Eylau and Friedland. After the peace of Tilsit, he retired to his estates, but in 1813 he commanded the Russian army, called the *Army of Poland*, entered Saxony, took part in the battle of Leipzig, and blockaded Hamburg. He afterward retired to his native country and died in 1826. He was the author of a book on light cavalry, published in 1794.



place of Glogau, attacked by the Würtemberg troops under the orders of Vandamme, surrendered at the simple appearance of a siege equipage formed of Prussian pieces from the arsenal of Custrin. Breslau made more resistance. This great city, in a commanding position on the Oder, with a population of sixty thousand, presented an *enceinte* almost equal to that of Strasbourg. The works were out of repair, of slight relief, and mostly unrevetted. Nevertheless, it was a bastioned *enceinte*, defended by six thousand men and inclosing sixty thousand inhabitants. General Thiele at first made a firm resistance; twice the Prince of Anhalt-Pless advanced at the head of some Prussian battalions of five or six thousand peasants of Upper Silesia to relieve him. The wise dispositions of Vandamme and the valor of our troops triumphed over every obstacle. The wet ditches being frozen over, Vandamme threatened to make an assault. The place capitulated on the seventh of January, and the garrison became prisoners of war; we here captured three hundred pieces of cannon. Brieg and Schweidnitz suffered the same fate. The latter place, which had been the object of several campaigns under the great king, fell in silence, after a few days' siege, and without its even being known or thought of in Europe. The news of these conquests consoled me for the mud of Pultusk. I had reason to hope that they would act powerfully on the Cabinet of Vienna, by depriving the Austrians of all hope of support in Silesia.

**BENNINGSSEN ATTACKS NAPOLEON'S LEFT.** — The principal armies did not enjoy the anticipated repose in their winter quarters; seeking to extend the sphere of my supplies, and to close against the enemy the access to Dantzic, I had pushed the corps of Bernadotte on Elbing. Ney was to cover the interval between us by establishing himself at Mlava; but the want of provisions, and his impetuous activity, induced him to push on to Heilsberg. Benningsen having reorganized his army, and seeing himself on the point of being reinforced by two divisions of the corps of reserve, began operations in the middle of January. Some say that, having received orders to do every thing in his power to cover Königsberg, the last hold of the Prussian monarchy and the last asylum of its king, Benningsen was induced by the movements of Ney to march by his right, so as to close the road to this capital; others think that the hazardous movement of the sixth corps made him conceive the hope of cutting it off. Be the reasons what they may, he resolved to attack this corps; and although he thus engaged his army in a direction strat-

egically false, it must be confessed that, by means of the gap left by Ney, the enterprise might have been fatal to us, if it had been executed more skillfully, and with more vigor.

Having left General Essen with one division on the Narew, where he was soon joined by the two others from the corps of Moldavia, Benningsen moved with his seven remaining divisions by Bischoffstein and Heilsberg on Gutstadt; independently of these divisions, the three light brigades of Generals Barclay, Bagravout, and Markof formed a corps of advance guard under the orders of Prince Bagration. The Prussian corps of Lestocq followed this movement by marching by Schippenbeil and Bartenstein on Preuss-Holland. It had been fatal to Ney, if the Russian army had marched from Johannisburg on Neidenburg; but, instead of following on the rear of his corps scattered over a space of twenty-five leagues in columns by regiments, it made a long detour to reach his head and throw him back on his line of retreat; this fault enabled him to concentrate his forces in the excellent position of Gilgenburg. Bernadotte, receiving timely warning of the enemy's approach, united his corps at Mohrungen. He was attacked there, on the twenty-fifth of January, by the Russian vanguard, which he drove back on Liebstadt. But this vanguard being sustained by the main body of the Russian army, Bernadotte was obliged to put himself in retreat on Strasbourg. Benningsen followed him by Osterode toward Loban.

These events forced me to recommence the campaign in mid-winter; the cold was excessive; the Vistula and the Narew were covered with enormous masses of ice, which, at any moment, might carry away our bridges; the ground was covered with snow; our magazines were not abundant, and even if they had been in great plenty, there were no means of transporting them. I was desirous of waiting for a favorable season, and feared that, if there should come on a thaw, we might have a repetition of the scenes of Pultusk: I did not wish to risk a Pultowa. Nevertheless, I soon saw the possibility of turning these things to great advantage, by seizing the occasion, which had once escaped us, of cutting off and annihilating the Russian army.

NAPOLEON'S MOVEMENTS.—I directed Bernadotte to continue to draw the enemy toward the Vistula. He was to have for his support the little *corps-d'armée* which Marshal Lefébvre had just collected at Thorn. All the other corps received orders to break up their cantonments. On the thirty-first of January, that of Lannes united at Brock; Davoust at Mesynitz; Soult and the cavalry at Willenberg, and Augereau at Niedenburg; finally



that of Ney approached Willenberg, where I established my headquarters. The corps of Lannes remained on the Narew, to cover my rear and to hold in check the troops which the Russians had left on this river. With my four other corps and the cavalry, I resolved to march on Benningsen's rear, hoping to subject him to the fate of the Prussians at Jéna. We began our march on the first of February; on the third we reached Allenstein with the cavalry and the columns of Soult, Augereau, and Ney; Davoust arrived at Wartenberg.

**HIS PROJECT DISCOVERED.**—Every thing seemed to conduce to the success of my projects. Benningsen had fallen blindly into the snare; his attention was fixed on Bernadotte, whom he pursued with vigor. He was running headlong to his own destruction. An accident, very fortunate for us, enlightened him as to the danger of his position, and snatched from me the fruit of one of my finest combinations. An *aid-de-camp* dispatched by Berthier to Bernadotte permitted himself to be taken by the Cossacks. His papers, which he had not the address to destroy, informed the Russians of our projects and the dangers with which they were threatened. They hastened to regain, by forced marches, their communications. To this misfortune we must add that Bernadotte did not receive my order, and he did nothing as I had directed.

**SOULT FIGHTS AT BERGFRIED.**—On the third we found the Russians in battle array at Jonkowo; their left rested on the Elbe. The Prussians had concentrated at Osterode. I, nevertheless, did not despair of still being able to turn their left. I established the mass of my forces opposite the enemy's army at Jonkowo, and I directed my right, under the orders of Soult, by the right of the Alle on the bridge of Bergfried, situated beyond their flank. If Soult had been able to debouch at Bergfried on the rear of the Russians, the day would have been decisive; but they defended the bridge with so much obstinacy that we could not get possession of it before night. Benningsen profited by the obscurity to retire to Wolfsdorf.

**COMBAT OF LANDSBERG.**—Vexed at seeing the enemy escape us again, I hoped to push him closely. He continued his retreat by Frauendorf and Landsberg on Preuss-Eylau. His rear guard was much cut up on the fourth and fifth, and still more seriously at Hoff and Landsberg on the sixth. It maintained itself, it is true, with much vigor, against the Grand Duke of Berg, who persisted in making the brigades pass, one after the other, through the defile of a marshy stream. The

cuirassiers finally overthrew all before them, sabered two battalions, and took fifteen hundred prisoners.

**COMBAT OF LIEBSTADT.**—The Prussians were isolated by this precipitate retreat of the Russians. Lestocq at first wished to open his way to Deppen; but his advance guard was met, on the fifth, at Waltersdorf, by Ney's corps, which had already passed the Passarge at Deppen. It fought bravely, the cavalry of La Roche-Aymon especially gaining great glory; but, being overpowered by our forces, it was completely defeated, and lost sixteen cannon and many prisoners. The main body of the corps escaped destruction only by a forced march; it crossed the Passarge at Spanden, and arrived, on the seventh, at Hussehnien between Preuss-Eylau and Zinter.

**BATTLE OF EYLAU.**—The Russians took position in rear of Preuss-Eylau. Their rear guard, which was established in front of the city, was displaced on the seventh, after a bloody combat—worthy prelude of the next day's butchery; this affair was creditable to Generals Markof and Barclay, who commanded this rear guard, and to the infantry of Soult, which attacked it. The little elevation near Tenkniten was dearly won by the eighteenth of the line; we were left masters after vigorous efforts. The shock was not less terrible in Eylau. Barclay de Tolly, sustained by the divisions of Prince Galitzin, returned there twice in the dark, and yielded, the third time, only to the vigorous efforts of Legrand's division. We were in possession, after eight o'clock in the evening. Murat established himself opposite the enemy and reported to me that he was fighting them in retreat. The loss of Eylau rendered this supposition plausible. I believed the report, and, overcome with fatigue, went to sleep. I had been marching or working twenty hours a day since I left Warsaw. I, however, awoke before daylight, and visited my troops, when a terrible cannonade thundered on Eylau. Led into error by the reports of Murat, I had slept, as it were, under the very fire of the Russian batteries. The army had marched for eight days without magazines, through snow and ice; the troops of Soult had carried Eylau at night at the point of the bayonet, and the total pillage of the city, thus taken, could scarcely be avoided. Half of the regiments were dispersed through the houses; their waking was terrible.

I had expected a general affair the next day; I thought, however, that it would take place at a greater distance, for the evacuation of the city, covering the front of the field of battle of the enemy, was well calculated to support this opinion, and gave



the greater probability to Murat's report. The Russians, having decided on giving battle, felt the importance of retaking Eylau while it was still covered only by Soult's corps, which was reduced to eighteen thousand men. Davoust, who had at first taken the direction to Domnau, was to approach my center. Ney had received orders to march to Kreutzburg. I hastened the arrival of Augereau to the support of Soult, and placed my guard in the churchyard. Davoust received orders to incline to the left, so as to come into line; Ney was directed to return to the right; Bernadotte was still two marches distant, in consequence of the capture of the officer who was charged with his orders. This event proved the necessity of a cipher, the use of which I afterward adopted.

The Russian army had its right at Schloditten and its left at Klein-Saussgarten. It was about eighty thousand strong. Benningsen had effected some changes in its organization; he had combined the cavalry attached to the divisions so as to carry it to the wings, and the reserve; the infantry was formed on two lines of battalions alternately deployed, and in column of attack. The reserve, composed of the fourth and seventh divisions, was formed in two deep columns in rear of the center, having at its left twenty-eight squadrons under Prince Galitzin. All the horse artillery (about sixty pieces) was united to supply the reserve with this arm. The artillery of the divisions, which amounted to, at least, one hundred and fifty twelves, and two hundred and fifty sixes and howitzers, was distributed along the front of the two lines.

Eylau is situated in a slightly undulating plain, bounded on three sides by ground still more uneven, and by hills and intervening lakes. The cold had been so great as to freeze over these lakes, and the armies could safely maneuver on the ice that covered their surface; and as they were covered with snow, the cavalry charged across without at first perceiving them. Our position commanded that of the enemy; on the left only had he the advantage of the heights of Saussgarten, which he kept but for a moment, for they were too far from the *corps-de-bataille*.

With the exception of artillery, our forces were about equal; but as it appeared difficult for Ney to arrive soon enough to take part, and as Davoust could not arrive before the middle of the day, the enemy was better prepared for the action than ourselves. I, nevertheless, expected a victory, for I counted on the discouragement of an army hotly pursued for four days. But the Russian soldier is remarkable in reverses; the day after a

defeat he shows the same countenance as the day after a victory. They fought like madmen. My own troops, to do them justice, performed miracles. Soult alone sustained the first effort of the enemy; and it required the brave soldiers of Austerlitz to resist such a shock.

The numerical superiority of the enemy in cannon was nearly fatal to us; I saw that the time had gone by when we could go forth to conquer a country with only forty pieces, as I did at Marengo. Soult had suffered considerably when the seventh corps debouched to form our center, and to attack that of the enemy. Murat's cavalry, reinforced by the division of St. Hilaire, from Soult's corps, rested on the right so as to facilitate the arrival of Davoust. The snow fell so rapidly that the air was perfectly obscured; we could not see two steps before us.

While Touczkof was opposing Legrand's division in front of Eylau, General Doctorof advanced the two heavy columns of the reserve to oppose Augereau; the division of Essen maneuvered to take him in flank. Unfortunately, this *corps-d'armée* directed its attack, without knowing it, between the reserve of the Russian cavalry and that of their infantry; it was perceived only when the squadrons were found pell-mell with the first division. They attempted to form squares, but it was too late; moreover, the firearms had become so wet as to render them useless; and the troops of Augereau, assailed on all sides and exposed to the fire of forty pieces in battery, became the victims of a sad error. The division of Desjardins was half destroyed; and that of Heudelet fared no better; Desjardins was killed, and Heudelet severely wounded; Augereau was also wounded.

To relieve him a little, I ordered Murat to charge, with all the reserve of cavalry, on the enemy's center. The division of Essen is pierced, and our mass of cavalry penetrates even to the third line of the Russians, which rests against the wood. The enemy's infantry, more disposed to be cut to pieces than to yield, close their ranks as our squadrons force their way through them; charged in turn by fresh troops, our cavalry is forced to retire after having lost Generals Hautpoult, Dahlmann, and many other distinguished chiefs. My *aid-de-camp*, Corbineau, is carried away by a shot. The retreat has become as difficult as the advance; for the Russians have re-formed and faced to the rear, and it is necessary to open a new passage sword in hand. In the mean time one of the Russian columns, which had repelled Augereau, pursues the remains of this corps along the west street of Eylau, and pierces even to the foot of the churchyard, where I



am standing with a battery of the guard, having at some distance six battalions of the old guard forming my last resource. I order my escort of one hundred men to charge the front of this column to arrest its impetuosity, and to give me time to make my dispositions. A battalion of my grenadiers advances and charges the first battalion of the Russian column, and stops it short; Murat on his side detaches the brigade of Bruyère, which takes it in flank. In an instant this column is overthrown and sabered. It was a feeble equivalent for the disaster of Angereau. This corps experienced such great losses that it was obliged to dissolve after the battle.

While these things were passing about Eylau, and at the center, St. Hilaire and a part of Murat's cavalry was fighting with even chances against the enemy's left, formed of the divisions of Sacken and Osterman, and sustained in reserve by that of Kamenski.

Affairs were threatening to take an unfavorable turn. I was waiting in fretful impatience for Davoust to debouch on our right, as he had been ordered; this alone could restore the victory. At last, about one o'clock, he appeared on the heights, driving before him the detached brigades of Bagawouth and Barclay. General Benningsen, learning that his left flank was turned and falling back in all directions, reinforced it with the division of Kamenski; this was not enough; Davoust, seconded by the dragoons of Milhaud and the attacks of St. Hilaire, drove before him Osterman, Kamenski, and Bagawouth; the whole Russian left was driven back to Kutschiten. Benningsen was obliged to send successively all his disposable force to sustain this wing. So many forces collected on this point finally arrested the progress of Davoust. As a climax of contrariety, the Prussian corps of Lestocq, having escaped from Ney, arrived on the field of battle unpursued; it passed the Russian lines in rear, and assisted to restore their affairs on the left. Davoust, who had already occupied the village of Kutschiten in rear of the enemy's left, was now forced to fall back, and considered himself fortunate in holding the heights of Anklapen for he had more than half the enemy's army on his hands.

Ney, who had allowed the Russians to escape, pursued only by a detachment, learned by accident that we were fighting at Eylau; he had neither heard the cannon nor received my orders. He promptly determined to move on Schmoditten so as to connect himself with my left. But it was too late to give a decisive turn to the battle, for night was already approaching, though the

combat was partially continued till eight o'clock; nevertheless, the arrival of Ney in rear of the right flank of the Russians became a decisive circumstance, for it determined them to retreat during the night. To execute this retrograde movement with great security, they caused Ney to be attacked by the division of Sacken, which had suffered the least during the day. Ney sustained himself near Schmoditten, but the attack deceived him, and made him doubt the issue of the battle. He took position at some distance from the road to Königsberg, and the Russians filed off all the morning, as it were, under the very fire of his cannon.

The losses on both sides were enormous: ten thousand dead bodies covered the field of battle, and thirty thousand wounded lay in the barns and gardens of the neighboring villages. Nevertheless, nothing had been definitely decided. My army was so weakened that I was hesitating whether I should not fall back and accelerate my junction with Bernadotte and Lefévre, when the news of Ney's arrival decided me to remain; and the retreat of Benningsen saved me the disagreeable apprehension of giving him the field of battle. He retired on Königsberg and covered himself with the Pregel. Murat followed him the next day to within two leagues of that city. This retreat of Benningsen offered me an opportunity for striking a terrible blow on the Russian army, which threw itself, with so much imprudence, into a *cul-de-sac*, with no other issue than the sea and the strand. If Bernadotte and Lefévre had been within reach, I should have marched on Tapiau, and placed the enemy in a frightful situation; but the rest of my army, with the exception of Ney's corps, had suffered so much that I deemed it more prudent to give it repose and wait the reduction of Dantzic, before resuming the offensive. Bernadotte entered into line two days after, and also the cuirassiers of Nansouty. The corps of Lefévre, directed on Osterode, might already be considered as a reserve. Independent of these reinforcements, I still expected the ten thousand grenadiers which Oudinot was marching from Warsaw on Pultusk and Willenberg.

Such was the cruel battle of Eylau, so interesting in the extraordinary circumstances that accompanied it, and so little decisive in its results. At eleven o'clock, Soult had suffered much, and Augereau's corps was comparatively destroyed. All had been lost but for the stand which I made for three hours at the cemetery of Eylau, at the head of my guard, my cavalry, and my artillery, which I directed myself. The army will not



refuse to bear me witness that I was not the least moved by the critical position in which we were placed until the arrival of Davoust. I could have wished to see by my side, on this occasion, those of my detractors who have accused me of wanting courage and presence of mind.\*

**THE FRENCH GO INTO WINTER QUARTERS.**—The enemy had forced me to leave my winter quarters. I had no desire to make a winter campaign. I was waiting for reinforcements, and especially for a supply of artillery and munitions. I, therefore, returned to my cantonments. The Passarge covered our left; the center was on the Alle, from Guttstadt to Allenstein, and the right by the Omulef. I established my head-quarters at Osterode, and afterward at the château of Finkenstein. Bernadotte, on the left, occupied Holland and Braunsberg; Soult encamped at Wormdit, Liebstadt, and Mohrunge; Ney was in advance on the Alle, at Guttstadt, and Allenstein; Davoust on the right at Hohenstein and Gilgenburg. The cavalry was distributed among these corps, the better to cover the cantonments. Lefebvre returned to the investment of Dantzic.

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\*In speaking of the results of the battle of Eylau, Alison evidently seeks to exaggerate the French loss and to diminish that of the Russians. His statements are exceedingly erroneous, and are not sustained by reliable authorities. He estimates the Russian loss at twenty-five thousand, and that of the French at thirty thousand. Thiers estimates the Russian loss at seven thousand killed, twenty thousand wounded, and three or four thousand prisoners; and that of the French at three thousand killed and seven thousand wounded.

The following is his note explaining these estimates:

"It is seldom that one can state the losses sustained in a battle with such accuracy as one is enabled to do for the battle of Eylau. I undertook a careful examination, in order to arrive at precision, and here follows the truth, at least as nearly as it is possible to attain it in such a matter. The inspector of the hospitals certified the same evening, at Eylau, the existence of four thousand five hundred wounded, and next day, after going his rounds in the adjacent villages, he increased the total amount to seven thousand and ninety-four. His report has been preserved. The reports of the different corps make the number of men more or less severely wounded amount to not fewer than thirteen or fourteen thousand. This difference is explained by the manner in which the authors of those reports understood the word "wounded." The chiefs of corps include even the slightest contusions, each of them naturally striving to make the most of the sufferings of his men. But half the men set down as wounded never thought of applying for any attendance, and this is proved by the report of the director of the hospitals. A month afterward a curious controversy was kept up by letter between Napoleon and M. Darn, who could not find more than six thousand wounded in the hospitals of the Vistula. This appeared disputable to Napoleon, who conceived that there must be more, especially if there were included in this number the wounded of the battle of Eylau and those of the actions which preceded it, after the breaking up of the cantonments. However, after minute examination, there were never found

**COMBAT OF OSTROLENKA.**—At the moment when I was establishing myself in rear of the Alle, the divisions which the enemy had left on the Narew, reinforced by that of Moldavia, attacked my right. Lannes was sick; Savary commanded his corps; fortunately for him, Oudinot, who was in march to join me by Willenberg, had orders to sustain him in case of need, and arrived at the required point. A Russian division was moving along the right bank of the river; Savary, seconded by Suchet, met and drove it back. At the same time two other divisions attacked Ostrolenka by the left bank. The enemy penetrated momentarily into the city; our troops drove him out, and debouched to give him combat; the affair turned to our advantage. The Russians retired with the loss of seven cannon and one thousand five hundred men, among whom was young Suwarof. This was the last event of this winter's campaign.

**DIFFICULTIES OF NAPOLEON'S POSITION.**—I wished to profit by the inaction rendered necessary by the unfavorable season, to reduce the places which I had left in rear, and thus to strengthen me in my position. I had consumed almost all my artillery munitions; they were brought by post from Magdeburg and Custrin; it required time to replenish them. The superiority of the enemy's artillery had induced me to send to France for all the disposable companies of artillerists, and I had given them Prussian pieces, in order to use the ammunition which we had found in the Prussian arsenals. I even directed French pieces to be cast to the Prussian calibers, for the same purpose. I also expected more than fifty thousand men from my *dépôts*, and from

more than six thousand and some hundred, and fewer than six thousand for Eylau itself, which, taking account of the deaths that supervened, agrees exactly with the statement of seven thousand and ninety-four furnished by the director of the hospitals. We think, therefore, that we are near the truth in computing the losses of the battle of Eylau at three thousand killed and seven thousand wounded. Napoleon, speaking in the bulletin of two thousand killed, and five or six thousand wounded, had, as we may see, not warped the truth much in comparison with what the Russians had done. One may even assert that, in the evening after the battle, he was founded in supposing that there were not more.

As for the losses of the Russians, I have adopted their own amounts and those which were certified by the French. We found seven thousand dead, and in the surrounding places five thousand wounded. They must have carried away a much greater number. Both, a German, says that they carried to Königsberg fourteen thousand nine hundred wounded, who almost all died from the cold. He admits, moreover, that they had seven thousand killed, and left five thousand wounded on the field of battle. Add three or four thousand prisoners, and you arrive at a total loss of thirty thousand men, which can scarcely be disputed. General Benningsen, always very inaccurate, admitted in his statement a loss of twenty thousand men."



my allies of the Confederation of the Rhine. This epoch of repose in the middle of old Prussia and Poland is one of the most remarkable of my life; it was not the least critical, nor the least glorious.

The visit of Baron Vincent and General Neuperg, envoys of Austria to Warsaw, to speak of mediation, gave me real apprehensions lest she might send one hundred and fifty thousand of these mediators on the Elbe, which would have rendered my position very embarrassing. I saw my danger, and more than once regretted having allowed myself to be drawn into these distant and inhospitable countries, and having rejected the advice of those who wished to turn me from it. The Cabinet of Vienna had, at this epoch, a more certain and honorable occasion to reestablish its preponderance than that which it chose in 1813. But it knew not how to profit by the occasion, and my firm attitude saved me.

**MENACES OF SPAIN.**—Even Spain, on whom I had reckoned with so much certainty, now added to the dangers to which I was exposed. At the very moment when I was hurling my thunderbolts against the Prussian army at Jena, Spain was threatening a rupture with me. The Cabinet of Madrid, which had to complain of my selling Louisiana to the Americans, and proposing to exchange the Balearic Isles with Sicily, was the less favorably disposed toward us, as the battle of Trafalgar had destroyed all hopes of advantage from our alliance. The Prince of Peace had been severely reproached by the Spanish merchants, who had suffered from the closing of the seas and the loss of their commerce with America; he now hoped, by a change of policy, to regain his popularity.

This minister,\* ignorant, as are most favorites at court, very

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\*Don Manuel Godoy was born at Badajoz, in 1764, of a noble but poor family. He entered the body-guard of Charles IV., and soon became noted in the *salons* of Madrid for his fine person and great talent for music, especially his skill on the guitar accompanied by his own voice. He owed to this talent his introduction to the Queen, of whom he ever after continued a favorite. His advancement was now most rapid, first in the army, and afterward in the council of state, to which he was transferred. He was soon made prime minister, and received the title of Duke of Alcudia. After the treaty of Bâle, in 1775, he was made Prince of Peace, and loaded with wealth and honors. The Queen compelled him, against his wishes, to marry one of the royal family, the Infanta Maria Theresa, daughter of Don Louis, the brother of the King. After the exile of Charles IV., Godoy accompanied the royal family to Rome, where he took up his permanent residence.

He was a man of light character, and of very little education, but had great cunning as a politician. For fifteen years he governed Spain as absolute master, and continued to enjoy the friendship of the King and Queen to the end of their lives.

much exaggerated the power of Prussia; because Spain had remained the same as at the time of Louis XV., he thought the relative power of Prussia and France must be the same as at the time of Frederick. Threatened by the English party, frightened by the non-ratification of the treaty signed by D'Oubril, and the coalition of Prussia, Sweden, Russia, and England against me, and undoubtedly persuaded that Austria would soon join them, he thought he could, with impunity, break all the ties which he had formed with France and thus restore to the Spanish nation the desired maritime commerce. The thing would have been natural enough if he had sought to obtain this neutrality by negotiation; but he thought it more simple to profit by my embarrassments to hurl against me a proclamation or manifesto, which, without designating me by name, was only too evidently directed against me. Eight days after, he learned the catastrophe of Jena, my entrance into Berlin, and the destruction of the monarchy which he had deemed capable of crushing me; he hastened to change the Spanish minister at the Court of Prussia, in order to endeavor to allay my resentment.

**PROFFERED INTERVENTION OF AUSTRIA.**—To complete my embarrassment, it was only necessary for Austria to declare herself; she had certainly more motives for doing so than the Cabinet of Madrid; for the latter had with me a community of interest in destroying the maritime supremacy of the English, and in saving America, which they had coveted for a century. The Cabinet of Vienna, on the contrary, had reasons to endeavor to profit by this occasion in order to regain, at a single blow, both Italy and their power in Germany. This, of course, they desired to do, but, divided in opinions, and checked by the Archduke Charles, who was opposed to a war, they wished to gain, by negotiation, time to arm, and then to propose a forced mediation. In the mean time Austria offered her intervention, and what she called her good offices, for the reëstablishment of peace! I was not blind enough to become the dupe of either Stadion or Godoy; but in these delicate circumstances it was necessary to dissemble my resentment toward the favorite of Charles IV., and to maneuver, with firmness and address, with the councilors of Francis I.

**THE ENGLISH MENACE CONSTANTINOPLE.**—This course was the more wise on my part, as the threatening attitude of the English before Constantinople might increase the difficulties of our position, by bringing about peace between the Turks and the Russians. The news of Michelsen's invasion of



Moldavia, reaching the Divan at the same time as that of my victories in Prussia, had added to the importance of Sebastiani's position at Constantinople; he had acquired great influence there, and he justified the confidence reposed in him, by the use he made of this influence. The invasion of the principalities, far from being imputed to the credit given to my minister by the Porte, appeared to be a full justification of the advantages of our alliance.

In the mean time England sought to realize the threat made by her ambassador of bombarding Constantinople; the squadron of Duckforth, which had blockaded Ferrol, received orders to enter the Mediterranean, with troops embarked at Gibraltar; it cruised in the archipelago near Tenedos. The Cabinet of London thought itself certain of the effect which the approach of this squadron would produce on a government which had trembled at the simple threat of its being sent; the English did not hesitate to demand of the Divan:

- 1st. The dismissal of Sebastiani;
- 2d. The alliance of Turkey with Russia and England;
- 3d. The cession of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Russians;
- 4th. The provisional surrender of the Dardanelles and of the Turkish fleet to the English.

I have been accused of being, in my policy, harsh and imperious; but, assuredly, I have never proposed to a power which I wished to make my ally to dishonor itself by surrendering to me her fortresses; this is the most I ever demanded of my conquered enemies; if I took those of Charles IV. by surprise, I saved him the humiliation of basely abandoning them to me.

PASSAGE OF THE DARDANELLES.—Such conditions were rejected by the ministers of Selim. Arbuthnot embarked clandestinely on board an English frigate, and rejoined the English squadron at Tenedos, from which place he continued to negotiate. The Turks, always indolent and presumptuous, lost this precious time without making the least preparation for augmenting the defense of the Dardanelles. Confident of the efficiency of their enormous mortars, which threw stone projectiles of some seven or eight hundred pounds to a considerable distance, but whose immense weight prevented them from being easily moved and pointed, they neglected all the advice given to them by French officers. Duckforth at length took advantage of a *fête* day when the Turkish artillerists were absent from their duties, and, with a very favorable wind, penetrated unexpectedly, on the nineteenth of February, into the channel, passed through it

without any serious accident, after exchanging a few broadsides, burnt a ship and four frigates off the point of Niagara, and presented himself before superb Byzantium, and threatened to bombard the seraglio and the rich capital of the Ottomans. The panic was general, and if Duckforth had profited by it to instantly begin the attack, or obtain a compliance with the required conditions, he would have dictated law to the Porte, for there were not ten pieces in battery ready for service.

**CONDUCT OF SEBASTIANI.**—The weak ministers of Selim decided unanimously to dismiss Sebastiani and to submit to the requisitions of England; the people responded by cries of indignation and rage. In these difficult circumstances, my ambassador showed great decision of character. Selim sent, at nine o'clock at night, one of the great dignitaries of the Empire to carry to him the resolution of the Divan, to show to him how great were the regrets of the Porte, and to assure him that the cries of the multitude directed against his person proved the danger to which he would be exposed by prolonging his sojourn at Constantinople; the reply of Sebastiani was noble. Rejecting the care which they wished to take of his person, he declared that he would not leave unless Selim should force him to do so, and that he would wait a resolution worthy of a great prince. "Tell your powerful monarch," said he, "that he ought not to descend from the lofty rank in which he has been placed by his glorious ancestors, by basely surrendering to a few English ships a capital of eight hundred thousand inhabitants, who have arms, munitions, provisions, and who can batter these ships to atoms." Selim, worthily appreciating this answer, was electrified by it; he determined to defend himself, and called Sebastiani before the Divan, which had been convoked in the night. The ministers partook of the generous sentiments of Selim, and were further encouraged by the exasperation which became more and more manifest in the capital at the news of what was going on. This exasperation was no longer against Sebastiani, but against the English.

Constantinople had great resources for defense, especially in her superb marine arsenal; but time was wanting. Every thing was placed at the disposal of Sebastiani, who was seconded by the engineer and artillery officers who had been sent by my orders from Dalmatia. A superb tent was erected for him in the garden of the seraglio, where he could, at the same time, direct the works of the defense and also the negotiations, so as to deceive Duckforth, in order to gain some days by promises. The



Marquis d'Almenara, the Spanish minister, seconded Sebastiani with all his power, and enjoyed with him the public confidence.

Every thing immediately took a new aspect; to the cold apathy and gravity of the Mussulman succeeded an electric fire, which communicated itself even to the old men and children; all strove for the honor of assisting in the defense of the capital; some made gabions and fascines; others constructed batteries and armed them with cannon; in four days nearly three hundred pieces were mounted on the side most exposed to immediate danger; the Tower of Leander was armed with cannon of heavy caliber, and furnished with furnaces for heating shot. A hundred gunboats, and the broadsides of the squadron, defended the channel between Pera and the seraglio, where were situated the marine establishments of the empire. The Sultan himself assisted in the work. At the end of eight days, which time had been gained by negotiation, five hundred pieces were directed against the enemy's fleet, and two hundred Mussulmans, with their fire-vessels, were ready to sacrifice themselves. Arbuthnot was sick, and he left to Duckforth the care of terminating a negotiation in which the Turks exhibited a more lofty bearing in proportion as their preparations advanced. At the same time Ismail Pacha, former vizier, was sent to the Dardanelles, where he applied the same activity in arming and fortifying the castles.

**RETREAT OF THE ENGLISH.**—Duckforth, seeing himself on the point of being invested in the Sea of Marmora, finally decided to retreat. On the second of March the wind changed to the east, and he took advantage of it to escape through the Dardanelles, saluted, as he progressed, by the artillery of the forts, which, a little better served this time, greatly damaged two of his best ships and sunk two corvettes. In this rash enterprise the English lost two hundred killed and five hundred wounded, and it would have cost them their entire fleet if they had been opposed by enemies more enterprising and experienced. Sebastiani exhibited, on this occasion, as much skill as energy, and his conduct was worth to us a victory. If the English enterprise had succeeded, there would have been an immediate peace between the Porte and Russia, and the entire army of Michelsen would have marched against us. Twenty-five thousand men had already started for the Bug.\*

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\*The following account of the passage of the Dardanelles by the British fleet is copied from the chapter on "Sea-coast Defenses," in Halleck's "Military Art and Science."

"The channel of the Dardanelles is about twelve leagues long, three miles wide at its entrance, and about three-quarters of a mile at its nar-

Nevertheless, the loss of the English had not been so great as to prevent their attempting to renew the enterprise with greater means; and the apprehension of this might tend to facilitate the renewal of peace between Russia and Turkey, should the former, in order to concentrate her forces against us, renounce the principalities. To encourage Selim, I resolved to offer him all the assistance within my power. The Viceroy of

rowest point. Its principal defenses are the outer and inner castles of Europe and Asia, and the castles of Sestos and Abydos. Constantinople stands about one hundred miles from its entrance into the Sea of Marmora, and at nearly the opposite extremity of this sea. The defenses of the channel had been allowed to go to decay; but few guns were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. In Constantinople not a gun was mounted, and no preparations for defense were made; indeed, previous to the approach of the fleet, the Turks had not determined whether to side with the English or the French, and even then the French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuading them to resist the demands of Duckforth.

"The British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two frigates, two sloops, and several bomb-vessels, carrying eight hundred and eighteen guns (besides those in the bomb-ships). Admiral Duckforth sailed through the Dardanelles on the nineteenth of February, 1807, with little or no opposition. This being a Turkish festival day, the soldiers of the scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the occasion, and none were left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been prepared for defense. But while the admiral was waiting on the Sea of Marmora for the result of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make the attack upon Constantinople, the fortifications of this city were put in order, and the Turks actively employed, under French engineers and artillery officers, in repairing the defenses of the straits. Campbell, in his 'Naval History,' says: 'Admiral Duckforth now fully perceived the critical situation in which he was placed. He might, indeed, succeed, should the weather become favorable, in bombarding Constantinople; but unless the bombardment should prove completely successful in forcing the Turks to pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would not compensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain. With this damaged and crippled fleet, he must repossess the Dardanelles, now rendered infinitely stronger than they were when he came through them.'

"Under these circumstances the admiral determined to retreat; and on the third of April escaped through the Dardanelles, steering midway of the channel, with a favorable and strong current. 'This escape, however,' says Baines, 'was only from destruction, but by no means from serious loss and injury. \* \* \* In what instance in the whole course of our naval warfare have ships received equal damage in so short a time as in this extraordinary enterprise?' In detailing the extent of this damage, we will take the ships in the order they descended. The first had her wheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, but escaped with the loss of only three men. A stone shot penetrated the second, between the poop and quarter-deck, badly injuring the mizzenmast, carried away the wheel, and did other serious damage, killing and wounding twenty men. Two shot struck the third, carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts; loss in killed and wounded, thirty. The fourth had her mainmast destroyed, with a loss of sixteen. The fifth had a large shot, six feet eight inches in circumference, enter her lower deck; loss fifty-five. The sixth, not injured.



Italy received orders to send Colonels Haxo of the engineers and Foy of the artillery, distinguished officers, capable of securing the Dardanelles in a short time from the enemy's attacks. I also wrote the following letter to Marmont, who occupied Ragusa:

"The order of the Emperor, general, is that you immediately

The seventh, a good deal damaged, with a loss of seventeen. The eighth had no loss. The ninth was so much injured that, 'had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite tack, she must have gone down'; her loss was eight. The tenth lost twelve. The eleventh was much injured, with a loss of eight—making a total loss in repassing the Dardanelles of one hundred and sixty-seven; and in the whole expedition two hundred and eighty-one, exclusive of two hundred and fifty men who perished in the burning of the *Ajax*.

"Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sailing with a favorable wind and strong current past the half-armed and half-manned forts of the Dardanelles. Duckforth himself says, 'that had he remained before Constantinople much longer—till the forts had been completely put in order—no return would have been open to him, and the unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence.' Scarcely had the fleet cleared the straits before it (the fleet) was reinforced with eight sail of the line; but, even with this vast increase of strength, the English did not venture to renew the contest. They had effected a most fortunate escape. General Jomini says, 'that if the defense had been conducted by a more enterprising and experienced people, the expedition would have cost the English their whole squadron.'

"Great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves were uninjured. The English say their own fire did no execution, the shot in all probability not even striking their objects—'the rapid change of position, occasioned by a fair wind and current, preventing the certainty of aim.' The state of the batteries when the fleet first passed, is thus described in James' 'Naval History': 'Some of them were dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned.' And Alison says: 'They had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles of Europe and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enormous caliber, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an English broadside.'

"Much has been said because the fortifications of the Dardanelles did not hermetically seal that channel (an object they were never expected to accomplish, even had they been well-armed and well-served); but it is forgotten, or entirely overlooked, that twelve *Turkish line-of-battle ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with their sails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, and lying within the line of fortifications; and yet this naval force effected little or nothing against the invaders.* It is scarcely ever mentioned, being regarded of little consequence as a means of defense; and yet the number of its guns and the expense of its construction and support could hardly have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts, some of which were as ancient as the reign of Amurath."

This passage proves the importance of guns of large caliber, throwing heavy projectiles, as a means of coast defense. Great advances have been made in this respect within the last few years.

send to Constantinople all your remaining officers of engineers and artillery, and a complete corps of six hundred sappers, *ouvriers*,\* and artillerists; furnish this troop with good arms and equipments; send with these six hundred men pay for three months, or even more if you have the money; the *ouvriers* should take with them such utensils as are not likely to be found at Constantinople, and the officers of artillery and engineers should supply themselves as well as they can with such books as, under the circumstances, will be most likely to be useful.

"You will inform the Porte that, if it wishes other troops, you will supply them, on its direct requisition. Indeed, the Emperor authorizes you to send as many as five thousand men, without further orders; but, for this purpose, you must have the requisition of General Sebastiani, and a formal *firman* of the Porte to the pacha into whose territory you send these forces. Do not hesitate to send your artillery and engineer officers to Constantinople, for you will be supplied with officers of these corps from the kingdom of Italy, and these, in their turn, will be replaced by others whom I shall send from France. If you are in funds, send two hundred thousand francs, in gold, to General Sebastiani, for the troops, it being the intention of the Emperor that they shall, in no manner, become a charge to the Ottoman Empire; if you are not in funds, notify me, in order that I may take measures accordingly."

**BOLD FRONT OF NAPOLEON.**—Notwithstanding the diversion expected from this war, the mud of Pultusk and the carnage of Eylau were not of a nature to inspire me with much confidence; but I lost not a minute in preparation, for I knew the *value of time*, which my enemies never could appreciate. I thought that the least sign of weakness might lose all, and I acted as if perfectly certain of success. Satisfied with the poor explanation of the Spanish minister, I demanded, as a pledge of his sincerity, the contingent stipulated by the treaty of San Ildefonso; he sent fifteen or sixteen thousand men, under the Marquis of Romana, who crossed France during the winter. I first intended to employ them in Italy, but afterward determined to send them to protect the north of Germany from the attacks of the English. Although it was not prudent to remove forces from Italy, the object mostly coveted by Austria, I nevertheless withdrew the divisions of Boudet and Molitor, and an Italian division, which were directed on Saxony, to form, with the Bavarians

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\*Literally workmen. The term in the French army corresponds very nearly to our artificers; but they have a separate military organization.



and Spaniards, an army of observation on the Elbe. I determined not to evacuate Naples, persuaded that if I touched the smallest link in this vast chain, it would soon be broken. St.-Cyr remained at Naples with my brother Joseph, and Marmont continued to carry on his operations in Dalmatia against the Montenegrins and the fifteenth Russian division. I even called Masséna from Italy to the grand army, to prove to Austria that I did not regard the idea of a rupture on her part as within the range of possibilities.

NEGOTIATIONS AT THE CAMP OF FINKENSTEIN.—My camp at Finkenstein was a complete diplomatic arena; indirect negotiations were there renewed with Russia and England. I addressed a letter to the King of Prussia, offering him the most favorable conditions, if he should be disposed to treat with me. I hoped to detach him from the coalition, which would have enabled me to treat more advantageously with the others. These overtures, communicated to Russia and England, led to some conferences. The Emperor Alexander had expected to enter this war merely as an auxiliary, and to take advantage of it to acquire the Turkish principalities. On the contrary, he saw himself exposed alone to the whole weight of my forces, while Austria took no part, and England kept continually promising powerful diversions, but never made any. Undoubtedly the interests of Russia were connected with those of Prussia; but was it necessary to compromise the safety of the empire for a new ally whom Europe, though still more interested, had abandoned? I had some hopes of bringing him to peace. He was not opposed to treating, but he wished advantages on the Danube and the integrity of Prussia, things very difficult to reconcile with my present position. He, moreover, proposed a congress at Copenhagen of all the powers.

In the mean time I had received a Persian envoy, whose master, hearing of our victories, deemed it for his interest to form an alliance with us. Maret was charged with negotiating with him, and he succeeded in concluding a treaty offensive and defensive on the most advantageous terms. I sent, on my part, to the Court of Teheran, General Gardanne with intelligent and well-instructed officers of the different arms. We also negotiated with the Porte, who had charged Waleb Essendi to propose to me a closer alliance, on condition of not forming a separate treaty. I declined such a clause. My situation was too complicated to impose on myself such terms. Although the Ottoman Empire was still in the hands of Selim III., it was too

vascillating an ally to subject my negotiations to the caprices of the Divan. I promised to take every possible interest in this empire, which was my natural ally, but I could do nothing more.

With respect to the negotiations with England and Russia, the conditions were such that I could not accept them. On the one side they required that I should abandon the Turks, who, thanks to Sebastiani, had just exhibited so much energy against the English squadrons and our common enemies; on the other side, England refused to make, in order to save her continental allies, any maritime concessions necessary to our security. There was, therefore, no means of coming to an understanding. It is true that Lords Grenville and Grey (Howick) had, at the beginning of the year, formally signified the possibility of negotiating on the basis of *uti-possidetis*, and if the cabinet had brought the same dispositions to the proposed congress of Copenhagen, there would have been no obstacle to forming a general peace; one of those ministerial revolutions which sometimes change the course of English policy, or at least seem to give it a new direction, had just proved that nothing was to be hoped from that source; perhaps this change even resulted from the declaration itself. Perceval declaimed strongly in the House of Commons against this pacific policy, and boldly declared that so long as I was at the head of affairs in France and had Talleyrand for counsellor, there was no hope of a durable and honorable peace.\* This enemy of our repose, applauded by the majority in England, instead of being recalled to sentiments more humane, was placed, a few weeks after, at the head of a new ministry, which rivaled that of Pitt in the exaggeration of its hatred to France and her chief. Canning was placed at the head of foreign affairs, and his opinions on this point were not less decided than those of Perceval.

These statesmen persuaded themselves that if they allowed me to consolidate the empire which my recent successes had extended to the Vistula, England would soon be reduced to a power of the second order. Perhaps there were grounds for such fears. But they exaggerated my ambition, as well as the dangers that

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\*Talleyrand, having invested largely in Bernese funds, was at this time doing all in his power to effect a treaty of peace with England, by which he would have derived large profits from his investment. Availing himself of his official information on affairs of state, he was in the habit of speculating largely in the funds. These speculations sometimes had much influence upon his management of foreign affairs. At one period he was immensely rich, but in 1828 his fortune suffered considerably by the failure of a great Paris house in which he was interested.



threatened them; this led them to demand certain concessions on my part, to secure what they were pleased to denominate the *repose of Europe*, but which really meant, the *triumph of England*. A patriotism, respectable in itself, but carried to excess, animated them against me, and forced me to oppose them in return. They believed me dangerous to England, and by their exaggeration rendered it necessary for me to treat them as irreconcilable enemies.

**TREATY OF BARTENSTEIN.**—At the very moment when this ministerial revolution was destroying all hopes of peace, and while we were still disputing about accessories, Russia and Prussia formed a still closer alliance at Bartenstein, on the twenty-sixth of April, with the firm resolution of driving me behind the Rhine. Although they did not stipulate, as in 1805, to take from me Lombardy and Belgium, this treaty was intended to throw me entirely out of Germany, and to restore Holland to the House of Orange.

I repeat, once for all, a Russian should be Russian in his feelings, and a Prussian should be Prussian; the feeling is censurable and despicable only where men, influenced by private interest or personal animosity, seek to abase their own country and exert their power to attain this object. Always disposed to render justice where it is due, I confess that this treaty was much more moderate than the project of 1805, and was perfectly suited to the interest of these two powers. England hastened to accede to it. Canning even agreed to allow Prussia a subsidy of twenty-five millions, to recruit her army, and prepare the English expedition which was to make a diversion on the Elbe. If it was natural that Russia and Prussia should wish to remove me beyond the Rhine, it was also natural that I, victorious, master of Germany and allied to ten millions of Germans, should be unwilling to decamp like a coward, without even disputing for the influence which they wished to take from me. The sword alone could decide the question. Will my detractors dare to ascribe this prolongation of the war to my ambition? What would the French, what would posterity, say of me if I had done otherwise? Could I surrender the whole continent, without any equivalent concessions from England? Would it not have been base in me to abandon Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg to the resentment of my enemies? To deprive the Turks of two of their provinces, which the Cabinet of London had promised to the Russians, while the Sultan, yielding to the councils of my ambassador, had just saved his empire from the influence of these

enemies, and had announced his intention to redouble his vigor on the Danube? I have not always been moderate; but it is not at this epoch that they can accuse me of exaggeration in my pretensions. Let us say frankly, a spark of Pitt's genius still animated Perceval and Canning; and his system had constantly been not to make peace while France was mistress of Belgium and influential in Holland and Italy. If he ever had consented to it, it had been merely to deceive us, as in 1802.

*It is thus seen that, notwithstanding all the declamations of my enemies, I always occupied the same political ground. They formed coalition after coalition to destroy my influence, and I sought to extend it, so as to secure and preserve it.*

OPERATIONS IN POMERANIA.—While these great interests were in agitation, I neglected no means to conciliate the Swedes; it will be remembered that, in setting out for the Vistula, I had charged Mortier to observe them with the eighth corps. He had no difficulty in holding them in check; the Quixotic Gustavus IV. was not a very formidable enemy; although he commanded brave soldiers, this petty war was much like that which the Swedes had formerly waged against Frederick the Great.

After two or three unimportant combats, Pomerania was occupied and Stralsund closed. I wished to end this contest, which was neither to the advantage of Sweden nor of me, and I wrote to Mortier to embrace the first opportunity to conclude a peace. Persuaded that the Swedes would not attempt any thing serious, and hearing of some sorties of the garrison of Colberg, Mortier deemed it best to direct his forces toward this point; but the Swedes having driven before them General Grandjean, who had been left to observe them, Mortier returned and repulsed them with loss at Anklam.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDEN.—D'Armfeld, the moving spirit of the war, had been wounded in this affair; the English no longer acted in accordance with the pleasure of the whimsical Gustavus; his nation disapproved of a war in which they had no interest, and this inconstant prince ratified an armistice, signed, April eighteenth, by General Essen, with the same want of consideration which he had shown in declaring war, for this occurred at the very moment when the English were at last sending him succor. Mortier had followed my instructions too literally in checking his victorious career instead of pushing the vanquished enemy into Stralsund and capturing their great flotilla, which had been retained by bad weather in the Haff; there would always have been time enough to sign an armistice.



But, as the error had now been committed, it was necessary to make the most we could of it; I required that a month's, instead of ten days' notice, should be given before breaking the armistice, which quieted all fears of enterprises by England and the coalition on my rear, and gave me time to complete the reduction of Dantzic. I added to the letter which Mortier was to send to General Essen:

"I have nothing more at heart than the restoration of peace with Sweden. Passions may have dissevered us, but the interest of the people, which should form the rule of action of sovereigns, ought to unite us. In the present contest, Sweden is as much interested as France in the success of my arms: she will feel still more than France the effect of an increase of Russian power. Is it then for the destruction of Constantinople that the Swedes fight? . . . Since the invasion of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the last English expedition to Constantinople, are not the objects of the coalition sufficiently unmasked? Sweden is no less interested than France in having a counterpoise against the enormous maritime power of the English. In any event, Sweden can have nothing to fear from France, but every thing from our enemies. Accustomed by the traditions of our fathers to regard each other as natural friends, it would seem that there were still greater reasons for closer relations since the partition of Poland and the dangers that threaten the Ottoman Porte; as our interests are the same, we ought to be allies, or at least not enemies."

I added to the marshal:

"If the Swedish general refuse his consent to the proposed modification, you will be supported by Marshal Brune, who has received orders to second you, and will renew the invasion of Pomerania. It will be impossible for the enemy, without the assistance of this province, to keep a large number of cavalry in Stralsund. Moreover, by occupying Pomerania, you will greatly embarrass the King of Sweden, for he will compromise himself in the eyes of his people by favoring a party so opposed to the true interests of Sweden.

"On the contrary, if M. Essen accedes to what is required by the Emperor of the French, you will immediately send back to Dantzic, Marienwerder, and Thorn the third and seventh mounted chasseurs and all the provisional regiments; you will establish your head-quarters at Stettin; you will canton your troops around Stettin, Demnin, and Anklam; you will cause to be reconnoitered the banks of the Peene, the position of Demnin, and the banks of the Trebel; and you will fortify and intrench, on your line,

all the places susceptible of defense, so as to cut off all communication between Swedish Pomerania and the Prussian states. You will immediately direct your attention to the preparation of a siege equipage for Colberg, the materials for which will be furnished from Stettin, Custrin, and Magdeburg; your *corps-d'armée* must be prepared, at any moment, to march either in the direction of Hamburg or on the Vistula. You will open a correspondence with our *chargé-d'affaires* at Copenhagen, and recommend to him to keep you advised of any movement of the English in the Sound, for their expedition, fitting out in the Thames, should always be an object of your surveillance. Also keep up a daily correspondence with Marshal Brune and the Duke of Feltre, so as to form all your operations in concert. It is probable, from all information received from England, that the debarkation can not take place in less than a fortnight; by that time the divisions of Generals Boudet and Molitor will arrive from Italy at Magdeburg, and secure the rear of the army."

The additional articles which I had required were agreed to on the twenty-ninth of April, and Mortier came at once to the environs of Stettin and reinforced the blockade of Colberg. Considering the state of things in the north of Germany, this event was not without importance. England, who had long promised a still more efficacious succor than that of her subsidies, had at last prepared to keep her word. The new English ministry, anxious to distinguish itself by some brilliant affair, had already preluded this expedition by projects for uniting, on our rear, forty thousand Anglo-Hanoverians, twenty thousand Swedes, fifteen thousand Russians, and all the Prussians that could be collected at Stralsund. Without attaching too much importance to these projects, it is nevertheless true that this diversion, had it been made at the proper time, would have given me some embarrassment. The English are reproached, with reason, with having acted too late; although time was requisite for preparations for a distant expedition, which could not be combined till after my passage of the Vistula, still, there was no reason why they should not appear in the Baltic by the latter part of April. Already a strong Hanoverian legion, recently organized, had been placed at Stralsund at the disposal of the King of Sweden; the Prussians were assembling, at the same place, a corps of which they then had a nucleus of four or five thousand men; but they limited themselves to these insufficient preparations.

**ARMY OF OBSERVATION ON THE ELBE.**—Persuaded that England would not fail to do all in her power to disturb our



security in these countries, which had so long submitted to her influence, I had collected, as has before been said, a corps of observation on the Elbe. Two French divisions from Italy, under Boudet and Molitor, the Gallo-Batavian troops, with which my brother Louis had reduced Hameln and Hanover, and the Spanish corps of Romana which arrived during the month of March, forming, with some other detachments, an effective force of fifty thousand men, seemed to me more than sufficient to check any descent made with such heterogeneous troops. Marshal Brune, who took command of these forces, was instructed to defend the mouths of the Elbe, the Ems, and the Weser, to hold Swedish Pomerania in check, and particularly to guard Berlin, Magdeburg, Hameln, and Stettin. If a landing should be effected by the enemy, Brune was to immediately unite these forces and to compel him to reëmbark; his first line was to canton between the Weser and the Oder; his head-quarters were to be at Schwerin, and the two French divisions, the *élite* of his forces, in reserve at Magdeburg. He thus held in respect Lübeck, Hamburg, Berlin, and even Amsterdam. Mortier left him, in addition, the divisions of Loison and Grandjean, employed at Stettin and the siege of Colberg, and he directed himself with two others toward Dantzic.

EXPEDITION OF THE ENGLISH TO EGYPT.—The English ministry, which pleaded its want of land forces, when solicited for assistance by its allies, could find plenty of troops where its maritime advantages were concerned. At the moment when it was reluctantly engaging in the expedition of the Baltic, its arms experienced a repulse both in Egypt and at Buenos Ayres. Piqued at their unsuccessful attempt on Constantinople, the English thought to avenge themselves on the banks of the Nile. Seeking to profit by the momentary interest which they had in sustaining Russia against the Porte, to get possession of this rich granary of the East, they hoped to succeed the more easily, as they counted on the support of the Mamelukes and the peaceful inhabitants of the country, trampled under foot by the Pacha of Egypt. The project of the Cabinet of London was to reëstablish the power of the Mamelukes, under the protection of the English, and to form with them an alliance which should secure to England the commerce of the country, and the political and military influence of all the Levant.

General Mackenzie, leaving Sicily with five thousand men, made a descent, on the fifteenth of March, at Aboukir, and entered into Alexandria by capitulation. General Frazer, coming from

the Dardanelles with the squadron of Duckforth, landed with reinforcements, a few days after Mackenzie. He immediately detached two thousand men to gain possession of Rosetta and secure his junction with the Mamelukes. The Albanians of Mahomet Ali allowed the English columns to penetrate into the narrow streets of this city, assailed them in this *coupe-gorge* by a murderous fire, and forced them to retreat, with great loss to Alexandria. Frazer, feeling the necessity of putting himself in communication with the Mamelukes, who were said to be toward Elhammed, sent General Stuart again to Rosetta. But Mahomet Ali, descending the Nile with his flotilla, was near capturing him, and drove him back to Alexandria, with a loss of twelve hundred men. Frazer, defeated, and about to be himself invested, proposed the evacuation of Alexandria and Egypt, on condition of the surrender of the prisoners captured by the enemy. The Porte, indignant at this new attack, declared war against England, armed a squadron of nine ships, and sent it to the Dardanelles, where the Russian fleet of Admiral Siniavin had just replaced that of Duckforth, and taken possession, on the twenty-first of March, of the island of Tenedos.

**SIEGES IN SILESIA.**—While my war-like preparations formed so strong a contrast with the calm that reigned in the cantonments of the two armies on the Passarge, I profited by the leisure afforded me by the enemy, to reduce all the works which were calculated to trouble our rear. The reduction of Silesia was continued with favorable results: Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, and Schweidnitz had already capitulated; Neiss, Cosel, and Glatz were about to experience the same fortune; but there still remained for me to reduce, Colberg, Grandentz, and Dantzic. I besieged the latter and blockaded the two others.

**SIEGE AND FALL OF DANTZIC.**—Dantzic, defended by General Kalkreuth and the celebrated engineer Bousmard, had a garrison of twelve thousand Prussians and three battalions of Russians. The siege of such a place is an important enterprise. Marshal Lefévre, with the tenth corps, composed of Poles, Badois, Saxons, and some French battalions, were charged with this siege. Lannes was placed in observation, with the grenadiers of Oudinot; the fifth corps, which he had heretofore commanded, passed to the orders of Masséna, and was reinforced by the Bavarian division of Wrede. The siege of Dantzic was begun on the first of April, and was pushed forward with vigor. The place was pretty seriously battered after the first of May, and asked for



succor. The island of Oliva, defended by about a thousand Russians, was carried on the sixth.\*

The Emperor Alexander had, at this epoch, gone from St.

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\*The siege of Dantzic is, probably, next to Sebastopol, the most celebrated in modern times. The strength of the place, the obstinacy of the defense, and the scientific ability of the siege, all combined to give it great notoriety. Marshal Lefévre commanded the forces, but General Chasseloup de Lobat, one of the ablest French engineers since the days of Vauban, directed the operations of the siege. The place held out for fifty-one days after the opening of the trenches. The impatient old marshal chafed under the slow operations of a regular siege, and was eager to make the assault. He also grumbled at the inexperience of some of his troops. But Napoleon, who fully understood the nature of the operations as well as the impatient character of his marshal, took measures to restrain as well as to pacify him. His rebukes to Lefévre are equally applicable to "petty cavaliers" of the present day, who freely criticise military operations which they are incapable of understanding, and who recklessly urge the sacrifice of thousands of lives which could readily be saved by the application of that military science and skill which they pretend to despise. A general who ignorantly or uselessly wastes the lives of his soldiers for an object which can be attained by other means is no better than a *murderer*, and should be held up to universal detestation. Those who urge him to such a course are accessories to the crime.

In answer to one of Lefévre's despatches, in which he exhibited his contempt for a science which he did not possess, Napoleon wrote: "You can do nothing but find fault, abuse our allies, and change your opinion at the pleasure of the first comer. You wanted troops; I sent you them; I am preparing more for you, and you, *like an ingrate*, continue to complain without thinking even of thanking me. You treat our allies, especially the Poles and the Baden troops, without any delicacy. They are not used to fire, but they will get accustomed to it. Do you imagine that we were as brave in '92 as we are now, after fifteen years of war? Have some indulgence, then, old soldier as you are, for the young soldiers, who are starting in the career, and have not yet your coolness amidst danger. The Prince of Baden, whom you have with you (that prince had put himself at the head of the Badenese and was present at the siege of Dantzic), has chosen to leave the pleasures of the court for the purpose of leading his troops into fire. Pay him respect, and give him credit for a zeal which his equals rarely imitate. The breasts of your grenadiers, which you are for bringing in everywhere, will not throw down walls. You must allow your engineers to act, and listen to the advice of General Chasseloup, who is a man of science, and from whom you ought not to take your confidence at the suggestion of the first *petty cavalier* pretending to judge of what he is incapable of comprehending. Reserve the courage of your grenadiers for the moment when science shall tell you that it may be usefully employed, and in the meantime learn patience. It is not worth while, for the sake of a few days, which, besides, I know not how to employ just now, to get some thousand men killed, whose lives it is possible to spare. Show the calmness, the consistency, the steadiness, which befit your age. Your glory is in the taking of Dantzic; take that place, and you shall be satisfied with me."

A very complete popular description of this siege is given by Thiers; but those who desire to examine the operations professionally must consult the special reports made by engineer officers.

Petersburg to Memel, either to take command of the armies in person, or to be near the theater of negotiations. He had just established himself at Bartenstein, and a council of war was convoked to devise means of rescuing Dantzic: a general attack against my army on the Passarge was rejected as dangerous. They adopted the project of landing, under the protection of the fort of Weichselmünde, a division of nine or ten thousand Russians, under the orders of young Kamenski, and of seconding him with three or four thousand Prussians, who were to advance by the tongue of land of Nehrung. It is rare that such partial and complicated debarkations ever succeed; this one failed. The Russians had but one means of attaining their object: this was to fall, the next day, on our line of investment; they hesitated, from the eleventh to the fifteenth of May, and then debouched from the camp of Neufarwasser. After an obstinate combat, General Schram was near being taken, when Lefébvre hastened to his assistance with a part of the siege corps. The combat was prolonged and still in favor of the Russians; but Lannes, having hastened to the assistance of our troops, with the grenadiers of Oudinot, drove the enemy back into his camp. The Prussians, who presented themselves too late, regained Pilau. Kamenski did not venture to attempt any thing further.

Foreseeing that the enemy would attempt the rescue of Dantzic, I had ordered Mortier to leave Pomerania on the first alarm, and approach the siege; and Brune, with the army of reserve, was to replace him as far as Stettin. The corps of Mortier, composed at that time of the divisions of Dupas and Dombrowski, having reinforced the besieging army, and Dantzic having no further hopes of succor, the place capitulated on the twenty-fourth of May, after having sustained fifty-one days of open trenches. This siege was honorable to both parties. Kalkeuth and Lefébvre rivaled each other in glory, as also did the chief engineers and soldiers of the two armies. After the fall of the place, as Kamenski could do nothing further at the camp of Weichselmünde, he left this little fort to the defense of its garrison and reëmbarked.

**SIEGE OF NEISS AND GLATZ.**—The same success crowned our arms in Silesia, where the campaign had been continued during the winter. Notwithstanding the considerable resources found in the places which had already been reduced, the siege of Neiss was a difficult operation. A garrison of six thousand men, intrenched even on the exterior of the place, required for its reduction a larger corps than that at the command of my



brother Jerome. He had to furnish a corps of observation, to check the garrison of Glatz, where General Kleist attempted, not only to raise the siege, but also to surprise Breslau. Lefévre-Desnouettes succeeded in baffling the first of these enterprises, and, seconded by General Dumui, who commanded at Breslau, he also forced Kleist to renounce the second. Neiss, closely pressed, capitulated, on the first of June, and the garrison, reduced to about five thousand combatants were made prisoners; we found in the places more than three hundred cannon.

Glatz, notwithstanding its strong position, surrendered on the fourteenth of June. The garrison, exhausted and discouraged by its enterprises on the exterior of the place, did not make the resistance that we anticipated. This capture completed the campaign of the ninth corps, in which Vandamme distinguished himself, and, with less than twenty thousand men, took, in eight months, six great places, one thousand five hundred cannon, and near twenty thousand prisoners.

**HOSTILITIES RENEWED.**—During the three months of repose which we had enjoyed, the Russian army had received a division of infantry, and the entire division of guards, under the orders of the Grand Duke Constantine, numbering thirty battalions and thirty-four squadrons, including the grenadiers; nevertheless, the Russians could not bring into line more than one hundred and twenty or one hundred and thirty thousand men, including the Prussian corps of Lestocq, and that remaining on the Narew. But there was an army of reserve, formed of the *dépôts*, and numbering about thirty thousand men, which was advancing on the Niemen, under the orders of Prince Labanoff. The Emperor Alexander had taken up his quarters in the vicinity of his army, so as to attend to either negotiations or military operations. His head-quarters were at Tilsit; the Court of Prussia was at Memel.

My army had also been joined by strong reinforcements in addition to the *dépôts* for recruiting the regiments; it had received the divisions of Oudinot, Verdier, Dombrowski, and Dupas, which came from Dantzic; these belonged to the corps of Lannes and Mortier. I had put both the *personnel* and the *matériel* in the very best condition. The effects of the bloody scenes of Jena, Pultusk, and Eylau were now scarcely visible. The Poles had levied near twenty thousand men, forming two divisions, under Generals Dombrowski and Zayonschek. The seven corps of my grand army, forming nineteen divisions, besides the guard of Murat's cavalry, were estimated at one hundred and seventy

thousand men. I had, therefore, a decided superiority, after the arrival of the troops from Dantzic, which joined me previous to the arrival of Prince Labanoff.

To restore the equilibrium, and to form a good support for the first line, Benningsen had constructed a very strong intrenched camp near Heilsberg, in position to command the two banks of the Alle. It was composed of five great works, enclosed on three sides, and sixteen *flèches* or intrenched batteries. The main body of the army was between this city and Bartenstein; the right, under Tolstoy, between Launen and Siegburg; a corps, at the left, kept up the communication with that of Essen, who was still near Ostrolenka. The Cossacks of Platoff covered all the front. By means of the inappreciable advantage of the sea, the Allies had made of Königsberg an immense *dépôt* of munitions and provisions. The army was abundantly supplied with every thing; one hundred thousand fire-arms recently landed from St. Petersburg and London were to be used in arming such Prussians as the King might raise, and also to supply the losses resulting from the war; more than one hundred vessels laden with munitions and provisions were to supply every thing that might be wanted.

It was well enough to use Königsberg as a temporary *dépôt*; but this place, resting as it does on the *cul-de-sac* of the Curishaf, was not properly situated for a strategic base; it would have been far better if the magazines had been taken up to Gumbinen. This fault influenced all the events of the war.

My army, though less richly supplied than the enemy, was, nevertheless, pretty well provided with the rich products of Old Prussia and the inexhaustible environs of Elbing and Dantzic.

Such was the respective situations of the armies on the return of the favorable season; the reduction of Dantzic and the failure of negotiations rendered it necessary for us to renew the contest. For some inexplicable reason, Benningsen, who had neglected to attack me while I was weakened by the absence of the corps employed in the siege of Dantzic, now advanced to make this attack, after the fall of that place, and previous to the arrival of his reserves. My army, fully reëstablished, occupied the following places: A Bavarian division at Warsaw; Masséna on the Omuleff; a Polish corps of observation, under Zayonschek, at Neidenburg; Davoust at Allenstein, Hohenstein, and Deppen; Ney at Guttstadt; Soult at Liebstadt and Mohrunen; Bernadotte in Holland and Braunsberg; Lannes at Osterode; Mortier on the lower Vistula, marching to rejoin me. The corps



of Lefébvre (the tenth) was broken up, after the fall of Dantzic; a part formed the garrison of that place, and the remainder was given to the corps of Lannes and Mortier. The second corps was still in Dalmatia, and the ninth in Silesia. Germany was occupied by Brune with the army of observation.

**DANGER AND ESCAPE OF NEY.**—Benningesen formed the project of cutting off the corps of Ney, which in fact had advanced too far. On the fourth of June the Russian army put itself in march, and took position with its right near Wormdit, the center at Arensdorf, and the left at Lannau; on its extreme right the Prussian corps directed itself toward Spanden. On the other side, a Prussian corps, coming from Seeburg, took position on the Alle, between Guttstadt and Allenstein. The next day this corps forced the passage of the Alle at Bergfried and attacked the right of Ney, while his left was attacked by the left of Benningesen, and the center of the Russian army marched by Wolfsdorf to cut off his retreat. If the Russians had acted with vigor, they might have made themselves masters of the road from Guttstadt to Deppen, and have thus secured the destruction of Ney; but, fortunately, they maneuvered so leisurely, and my marshal, although attacked by triple forces, displayed so much energy, coolness, and courage, that he had time to retire from Guttstadt to Ankendorf. On the same day, the right of the Russians and the Prussian corps made demonstrations on the Passarge. Doctoroff presented himself with two divisions at the bridge of Lomitten, which Soult's division defended with much firmness. The Russian general, after having vainly endeavored to seize the passage, fell back on his left, either because he had been too roughly handled by Soult, or because his orders had been merely to make a demonstration. He moved toward the *corps-de-bataille*, which was near Guttstadt. The Prussians had been still less fortunate at the bridge of Spanden, where Bernadotte had collected his entire corps; he succeeded in repulsing the enemy, and was wounded on this occasion in the head. On the sixth the Russians fell, in three bodies, on Ney; the little lakes which covered his flanks, forcing the enemy to long and indirect marches, enabled this marshal to fall back on Deppen, notwithstanding he was menaced on all sides at the same time; he finally succeeded in repassing the Passarge at that place, after a contest in which he covered himself with glory.

**NAPOLÉON MARCHES TO HIS ASSISTANCE.**—On the seventh the enemy remained stationary opposite Deppen; I profited by this circumstance to unite my army. I rejoined Ney with

the corps of Lannes, my guard, and the reserve of cavalry. Mortier moved by forced marches on Mohrungen; Davoust connected himself with the right of Ney. I, at the same time, ordered Soult, who had assembled his corps at Liebstadt, to cross the Passarge at Wolfsdorf, in order to threaten the enemy's communications with the intrenched camp at Heilsberg and to force them to abandon, without resistance, the banks of the Passarge. We effected a junction with him, on the eighth, at Altkirch; Benningsen, not thinking proper to await us, put himself in retreat on Guttstadt, where he passed the Alle on the ninth, and regained his camp at Heilsberg by the right bank. The same day Murat pushed to Glottau the Russian rear guard, which attempted to defend the approach to Guttstadt, where my army had just taken position. We followed the enemy the next day, descending the left bank of the Alle.

CHANCES OF NAPOLEON'S POSITION.—As the enemy had given me time to increase my army to one hundred and sixty thousand men before the arrival of all his reinforcements, it was evident that the chances of the campaign would be in my favor, if Austria should delay hostilities. It was, therefore, for my interest, to strike a quick and decisive blow. Benningsen in attacking Ney at Deppen, had merely anticipated me a day or two, or rather favored my views by coming out to meet me, for I had left Ney in his advanced position to induce the enemy to leave his intrenchments. The union of my forces around Guttstadt no longer permitting delay, I resolved, in my turn, to take the offensive.

The intrenched camp of Heilsberg, and the concentration of all the enemy's magazines at Königsberg presented two principal maneuvers to my choice. The first and most skillful was to execute a general movement, the right in advance, in order to establish my line between Bischoffstein and Heilsberg, the right toward Bartenstein and the left toward Guttstadt. This would have been the same maneuver as that of Jena and Naumburg against the Prussians, with still greater chances of success, since the Russian army, beaten on the left and driven back on the lower Passarge and the Frish-Haff, would have been thrown on the sea. Königsberg would undoubtedly have given it a refuge; but this place, shut in, as it were, on the west by the Baltic and on the north by the Curishaf, would have offered no issue to the beaten army; for I should anticipate them at Weklau as soon as they should attempt to put themselves in retreat. The second was to advance my right on the intrenched camp of Heilsberg,



while fifty thousand men maneuvered by my left on Eylau, to menace the Allies' line of operations, to force them to abandon their redoubts without combat, and to press them closely in their retreat so as to cut them up at the passages of the Pregel and the Niemen. This last plan was less advantageous than the first and was opposed to the rules of strategy, inasmuch as it compromised a considerable corps between the enemy and the sea. I nevertheless preferred it, because my left was already in that direction, and it would have been necessary, in order to maneuver by my right, to describe a long curve around the Russian army, to uncover my communications with Thorn and Warsaw, and to throw myself into the woody and rough country on the right of the Alle. I must confess, however, that the first plan was more in conformity with military rules. One of the motives which contributed most to induce me to choose the second was, that I had already remarked, at the epoch of the battle of Eylau, that Benningsen exhibited a pusillanimous uneasiness about Königsberg; and, as this was not a military point, I concluded that there was some particular motive for this, either of policy toward Prussia, or of the means of supplies. By depriving the enemy of his magazines, I should not only procure certain supplies for my own troops, which was an important consideration in these distant countries, but I should overturn the Allies' entire system of operations. On the other side, it was possible that the march of Soult on Königsberg might decide the Russians to fall back on their right to cover that city, and I should still remain capable of throwing menacing forces on their left flank, to cut them off from the road to Tilsit. For these reasons I neglected strategic principles and decided to advance by the left bank of the Alle on Heilsberg.

**BATTLE OF HEILSBERG.**—On the tenth of June my vanguard met that of the enemy near Bewernick. After an obstinate combat, the Russians were beaten and driven back on their army. At nine o'clock in the evening we formed ourselves opposite their camp. I at first had the idea of attacking their left of the right wing of the Russians, posted on the left bank of the Alle, so as to penetrate to Heilsberg and cut their army in two, and thus render its destruction inevitable. Although it was already quite late, I ordered Soult's corps to attack the intrenchments which covered the Russians on the side of Lawden and Langviese. Although I seconded Soult with the corps of Lannes and the fusileers of the guard, the Russians still maintained their position; we only carried an outwork, from which their

reserve afterward dislodged us. In less than three hours we had lost about six thousand men *hors-de-combat*.

By renewing the attack the next day, I should risk the loss of the corps engaged in it, and there was less reason for making this attack, as by moving on Königsberg I was certain of displacing the enemy without resistance. I hesitated a moment whether I would not march on Bischoffstein, with the corps of Ney and Davoust; the motives already given induced me to take the opposite direction. On the eleventh, at break of day, my army moved in two columns on Landsberg and Preuss-Eylau. A single corps was left before the camp of Heilsberg to cover my movement. I confess that this operation was not without its objections, for it exposed my communications, and the enemy, basing himself on the camp of Heilsberg, might have operated on our rear, and enclosed us between his army, the lower Pregel, and the sea. But I knew Benningsen too well to fear this; so vigorous an operation was above his grasp, and I had every imaginable reason to suppose that, instead of attacking our communications, he would retreat, in order to prevent his being anticipated on the Pregel. Moreover, I took good care not to pass Landsberg, so long as the enemy remained at Heilsberg; and if he had marched on my rear, I should have made haste to assail him in the same manner as Davoust had moved against the Prussians at Auerstädt, with the additional advantage of having a superiority of numbers on my side. In the last extremity, I could have fallen back by Mehlsack on the lower Passarge, and have escaped with the sacrifice of a mere rear guard.

**BENNINGSSEN RETIRES.**—But I had no need to resort to this, Benningsen fully justified my expectations; during the night of the eleventh he passed to the right of the Alle, burned the bridges of Heilsberg, and commenced his retreat by Bartenstein, Schippenbeil, and Friedland, on Wehlau; I then continued to advance with security toward the Pregel. On the twelfth I arrived at Preuss-Eylau. On the thirteenth Soult moved on Kreutzburg. The Grand Duke of Berg and Davoust took the direct road from Preuss-Eylau to Königsberg. Lannes advanced to Domnau; he was supported by Mortier and Ney, who moved to Lampach. The corps of Bernadotte, commanded by Victor, had left the lower Passarge to join us by Mehlsack, and was also directed on Preuss-Eylau. Benningsen, having reached the heights of Friedland, had suddenly suspended his march on Wehlau. Piqued at seeing himself decidedly anticipated by us in the direction of Königsberg, he resolved to himself pass the Alle offensively, in hopes



of beating in detail the different corps of our army. This movement was not contrary to the rules of the art, but it should have been executed with vigor and been limited to a series of partial combats, rather than a general battle. The Russian general had an additional reason for such a course, inasmuch as he was awaiting the arrival of a corps of twenty-six or twenty-eight thousand men, which Prince Labanoff was bringing from Tilsit, whereas I had no hopes of any further reinforcement.

**BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.**—Conformably to this plan, Benningsen, preceded by all the cavalry of reserve of Prince Galitzin, took the road to Friedland on the evening of the thirteenth of June. A regiment of our hussars, which had already occupied that city, was driven out the same evening. The fourteenth, at break of day, the Russian army passed the river, and deployed itself in the plain on the left bank. The corps of Lannes had arrived near Friedland; unable to dispute the plain with the enemy, it at least succeeded in maintaining itself in the village of Posthenen and the surrounding woods. Whatever course the enemy might take, it was for my interest to concentrate my forces on the right in order to bar the road from Allenburg to Wehlau. For this purpose I had directed Mortier to the support of Lannes, and had advanced myself with the guard on Domnau, and also had ordered half of the reserves of cavalry and the corps of Ney to the same place. Victor received orders to move by a forced march to pass this city.

Learning at Domnau the true situation of affairs and the unexpected return of the enemy, I hastened to dispatch Mortier to Lannes' assistance, and ordered these two marshals to check the Russians as much as possible, to give me time to arrive with my guard and the corps of Ney and Victor. The position of the enemy in the bend of the Alle offered too fair an opportunity to celebrate the anniversary of Marengo for me to suffer it to escape. Lannes and Mortier punctually executed what had been directed, by pivoting on their left to defend Heinrichsdorf and cut off the road to Königsberg. The enemy admirably seconded my views. Instead of attacking us boldly, he spent five or six hours in firing and deploying, without advancing a step.

I at last arrived about one o'clock, followed at an interval of two hours by Ney and Victor. Murat with half of the cavalry and the corps of Davoust and Soult, being still engaged in their movement on Königsberg, I directed the first two to march in the direction of Friedland. Perhaps it had been well to await them, in order to acquire a decided superiority over Benningsen,

and I should not have hesitated to do so had I believed that he would venture to pursue his march against me, and engage himself on the road from Königsberg in the direction of Abschwang. Reinforced by forty thousand men, and having been joined by my fine cavalry, I could have driven him into the marshy forests of Zehlau and Frischind, from which he would never have escaped. I had so well foreseen all the chances which had just offered themselves to me that I had written to the Grand Duke of Berg as follows:

"The enemy is here in order to give battle with all his army. He at first thought to debouch by the road from Stockeim to Königsberg; now he seems to think only of receiving the battle which is about to commence. I hope that you will be already in Königsberg; and as the corps of Soult will be sufficient to guard that city, you will undoubtedly fall back with the rest of the cavalry and the corps of Davoust, on Friedland. This is the more urgent, as it is possible that the affair may still continue to-morrow. Endeavor, therefore, to arrive by one o'clock in the morning. If I perceive, at the beginning of the action, that the enemy's forces are too numerous, it is possible that I shall merely cannonade him to-day and await your arrival."

But after I had more closely reconnoitered this *coup-gorge* into which Benningsen had engaged himself, and had reflected on the unenterprising character of my adversary, I deemed it best not to postpone the opportunity to punish him for his error. It will be seen that in this I was right.

Friedland is situated in the reëntering bend of the Alle; the curve opened in the direction toward our approach. The space included in this bend is cut in two by a small mill-stream and the lake formed by damming up the water for the use of the mills. The enemy's left, composed of four divisions, under Prince Bagration, was between this lake and the Alle. The right, composed of three divisions of Prince Gortschakoff and two-thirds of the cavalry, extended from the lake to the north into the plain opposite Heinrichsdorf. The enemy, in order to facilitate his communications, had thrown three bridges across the Alle, immediately opposite the city and near his left wing. It was evident that to strike a decisive blow it was first necessary to overthrow this left, in order to gain possession of Friedland and the bridges; for the right, extending three-quarters of a league from the city to the north, would be driven on the Alle and cut off. I instantly formed my plan from these facts. The dispositions dictated for the battle are worthy of a place here:



"Marshal Ney will take the right from Posthenen toward Sortlack, and will rest on the present position of General Oudinot. Marshal Lannes will form the center, which will extend, at the left of Marshal Ney, from Heinrichsdorf to nearly opposite the village of Posthenen. The grenadiers of Oudinot, which now form the right of Marshal Lannes, will insensibly incline to the left so as to attract the attention of the enemy. Marshal Lannes will mass his divisions as much as possible, and by this means will be able to place himself on two lines. The left will be formed by Marshal Mortier, holding Heinrichsdorf and the road to Königsberg, and thence extending opposite the right wing of the Russians. Marshal Mortier will not advance, as the movement will be made by the right, resting on the left.

The cavalry of General d'Espagne, and the dragoons of General Grouchy, joined to the cavalry of the left wing, will maneuver to injure the enemy as much as possible, when, pressed by the vigorous attack of our right, he shall find it necessary to fight in retreat. General Victor and the imperial guard will form the reserve, and be placed at Grünhof and Botkein, and in rear of Posthenen. Lahoussaye's division of dragoons will be under the orders of General Victor; that of Latour-Maubourg will obey the orders of Ney; General Nansouty's division of heavy cavalry will be at the disposition of Marshal Lannes, and will fight with the cavalry of the *corps-d'armée* of reserve, at the center. I will be with the reserve. The advance will be by the right, the initiative being taken by Marshal Ney, who will await my orders. The moment the right moves on the enemy, all the artillery of the line will redouble its fire in a direction best calculated to protect the attack of this wing."

About five o'clock in the afternoon the signal of attack is given, and every thing is executed with admirable precision. Ney advances with intrepidity; the Russians defend themselves with equal bravery. The concentric fire of our artillery commits so much the greater execution as the enemy falls back on the city, where, crowded on several lines, he can not move. To disengage themselves, a grand charge of cavalry is made against the right flank of Ney; but this marshal, leaving to the dragoons of Latour-Maubourg the care of repelling this charge, precipitates himself on Friedland at the head of his divisions. This vigorous blow, sustained successively by the divisions of Dupont and the other troops of the first corps, decides the victory. The artillery of Senarmont and Ney scatter terror and death among the squadrons and battalions of the enemy, which, hemmed in by the river,

the city, and the lake, knew not how to escape from the gulf. It was sad to see these men uselessly slain in the terrible position in which they were placed. Benningsen, seeing too late his error, leaves Friedland and goes to the right bank of the Alle to rally some reserves and artillery so as to take our line in flank and suspend its movement.

Ney already reaches the head of the great lake and presses the enemy, who is crowded in the entrance to the city, but he is here attacked with great bravery by the Russian imperial guard. The division of Bisson, abandoned by its chief, is driven back; that of Marchand is checked; a retrograde movement begins at the left; but the division of Dupont, rivaling its ancient comrades of the field of Montreuil, falls on the enemy's guard, and, assisted by Marchand, pierces and drives them all back into the *cul-de-sac* of Friedland.

Nevertheless, Bagration does not suffer himself to be discouraged by his difficult position. Being able to bring into action only a small number at a time, he continually relieves them by fresh regiments, who in turn are sacrificed.

The French divisions fight as furiously to force an entrance into Friedland as the Russians do to maintain themselves there till their right can fall back. In the space of two hundred and fifty toises, sixty thousand men fight with the rage of despair, and seem to have sworn to conquer or die. Benningsen, hoping to save his material, orders the artillery to cross the river; the Russian infantry, unable any longer to support the contest, moves by platoons in disorder along the road to the bridges. Benningsen in vain endeavors to rally the wrecks on the other side of the Alle, and to repass the river offensively under the protection of one hundred and twenty pieces of reserve which he had stationed up the river. Nothing could arrest the impetuosity of the columns of Ney and Victor; and Bagration, having withdrawn his last battalions, plunged into Friedland, and set fire to the bridges in order to check the ardor of our pursuit.

While we obtain this decisive success, Lannes and Mortier give occupation to the enemy's right, and even allow Prince Gortschakoff to gain some successes, in order to draw him the more certainly into the snare which I have set for him, by permitting him to engage himself on the road to Königsberg. Warned too late of the catastrophe of the left wing by the burning of Friedland and the stragglers who returned from that place, the Prince forms the resolution to cut a passage, sword in hand. One of his divisions penetrates into Friedland, where a horrible



*mêlée* is again formed with the troops of Ney. But the bridges are already destroyed, and Lannes and Mortier fall on the rear of the enemy, while Ney and Victor check him in front. Here the carnage becomes frightful, and there is every reason to expect the entire destruction of this half of the enemy's army. But none of the isolated corps of these brave men ever think of capitulating; they prefer to throw themselves into the Alle and to seek a ford even at the risk of drowning. They thus succeed in rejoining Benningsen. Even the artillery precipitates itself into the river; but only a small part is saved. The cavalry of their extreme right files along the left bank on Allenburg, where it crossed the river.

Benningsen had this day committed innumerable errors; in the first place, he should have fallen vigorously on Lannes when he debouched in the morning on Friedland; if he had not thereby secured the victory, he would at least have procured a suitable field of battle, and by turning on his left, so as to extend his right on Heinrichsfeld, would have preserved his direct line of retreat on Wehlau, without exposing himself to be driven upon the Alle. There was, in his conduct, a mixture of rashness and irresolution difficult to be reconciled.\*

**THE RUSSIANS RECROSS THE NIEMEN.**—The Russian army, enfeebled by the loss of about twenty thousand men *hors-de-combat*, sought only to regain its frontiers. On the fifteenth it passed the Pregel at Wehlau, and took the road to Tilsit. The corps of Kamenski and Lestocq, which defended Königsberg, having learned the result of the battle of Friedland, evacuated this city, and also retreated on Tilsit, hotly pressed by Davoust. On the sixteenth Soult entered into the capital of old Prussia, where we made immense captures; for, independently of considerable magazines, we found there more than one hundred thousand stand of arms, recently debarked from England, and also a large quantity of munitions. Murat, who had hastened to pass the Pregel at Tapiau as soon as he heard of the victory of Friedland,

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\*Allison estimates the Russian loss in this battle at seventeen thousand killed and wounded, and the loss of the French at nine thousand. These estimates are about as erroneous on one side as were those of the French bulletins on the other. From the best authorities that can now be procured, the Russians lost about twenty-five thousand men *hors-de-combat*, and the French about eight thousand. Allison says the Russians lost but seventeen guns, but Thiers, after a full investigation of all the authorities, says the French captured eighty pieces of cannon. Few prisoners were captured on either side, except the Russian wounded left on the field. A large number of Russians were drowned in crossing the Alle. These are included in the above estimates.

cut up the enemy's rear guard, and his army, closely pursued by our cavalry, passed the Niemen, at Tilsit, on the morning of the nineteenth: the same day I entered that city.

**THEY PROPOSE PEACE.**—The Emperor Alexander, who had arrived from Memel at the head-quarters of his army, being dissatisfied with England for having refused him the means of facilitating a loan of one hundred millions, and having promised for six months to make powerful diversions, without sending a single man, now offered me peace. Victorious in Turkey, but thus engaged in a double war, he had no immediate motive for sacrificing himself for Europe, which left him unassisted. He had undertaken this war for interests entirely distinct from those of the people who separated his empire from mine. As for me, I esteemed myself fortunate in terminating the war so advantageously; for Austria was at length beginning to assemble her troops.

**INTERVIEW OF TILSIT.**—Our first interview took place on a raft in the middle of the Niemen. On approaching me, the Emperor Alexander remarked that he had no less complaints against England than I had. "In that case," I replied, "*peace is made*; and we will shake hands in sign of reconciliation." We afterward had several other interviews at Tilsit, where the Emperor Alexander established himself. His exterior was noble, gracious, and imposing; the quickness of his conception seemed to me great; he comprehended at a glance the most important questions. Like Francis I. and Louis XIV., in every thing, it might also be said of him, that he was a knightly king (*roi-chevalier*). If he had lived in the same age with the conqueror of Marignan, he would incontestably have carried away the palm. It may have been good policy to represent him differently from what I saw him, and it is certain that his conduct in 1812 and 1813 was different from what I anticipated; I believed him quick, but I thought him weak. It was not easy fully to understand the character of this prince; even Labruyère would have been embarrassed in exactly defining him.\*

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\*Allison thus describes the interview of the two emperors on the Niemen:

"By direction of the French general of engineers, Lariboissière, a raft of great dimensions was constructed on the river Niemen, *the raft of Tilsit*, which will be recollected as long as the cage of Bajazet, or the conquests of Alexander. It was moored in the center of the stream, and on its surface a wooden apartment, surmounted by the eagles of France and Russia, framed with all the possible magnificence which the time and circumstances would admit. This was destined for the reception of the emperors



I also saw at Tilsit a regiment of his guards; and I never forgot the sensation I felt on seeing them. Many men saw in these troops only disagreeable stiffness. I myself never admired automaton soldiers; I wanted such as could be acted on by proclamations; nevertheless, I was surprised at the precision and the *aplomb* of this infantry. I saw that an army so thoroughly disciplined, and of such extraordinary firmness, would be the first in the world, if to these qualities it should add the electric enthusiasm of the French. Some time afterward, speaking on this subject with a connoisseur, I said to him: "My soldiers are as brave as it is possible for men to be; but they reason too much. If they had the impassible firmness and docility of the Russians, the world would be too small for me. The French soldiers love their own country too well to become Macedonians."

**PEACE CONCLUDED.**—After fifteen days of conferences, peace was signed, on the seventh of July, at Tilsit. It was honorable for the two nations who had fought with so much bravery; but the advantage was on my side. The Empire acquired an immense preponderance by this peace. As the most obstinate of my enemies began to regard my cause as gained, how could I myself fail to think so?

alone; at a little distance was stationed another raft, richly, but less sumptuously, adorned, for their respective suites. The shore on either side was covered with the Imperial Guards of the two monarchs, drawn up in triple lines, in the same firm and imposing way in which they had stood on the fields of Eylau and Friedland. At one o'clock precisely, amidst the thunder of artillery, each emperor stepped into a boat on his own side of the river, accompanied by a few of his principal officers; Napoleon was attended by Murat, Berthier, Bessières, Duroc, and Caulaincourt; Alexander, by the Grand Duke Constantine, General Benningsen, Prince Labanoff, General Ouwaroff, and Count Lieven; the numerous and splendid suite of each monarch followed in another boat immediately after.

"The bark of Napoleon, rowed by the marines of his guard, advanced with greater rapidity than that of Alexander. He arrived first at the raft, entered the apartment, and himself opened the door on the opposite side to receive the Czar, while the shouts of the soldiers on either shore drowned even the roar of the artillery. In a few seconds Alexander arrived, and was received by the conqueror at the door on his own side; their meeting was friendly, and the very first words which he uttered bespoke both the lacerated feelings occasioned by the conduct of the government of Great Britain during the war, his deep penetration, and clear perception of the ruling passion of Napoleon—"I hate the English," said he, "as much as you do, and am ready to second you in all your enterprises against them." "In that case," replied Napoleon, "every thing will be easily arranged, and peace is already made." The interview lasted two hours, during which Napoleon exercised all the ascendancy which his extraordinary talents and fortune, as well as singular powers of fascination, gave him, while the Russian emperor gave proof of the tact and  *finesse*, as well as diplomatic ability, by which his nation, beyond any other in Europe, is gifted."

Nevertheless, this treaty found many detractors among the critics of the *salons*, who imagine that treaties are made as readily as decrees: Some reproached me with having too much humiliated Prussia; others, and this party was the most numerous, pretended that I ought to have united with the liberal party in dethroning Frederick William, whom I had made my irreconcilable enemy, by the spoliation of half his states. The prompt rout of the Prussian armies, and my brilliant reception at Berlin, had proved to me, it is true, that this war had not the assent of the mass of the people. It has been falsely concluded from this that I ought to have profited by the existing circumstances to give a democratic organization to Prussia. Even had it been in accordance with my principles to propagate a new revolution, I had every reason to apprehend serious obstacles on the part of neighboring powers, interested in opposing them. Russia would not have treated on such conditions, and Austria would have interposed an obstacle.

PRUSSIA.—The system on which I had formed my empire was not at all to the taste of the old dynasties; but it was not necessary to conclude, as so many declaimers have done since the event, that it made inevitable a war of extermination between us. They are very much deceived who think that the House of Brandebourg saw in me only an agent of the Revolution; its conduct toward me for the preceding six years, the alliance of the Court of Madrid, the conduct of the Cabinets of Berlin and Copenhagen, sufficiently prove that the existence of my throne accorded very well with theirs. All my steps had tended to reconcile France to the institutions of her neighbors; and those who observed me ought to have appreciated the efforts which I made to reconcile the revolution with Europe. In constructing the royal authority of new elements, I wished to concede what was demanded by the spirit of the age.

To derive the greatest possible advantage from my position and my successes, and to give to the Empire an auxiliary force calculated to secure its durability, I had to choose between three means: either to base my support on the nations themselves, or to treat with their existing governments, or to seek to conciliate both the governments and the people. The worst system of all was to humiliate the kings and to cut up their states without doing anything for the people.

To base my support entirely on the mass of the people, it would have been necessary to scatter anarchy everywhere, and to destroy both the form and *personnel* of the existing govern-



ments. But this would have been the inevitable means of producing a war of extermination between my dynasty and every thing around me.

There was but a single moment in my whole career when I could have applied the third of these means in Prussia, and have attached to myself both the prince and the nation; this was the beginning of 1806. After the war had once begun, the thing was impossible. The court had thrown itself headlong into the arms of my enemies; the nation, oppressed by the war, felt its humiliation. In truth, the people were anxious to adopt the institutions which governed in my empire; but they did not want revolutionary principles. The fault which had separated my interests from those of the House of Brandebourg had been committed; there was now only one way of reconciling us: this was, *to give to this monarch, states equivalent to those which he had lost*, and on this condition, to induce him to contract an alliance with me. All this might have been very well before the war, when the presidency of the Confederation of the Rhine could have been offered to Frederick William; but after Tilsit, there was no way of doing this without sacrificing to him Hanover and Westphalia, or of conferring on him the title of King of Great Poland, not as a Prussian province, but as a separate state. After the intimate relations which had been formed between this prince and the Emperor Alexander, would it not have been imprudent to make such a donation? Would it not have been furnishing arms to my adversaries? Moreover, would Russia herself have recognized this kingdom? I leave it to diplomatists to decide this question; but although I had resolved it negatively, I should have preferred it to demagogic propagandism. In fact, where has this system of propagandism ever served us? Certainly not in Italy, where all the country was in insurrection against us, except some patriots in the cities. If it procured us friends, it also made us enemies; and existing interests have always more arms for self-defense than new interests have for acquisition. This system of propagandism has sometimes been useful as a counterpoise; it has never been either the cause nor the agent of our success.

Pichegru alone found it a powerful support in Holland. My victories were never so great as from 1805 to 1810, when I no longer carried to the people anarchy under the cap of liberty. I was certain to overcome resistance by reducing them to questions purely military. What advantage did I derive in Spain by taking the interest of the people against the abuse of fanati-

cism and despotism? The King of Prussia had already effected a demi-revolution himself, by promulgating a new law for military promotion without respect to birth; civil employments in Prussia were already open to all the citizens. Thus, with the exception of a few insignificant principles, equality of right was already established; what remained for me to give the Prussians? the agrarian law?

CONDITION OF THE TREATY OF TILSIT.—But let us leave the field of conjecture and return to the treaty of Tilsit. Prussia had provoked the war; it was necessary that some one should pay its expenses; and, under the conviction that it was no longer possible to make her our friend, it was very natural that it should be imposed on Prussia. I therefore determined to reinforce my federative system at her expense; this was indispensable since I threw her into the ranks of my enemies, it was necessary for me to reinforce mine in proportion. I created the duchy of Warsaw as the basis of a project for the restoration of Poland; I augmented the Confederation of the Rhine by the kingdom of Westphalia, formed of the Prussian provinces between the left bank of the Elbe and Magdeburg, the states of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, and the duchy of Brunswick. This kingdom fell to my brother Jerome, to whom I afterward gave Hanover also; but the last was still reserved at Tilsit as the means of treaty with England. The Confederation of the Rhine had already been reinforced, as has been said, by Saxony, whose elector took the title of king, and of Grand Duke of Warsaw; his grandfather had already occupied this throne, and the selection of this prince sufficiently announced my intention of ultimately restoring Poland.

REVOLUTION AT CONSTANTINOPLE.—It was in the middle of the conferences of Tilsit that I learned the new revolution which had precipitated Selim III. from a throne which he had just shown himself so worthy to fill. Such are the monstrous governments of the East, that the smallest event often overthrows the finest combinations and leads to incalculable catastrophes. The death of an old mufti, changing the entire face of the empire, proved to me that its policy was not to be relied on from one day to another. Selim sought to rid himself of the turbulent spirit of the degenerate Janizaries; he had seen the advantage of a corps of European discipline (the Nizzam-Geddites), who had distinguished themselves at St. Jean-d'Acre against us, and quite recently in Romelia. He wished to effect an insensible fusion of the Janizaries into this corps; we in-



duced him to adopt this system, which was the only one that could give the Porte a means of repression against the undisciplined and unbridled soldiery, and against the insolent priests and ulemas, who made of this soldiery blind instruments of their own ambition. This was at once a political and military restoration.

The ulemas and the chiefs of the Janizaries, masters of the multitude, incited it against these changes; it was necessary to renounce the proposed fusion. But difficulties did not end here; the old mufti, a friend of the Sultan, dying at this time, was replaced by one of those crafty and ambitious men, who make religion the means of intrigue and trouble, in order to rule the state. Soon the opinion of the multitude became more and more excited and exceeded all bounds; the mufti and the caimacan, profiting by the absence of the vizier and the captain-pacha, who were with the army of the Danube, fomented an insurrection in the capital, seconded by an audacious adventurer named Cabakchi-Oglou. This man, placed at the head of the yamacks, soon became the arm of this vast conspiracy. The Janizaries, the artillerists, sailors, and people, were all led away by the high-sounding phrases announcing the pretended crime of Selim against the laws of Mahomet, the usages of the empire, and the privileges given to his predecessors; of that Selim, in a word, who had dared to form the project of assimilating them to infidels. They demanded the heads of all the friends of the Sultan who had seconded his impious projects; all were sacrificed. After two days of these threatening scenes, the mufti, interrogated by the conspirators, with all the charlatanism of pretended inspiration, declared that Selim could no longer reign, by the laws which he had despised and sought to change. The Janizaries loudly demanded his deposition; he was imprisoned and replaced by his nephew, Mustapha.\*

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\*A counter-revolution took place in July, 1808, and Mustapha IV. was deposed; but the unfortunate Selim III. lost his life, and Mahmoud II. was raised to the throne. The Janizaries were the principal opponents of all reforms attempted by Selim III. and his successors, and produced several revolutions in the government. They were particularly opposed to the introduction of the European military organization into the Turkish army. Their last revolt was on the fourteenth of June, 1826, when the Sultan and Hussein Pacha, at the head of the Grand Seignior's troops, repulsed the rebels, burnt their barracks, and put many of them to death. A proclamation was issued on the seventeenth of June, abolishing the corps forever, and pronouncing a curse upon the name.

This corps was first organized about the year 1389, from captive slaves. After long years of severe discipline, it became the terror of other nations, and finally of its own government.

This catastrophe suspended, for the whole month of June, those immense preparations which the Porte had ordered for the expulsion of Michelson from the principalities. According to the plan of campaign adopted by the advice of Sebastiani, two hundred thousand men, assembled at Schumla, were to pass the Danube near Ismail; and, profiting by the detachments which had weakened Michelson, to cut him off from the Dniester or force him to return, in all haste to Podolia. Nothing of all this was yet executed; Michelson, who had already evacuated Bucharest, returned there with audacity.

**PROJECTS ON TURKEY.**—These revolutions, whose results on the policy of the Divan I did not yet know, disgusted me with an alliance on which no solid projects could be founded. Strenuous as I had formerly been in stipulating for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to the same degree did I now feel myself free from all obligations toward barbarians who were incapable of respecting their best princes.

A conquering tribe descending from the mountains of Nattolia for the invasion of the Greek Empire, these Turks are Tartars, encamped in Europe; they having nothing European. It is in vain to praise the services rendered by them to France by their different attacks on Hungary, and diversions against the then all-powerful House of Austria; in these aggressions there was nothing based on the interests of European policy. They fell upon Hungary and Austria, as they formerly fell on Romelia. Once only did France arm them in favor of Poland, in an interest which was still their own. Our manners, our usages, our religion, all are in formal opposition to these barbarians.

Convinced that if they were driven back into Asia, it would be a benefit to the human family, I gave the Emperor Alexander to understand that I would not fail to coöperate in this noble enterprise. I judged Turkey too much by European states; this revolution, combined with the anarchy which reigned in all the pachalics, and which seemed to tend to an emancipation from the Porte, made me feel that the Ottoman Empire was about to fall. I might gather a rich harvest in her ruins; master of Corfu and the Ionian Isles, I might pretend to the possession of Albania, the Morea, the islands of the Archipelago, provinces rich in mines, and forests of good ship-timber, and furnishing a good nursery of excellent seamen. I should thus secure my influence in the Levant; I should prepare immense maritime means; who knew but the glory of restoring Greece was reserved for me?

**STIPULATIONS IN THE TREATY OF TILSIT.**—But as



this subject might lead to discussions and postpone our reconciliation, the basis of which was already laid, and as I could not immediately effect the partition of an empire with which I was connected, if not by formal treaties, at least by close relations and mutual conveniences, we postponed the question with the understanding that it should be discussed at some other time. It was agreed that the present state of the Ottoman Empire should be provisionally maintained, and that no ulterior changes should be made but by mutual consent. I tacitly consented that the Russians should continue to occupy the principalities as far as the Danube; I was to occupy Prussia so long as the provisional state continued.

We were to propose peace, in concert, to our reciprocal enemies; Russia to offer her mediation to England, and I to the Turks; if our propositions were rejected, we were to act together for the same common object. An eventual treaty provided in part for the rejection of peace by the English. Russia was to force Sweden to close her ports; I was to effect the same in Denmark, Portugal, and the states of the Pope; Spain, who had already closed her ports, would also adopt the system of reprisals ordered by the Berlin decree; thus putting the English under the ban of Europe. I promised the Emperor Alexander not to augment the duchy of Warsaw, and to do nothing further toward the restoration of Poland.\*

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\*The following eloquent remarks on the treaty of Tilsit are extracted from Thiers' "Consulate and Empire":

"Never had greater luster surrounded the person and the name of Napoleon; never had greater apparent power been acquired for his imperial scepter. From the Straits of Gibraltar to the Vistula, from the mountains of Bohemia to the North Sea, from the Alps to the Adriatic, he ruled either directly or indirectly, either personally or by princes who were some of them his creatures, the others his dependents. Beyond were allies or subjugated enemies, England alone excepted. Thus almost the whole continent was under his sway; for Russia, after resisting him for a moment, had warmly adopted his designs, and Austria found herself forced to suffer them to be accomplished, and even threatened with being compelled to concur in them. England, in short, secured from this vast domination by the ocean, was about to be placed between the acceptance of peace and a war with the whole world.

"Such was the external appearance of that gigantic power: it had in it enough to dazzle the world, and it did actually dazzle it; but the reality was less solid than brilliant. A moment's cool reflection would have sufficed to convince one's self of this. Napoleon, diverted from his struggle with England by the third coalition, drawn from the shores of the ocean to those of the Danube, had punished the House of Austria by taking from it, in consequence of the campaign of Austerlitz, the Venetian States, the Tyrol, Suabia, and had thus completed the territory of Italy, aggrandized our allies of South Germany, removed the Austrian frontiers from ours.

Such in substance was the treaty of Tilsit, on which has been formed so many romances. It has been pretended that I spoke of restoring the eastern and western empires, promising to aid Russia in the conquest of Constantinople, provided she would consent that I, or my family, should possess Italy, Spain, and Portugal; and that, taking a map of Europe, I myself traced out the line of demarkation, following the river Oder, thence directly across the Krapacs to the Danube and the Black Sea, giving all east to the Russians and taking the west as my own

So far, so good—for, to finish the territorial emancipation of Italy, to secure friends in Germany, to place new spaces between Austria and France, was assuredly consistent with sound policy. But in the intoxication produced by the prodigious campaign of 1805, to change arbitrarily the face of Europe, and instead of being content to modify the past, which is the greatest triumph given to the hand of man, instead of keeping up for our profit the old rivalry of Prussia and Austria, by advantages granted to the one over the other—to wrest the Germanic scepter from Austria without giving it to Prussia; to convert their antagonism into a common hatred of France; to create, by the title of Confederation of the Rhine, a pretended French Germany, composed of French princes, to whom their subjects had a natural antipathy, of German princes, unthankful for our gifts, and after rendering, by this unjust displacement of the boundary of the Rhine, war with Prussia inevitable, war impolitic as it was glorious, to suffer one's self to be carried by the torrent of victory to the banks of the Vistula, and on arriving there to attempt the restoration of Poland, having on one's rear Prussia, vanquished but fuming, Austria secretly implacable—all this, admirable as a military work, was, as a political work, imprudent, extravagant, chimerical.

"With the aid of his genius, Napoleon upheld himself at these perilous extremities, triumphed over all obstacles, distance, climate, mud, cold—and completed on the Niemen the defeat of the continental powers. But, at the bottom, he was anxious to put an end to this daring expedition, and his whole conduct at Tilsit betokened that situation. Having estranged for ever the heart of Prussia, which he had not the good idea to attach to himself for ever by a signal act of generosity, enlightened respecting the sentiments of Austria, feeling how victorious soever he might be, the necessity for making himself an alliance, he accepted that of Russia, which presented itself at the moment, and conceived a new system of policy founded on a single principle—the concurrence of two ambitions, Russian and French, to do whatever they pleased in the world—a mischievous concurrence, for it behoved France not to allow Russia to do everything, and above all not to allow herself to do everything. After having aggravated by the treaty of Tilsit the deep ranklings of Germany, by creating in her bosom a French royalty which must cost us in men, money, animosities to overcome vain counsels, all that those of Naples and Holland already cost us; after having half reconstituted Prussia, instead of restoring or destroying her entirely; after having, in like manner, half reconstituted Poland, and done everything in an incomplete manner, because, at these distances time pressed, the strength began to fail, Napoleon made irreconcilable enemies, impotent or doubtful friends, raised, in short, an immense edifice, in which everything was new from bottom to top, an edifice run up so rapidly that the foundation had not had time to settle, the mortar to harden.

"But, if everything is censurable, in our opinion, in the political work



empire. I may have used some high-sounding phrases in the presence of a young sovereign, but these pretended projects are too absurd for comment.

The peace of Tilsit was unexampled in the annals of France; who could expect that it would find detractors? Such might well be found in Germany and in England; but it was reserved for evil Frenchmen to revile the finest monument of national glory.

of Tilsit, brilliant as it may appear, all is admirable, on the contrary, in the conduct of the military operations. That army of the camp of Boulogne, which, carried with incredible dispatch from the strait of Calais to the sources of the Danube, enveloped the Austrians at Ulm, drove back the Russians upon Vienna, finished by crushing both at Austerlitz, having then rested for some months in Franconia, soon recommenced its victorious march, entered Saxony, surprised the Prussian army in retreat, broke it up by a single stroke at Jena, pursued it without intermission, turned it, took it to the last man on the shores of the Baltic; that army which, diverted from north to east, ran to meet the Russians, hurled them into the Pregel, then exhibited the unheard-of spectacle of a French army quietly encamped on the Vistula, then, suddenly disturbed in its quarters, left them to punish the Russians, reached them at Eylau, fought, though perishing with cold and hunger, a bloody battle with them, returned after that battle to its quarters, and there, encamped again upon snow in such a manner that its repose alone covered a great siege, fed, recruited, during a long winter at distances which baffle all administration, resumed its arms in spring, and, this time, Nature assisting genius, placed itself between the Russians and their base of operation, compelled them, in order to regain Königsberg, to cross the river before its face, flung them into it at Friedland, and thus terminated by a splendid victory, and on the banks of the Niemen, the longest, the most daring expedition, not through defenseless Persia or India, like the army of Alexander, but through Europe, swarming with soldiers as well disciplined as brave—this is unparalleled in the history of ages, this is worthy of the everlasting admiration of men, this combines all qualities, celerity and slowness, daring and prudence, the art of fighting and the art of marching, the genius of war and that of administration, and these things, so diverse, so rarely united, always opportune, always at the moment when they were needed to ensure success. Every one will ask himself how it was possible to display so much prudence in war, so little in politics. The answer will be easy,—in war Napoleon was guided by his genius, in politics by his passions."

## CHAPTER XI.

FROM THE TREATY OF TILSIT TO THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR  
IN THE SPANISH PENINSULA.

Results of the Campaigns of 1806 and 1807—Origin of the Continental System—Its general Plan—Its Influence on Commerce—On Industry—This System leads to War—Its Influence on State Policy—On Maritime Relations—Measures requisite for its Execution—Mediation offered by Russia to England—English Expedition against Denmark—Preparations of the Danes for Defense—Capture of Copenhagen and the Danish Fleet—Bruno takes Stralsund and Rugen—Russia declares War against the English—Intercession of Austria—Negotiations respecting Turkey—Distribution of New Titles of Nobility—Suppression of the *Tribunat*.

RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1806 AND 1807.—The war with Prussia had produced extraordinary results; I hardly knew how to dispose of the power which it gave me. Since their departure from Boulogne, two hundred thousand Frenchmen had been paid, fed and clothed at the expense of the enemy; more than four hundred millions of contributions in money and supplies had been levied on the occupied countries; the treasury had received a part of this, and the expenses of our budget, reduced by the entire support of the army, had not employed one half of the funds which had been assigned to it. A short time before, I had sold Louisiana in order to procure money; returning from Austerlitz, I had found the treasury empty, and the bank on the eve of bankruptcy. Two years had scarcely elapsed since this crisis, and I now had a year's revenue in advance, in the coffers of the state, and a considerable reserve in the vaults of the Tuileries; while the pamphleteers, in English pay, were proclaiming throughout Europe that my power would soon terminate for want of finances.\*

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\*The following brief summary of the condition of French finances at different periods is copied from Thiers:

"A vulgar sign, but a true one, of the disposition of minds, is the rate of the public funds in the great modern states which make use of credit, and which, in a vast market, called Exchange, permit the sale and purchase of the titles of loans which they have contracted with the capitalists



ORIGIN OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM.—But if my resources were great, a proportionally vast field was open for their employment. The epoch of the treaty of Tilsit was the apogee of my glory and power, for I there laid the basis of a great system which was calculated to consolidate them. This system, properly called *Continental*, has never been perfectly understood.

However great the immediate advantages of this system, I hoped for one still greater in forcing the English to peace; for the British colossus had heretofore been but feebly affected by the increase of my power; it regarded this increase as a temporary evil which would touch England only indirectly. Maritime peace was henceforth the only object of my wishes, and I explained myself to the Emperor Alexander in such a manner as to leave no further doubt on the subject, by intrusting him with the care of procuring it for the world by his powerful intervention. To prove that my desire on this subject was sincere, it will be sufficient to look for a moment at the situation of the two parties and the evident interest which I had in such a course.

The burning of Toulon, the naval battles of Ouessant, of Cape St. Vincent, of Camperdown, and of Trafalgar, the surrender of the Batavian fleet in the Texel, and the disaster of Copenhagen (which remains to be described), had ruined, for twenty years, all the continental navies. England had no further rivalry to fear; the use she made of this power is but too well known. A long peace was requisite to reconstruct maritime arsenals, to rebuild ships, and to train sailors by voyages on the ocean.

Although France had lost her most important colony, she still might raise up sailors by her commerce with the vast Spanish possessions, and with India through the Isle of France; Holland still preserved the Moluccas, and her relations with China and Guiana. Spain had still more ports and extent of

of all nations. The five per cent stock (signifying, as everybody knows, an interest of five allowed for a nominal capital of one hundred), which Napoleon had found at twelve francs on the eighteenth Brumaire, and which afterward rose to sixty, got up, after the battle of Austerlitz, to seventy, and then passed that point to reach ninety, a height at that time unprecedented in France. The disposition to confidence was even so strong, that the price of this stock rose still higher, and toward the end of July, 1807, reached ninety-two and ninety-three. Previously to the time of the assignats, when a fondness for financial speculations did not exist; when the public funds had not yet made the fortune of great speculators, nor had, on the contrary, brought ruin on the legitimate creditors of the state; when the value of money was such that it was easy to find in solid depositories an interest of six or seven per cent—it required immense confidence in the established government to cause the titles of the perpetual debt to be accepted at an interest of five per cent."

coast in the two hemispheres than all Europe united, and much more than she required to form sailors for her merchant ships. The Americans were developing themselves from day to day, and the greater their increase, the more intimately were their interests connected with France. If I had a positive maritime interest in desiring peace, it was no less to my interest on the continent; my power could not be further extended without injury to its solidity; it was necessary to render it invulnerable by binding it together, with institutions of reciprocal advantages to all the parts of this immense edifice. To render peace durable, it was necessary that neither party should have anything to regret; but this was not possible; a truce for a year or two would have profited England only, and have ruined our commerce, by engaging it in distant enterprises. In order to obtain the complete and durable peace which we desired, it was agreed that Russia should propose her mediation for peace, and, if England should persist in rejecting it, Russia should accede to the Continental system.

**ITS GENERAL PLAN.**—This system, which has been so unjustly decried without being understood, we will now proceed to examine; it may be divided into two distinct branches—the one political, and the other commercial or maritime.

**ITS INFLUENCE ON COMMERCE.**—In its commercial relations, two essential points of view were to serve me as guides: the first, to so cripple the English commerce as to deprive the ministry of the means of *subsidizing* the continent and of continuing the war; the second, to oppose their manufactures by developing ours. For this purpose it was necessary to open channels for our products and to close them to the enemy—that is, to exclude the English from the markets. Many partial measures had already been taken for this purpose, but they amounted to nothing, so long as no general system was adopted for placing these rulers of the sea under the ban of Europe. I had given the prelude to this system in my Berlin decree, in 1806, and the finishing stroke in the Milan decree of 1807. This system of legislation was an outrageous one, but necessity and the example of my enemy forced me to it. Decrees alone were not sufficient; it was necessary to isolate England from Europe and to ruin her commerce. In this respect, the Continental system only partially performed its object, because the war in Spain opened to the enemy the most important outlets for her products.

**ITS INFLUENCE ON FRENCH INDUSTRY.**—With respect to industrial products, this system led to important re-



sults. A great empire requires not only a general direction for its policy, but its economy must also have a similar tendency. Home industry requires a channel or road, like every thing else, in which to move and advance. But France had no such channel till I marked out one by giving to her the Continental system.

The economy of France, before the Revolution, was directed to colonies and exchange commerce. This was then the fashion. She had the greatest success. Some had ventured to say that this success had no other results than the ruin of the state finances, the loss of our credit, the destruction of our military system, the loss of consideration abroad, and the ruin of our commerce at home. These are just so many absurdities! It is not colonial wealth and commerce of exchange that have produced such sad results; but a debilitated administration, and factious *parlements*. Fine harbors and rich merchants have no more prevented agriculture from flourishing in France than they have in England; and the kingdom was so far from being ruined under Louis XVI., that it sustained twenty years of wars and revolutions, and prospered all the time.

All nations have been enriched by this colonial and commercial system, and France especially owed to it her splendor. But the war had utterly destroyed this system; the seaports were ruined; no human power could immediately restore to them what the Revolution had destroyed. It was, therefore, necessary to give some other impulse to the spirit of trade, in order to restore life to French industry. The only means of doing this was to deprive England of her monopoly in manufactures, and to direct to this the general tendency and economy of the state. This required the Continental system in all its force; nothing less could answer the purpose, for it was necessary to offer an enormous premium upon fabrics before capitalists could be induced to make the requisite outlays for the construction of large manufacturing establishments.

The result proved the correctness of my views; I transferred the seat of industry across the Channel, and it has made such great progress on the continent that it fears no rivalry. If France wishes to prosper, let her retain my system, merely changing its name. If she desires ruin, let her recommence her maritime enterprises; the English will destroy them at the first outbreak of war. I was forced to carry the Continental system to extremes, because it was my object not only to benefit France, but also to injure England. We could receive colonial products only through

the English ministry, for it naturally controlled all the flags that engaged in colonial trade. It was, therefore, necessary to import as little as possible; and the best means of accomplishing this was to impose enormous duties on such products. The political object was accomplished; the state finances were benefited; but the French ladies were disconsolate, and they sought to avenge themselves on me for thus cutting off their luxuries.

Every day's experience proved the benefits of the colonial system, for the state prospered, notwithstanding the burthen of war. The imports were well regulated; credit on a par with the interest of money; the spirit of improvement showed itself in agriculture as well as manufactures; villages were built up anew, like the streets of Paris; the roads and canals facilitated the interior movement; some new improvement was invented every week; I caused sugar to be made of beets, soda of salt, indigo of pastel; the improvement in the sciences kept pace with that in the arts. In England, on the contrary, a few merchants enriched themselves, but the industrial mass suffered; the notes of the bank lost a third and almost one half their value, for a pound sterling was worth in exchange only thirteen francs. The injury to England would have been still greater if Spain had entered into my system as I had hoped, and if the unexpected revolutions in Spanish America had not opened valuable markets to the English. Although its execution was imperfect, and had much fallen short of its intended object, it nevertheless would have been madness to renounce this system at the very moment when it was bearing fruit: it was necessary to strengthen it and to give it a wider career of emulation.

**THIS SYSTEM LEADS TO WAR.**—The obligation which now rested on me to persevere in this system, and the necessary continuance of the war by England, influenced the political condition of the continent. From this moment the matter assumed a more serious character. The question involved the prosperity and almost the existence of England. The war became popular with the people. The English no longer entrusted their protection to foreigners; they now took the matter into their own hands, and again appeared with strong armies on the continent. They were to have for auxiliaries all those whose interests were momentarily affected by my system, and this class was large. If a great maritime commerce is one of the first elements of wealth and prosperity, the freedom of the seas becomes the most necessary and valuable of all things, for every nation on the globe. This freedom of the seas was the main object of my Continental



system; but people who preferred their present enjoyments could see, for the moment only the closing of their ports and the cessation of their traffic; future benefits were scarcely considered. This explains the general hatred which was unchained against my system. Not only were all the coast countries tired of the war and the sacrifices it imposed on them; this feeling extended even to the heart of the continent. The cloths of Silesia and the fabrics of the confines of Bohemia went no longer to Cadiz, to be carried by Spanish flags to Mexico. The North no longer sold its grains to Holland, or purchased wines of us. The silks of Lyons could reach Prussia only by land; England and Sweden were reached in trade only by Archangel. The true cause of this evil was the maritime despotism of an insular power, which had the means of placing so many obstacles to the general welfare of the continent. I had now grappled with this colossus, but the people whom it oppressed, instead of momentarily submitting to sacrifices in order to second my efforts, imputed to me all the evils from which I was seeking to deliver them; so true is it that great national policy is above the understanding of the merchant and stock-jobber.

ITS INFLUENCE ON STATE POLICY.—The political branch of this Continental system offers, like the commercial branch, two points of view of equal importance: the first consisted in effecting with the neighboring powers, by means of alliances, treaties, and leagues, what I had effected in France by decrees—the exclusion of English commerce; the second consisted in preparing, by the same alliances, the maritime and military means for attacking more directly the British colossus, when the favorable moment should arrive. We could attack in India by means of Russia, Persia, and Turkey; we might reach it in the Antilles, from Spanish America and the United States. Finally, we could attack it in Europe by the union of all the states interested in overthrowing its maritime despotism.

The treaty of Tilsit had not absolutely provided for all the combinations conducive to this result; but it had, nevertheless, done much in that direction. Since the English refused to respect neutrals, it was necessary that no one should be neutral; every one had necessarily to decide for England or against England; our engagements, made on condition that this power rejected the mediation of Russia, would oblige the maritime nations to act in concert with us. Spain was at war with the English; Turkey had just declared war against them; Italy, with the exception of the Court of Rome, which still held out, was subject to

my laws. Prussia had just broken with them. There was then only Portugal, Sweden, and the Pope to bring to terms, in order to entirely interdict to them all access to the continent, for we hoped that Denmark would hasten to join our system. Austria, indeed, offered more difficulty, but she had only the single seaport of Trieste. From Venice I could control all vessels approaching that port; and the Seven Isles rendered me master of the Adriatic. Moreover, Austria would hardly expose herself to a war with Russia and France for relations that concerned her less than any other continental power; she had neither colonies to regret nor products for maritime exportation. I could give her promises to indemnify her for any losses. If I should finally enter into the project of the partition of the Ottoman Empire, Servia and Bosnia might serve as the price of her condescension. I determined to bring her into my Continental system.

**ITS INFLUENCE ON MARITIME RELATIONS.**—In case England should refuse the Russian mediation for peace, it would be necessary not only to close against her all access to the continent, but also to turn against her all the resources of the maritime powers. Europe could still oppose to her one hundred and eighty ships of the line—viz., sixty French, forty Spanish, twenty-five Russian, fifteen Swedish, fifteen Dutch, fifteen Danish, and ten Portuguese. In a few years this force could be increased to two hundred and fifty. By the aid of these means and our immense flotilla, it was not impossible to conduct a European army to London. One hundred ships, employed in the two hemispheres, would draw away a great part of the British naval forces, while eighty of the best vessels, united in the Channel, might secure the passage of our flotilla and avenge the outraged law of nations.

Such was the fundamental principles of my system, which writers in English pay have taxed with folly; the want of success of the project resulted, perhaps, from faults committed in its execution with respect to Spain. How is it possible to judge fairly of a project which was not adopted till the end of 1807, and failed the following year by the misfortunes which opened to the English on the peninsula and the American continent? Had it not been for the war with Spain, the whole continent of Europe and all the Spanish colonies would have been interdicted to English commerce; the naval resources of all the continental powers would have been directed against England; I should have resumed my project of a descent from Boulogne with much greater chances of success.



**MEASURES FOR ITS EXECUTION.**—The first means of reaching my object, in this double political and commercial relation, was to occupy militarily all the maritime countries where England had great influence, and where no sincere accession would be given to our system. Sweden, Portugal, and Rome were of this class; Denmark was to be invited to accede to this system, and, in case of her refusal to be occupied like the others. England, who had eyes and ears everywhere, and whose gold discovered the most profound secrets of foreign cabinets, was informed of these dispositions as soon as they were made. Instead of yielding to the tempest, she prepared herself to master it.

**MEDIATION OFFERED BY RUSSIA.**—In the mean time the Emperor of Russia had hastened to send to London the offer of his mediation for peace, announcing that he had agreed with me, that I, on my side, would accept it, provided that England did the same within a month from the ratification of the treaty. The Cabinet of London consented to the mediation, but would make no reply to the proposition till it should see the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit! It was in vain objected, on the side of Russia, that these articles were eventual, temporary; that the Emperor could not communicate them, inasmuch as he had promised secrecy, but that they were in no way prejudicial to England, since they ceased to have any force the moment the Cabinet of St. James decided on peace. The matter rested here, when the news of the English attack on Copenhagen filled Europe with alarm.

**ENGLISH EXPEDITION AGAINST DENMARK.**—The great armament so long promised to the coalition was just ready to sail for the Baltic when peace was signed. Perceval and Canning deemed the moment opportune to employ this imposing force, now useless on the continent, against Denmark, who had opposed the pretensions of England, but was at peace with her. If a debarkation on the continent was impossible, such was not the case with the island of Zealand, where they could attack Copenhagen in spite of our legions, whose passage the English fleet might intercept by the Belt. The expedition was, therefore, directed against that city, and its success was deemed the more certain because Denmark, surrounded by belligerent troops on the side of Pomerania and Mecklenburg, had directed all her attention and forces on the side of Holstein, in order to secure her territory from insult.

The Cabinet of St. James alleged, as the motive of this unjust aggression, its knowledge of the secret conditions of the

treaty of Tilsit, in which we (France and Russia) had stipulated the conditional closing of the ports of Denmark, and the exclusion of the English from the continent.

A fleet of twenty-nine ships, twelve frigates and five hundred transports set sail, on the twenty-seventh of July, entered on the fourth of August a port in the Sound and a port in the Belt, and landed an army of thirty-two thousand men, including the Hanoverians before sent to Stralsund. Lord Cathcart commanded this expedition. Under him was Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterward Lord Wellington. This conqueror of Schindiah and the Mahrattas, recalled from India by the laws of his country, here performed his first service on the European continent. An immense equipage and select troops furnished these chiefs the means of a successful enterprise. Jackson was sent to Christian VII. to propose to him a close alliance with England, and to demand the surrender of his fleet, to be taken to English ports, as a pledge of his sincerity! It was a repetition of the infamous demands made upon the Turks, but supported, this time, by more powerful means. The King, the Prince Royal, and the two Bernstofs, had too high a regard of their own dignity to accept what the Turks had repelled with indignation. If England had denounced the stipulations of Tilsit, and proposed to Denmark to join her in the defense of her territory, declaring war against her in case of her refusal, this step would have been more natural; but to impose on her the obligation of committing an act of base cowardice was rather too much! On vague rumors, and a mere suspicion of what had taken place at Tilsit, the English were about to assail a government which had armed itself on the shore of the Trave, to oppose us.

**PREPARATIONS OF THE DANES FOR DEFENSE.**—The Danish government, though taken unprepared, showed itself no less noble than in 1801. The Prince Royal, who was in Holstein, flew to Copenhagen, through the midst of the English cruisers, induced the King to retire to Glückstadt on the continent, confided the defense of Zealand to General Peymann, organized the provincial militia for the succor of the capital, then returned to the army of Holstein to hasten its arrival. During the communications between the authorities of the two parties, and while the English were constructing and arming their land batteries, these militia, numbering about ten thousand, advanced toward Kioegge; but being surprised there on the twenty-ninth of August,



by twelve thousand Anglo-Hanoverians, they were beaten and dispersed.\*

**CAPTURE OF COPENHAGEN.**—The efforts of the English negotiator and generals having failed to accomplish their object, they declared, on the second of September, that they would bombard the city. General Peymann had only a small number of troops of the line, but the *bourgeoise* militia of Copenhagen had taken arms with the same enthusiasm as in 1801. But this force could do nothing against the thunders of the enemy's fleet and land battalions; this beautiful city was soon set on fire; in three days six hundred houses became a prey to the flames, and a capitulation was the only means of saving the city from total destruction.

In the mean time the Prince Royal had hastily assembled the army cantoned in Holstein, and marched it to the coast of Fionia. Vain hope! The passage of the Belts was cut off, the capital had already fallen, and the English had carried away their fleet of eighteen ships and twenty-one frigates or brigs. Not content with despoiling all the maritime arsenals, they destroyed the Danish ship-yards and all the utensils and machines used in building; then, with their important but odious trophies, they returned to the Thames. The exasperation of the Danes was such that the Prince Royal sent an order to General Peymann to burn the squadron rather than surrender it. But the officer who carried this order was taken in his attempt to penetrate into Copenhagen. Far from being discouraged by this misfortune, the King of Denmark, indignant at such treatment, swore desperate war against the English, closed his ports against them, ordered the cessation of all relations with them, and seized

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\*This attack upon Copenhagen, without any previous declaration of war, and without any just cause of complaint against the conduct of Denmark as a neutral power, has been condemned by every impartial writer on that event. The English themselves do not attempt to justify it on any other ground than that of *expediency*,—a word so frequently employed to cover injustice, dishonesty, and crime, by states as well as individuals.

The reply of the Prince Royal to the demand of the English to surrender into their hands his entire naval force was a noble one: "No example is to be found in history of so odious an aggression as that with which Denmark is menaced; more honor may now be expected from the pirates of Barbary than from the English government."

The injury to Copenhagen before the surrender was very great. The principal churches and public buildings were in ruins; eighteen hundred houses were destroyed; fifteen hundred inhabitants lost their lives, and a vast number were wounded. About three thousand five hundred pieces of artillery were captured, and the prize-money distributed to the British troops was about four million and eight hundred thousand dollars.

upon British subjects and property throughout all the kingdom. This venerable prince never returned to his capital, but died shortly afterward at Rendsborg, and it is thought that the chagrin he felt at these reverses contributed to accelerate his end.

Assuredly, if the interest of state is sufficient to legitimize such an aggression, and if the Cabinet of London can, on this principle of great state policy, justify itself in the eyes of Europe, it would have been just, at least, to treat my enterprises with more indulgence than has been done; for no one of them was so unpardonable as this, and none but were as necessary for the interests of my empire as this was for England.

**BRUNE TAKES STRALSUND AND RUGEN.**—As soon as I heard of the approach of the enemy's squadrons, I directed Brune to do every thing in his power to assist the Danes. After the peace of Tilsit, it was no longer for the interest of Sweden to remain in close alliance with England against France and Russia combined; this was to expose herself to certain ruin. But Gustavus IV., consulting only his passions, and influenced by the success of the English against the Danes, whom he hated, did not fear to brave the threatening thunders, by himself breaking the armistice of Schlattkow. It is said that the promise of Norway and a part even of the Danish territory led him to adopt this extravagant resolution.

I ordered Marshal Brune to get possession of Stralsund. This place, easily supplied by sea, was capable of a long defense. Chasseloup was charged with this siege, the means being supplied from the arsenals of Magdeburg, Berlin, and Stettin. The attack, begun on the fifteenth of August, on three fronts, was pushed with uncommon activity. The recollection of the fine defense of this place by Charles XII., whom Gustavus pretended to imitate, was a powerful motive for him to hold out to the last extremity; but this prince possessed only the rashness of his ancestor, not his genius. The Swedes complained, moreover, of the obstinacy of their sovereign. Abandoned by the English, who had concentrated their forces in Zealand, and touched by the remonstrances of the magistrates, he ordered the place to be evacuated, and Brune took possession of it on the twentieth of August, finding four hundred pieces of cannon and the fortifications untouched. Fifteen days after, the island of Rugen was also ceded to us, in virtue of a capitulation requiring the Swedish army to retire to its own country and the fleet to leave the coasts of Germany. Stralsund was of no use to me for a continental war, but if I restored it to the Swedes, it might be



made a place of debarkation for the English; I therefore directed Brune to dismantle it.

**RUSSIA DECLARES WAR AGAINST THE ENGLISH.**—The affair of Copenhagen was the most insulting answer that could be given to the Emperor Alexander's offer of mediation. Justly indignant, he declaimed with energy against this infraction; but all his efforts being unable to prevent the spoliation of the fleet and the arsenals, it only remained for him to break off all relations with England, which he did by his manifesto of the seventh of November. After a long enumeration of griefs, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg broke off all communication with England, recalled its legation, interdicted all relations between the two countries, proclaimed the principles of the armed neutrality, and declared that it would reëstablish nothing without first obtaining satisfaction for Denmark; it finally closed with these words:

"When the Emperor shall be satisfied on all pending points, and especially on that of peace between France and England, without which no part of Europe can hope for real tranquillity, His Imperial Majesty will then willingly resume with Great Britain the relations of friendship, which, under the circumstances, the Emperor has already preserved, perhaps, too long."

England replied by specious arguments, but without manifesting any sincere desire for an accommodation. War was now inevitable.

**INTERCESSION OF AUSTRIA.**—The Cabinet of Vienna had already offered its mediation when the continental war was at its height in Poland. Invited to enter into the general league, it thought best to add its influence to that of Russia to induce England to make peace. If she should accept the proposition, it was thought at Vienna that this alone would dissolve the formidable league established under my influence. Two or three years of maritime peace would overthrow all the supports of this league, for it would then have no object. If, on the contrary, England should refuse, and Austria should be drawn into a rupture, the Cabinet of Vienna flattered itself that it would obtain, on my part, a just indemnification; and to stimulate this expectation, I had already proposed to Francis I. such parts of the Turkish provinces as he might desire. Consequently the Count of Stahrenberg, Austrian minister at the Court of St. James, made strong efforts to induce the English cabinet to make concessions.

NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING TURKEY.—In the mean time matters took a more favorable turn for us at Constantinople than I had anticipated, which placed me in an embarrassing position in regard to Russia. The factionists who had dethroned Selim soon disputed among themselves for the spoils. The mufti triumphed over the caimacan by the aid of this same Cobakchi, who, from an obscure chief of Yamacks, became for a time the regulator of the empire. Sebastiani was sufficiently adroit to secure his support, so that he soon exercised over Mustapha part of the influence which he had had over Selim. The issue of the enterprises of the English against Egypt, and of the naval combat of Lemnos, was calculated to increase this ascendancy. As soon as the war with England had been formally declared, the new captain-pacha, Seyd-Ali, desirous of distinguishing himself, made sail with a squadron of nine ships, passed out of the Dardanelles, and, on the first of July, offered battle to his adversaries near Lemnos. The engagement was warm; the Russians, better instructed in naval tactics and better disciplined, broke the enemy's line, captured a vessel, and forced the captain-pacha to return into the Dardanelles; but having suffered themselves, they returned to Corfu, where they soon learned of the peace of Tilsit and of the armistice of Slobodza.

Colonel Guilleminot, sent to the army of the vizier to negotiate this armistice, had concluded it on the twenty-fourth of August. Michelson was dead; his successor agreed to two articles which the Emperor Alexander rejected. Nevertheless, the evacuation of the principalities had commenced; the Turks violated the armistice by passing the Danube at Galacz, and by executing some Moldavian authorities established by the Russians. The latter, informed of the refusal of the Emperor to ratify the armistice and of the infraction of the treaty, promptly reoccupied the left bank of the Danube.

But the treaty of Tilsit had completely changed the policy of the Cabinet of London in regard to Russia and the Porte; it immediately ordered the evacuation of Alexandria, and attempted to reestablish its relations with Turkey. Lord Paget endeavored to be admitted at Constantinople, but Sebastiani succeeded in procuring his rejection. On the other hand, the Turks had accepted my mediation. I therefore was obliged to decide upon the course I was to pursue. The good dispositions of the Divan had somewhat calmed my resentment against the persecutors of Selim. Sebastiani, whose opinion I had asked respecting a partition, opposed the project with specious arguments;



should I renounce it, it would then be for my interest to act as mediator in order to conciliate the interests of the two nations from which I could derive equal advantages against my irreconcilable enemy, either to close the Black Sea, or to open to ourselves the gates of the East. I felt that, perhaps, I had gone too far in my conversations at Tilsit; I directed Savary, who was on a mission to St. Petersburg, to enter into explanations respecting the future fate of Moldavia and Wallachia, and in regard to their evacuation, which the Turks insisted upon as a preliminary to any negotiations.

The Emperor Alexander opposed to him my promises; the Chancellor Romanof objected on account of the effect which this evacuation would have on public opinion, which was already very unfavorable to the treaty of Tilsit; the cession of these two principalities was the only satisfaction which they could give to the nation for the sacrifices which this treaty had imposed. The position was becoming delicate. If the expulsion of the Turks from Europe often excited my imagination, as an enterprise both chivalric and philanthropic, I also felt that state policy rendered this project somewhat difficult. I thought that the care and profit of it should not be left to Russia alone; and that if I did not participate in it, I ought not to encourage it. On the other hand, I was of opinion that, with the concurrence of these two powers, we could close the Black Sea and the Levant against the English. To attain this great object, I could not sacrifice the Porte to Russia, nor could I fully and openly espouse the cause of the Turks against Russia, with whom I had just so intimately connected myself at Tilsit.

Statesmen will comprehend the difficulty of attaining my objects with means so heterogeneous. The Cabinet of London, it is true, had succeeded, in 1799, in effecting this monstrous union of opposing elements, but all had then a common object—the prevention of our establishing ourselves in Egypt—and all old resentments were hushed till that object could be accomplished. But my position was very difficult; I could only propose my good offices to bring about a peace. This, however, was no easy matter; the Emperor Alexander persisted in demanding the principalities, and the Turks refused to discuss the subject so long as the cession of these provinces was spoken of. It was to be feared that the mere proposition of abandoning the principalities would throw the Divan into the arms of England, although this power had promised them to Russia in 1806. In state policy, the past is forgotten, and only the present is considered.

The entire year was passed in discussions on the single question of the place of negotiations; Russia wished to have them conducted in Moldavia; and I preferred to treat by myself at Paris. My object was to gain time, till I had executed my projects on Rome, Portugal, and Spain. If these projects should succeed, I should then be better prepared to pursue toward Russia the course which might seem preferable.

**DISTRIBUTION OF NEW TITLES OF NOBILITY.**—Before relating what took place in these countries, it may be well to say a few words in regard to France and the new nobility which I had just instituted. I was induced to this measure by powerful motives.

The scenes of Jena, Auerstädt, Pultusk, Eylau, Heilsberg, and even the victory of Friedland, had terribly thinned the ranks of my veterans of Boulogne; only the souvenirs of them existed in the regiments. The skeletons (*cadres*) were filled with young soldiers. I thought to stimulate them to new exertions by giving a just recompense to their predecessors for the glory acquired by so much courage and resignation. Moreover, the position of my throne required that I should leave to my successor a respectable class, interested in its maintenance. If a nobility be a doubtful support of thrones, and if it be true that nobles and priests are as factious as plebeians, at least this is not applicable to a new dynasty sustained by a nobility of its own creation.

*Equality of ranks*, in an old state demoralized by luxury, is a monstrous idea; and, as I have said before, I had resolved to destroy this deplorable result of the Revolution; but, in establishing social supremacies which were demanded by good morals and good sense, I sought to maintain *equality of rights*, without which there is only abuse and injustice. The institution of my nobility could not injure this *equality of rights*. The right of transmitting from father to son the souvenirs of services rendered to the state is derived from the principle of property and is nothing more than justice. Why is it permitted to transmit in this way wealth, often unjustly gained, and not to transmit the most valuable of all riches—honor?

The establishment of an hereditary nobility was calculated to reconcile, in time, new France with Europe and with old France. It was substituting a nobility acquired by illustrious services, for one which was founded only on feudal rights. All Europe was governed by nobles who were armed against the French Revolution, and we found them an obstacle wherever we sought to introduce our influence. It was important to bring



this contest to an end. To secure the fusion of the two nobilities, I wished to reconstitute the old; I was ready to stipulate that any family which had had among its ancestors a marshal of France, or a minister, should be susceptible of obtaining ducal letters; an admiral, a lieutenant-general, an archbishop, would have established claims to the title of count, etc. It was sufficient to constitute the necessary *majorats*. This historical nobility would have combined the past, the present, and the future. A Montmorency would have been a duke, not because he was a Montmorency, but because one of his ancestors had been constable. Every citizen who faithfully served the state could aspire to the same grade and to the same title. This idea, like that of the Legion of Honor, was essentially liberal; the people attached to it no other meaning than that of reward for services rendered. Every one could merit it by services; all could obtain it at the same price; it was offensive to no one.

The spirit of my empire was a movement upward—an elevation. Such, indeed, is the character of all revolutions. This spirit pervaded the whole nation; it had taken up arms in order that it might rise. I placed at the head of this movement, and as its object and reward, great recompenses. They were the result of public gratitude. They were to be kept in conformity with the spirit of equality, for the lowest soldier could obtain them by great deeds.

The statutes of March 1st, which accorded titles, were promulgated and produced a great sensation in France as well as in the army. I have never had the slightest reason to regret this measure. Perhaps the nominations were made too much in mass, and some of them without due consideration. If I had at first named only the marshals, and a hundred distinguished generals and colonels, reserving to myself the right of granting new titles and dotations, either after a battle, or every year at some great national festival, I should have possessed a strong means of stimulating powerful exertions; but this would have produced dissatisfaction, and my object would not have been so well accomplished. Nevertheless, I repeat it, the distribution was too general, and it was intrusted too much to deputies. The secretaries of Berthier became the dispensers of glory; they appointed by the Imperial Almanac, and there were found among the elect the names of colonels who had been killed a year or two before; certain generals, through accidental or intentional error, received double dotations. This depreciated, in public estimation, one of my finest institutions and one of my noblest conceptions.

The Faubourg of St-Germain did not fail to ridicule these nobles of new creation. Even the army was less pleased with the measure than I had anticipated. Some attached little value to titles against which they had contended with so much success; they pretended to accept them merely as an act of obedience; others regarded them as a burden difficult to be borne; and the nomination being made by grade, it was looked upon as a system rather than a personal distinction. The same objection had been made to the Legion of Honor. But this latter had a very different object; it was intended as a distinction for all kinds of merit; those who had gained this distinction had an incontestable right to it; it was not a favor. It must be confessed, however, that after an extensive distribution of this cross, I ought to have instituted one purely military. This I thought to do by instituting the order of *Trois-Toisons*, a project which was afterward abandoned.

There are great differences in the several European systems of reward for public services. All have their abuses. Austria and England are sparing in their use; Russia is prodigal. The best is a medium between these extremes. I abandoned the order of the *Trois-Toisons* because the plan was objectionable. Ney, Davoust, and many other brave generals who were not present at my three entries into Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid, but who had covered themselves with glory at a distance of fifty leagues, would have been excluded; this would have been unjust. Moreover, this institution would have awakened the disagreeable recollections of these powers which had now become my allies. But I might have instituted an order of merit exclusively military, in three classes, like the Legion of Honor; this would have been more acceptable to the army.

**SUPPRESSION OF THE *TRIBUNAT*.**—During this year the *tribunat* was suppressed.\* Having already lost its considera-

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\*The following history of the French *tribunat* is copied from the *Encyclopædia Americana*:

"The French constitution of December 15, 1799, projected by Bonaparte and Siéyes, committed the legislative power, though more in appearance than in reality, to a body (*corps législatif*) of three hundred men, and a *tribunat* of one hundred members chosen by the conservative senate, from the three lists of candidates proposed by the departmental colleges. To the three consuls was reserved the right of initiating laws; to the *tribunat*, that of deliberating on subjects thus proposed, and to the legislative body, that of accepting or rejecting measures thus proposed by the first, and discussed by the second. The members of the council of state, as the mouth-pieces of the government, had a considerable influence in each body. The *tribunat* had also the privilege of expressing its wishes, and making representations to the government, and sometimes ventured to exercise this right. A *tribun*



tion by the elimination of its most distinguished members, this assembly was of no advantage to the progress of state affairs. The legislative body was sufficient for the discussion of projects of laws, and for afterward voting for their adoption or rejection. The senate, as an upper house, preserved the initiative of all great changes in public institutions, and a control over the measures of the lower house. It was indeed a mute government, but experience had somewhat disgusted us with the declamations of the tribune. France in 1814 and in 1815 has shown whether I was right in distrusting large deliberative assemblies, where passion rules more than reason, and which are always basely servile in flattering authority, or visionary and imprudent in opposing it.

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was to be twenty-five years old, and have a yearly income of fifteen thousand francs. The *tribunat* was renewed every five years, by the reëlection of one-fifth of its members yearly. The last voice of freedom in the *tribunat* was Carnot's speech in opposition to the election of Bonaparte, as emperor, in 1804. By the *sénatus-consulte organique* of May 18, 1804, its general meetings were abolished, and it was permitted to meet only by sections, of which there were three (for legislation, home affairs, and finance). In 1807 the *tribunat* was suppressed."

Many have supposed that the suppression of the *tribunat* was virtually a prohibition of the liberty of discussing the laws prepared by the government. Such was not the case. It was simply a transfer of the right of discussion to the legislative body, which, under the constitution of 1799, voted silently and without any discussion whatever. By the present change that body recovered the faculty of speech, and was permitted to discuss the *projets de lois* submitted by the government. A part of the members of the suppressed *tribunat* were transferred to the legislative body, and the others provided with places in the various administrative departments. The details of these changes are very fully given in Thiers' "Consulate and Empire."

## CHAPTER XII.

## AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL; FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE PENINSULAR WAR TO THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

**Affairs of Spain**—Napoleon decides to occupy Portugal—Treaty of Fontainebleau—Junot occupies Portugal—Dissensions in the Royal Family—Talleyrand urges a War with Spain—Affairs of Italy—Napoleon's Interview with Lucien—The Milan Decree—Difficulties with the Pope—Napoleon's vast Designs in Italy—Projected Transfer of the Holy See to Paris—Occupation of Rome—Annexation of Tuscany to France—Difficulties in the Royal Family of Spain—The French occupy the Spanish Fortifications—Alarm of the Spanish Court—The pretended Project of removing it to Mexico—Political Explosion in Spain—The Revolution of Aranjuez—Murat enters Madrid—Napoleon's Instructions—Interview with the Spanish Court at Bayonne—He resolves to place a New Dynasty on the Throne—Objections to Napoleon's Plans—His Reasons for adopting them—Operations of Murat—Insurrection of the Second of May—Spanish Junta convoked at Bayonne—Napoleon's Conduct toward Ferdinand VII.—General Insurrection in Spain—Moncey driven from Valencia—Insurrection in Aragon—The Army of Galicia advances on Valladolid—Joseph proclaimed King of Spain—Dupont capitulates at Baylen—Beginning of the Siege of Saragossa—Retreat from Madrid—Romana flies from Denmark—Errors of the Campaign—Junot's Position in Portugal—General Interests of this Country—Sacrifices imposed on the Portuguese—General Insurrection in Portugal—Landing of Wellington and the English Army—Junot evacuates Portugal—Military Operations in the North of Europe.

**AFFAIRS OF SPAIN.**—It is time to direct our attention to the Iberian Peninsula, where a frightful revolution was about to take place. The negotiations opened with Portugal, in consequence of the treaty of Tilsit, did not prove successful; I expected this, and my measures were prepared to terminate the matter with this vassal of England. Relying on the weakness of Godoy, I also had good reason to count on Spain, and determined to attach her more irrevocably than ever to my inter-



ests.\* For this purpose it was necessary to give a new basis to our relations, so as not only to induce her to adopt the Continental system with all my commercial regulations, but also to secure myself from any new hesitations on her part.

The famous and imprudent proclamation of the Prince of Peace had proved that this power adhered to France from fear, rather than from that strong community of interests which had presided at the family pact of 1762, and the treaty of San Ildefonso. If she made the least retrograde step from the system which she had heretofore followed, I might expect at any moment to see her in the arms of England. What would then have been the result of all the efforts which I had made for the last ten years?

It is true, as has already been said, that the Cabinet of Madrid had some reason for complaints respecting the Balearic Isles, and that the battle of Trafalgar had already disposed them to regret this alliance. The English party had daily gained strength since these events; of this I was not ignorant. All who resided in the seaports, or who had an interest in Spanish America, wished for peace with England. My difficulties with the Pope influenced the opinion of the clergy. Nevertheless, public opinion was still on my side, and all the public animadversions fell on Godoy. Although he had repaired his error toward me by sending the corps of Romana to the North, I nevertheless felt convinced that I could not venture to count too much on the continuance of his blind devotion.

These extraordinary threats of the Cabinet of Madrid had

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\*English and Spanish historians state that Napoleon's attempt to subjugate Spain was planned at Tilsit. On the contrary, there seems to have been no such design on his part; he was drawn into it step by step by the political events which occurred from time to time. Thiers, who has had an opportunity to examine unpublished French and Spanish documents on this subject, says: "I declare that all the historians who have represented the origin of Napoleon's designs upon Spain as dating so far back as Tilsit are mistaken; that all those who have supposed that Napoleon assured himself at Tilsit of the consent of Alexander to what he projected respecting Madrid, and that he was in haste to sign the peace of the North, in order to return the sooner to the affairs of the South, are equally mistaken. At Tilsit Napoleon settled nothing but a general alliance, which guaranteed the adhesion of Russia to all that he should do on his part, on condition that Russia should be suffered to do what she pleased on hers. At this period, he did not at all consider it urgent to interfere in the affairs of Spain; he was full of resentment on account of the proclamation of the Prince of Peace, promised himself to express his sentiments upon it some day, and to secure himself, but thinking at his return of nothing but imposing peace upon England, by threatening her with complete exclusion from the continent, and of making use of the Cabinet of Madrid to bring the Cabinet of Lisbon into his projects."

the advantage of discovering to me the precipice, not before perceived, but whose depth I now might sound. Not only my Continental system, but still more my maritime system, would fall, if Spain should ever join the interests of England. I had reason to fear this sooner or later, and especially so since what had just occurred. Not only was the prosperity of France warmly interested in this, but also my own dynasty. If Charles IV. had abandoned the Bourbon interest in France, what guarantee had I that his successor would do the same, and that Godoy would not renew the foolish enterprise of 1806? What would become of me if, while in the heart of Poland with all my forces, a French prince, assisted by one hundred thousand Anglo-Spaniards, should present himself at Bordeaux? Even supposing that there was no danger of such an attempt during my life, what a powerful motive would be left for future troubles if even, after my death, the peninsula should become the point of support for some new pretender, assisted by England! It was the lever of Archimedes which would overthrow my empire.

If I had at first intended to dethrone the Spanish branch of the Bourbons, and this had been my only object, I should have profited by my alliance at Tilsit, and the grounds of complaint afforded by the proclamation of the Prince of Peace, to openly declare war. This would have been the most loyal course, and one which best accorded with my character; but it would have produced precisely what I wished to avoid; at the first sound of cannon, all the ports of Spain and Spanish America would have been open to the English, and the English influence would have been established for a long time at Madrid, Cadiz, and Mexico. An idea, much less chivalric, but much more expedient, naturally presented itself to my mind; this was to secure for ever my ascendancy and my influence in the peninsula by ceding Portugal to Spain and demanding of her in exchange the provinces between the Pyrenees and the Ebro. *This was all I could desire to completely secure my control even to the heart of the monarchy, to make it dependent on me, and to break forever the English connection with Portugal, and consequently with Spain.\**

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\*Several historians, Spanish, Portuguese, and English, have stated that the determination of the Prince Regent to emigrate to Brazil was fixed by the British ambassador's communicating to him a decree of Napoleon in the *Moniteur* of November 11th, "*that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign.*" Allison repeats this story, but says the ominous line appeared in the *Moniteur* of November 13th. Thiers says that no such phrase can be found in the *Moniteur* of these or any posterior or anterior date. But in an article of the *Moniteur* of the twelfth, commenting on the conduct of the



**NAPOLEON DECIDES TO OCCUPY PORTUGAL.**—Portugal presented itself naturally as the first step for attaining the object of my enterprise. England had reëstablished here all her influence and her monopoly. The first step taken in accordance with the treaty of Tilsit to oblige the Prince Regent to enter into this grand alliance had no other results than to confirm England respecting the tenor of the secret articles of this treaty. It was to London that the Prince Regent went to ask what response he should make to my summons! I had judged, by the negotiations of 1801, the interest taken by the Cabinet of St. James in its relations with this country, since the mere approach of General Leclerc's army had done more to decide them to sign the preliminaries of peace than any thing else that took place at that epoch in Europe.

I knew, therefore, that the occupation of Portugal would give a marked blow to British commerce and British policy. The same lesson of the past convinced me that the Prince Regent, yielding to the rule of necessity, would promise for the moment whatever I might desire. But we could never count on his sincerity, for his course was already determined on; he would prefer to transport his residence to Brazil rather than enter frankly into my alliance. He had been preparing himself for this for the last four years, and avowed it formally by his proclamation of the second of October. When the storm threatened him more nearly, he indeed offered to close his ports to the English; but so little dependence was to be placed on his promises, that two days after (October 22, 1807) his envoys signed, at London, a more close alliance with England! It was evident that he merely wished to gain time enough to secure the emigration of all his court, with the archives and the superior employees of the government. Moreover, the mere expulsion of the British flag had not prevented, under a borrowed flag, Portugal from being used as an English colony by English factors established in Portugal, and by companies having the exclusive trade in the wines of Oporto. I, therefore, demanded the expulsion of the English, and the confiscation of their property and merchandise. The Prince Regent, who had not the same motives for hatred and vengeance as I had, could not agree to these conditions; had he promised, his people would not have suffered him to accomplish it.

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English at Copenhagen and Constantinople, it is remarked that these English intrigues in Portugal, if persisted in, might produce the downfall of the House of Braganza. It is quite probable, however, that Lord Strangford did make the statement, as represented, in order to influence the Prince Regent to leave Portugal.

The formal refusal of this prince determined me. I saw that it required a power as formidable as mine to effect an entire change in the future relations of Portugal. I decided on the partition of this kingdom, and the expulsion of the House of Braganza. There was, it is true, more violence than justice in this measure; but I hoped from it the eternal expulsion of the English from the peninsula; an immense result for the accomplishment of my projects, and for the future greatness of my empire. Of course I had the same right to this usurpation as the English had to burn Copenhagen and carry off the Danish fleet. If they did not keep that country, it was merely because they had not forces sufficient to maintain themselves in it. The formal occupation of the kingdom of Portugal enabled me either to dispose of it at my pleasure, or to exchange it for Etruria and the provinces from the Pyrenees to the Ebro; it might moreover serve as an introduction to the eventual occupation of Spain itself.\*

**TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU.**—The better to attain my objects, I proposed to the Cabinet of Madrid the partition of Lusitania. A treaty to this effect was concluded at Fontainebleau on the twenty-seventh of October, 1807. It procured me the possession of Etruria, and the Infante of Parma received in exchange the province of Minho; Godoy, the Algarves and Alentejo; the remainder was to be sequestered till peace, and Charles IV. proclaimed emperor of the (Spanish) Americas. The Court of Madrid entirely adopted my views; it not only granted a passage to our troops, but placed a corps of the *élite* at my disposal in order to secure the success of the enterprise.

**JUNOT OCCUPIES PORTUGAL.**—At the approach of the army commanded by Junot,† the Prince Regent promised every

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\*This is not good logic. The conduct of the English at Copenhagen did not justify the seizure of Portugal by the French. The only tenable ground for justifying the invasion of Portugal was, that by the long dependence of this government upon England, and its entire submission to English dictation, Portugal had become a mere vassal state, and had thereby lost her rights as a sovereign and independent power. She, therefore, could not, in a war with England, claim the rights of a neutral state. There can be no doubt that Portugal at this time was as much under the dominion of England as any of her dependencies in Asia, Africa, or America, and had about as little claim to the rights of neutrality. But great conquerors, like Napoleon, pay little regard to the forms or principles of international law.

†Andoche Junot, Duke of Abrantès, was born in 1771, at Bussy-les-Forges. He first studied law, but afterward entered the army, and at the siege of Toulon was made Napoleon's secretary. Just as he had finished a dispatch during this siege, a shell which fell near him covered him with



thing that was desired of him; but such had always been the case. Nevertheless, my lieutenant, having orders to occupy Portugal at all events, continued to advance. The terrified court embarked for Brazil, and left me its kingdom, by transporting a European dynasty to an American throne.

Informed of this project by the proclamation of the second of October, I had directed Junot to make all haste to prevent the embarkation; but my declaration of November fifteenth, announcing that the *House of Braganza had ceased to reign*, inserted too soon in the *Moniteur*, reached Lisbon, by way of London and the sea, in eight days.\* The Prince Regent, dethroned by my decrees, was relieved from further uncertainty respecting the course he should take, and deemed it prudent not to await the approach of my troops. He embarked on the twenty-seventh of November, and took with him a treasure of five hundred millions, and a fleet of eight ships, three frigates, four brigs, leaving behind five ships, five frigates, and twelve schooners, which he was unable to take away. Contrary winds retained them two days in the Tagus; our troops were within two leagues, and the next day entered Lisbon.

Junot had marched with such precipitation that he had crossed, without the slightest precaution, the sterile country from Alcantara to Castelbranco and the frightful mountains which separate this city from Abrantès, where his army was near perishing. He reached Lisbon with only two or three thousand men, who resembled specters more than conquerors. This rapidity was requisite to prevent the emigration of the government. Junot deemed this object so important that he entered Lisbon with only a feeble escort, and even fired at the departing squadron with the Portuguese batteries, so great was the terror which preceded him. He nevertheless was too late, and this imprudent and precipitate march contributed not a little to our ulterior reverses in this country, by exhibiting to the Portuguese our young and famished conscripts as adversaries not very formidable—a first impression which was never effaced. The his-

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dust. Turning to Bonaparte, he coolly remarked: "This comes just in time, I wanted some sand to dry my writing." This gave the general a high opinion of his courage, and he appointed him *aid-de-camp*. He accompanied Napoleon to Italy and Egypt, and served in most of his campaigns, receiving numerous wounds. For his early success in Portugal he received the title of Duke of Abrantès, but his subsequent operations proved his utter want of capacity to command a separate army. In 1812 he commanded the eighth corps and distinguished himself at the battle of Valourina. He died in 1813.

\*Vide note on page 558.

tory of the miseries endured by this army would have turned me from my projects, if I had not been entirely deceived respecting the character of the nations which I wished to subdue.

While Junot was thus making his adventurous march to Lisbon, the Spanish General Taranco took possession of the provinces of the Douro, and the Marquis of Salano penetrated by Alentejo to Evora and Setuval; a Spanish division, under General Caraffa, had followed Junot to Lisbon.

**DISSENSIONS IN THE ROYAL FAMILY OF SPAIN.**—At this epoch, domestic quarrels of a scandalous nature disgraced the family of Charles IV. The Prince of Peace, abusing his influence, humiliated the heir to the throne; and the latter, seeking shelter from the vexations of the favorite, authorized by his father, had asked of me the hand of a princess of my house, with the hope of securing my protection. Unfortunately, I then had at my disposal none but the daughter of Lucien. Her father had so ill conducted himself toward me that I could hardly reward him for it by giving a throne to his daughter, over whom he would exercise more influence than I could. Moreover, I had no great confidence in this step of Ferdinand. This prince had married, as his first wife, the daughter of Queen Caroline of Naples, the most implacable of my enemies; I knew that this connection had influenced his political sentiments, and that his hatred to Godoy had alone caused his proposed connection with France.

Nevertheless, the false steps recently taken against me by the favorite and the demand of a princess of my house by Ferdinand was sufficient proof that the hatred of this prince was susceptible of change; he called me in his letter, *the great man of the age*. But was this step of the Prince of the Asturias legal? An hereditary prince, who, without the consent of his king, establishes relations with a foreign dynasty, is the most guilty of state criminals. I deferred answering him. It was necessary first of all to have some explanations with my brother Lucien.

**TALLEYRAND URGES WAR AGAINST SPAIN.**—Talleyrand, whose pride equaled his ambition, had left, at the end of 1807, the department of foreign affairs, in the quality of Vice-Grand Elector, an office which had been created for him, as that of Vice-Constable had been for Berthier. A base jealousy actuated this vain diplomatist, and a question of the antechamber made him leave a post where he had more importance and power, in order not to suffer the proximity of a rival whom he detested.



Skillful in directing an intrigue, Talleyrand was a man of business rather than a statesman. He had an easy and luminous way of presenting things. His work suited me, and I did all I could to turn him from the ridiculous change which he solicited. He was replaced by Champagny.

At the time of the ordinary trip to Fontainebleau, and of the dissensions in the royal family of Spain, he had already begun to regret having left the ministry; he was tired of inaction, and thought that I might consent, perhaps, to give him a kind of supreme control over our foreign relations, and also allow him to retain his new dignity. With this object, he overwhelmed me with memoirs, notes, and conversations, tending to prove that I had only to show myself with thirty thousand men to subjugate Spain. Europe was strangely deceived in this matter, for it deemed him, on his own word, to have opposed the war.

AFFAIRS OF ITALY.—Far from adopting his views, I wished to begin by securing to myself the line of the Ebro, and then to wait the course of events. After the signature of the treaty of Fontainebleau, I repaired to Italy. I had several objects in view in this journey; I hoped that my presence in this country might decide Austria to enter frankly into our grand alliance against England. This object was accomplished, for the Cabinet of Vienna soon directed Count Stahrenberg to quit London, if his mediation should be rejected; and, in fact, this ambassador left England the early part of February. Moreover, I imposed on the Pope, and made him enter into an Italian Confederacy like that of the Rhine, composed of Naples, Etruria, the kingdom of Italy, and the states of the Pope, under my protectorate.

INTERVIEW WITH LUCIEN.—I afterward wished to come to explanations on the proposition made by the Prince of the Asturias. Lucien had been ambassador to Madrid, and was well acquainted with this court; by placing his daughter\* on the throne, he would have been able to serve my policy; but I demanded, as a pledge of his obedience, that he should separate from his wife, whose conduct was far from irreproachable and who had lived with him publicly as his mistress.† I wished to ally my brother to one of the greatest sovereign houses in Europe. And the act of obedience which I required would have

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\*This daughter was by Mademoiselle Boyer, Lucien's first wife.

†This was the widow of the banker Joubertean, whom Lucien had married at the end of 1803. This marriage greatly enraged Napoleon, and was the foundation of the misunderstanding between the two brothers.

been in my estimation a sufficient pledge of his future sentiments, and have redoubled the honor of my family. We had an interview at Mantua. Lucien consented to the marriage of his daughter, but refused the conditions which I made to a reconciliation; I had everything to apprehend from a brother who gave to Europe this dangerous example of scorning my wishes; of a madman, who was sacrificing to his base inclinations the throne of Spain, and the destinies of France; a deplorable blindness, since it had great influence on my own disasters as well as those of Spain! !

**THE CELEBRATED MILAN DECREE.**—It was on my return from this interview that I issued my famous Milan decree, in reprisal for the new pretensions of England. When near the accomplishment of my grand system, I received the British Order in Council of November 11th, declaring *that all countries occupied by our troops, or excluding the English flag from their ports, should be considered in a state of blockade; and that every vessel destined for such countries should be subject to visit, stopped in the open seas, taken to English ports, and made to pay such an imposition as should be fixed by law of Parliament.*

This was subjecting our commerce and that of Europe to an infamous tax, since it admitted a kind of suzerainty and right of control in the English over all foreign goods crossing the high seas; this was stamping the seal of infamy on all powers which should willingly submit to such a code. I opposed to it the Milan decree of December 17th. It declared:

1st. *That every vessel which should conform to the British Order in Council should be denationalized, treated as an English vessel and a good prize, whether taken in the ports of the continent or captured on the high seas.*

2d. *That the British Isles should be declared in a state of blockade, on land and on sea, and that any vessel sailing to or from these islands, or their colonies, should be a good prize.*

Thus one abuse led to another, in this fatal career in which we were urged by our bitter hatred; nevertheless, this corsair legislation would have resulted in the detriment of our enemies, had it not been for the lamentable event which opened to the English the ports of Spain and of Spanish America.

**DIFFICULTIES WITH THE POPE.**—At this epoch a quarrel, not very serious in appearance, but which might, however, have led to serious results, took place between me and the Pope. Since the *articles réglementaires* which I had added to the concordat, or, rather, since the return of Pius VII. from my corona-



tion without having obtained the restitution of the provinces as he had hoped, the Holy See had commenced a little underhand war, which had become the most bitter at the epoch of 1805. The Court of Rome complained that, in its temporal relations, I had required it to enter into this Italian confederation.

An English and Russian squadron was then preparing to effect a landing in Calabria and even in Naples. The French *corps-d'armée*, placed in the *presqu'île* of Otranto, would have been lost if the Pope had consented, through worldly ambition, to ally himself with *heretics*. I demanded of the Holy See that it should receive a garrison in Ancona, and conclude an offensive and defensive alliance against the coalition, with the Viceroy of Italy and the King of Naples. It refused to do this.

After the peace of Presburg, a French army entered Naples, and it became more necessary than ever for me to communicate with my army through the Roman states. In the mean time, without troubling himself with the condition of Austria, the Pope had surrendered himself to English councils. Agents were exciting the people to revolt; everywhere, from Ancona to the frontiers of Naples, they murdered our soldiers. General Bentinck had organized a focus of insurrection in Sicily, and his great laboratory was in Rome. I warned the Pope of this, and summoned him to close his ports to the enemies of France, to drive them from Rome, and to frankly make common cause with us. I renewed these demands at the time of my journey to Milan, and my proposition for entering into the Italian confederation was no better received. The Holy See responded by menaces which would hardly have been pardonable in the time of Gregory VII. This was to completely annul my position in Italy, and to permit a handful of degenerate Romans under the monastic yoke to oppose all that I could do to aggrandize this peninsula; such a state of things could not continue.

Lombardy already began to appreciate the efforts which I was making for the regeneration of that country. The army was naturally the main object of my care; no means were neglected to revive a military feeling in this people, debased by three centuries of foreign domination; I revived the love of glory by constructing great monuments. The Forum-Bonaparte, an enterprise worthy of the Romans, was to be built on the ruins of the citadel of Milan. The project had been traced out by the celebrated Antolini, but its execution was deferred till peace; in the mean time a magnificent arena and a circus which would have done honor to the most glorious era of Rome were raised in a portion of this same ground. The superb triumphal arch

of the Simplon, projected on the avenue of Domodossola, was to carry to the remotest ages the memory of the campaign of the St. Bernard and the resurrection of the Italian Republic. Measures were also taken to encourage letters. Some have reproached me with having imposed chains on literature, or with having degraded it to such eulogies as I ordered; this is absurd; to repress abuses is not to oppose an obstacle to *belles-lettres* under a glorious reign; and if eulogies were pronounced upon the great things which I undertook, it was because there could be no better theme for letters than in celebrating immortal works.

NAPOLEON'S VAST DESIGNS IN ITALY.—I moreover had vast designs on Italy. This long *presqu'île*, with Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily, presented a sea-coast of not less than one thousand two hundred leagues; it had once ruled the world by its armies, and it seemed not the less intended by nature to rule the seas. Too narrow and deep for a continental power, it did not offer the necessary surface for maneuvering easily on either slope of the Apennines; the invading armies have always been obliged merely to attack the defensive forces in front. An enemy, coming from the north, and making himself master of Rome on the one side and Pesaro on the other, would be in quiet possession of all the country in his rear, for the Italian army, driven back into Calabria, could only act by debarkations. As a maritime power, on the contrary, Italy would be formidable.

The Genoese and Venetian sailors for three centuries disputed the commerce of the East, and they would have played a much greater part had not their country been divided up into twenty smaller states. Magnificent roadsteads, like those of Spezzia, Tarentum, Cataro, Ragusa; considerable ports, as Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, Ancona, Venice, Ragusa, Corfu; an abundance of sailors; a proximity to Macedonia, Bosnia, and Albania, whose vast forests furnished the finest ship-timbers; and to Hungary, from which copper could be obtained with facility; such are some of the innumerable advantages presented by Italy for equipping large fleets. Time and money were only necessary to equip, in this country, a naval force of fifty ships and as many frigates, and, in concert with Spain, France, and Holland, to put an end to English supremacy.

TRANSFER OF THE HOLY SEE TO PARIS.—The first step toward the regeneration of Italy was to put an end to the temporal power of the Pope. The possession of the Roman states was essential in order to connect Naples, that is eight millions of southern Italians, with the kingdom of Italy, Tuscany, Genoa,



Piedmont, Cisalpine, or the eight millions of northern Italians. To take possession of the Roman states and still leave there the spiritual power of the Pope was a difficult matter, as it would have been forging arms against myself. I found a unique and admirable means of attaining my object, in executing a double project which would leave me free arbiter of the Roman states, and at the same time reinforce my authority by all the influence left to the Holy See in Europe. This was to transfer the head of the Church to Paris, and afterward to unite the people of Italy as a single nation.

It was with this object, and on the news of the agitation which reigned at Rome, that I resolved to make an end of the matter. A few days after my victorious entrance into Vienna, and four days previous to the battle of Essling, I issued my decree, annexing Rome and the states of the Church. What immense results would have sprung from this project if I had succeeded in it! I should have rid the empire of all ultramontane intrigues; I should have procured for it, by the influence of the Pope, a great ascendancy over the Catholics of Poland, Hungary, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. And by retempering the descendants of the ancient Romans, and putting them in the same mould with the Neapolitans and Lombards, I might make Italy a respectable maritime power, since she would have as much coast and as many ports as France. The Pope would also have gained more than he lost by this project, for instead of being a petty prince of Italy, he would have become the second personage in Europe.

**OCCUPATION OF ROME.**—Perhaps I committed an error in hastening too much the execution of this design. It was important for me to spare the Pope as much as possible, at the moment when I was dealing my blows in Spain and Portugal; but, drawn on by the moral effect produced on me by the hostile course of the Roman pontiff, at the moment when the alliance of Tilsit gave him up to my discretion, I ordered, at the end of January, 1808, a corps of six thousand men to enter Rome, and I demanded the cession of the Marches, and a frank adhesion to the Italian league. The Pope, proud of being placed on his own field of battle, thought to defend his temporal power by replying to me with the thunders of the Church. Briefs,\* bulls, com-

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\*A *brief* is distinguished from a *bull*, in being more concise, written on paper, sealed with red wax, and impressed with the seal of the fisherman, or Peter in a boat. A *bull* is more ample, written on parchment, and sealed with lead or green wax.

plaints, menaces, were redoubled. His brief of March 27th, 1808, especially, held language to which I was little accustomed; it threatened me with excommunication; I replied to it by a decree annexing Ancona and the Marches to the kingdom of Italy.

**ANNEXATION OF TUSCANY TO FRANCE.**—These partial reunions were, as I have said, only a prelude to a more vast design; some weeks after, having given a part of the Roman states to the kingdom of Italy, I pronounced the reunion of Tuscany and the duchy of Parma with France. The treaty of Fontainebleau had given me this country in exchange for a part of Portugal. It was important for me to hasten to take possession of it, and, by transporting the limits of my empire to the Ombrone, I should give a more solid basis to my influence over Naples.

**NAPOLEON RENOUNCES THE ALLIANCE WITH FERDINAND.**—I returned from Italy to France more indignant than ever with Lucien, and very little disposed to satisfy the wish of Ferdinand. I had not so replied to him; this was a fault with which posterity will reproach me, although it was not exclusively mine. It was the result of circumstances. *But what would have been said of me if, justly distrusting Ferdinand and his counsellors as I did, I had moreover placed Lucien, in the quality of his father-in-law, at the head of the opposition against me?*

**FERDINAND ARRESTED BY HIS FATHER'S ORDERS.**—Events soon became so complicated as to render it uncertain what course I ought to pursue. Godoy, hearing of the proposition which Ferdinand had made to me, to marry a princess of the imperial family, and of the conferences which this prince had had on the subject with the ambassador, Beauharnais, thought that his own existence depended on his preventing this union, which would secure the triumph of the heir to the throne, on whom he had cast so many indignities. Trembling at the consequences of such an event, he induced Charles IV. to consider this intrigue as a serious matter, and to have his son tried, as a state criminal, by the high court of the Council of the Indies and of Castile; he was made prisoner in the palace (October 29th), and there was every probability that this prince would experience the same fate as the unfortunate Don Carlos, who was condemned by Philip II. I succeeded in saving him; Charles IV. pardoned his son, but proceeded against his counsellors.

**NAPOLEON OCCUPIES THE SPANISH FORTIFICATIONS.**—The occupation of Portugal required a line of posts across Spain; this arrangement accorded very well with my views.



Under pretext of sustaining Junot, I had pushed Murat on the Ebro, with fifty thousand men. Duhesme entered into Catalonia as if merely to cross and rejoin Murat. He succeeded in placing garrisons in Figüêras and into the citadel of Barcelona; Murat also succeeded, by subterfuge, in garrisoning Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. I shall not undertake to justify these steps, though they will appear less censurable if it be remembered that these places were to fall to me in the projected exchange of Portugal for the provinces of the Ebro. By occupying them I wished to prevent all idea of resistance on the part of the Spaniards, and to more easily remove all scruples that might oppose this exchange; history had taught me that, in great enterprises, success justifies the means; the result of my enterprise was to be so immense that I sacrificed every other consideration to its success. I deemed myself the more certain of becoming the arbiter of Spain, as the *élite* of the Spanish army was with Romana, near Denmark, and twenty-five thousand men had just entered Portugal with Junot. An unexpected revolution soon gave a different aspect to affairs.

**ALARM OF THE SPANISH COURT.**—There being no further reason for delay, and Portugal being agitated by the rumor of a partition, I directed Junot to take possession of the whole country in my name. This step was a natural prelude to the projected cession, for before ceding away a country it is necessary either to establish a claim to it or to gain possession of it as a right of conquest. This apparent violation of the treaty of Fontainebleau was a thunder-clap to Godoy and his partisans, who did not comprehend its motive. Combined with the clandestine occupation of the fortresses, this measure discovered to him the abyss which was opening beneath his feet. He remembers his proclamation, the trial of Ferdinand, the marriage project, and trembles at being exposed to my vengeance. He persuades Charles IV. that I am going to treat him as I had done the Prince Regent of Portugal. With this idea he induces him to transfer the court to Seville, where he can defend himself on the left bank of the Tagus, or, if beaten, fly to America.

**PROJECT OF REMOVING IT TO MEXICO.**—Godoy has been accused of contriving with me the removal of the royal family to Mexico, the same as the family of Braganza had taken refuge in Brazil. Two circumstances will be sufficient to demonstrate the folly of these allegations: the first, is the importance attached by England to the departure of John VI. to Rio Janeiro, and her interest in having Charles IV. imitate his example; the

second, is the opposition made by my ambassador, Beauharnais, to this departure. I, indeed, blamed him for it afterward, but the course he pursued is proof that no such project had been previously concerted; I merely reproached my minister for not allowing them to execute this unexpected resolution, which would have simplified this question and rendered me absolute arbiter of Spain, instead of plunging me into the inextricable embarrassments of a revolution.

If the emigration of Charles IV. to America had been my original object, it might very properly be imputed to me as a fault; I knew too well the hazard of presenting myself to the Spaniards as the arbiter of their destinies, bringing, as its first pledge, the separation of their colonies. The progress of affairs might lead to this result, but it never entered as a basis in my projects. As an alternative, I should prefer to see the Bourbons in Mexico than in Madrid. Moreover, it was possible that Charles IV., placed on the throne of Mexico, might connect himself by a good treaty with the mother country, and that this vast trans-Atlantic empire, revived, under a direct and concentrated government, might at least sustain the independence of its flag and of its commerce. If I attained neither of these two objects, I might at least give a strong impulse to the interior of Spain, and give her more vigorous institutions, in order to direct all her energies to a maritime war. *At all events, it is certain that, if England preserved the universal empire of the seas, America would sooner or later fall into her dependence, but the only means of disputing this empire with her was to secure the resources of Spain. If, by the aid of these resources, I should succeed in reëstablishing the maritime equilibrium and the liberty of commerce, the emancipation of Spanish America would profit French industry as much as the English.*

**POLITICAL EXPLOSION IN SPAIN.**—Be this as it may, the news of the departure of the court to Seville, spread through Spain, became an electric spark, which occasioned a sudden and terrible explosion. Public opinion in this country had not kept pace with the rest of Europe. The lights of intelligence had not penetrated either the highest or the lowest class, but was confined to the middle classes of the petty nobility, men of the robe, and the secular clergy. These felt the degradation of their country and blushed to obey a government which was conducting it to its destruction. They were called liberals.

**REVOLUTION OF ARANJUEZ.**—The rumor of my projects, amplified and interpreted to suit party passions, set every thing into fermentation. The monks, fearing for their influence,



deemed themselves lost if my government should be extended to Spain, for the catholicism of the concordats was not what suited them. The liberals felt the humiliation of their country; all thought to prevent its ruin by a conspiracy.

In the night of the nineteenth of March, 1808, the people of Madrid go in a crowd to Aranjuez and demand the head of Godoy; the army, and even the body guards, as at Paris, place themselves at the head of the revolution. The Prince of Peace, concealed in a granary, escapes from search; happily for him, he was not discovered till afterward, and they then satisfied themselves in securing his person, after having maltreated him. The old King, frightened by the cries of the multitude and the insinuations of the conspirators, abdicated in favor of his son. The Spaniards gained nothing by this change, for the son whom they placed on the throne would have conducted matters no better than his father. But they rid themselves of an execrated favorite, and this was much in the eyes of the multitude, who do not look below the surface of things.

**MURAT ENTERS MADRID.**—Murat, on hearing of the troubles of Aranjuez, immediately directed himself on Madrid with thirty thousand men who were cantoned in Castile; he entered this capital on the twenty-third of March. A few days after, Charles IV., recovering from his stupor, and incited by Godoy and the Queen, retracted his abdication, and declared that it had been drawn from him by force. He cared little about the crown, but much about its being given to his son. This entrance of Murat into Madrid was an imprudent and premature step. The Grand Duke of Berg flattered himself that he should be placed on the throne as Charles V., and his desire to accomplish this object hurried him on, without reflection, to whatever seemed calculated to hasten this desired event. So far was I from having decided to change the dynasty, that, only a few days before this news reached me, I had remitted to Eugenio Isquierdo (the Spanish ambassador) the basis of a treaty, *ceding to Charles IV. all Portugal, for an equivalent territory between the Pyrenees and the Ebro; I guaranteed to him the rest of his monarchy on condition that he opened the ports of America to French ships and French commerce.*

I was aware that this alienation of four provinces might meet with some difficulties; but, by being already in possession of them, the main obstacle was removed, for, on the one hand, I would only ask for provinces which I already possessed, on the other, offer a more than equivalent indemnity from territory already in my power. This was the secret object of my occupa-

tion of a part of the kingdom, and of the presence of Murat in Castile.

NAPOLEON'S INSTRUCTIONS TO MURAT. — Nothing better proves the correctness of my views in this affair than the letter which I wrote to Murat, on the twenty-seventh of March, on learning the revolution of Aranjuez:

*"To the Grand Duke of Berg:* I fear that you deceive me on the situation of Spain, and that you are yourself deceived. The affair of the nineteenth of March has signally complicated events; I am in great perplexity.

"Do not believe that you are attacking an unarmed nation, and that you have only to show your troops to subjugate Spain; the revolution of the twentieth of March proves that there is still energy in the Spaniard. You have to deal with a new people; they have all the courage, and they will have all the enthusiasm, which is met with among men who are not worn out by political passions.

"The aristocracy and the clergy are the real masters of Spain; if they fear for their privileges and for their existence, they will make *levées-en-masse* against us, which may render the war interminable. I have partisans; if I present myself as a conqueror, I shall have none. The Prince of Peace is detested, because he is accused of having given up Spain to France; this is the complaint which has served for the usurpation of Ferdinand; the popular party is more weak. The Prince of the Asturias has none of the qualities requisite for the head of a nation; but this will not prevent that, to oppose us, they should make a hero of him. I do not wish that any influence should be used toward the personages of this family; there is never any use in making ourselves odious and in influencing passions. Spain has near one hundred thousand men under arms; this is more than enough to sustain with advantage an interior war; divided on different points, they can serve us as a nucleus for the total rising of the monarchy.

"I present to you the general views of such obstacles as are inevitable. There are others which you will meet. England will not fail to take advantage of this occasion to multiply our embarrassments. She daily sends dispatch-vessels to the forces which she keeps on the coast of Portugal, and in the Mediterranean she is enrolling Sicilians and Portuguese.

"As the royal family have not left Spain for the Indies, nothing but a revolution can change the state of this country; and perhaps of all Europe this country is the least prepared for such



a change. The men who see the monstrous vices of this government and the anarchy which has taken the place of legal authority, are few in number; the majority profit by these vices and by this anarchy. In the interest of my empire, I can do much good for Spain. What are the best means of doing this? Shall I go to Madrid? Shall I exercise the act of a grand protectorate in pronouncing between the father and son? It seems to me difficult to support Charles IV. on the throne. His government and his favorite are so unpopular that they cannot sustain themselves for three months. Ferdinand is the enemy of France; this is the reason of their making him king. To place him on the throne will serve the factions which, for twenty-five years, have labored for the ruin of France. A family alliance would be a feeble bond. Queen Elizabeth and other French princesses have perished miserably, when they could be immolated with impunity to satisfy atrocious vengeance. I think that nothing should be precipitated; that we should take council from the events which shall follow. It will be necessary to strengthen the *corps-d'armée* on the frontiers of Portugal and to wait. . . .

"I do not approve of the course of your imperial highness in thus precipitately taking possession of Madrid; you should have kept the army ten leagues from this capital. You have no assurance that the people and the magistracy will recognize Ferdinand without a contest. The Prince of Peace must have partisans in the public employments; there is, moreover, an habitual attachment to the old king which may produce results. Your entrance into Madrid, by disquieting the Spaniards, has powerfully served Ferdinand. I have given orders to Savary to go near the new king to learn what is passing. He will concert with V. A. I.; I will hereafter advise what course is to be pursued. In the mean time I have marked out the course which I deem it proper to direct.

"You will not compromise me by an interview in Spain with Ferdinand, unless you deem the situation of things to be such that I ought to recognize him as King of Spain; you will conduct yourself respectfully toward the King, the Queen, and Prince Godoy. You will exert yourself in their favor, and render them the same honors as heretofore. You will regulate your conduct in such a way that the Spaniards shall be unable to divine what course I intend to pursue; it will not be difficult for you to do this, as I myself even do not know.

"You will give the nobility and clergy to understand that if it should become necessary for France to interfere in the affairs of Spain, their privileges and immunities will be respected.

You will tell them that the Emperor only desires to improve the political institutions of Spain in order to place it in keeping with the present state of civilization in Europe, and to rescue it from the rule of favorites. . . . You will say to the magistrates and to the *bourgeois* of the cities, to the men of intelligence, that Spain has need of a new government; that she requires laws to guarantee the citizens from the arbitrary rule and usurpations of feudal rights; and institutions calculated to stimulate manufactures, agriculture, and the arts. You will describe to them the present tranquil and prosperous condition of France, notwithstanding the wars in which she is engaged; the splendor of her religion, as reëstablished by the concordat, which I have signed with the Pope. You will demonstrate to them the advantages to be derived from a political regeneration; order and peace at home, and consideration and power abroad. Such should be the spirit of your speeches and your writings. Do not take any abrupt step. I can wait at Bayonne; I can pass the Pyrenees, and, fortifying myself on the side of Portugal, can carry on war from that side.

"I shall attend to your individual interests; banish them from your thoughts. Portugal will remain at my disposition. Let no personal project occupy your thoughts or influence your conduct; that will only injure me, and yourself still more than me.

"You are too hasty in your instructions of the fourteenth. The march you prescribe to General Dupont is too rapid; on account of the events of the nineteenth of March, certain changes are to be made. You will make new dispositions; you will receive instructions from my minister of foreign affairs.

"It is my order that discipline the most severe be maintained: no pardon for the smallest faults. Have the strictest regard for the inhabitants; the churches and convents will be especially respected. The army will avoid all rencounters with the corps or detachments of the Spanish army. Let not a particle of powder be burned in this way. Let Solano pass Badajos. Let him be watched; so arrange the marches of my army as to always keep it some leagues distant from the Spanish corps. If war should be kindled, all will be lost. Policy and negotiations must decide the destinies of Spain. I recommend to you to avoid any explanations with Solano, or any other of the Spanish generals and governors."\*

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\*As this letter so entirely differs from Napoleon's instructions of the twenty-seventh and thirtieth, it has been pronounced by some a forgery. It, however, bears indubitable evidence of being the production of the Emperor. Thiers has examined the question with great patience and indus-



In reading these instructions, no one will accuse me of having inconsiderately engaged in a foolish enterprise. I wished to place my relations with Spain beyond the caprices of a favorite and the intrigues of the English party; I deemed a change to be for the interests of all, but I wished it with the assent of the Spaniards themselves. I wished to commence by connecting the ancient dynasty more closely to my system.

**NAPOLEON MEETS THE SPANISH COURT AT BAYONNE.**—The ascension of Ferdinand to the throne rendered necessary on my part new combinations; to the motives of hatred which this prince might already have toward the former protector of Godoy, I had just added a cause of complaint, not less evident, by the silence which I had kept on his propositions of marriage. It was now necessary either to attach this prince to myself, or to dispose of his throne, by restoring it to his father or by giving it to one of my brothers. To the first I felt opposed; chief of a new monarchy, I had no inclination to encourage palace revolutions; the other two had also great inconveniences. In this perplexity I resolved to go to Bayonne to see for myself what course I should take.

I at first had an idea of going to Spain, for the old court was urgently entreating me to come to its assistance, and to rescue it from the abyss into which it was plunged. It was unwilling to live at any price under the domination of Ferdinand, and asked for the most modest asylum in France as a special favor, wishing only to be rid of the cares of the throne and the presence of a son whose faults it exaggerated. I resolved upon a conference with this court. I also gave Ferdinand to understand that I desired to confer with him on the grave position in which the revolution had placed him. I thought that, not to place him in my presence or that of his father, they would induce him either to revolt or to fly to America; he did neither the one nor the other. After having conferred the regency on the council, with his uncle Don Antonio as president, he set out to meet me, thinking to find me at Vittoria. Not finding me there, he resolved to push on to Bayonne, notwithstanding the discouraging letter which I had

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try, and concludes, from all the evidence, that it is genuine, that it was dated March 29th, but was never delivered. The date it has usually borne is the twenty-ninth. It certainly could not have been written on the twenty-seventh. Between the twenty-seventh and the thirtieth Napoleon was still undecided in regard to the course to be pursued toward Spain. This letter must have been written during that interval. But having determined upon his course, after receiving, on the thirtieth, Murat's letter of the twenty-fourth, this one of the twenty-ninth was recalled.

sent him. Undoubtedly the treaty made with Isquierdo contributed to quiet his counsellors with regard to my intentions on the Spanish monarchy; the entire cession of Portugal seemed to them a sufficient pledge for these intentions. It therefore only remained for Ferdinand to gain his suit personally, and he flattered himself that this could be gained without difficulty by his protestations.

My detractors have accused me of forcing him to leave Vittoria for Bayonne. This had been an absurd fault; it would have given me the appearance of a felony without any advantage. I was not displeased that he came, for I had promised him an interview; but I should have preferred to have him take the part of embarking. So far was it from necessary to employ force to bring him to Bayonne, that he was on the point of asking the aid of French troops against those who wished to prevent him.

HE RESOLVES TO PLACE A NEW DYNASTY ON THE THRONE OF SPAIN.—I had no sooner conferred with him and his counsellors than I saw how ignorant they were of their own situation. They had determined on nothing; they never had any foresight; they pursued their policy like blind men. I immediately saw the danger of leaving Spain in such hands; before a year had elapsed, it would have been in the hands of the English. I then decided to provoke an abdication and to place one of my brothers on the vacant throne.

The thing was easy enough with the father, for he had resolved not to again place his feet within a kingdom where he was continually exposed to the excesses of an exasperated multitude; the Queen asked for nothing but the favorite. Arriving at Bayonne, some days after his son, he repeated that his abdication had been forced from him; he required that Ferdinand should restore to him the crown, which was done on the first of May; four days after, the father ceded to me his rights over Spain, from the sole fear that his son might succeed him.

The history of the Atridæ offers nothing more disgusting than the hatred which animated the King and Queen of Spain against their son; and the latter, goaded by ill-treatment, returned this sentiment with interest. I expected no very serious resistance, for the revolution of Aranjuez was not, as has been imagined, the result of a great national movement. It was merely the affair of a coterie—a palace revolution—the expulsion of an unpopular vizier. It in no respect resembled the origin of the French Revolution. Nevertheless, the feelings of the nation had been put in effervescence; this might produce disagreeable



results, and the several parties were already flattering themselves to be able to turn it to their own profit. The men who wished a change in Spain were agreed only on one point; this was that they did not desire such a revolution as ours; some desired a capable government, an authority which would sweep away the rust that covered their country, in order to give it consideration abroad and civilization at home; others, and they were the most powerful, wished to substitute a confessor in place of Godoy, and to restore, in all its luster, the rule of the clergy; others again wished to augment the influence of the grandees at the expense of the favorite and of the monarch.

I could satisfy the first, by seizing the revolution where they had now brought it. It was necessary to give to Spain a dynasty at the same time strong and free from prejudices. Mine united these qualities. Every thing seemed to promise that Spain, to avoid anarchy, would accept a sovereign who should present himself armed with a powerful lever. It would, by this means, enter into my system without resistance and without war. By ending with Spain as I hoped, I should accomplish the three great objects of my reign: *I should secure to France the most important maritime alliance; I should be relieved from all the embarrassments of a reaction: I should give solidity to my edifice; I should regenerate another of the finest portions of the globe.*

**OBJECTIONS MADE TO NAPOLEON'S PLANS.**—I do not pretend that these reasons have seemed satisfactory to all; since the turn which affairs took, they have by some been severely censured. These objections may be summed up as follows:

1st. That I was already deriving all the advantages which I could hope from Spain, since her fleets and armies were already at my disposal, and her ports open to my commerce.

2d. That one of my brothers, even supposing that he should be recognized on the throne of Spain, would be unable to do as much for me as Charles IV.

3d. That in any state of the question it would be impossible to close all access to clandestine commerce in Spain and America; and if it were possible, it could be done more successfully by the old dynasty than by a new government, which would be under the necessity of making concessions to commerce in order to make partisans. (The conduct of my brother Louis, in Holland, would seem to prove the correctness of this.)

4th. Even supposing that the threatening proclamation of the Spanish government, in 1806, was a sufficient indication of its secret intention to quit my alliance at the first favorable occasion,

it was, nevertheless, certain that it would persevere in this alliance so long as my position should be respectable on the continent.

5th. That an ally of such importance, however vacillating it might be, was certainly better than an irreconcilable enemy.

6th. That by a war we might lose every thing, but would gain nothing; in a word, that it was both dangerous and wrong to attack a government that was already doing every thing that I desired.

7th. That, should the Spaniards make resistance to me, the scission of America would become inevitable, and these territories would thus pass under the control of the English.

**HIS REASONS FOR ADOPTING THEM.**—All these arguments were specious; they would have been just if I could have reckoned on a continuance of our existing relations with Spain; but it has been shown that nothing was less certain, and that it was precisely to render these relations certain and lasting that I formed my projects.

But if my object was simple and suited to the interests of my empire, the means of attaining this object were difficult and complicated. A formal declaration of war, based on the hostile proclamation of the Prince of Peace, was no longer possible when Ferdinand came to Bayonne; I could not proclaim myself the defender of Charles IV. and sacrifice, at the same time, both the favorite and Ferdinand, for Charles would not have remained three months on the throne. Moreover, it was not the question to render the war less easy by siding with this party or that, but to avoid war, for even its declaration would have been a calamity. I feared this most of all things; for if I had not been persuaded that it was possible to avoid it entirely, I should have recognized Ferdinand without hesitation. My instructions to Murat are sufficient proof of this.

If, on the contrary, I should succeed in inducing the son to renounce as easily as his partisans had induced his father to abdicate, then sixty thousand men, supported by a powerful party, had been sufficient to ensure our possession, and the rupture would not take place. I did not leave Ferdinand long uncertain of his fate; I represented to him that the interests of France and Spain were that they should always remain united against England; that he was surrounded by the enemies of France; that he was, perhaps without being aware of it, at the head of this party; that the Bourbons of Spain would never entirely forget that their family had once possessed the throne of France, and that on this account the alliance so necessary to the two states would never



be solid; that his father, Charles IV., had abdicated the crown in my favor, and that it only remained for him to follow his father's example. After some hesitation, he resigned.

Such was the origin of the war in Spain, and such the reasons which guided my conduct in undertaking it. The just complaints which I had to make against Spain, the contemptible nullity of its government, the grand results which I should have obtained from it if I had succeeded in my project, may serve to explain the motives of this project, as posterity will justify the views of Catherine II. on Poland. I have been reproached with the means which I employed to ensure success. Nevertheless, my conduct has not been so tortuous in this affair as appearances have led some to suspect; it appears more ambiguous because I myself changed my views after the revolution of Aranjuez and the interview of Bayonne. The skin of the fox but ill fits the lion; and I have never sought to disguise myself in it.

**OPERATIONS OF MURAT.**—I was not long in being undeceived respecting the results of this step. All the month of April was passed in petty hostilities between Murat, who was hoping for this throne, and the council of regency left by Ferdinand VII. on his departure from Madrid. The Grand Duke of Berg flattered himself that he would put an end to these difficulties by obtaining from Charles IV. the title of lieutenant of the kingdom, at the moment that he resumed the reins from the hands of his son. Strong in this authority, Murat thought that he had now only to take possession of the provinces, and accordingly detached Marshal Monecy on Valencia, and Dupont on Cadiz. He went to work more rapidly than I wished; he was eager to reign.

**INSURRECTION OF MAY 2.**—On leaving Madrid, Ferdinand had announced his intention of going to Vittoria, where they persuaded him that I would meet him. No sooner was his departure decided on than the report spread through all parts that the prince, surrounded by French troops, had been constrained by force to take this course. A deep agitation, the precursor of an eruption, propagated itself thenceforth even to Madrid. To incite the people still more, it was added that the Infante Francis de Paul, the only one of the royal family left in the capital, was to be carried away into France. At this news, all Madrid rises; Murat, assailed by a furious multitude, is obliged to employ grape-shot to prevent being overcome by them. Our columns, encamped around Madrid, penetrate into the streets, where a furious combat takes place. Our soldiers immolated in the first success of the populace, incite their comrades to

vengeance; all citizens found armed are slain. These scenes of terror continue till night, which, with its shadows, veiled the execution of the most guilty of the leaders of this *emerute*.

SPANISH JUNTA CONVOKED AT BAYONNE.—On learning this deplorable massacre, I immediately saw all its consequences; to retreat was not now possible. I hoped to gain a decisive success by assembling a grand national junta. I demanded of the regency constituted by Ferdinand, to designate, by the councils of the kingdom, the one of my brothers whom it preferred for its sovereign; it selected, of its own choice, Joseph, then King of Naples. A junta of one hundred and fifty of the most notable of the Spaniards, taken from the three orders, was assembled at Bayonne to discuss, in concert with me, the constitutional act which was henceforth to govern the kingdom.

The discourses made in this august assembly are an historical monument, remarkable, and calculated to confound all the conjectures on the secret motives which caused minds to change so *promptly*. The dukes of Infantado, of Ossuna, of Fernando Nuñez, of Híjar, and Delparque, made no scruple in promising to Joseph the same attachment which they had always shown to their legitimate princes. On the sixth of July, the junta recognized him as king, and proclaimed the constitutional act which fixed his powers and the succession to the throne, and also contained numerous principles of reform.

There remained no legal power in Spain to oppose this change of reign. The old king was grateful to me for having taken the throne from his rebel son, and went to repose first at Compiègne, and afterward at Marseilles. His son was taken to the Château of Valençay, where the necessary preparations were made for his reception as a dethroned king. This château belonged to Talleyrand, who, far from opposing the choice made of it for his royal guest, even offered to make him take the oath to the new constitution and to Joseph!

The Spaniards could not abide their old king; he left neither regrets nor *souvenirs*; but his son was young, his reign offered some hopes; he was unfortunate, and they made a martyr of him. They imagined everything in his favor; the liberals cried out for national independence; the monks exclaimed against illegitimacy and impiety. All the nation took arms under these two banners.

NAPOLEON'S CONDUCT TOWARD FERDINAND VII.—It has been said "that I was wrong in putting this young king in sequestration at Valençay, and that I would have done much better by leaving him on the throne and sacrificing Godoy. He had



not failed to make discontents; factions would have increased, and soon begun to war against each other; I should have acquired the title of protector of the old king, by affording him an asylum. The new government would not have failed to compromise itself with the English; I should have declared war against it, both in my own name and in the quality derived from the powers of his father. I should, in this way, have made war with the support of a powerful party. Spain would have confided to her army the care of her defenses, and, after it had been beaten, the nation would have submitted to the right of conquest. They would not have thought of murmuring at this, because in disposing of a conquered country I would only have acted according to established usages, and because she would have seen in me the man who had delivered them from Godoy."

All this had been well enough, if I had not feared even the idea of war, certain that the English were ready to collect all the fruits of it. In default of this system, I could still have returned to the project of the marriage of Ferdinand VII. with a princess of my family; and if I had not a little too much reckoned on the facility of the execution of my new design after Ferdinand had left his kingdom, I should not have failed to adopt this course.

If I had possessed the gift of reading the future, I should have adopted this step, but I thought that, the result being the same to them, the Spaniards would accept, without hesitation, a change of dynasty which the position of affairs rendered inevitable. I acted too abruptly in this second period of the enterprise, because I neglected the gradations, and, not satisfied with giving them a king, I also announced myself as a reformer. No country had more need of reformers; but those who fed on abuses were thus made my opponents, and these were the most influential mass. The monks especially, and the high clergy, fattening on the public distresses, made it a duty to oppose me. Demagogues railed at the constitution as despotic, because it was wise, and gave the necessary guarantees to the throne; the priests rejected it, because it imposed limits to their influence; the grandees of Spain, divided in opinion, thought it gave them too little power. All interests and wounded self-loves rose in insurrection, and, pretending that I had dispossessed the old dynasty in a way offensive to all Spaniards, refused to recognize that which I had put in its place. It resulted from this, that no authority was anywhere recognized, or, rather, that it sprung up everywhere. The nation *en masse* deemed itself charged with the defense of the state, since there was no army or authority to be intrusted with this defense.

Each man took upon himself the responsibility of it. I had against me anarchy with all its resources; I had an entire people on my hands.

GENERAL INSURRECTION.—At the very moment that I was flattering myself to have my projects sanctioned by the deputies of the Spanish nation, convoked at Bayonne, this entire nation rose in insurrection, as if to confound my hopes. The cannon of the second of May was still echoing through Spain, when the report was circulated that Ferdinand had been forced to abdicate the crown, and was imprisoned; that this prince had not only protested against this violence, but had also appealed to all brave Spaniards to save the kingdom. A thrilling proclamation, fabricated by our enemies, is addressed, in the name of the captive king, to the Aragonese and the faithful Asturians who defended the cradle of the monarchy; this confirms the rumors. In an instant Spain is on fire; Valencia, Seville, and Cadiz revolt, the French squadron at anchor in the latter port is captured. The captain-general, Salano, who had covered himself with glory in fighting against us in 1794, on the eastern Pyrenees, but who had since then followed the army of Moreau as a volunteer, accused of protecting the French, is massacred. At Seville and at Valencia the same scenes are repeated; here the captain-general is torn in pieces; the French, established in great numbers in this latter city, are massacred or put in irons, and their property given up to pillage. A junta of government is installed at Seville, and arrogates to itself the powers conferred on the provisional council and that of Castile and the Indies, to govern the kingdom in the absence of its sovereign. The province of the Asturias also creates a junta, and, through its chief, demands the assistance of England. Another junta in the east demands the assistance of Austria, and, as if in remembrance of the War of the Succession, offers the throne of Spain to the Archduke Charles. Admiral Collingwood sends a frigate to Trieste for him, while England officially recognizes Ferdinand VII. The energy extends with electric rapidity from one end of the kingdom to the other; each province, and each city, however unimportant, has its junta, where all objects of public interest are tumultuously discussed; all Aragon rises; and the inhabitants of Saragossa, after having thrown in prison all the captains-general whom they suspect, decree, by unanimous acclamation, the general command to Palafox, a young officer, twenty-eight years of age, who has escaped from Bayonne, whither he had followed Ferdinand, and whose decided character is in unison with the



general opinion. Catalonia imitates this example, and Duhesme is soon shut up in Barcelona, and cut off from all communication with France. Even at Valladolid, in the center of our cantonments, the junta which organizes itself there issues a proclamation worthy to figure, from its frightful energy, with the discourses of Barrère of the twenty-third of August, 1793.

The movement was so general and so spontaneous that I have never been able to explain it; but, as it had its origin in the populace, I have reason to believe that it was the result of a vast conspiracy formed by the clergy. But what is very remarkable in this sudden revolution is, that it offers the anomaly of republican demagogues and religious fanaticism acting in concert for the independence of the nation, and the deliverance of the legitimate sovereign. Between them there is no dissension, no suspicion, no civil war, and, except a few hundred victims massacred at the first outbreak, all the fury of the people turned against us. Never was a national movement more complete or more extraordinary than this. The Romans, selling the ground on which was encamped the army of Hannibal, exhibited less energy than the Spanish nation in these grave circumstances.

At no period of the French revolution was France so near ruin, and at no period did she exhibit so much energy. In 1792, when the Prussians entered Champagne, the National Assembly had already had two years to confirm its authority, to organize more than three hundred thousand good troops, and to place the frontiers in a formidable state of defense. In 1793, when, after the battle of Neerwinden and the defection of Dumouriez, France saw her northern frontier invaded, the war of La Vendée extending its ravages, the south agitated by the federalists, she was saved by the force of the revolutionary government; but the power given to this decemvir-dictatorship, far from being the work of the nation, was the conception of a few men of energetic character, placed between victory and death. The mass of the French disapproved of these measures, and took up arms only to escape the guillotine. There is, therefore, no resemblance in the two cases. If Paris had been occupied by the Austrians, would the terrible law of the fifth of September have produced the same results? There is no reason to doubt it. In fine, the movement of France was more regular, more military, more imposing; that of Spain was more extraordinary.

The monarchy was militarily occupied; its capital in my power; the legal government captive; the frontier defenses surprised; the army scattered in Holstein, Portugal, and in the mar-

itime ports closed against England; this army had not more than sixty thousand men. Notwithstanding this sad state of affairs, not a Spaniard despaired of the kingdom; some faithful friends, sent by Ferdinand with his protestation, were sufficient to raise in all the provinces the cries of vengeance and death. The entire nation was in motion; if they did not fly to their colors, as they did in France in 1793, it was because the Spaniard abhors the restraints of military discipline; but each one is indignant, is excited, and swears to defend his fireside till death.

Such was the nation which three centuries of political nullity and apathy had so degenerated under the yoke of the monks, and which my agents compared to the Neapolitans. To what cause must we attribute this enthusiasm of the Spanish people? Was it patriotism or offended pride? Where are the heroes of this war? With the exception of Palafox and Alvarez, who merit this title? Far from me be the thought of depreciating the gallant and the generous; but I seek the causes of an extraordinary event, and I confess myself unable to find them. The sudden resuscitation of a whole nation, plunged for ages in a torpor, is always connected with a thousand incidents which escape the most profound observation. It requires the pen of a Tacitus to trace the picture of this revolution; but let it not be too long delayed; for, in time, objects become discolored, and take the hues which a skillful writer knows so well how to give them.

But let us return to our subject. On all sides the levies are multiplied; the troops of the line are increased; the provincial militia organized; soon Spain will have an army of from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty thousand men, supported by the whole nation in arms. These events must soon destroy the communications and prevent the junction of my *corps-d'armée*, for they are dispersed over an immense surface, and their total force does not exceed seventy thousand men.

MONCEY DRIVEN FROM VALENCIA.—Moncey was marching with six thousand men on Valencia, where he flattered himself with being sustained, in case of need, by the division of Chabran, which he called from Tortosa; but Caro disputed its approach with a corps of troops of the line and peasants. After some success, Moncey failed in his feeble efforts against the walls of this capital. Destitute of heavy artillery, cut off from all communication with Chabran, and reduced to five thousand men, he very reasonably determined to regain Madrid by a different route from that by which he had come.



The center and the north of Spain, occupied by the *corps-d'armée* of Bessières, are a prey to insurrection like the extremities of the kingdom, and here it is more dangerous, since it threatens the line of the Ebro and our communications. St. Ander, incited by its bishop, Logrono, by a stone-cutter, are the theaters of partial revolts, the precursors of a general movement; the insurgents of the north have established themselves as far as Reynosa. Valladolid rises in its turn. The captain-general, Cuesta, carried away by the universal movement, puts himself at the head of two thousand soldiers and five or six thousand insurgents. Galicia, which was not yet occupied by us, is entirely at the disposal of the authorities which are established there. Here, as elsewhere, all the male population from seventeen to forty years of age are required to take arms.

In the mean time, Bessières, established at Burgos, has pushed Verdier on Logrono; Lasalle goes to burn Torquemada. Merle puts himself in march on St. Ander, when the movement at Valladolid obliges Bessières to check him; the marshal hastens to march against Cuesta, posted militarily at Cabezon, and dislodges him after a slight combat. Our troops enter Valladolid on the twelfth of June; Lasalle pursues and sabers the insurgents. Cuesta retires to Benevento, Bessières returns to Burgos, after having withdrawn the arms from Valladolid; Merle then resumes his expedition against St. Ander, forces the passage of the mountains, presents himself before the city, and enters it on the twenty-third of June.

INSURRECTION IN ARAGON.—Our success is not so easy in Aragon, where Palafox justifies the confidence reposed in him. Destitute of troops of the line, the entire province takes up arms; old soldiers serve as a nucleus for the army; officers of artillery fly hither from Pampeluna and Madrid, and engineers from the school of Alcala. I order General Lefébvre-Desnouettes to march from Pampeluna with three thousand Poles and the same number of French, to destroy this germ of resistance. Palafox marches toward Epila against him at the head of six thousand insurgents; after a few discharges of artillery and musketry, the Polish lancers overthrow them in an instant, and with great carnage. Saragossa is nevertheless disposed for a vigorous resistance. The most suitable convents are transformed into batteries of two tiers; traverses and coupures are constructed in the streets; the male population prepare with energy to bury all beneath the ruin of their houses. A first attack succeeds in penetrating the city, when it is found impossible to take

the place. I cause a siege equipage to be collected from Pampluna; but a whole month passes before they can begin a regular siege.

**THE ARMY OF GALICIA ADVANCES ON VALLADOLID.**—In the mean time the storm increased in the west. The junta of Oviedo had received promises of assistance from England, and embarkations were preparing in all the ports of Great Britain. Fifty thousand firearms were immediately sent with Colonel Doyle to encourage the levies of Galicia which assembled at Lugo, and were reinforced by the corps of Taranco from Portugal. The exasperation of these troops was carried so far as to massacre the respectable General Filangieri, who had been designated to command them, and whose only crime was his having given offensive advice. This army, debouching on Astorga, under the orders of Blake, united on the Esla to that of Cuesta, and advanced on Medina-del-Rio-Seco, with thirty-five thousand men, and thirty pieces of cannon. Bessières, hearing at Burgos of this threatening assemblage, and being timely reinforced by Mouton's division of troops from Poland, decided to march against the enemy, though inferior in numbers by one half.

**JOSEPH PROCLAIMED KING OF SPAIN.**—At the same time the junta which was assembled at Bayonne adopted the constitution of the kingdom, on the sixth of July, and proclaimed my brother Joseph, as it were in derision, King of Spain and of the Indies. This constitution, modeled after that of the Empire, and preserving strong powers for the executive, contained all the generous principles which were calculated to secure a better future to Spain; it does much credit to the Duke of Basano, who was one of its principal framers; but the reforms contained in it contributed not a little to augment the number of our enemies. It was too liberal for the monks, and not enough so to satisfy the radical party.

Joseph entered Spain at the moment that Bessières was marching to meet Cuesta and Blake. If these were victorious, the fate of our army in Spain had been sealed; for they would have been in possession of our line of retreat, and all had been lost. The rencounter took place the fourteenth of July at Medina-del-Rio-Soco; the Spaniards, formed in two lines at too great an interval, were impetuously attacked in front by Merle and Mouton, while Lasalle charged them in flank. The first line was broken and routed; the second now took the offensive; while Mouton received its attack in front, the division of Merle assailed it in flank and spread terror and death everywhere. This vic-



tory, which procured us four thousand prisoners and fifteen pieces of cannon, and saved the army, was glorious, for the Spaniards fought with courage, but without experience. Generals Guillemillot and Mouton distinguished themselves.

Joseph arrived at Madrid, preceded by the news of this sad victory over the people whom he was called to govern. Bessieres, though reinforced, did not pursue the enemy's generals, between whom there was much discord; he might easily have advanced into Galicia, and even have shown my victorious eagles on the banks of the Portuguese Douro, so as to disengage Junot, who was then attacked by numerous enemies. But perhaps it was fortunate that he did not do this, for the bloody check which he received a few days after at Baylen had probably turned against us the momentary success which had conducted this marshal to the gates of Coruña.

DUPONT CAPITULATES AT BAYLEN.—Dupont had been detached on Seville and Cadiz, to reduce these two important places. One half of his *corps-d'armée* being employed on secondary expeditions, he passed the Sierra Morena at the head of only eight thousand men; reaching Andujar about the first of June, he carried the bridge of the Guadalquivir at Alcolea, after having beaten a corps of twelve thousand men under General Echevari, and carried Cordova by a *coup-de-main* on the seventh of June. He was seconded by the division of Wedel, which had at first been destined for another expedition, but had afterward received orders to join him. Dupont, hearing at Andujar that at the order of the supreme junta at Seville, all the south of Spain was rising; that Solano's troops of the line, returned from Portugal, and joined by the garrison of Cadiz and the regiments dispersed in Andalusia or at the camp of Saint Roche, formed a mass of forty thousand men, deemed his mission impossible, and waited behind the Guadalquivir for further orders and reinforcements. Savary, to whom Murat in his illness had momentarily confided the command, having directed him to keep in rear of the Guadalquivir so as not to draw the fire of the insurrection on this side of the Sierra Morena, Dupont had taken position at Andujar and directed Wedel to guard Baylen, so as to cover himself on the side of Baeza, when Castaños presented himself with his army before him, and maneuvered to gain his left. Dupont, who had shown so much presence of mind and vigor on the Mincio in 1800, and before Ulm in 1805, is here completely confused; he demands one of Wedel's brigades. The latter repairs to Andujar, on the sixteenth of July, with his entire division, leaving at

Baylen only a detachment under General Gobert. Castaños sends there twelve or fifteen thousand men, under the orders of General Reding; the ford of Mengibar, on the Guadalquiver, is forced; the enemy penetrates between our divisions, and sustains this movement. Dupont imagines that he can avoid the embarrassment by ordering Wedel to return to Baylen, to dislodge the enemy, and after securing this post, to again join him at Andujar, whence he was to fall, in concert with him, on the divided corps of the enemy. But if such was really the project of Dupont, since Wedel was already united with him, why again separate and send him away to Baylen? Why not attack the enemy, with his united forces, first at Baylen and then at Andujar, if Castaños should venture to cross the Guadalquiver? The position of Dupont was about the same as mine at Castiglione, in 1796, when the enemy took possession of Brescia, on my communications; he should have followed my example, and first beaten the corps which threatened his retreat and then have overthrown the other.

Dupont committed the fault of dividing his forces at the critical moment, and his lieutenant committed another not less grave. Wedel, finding Baylen evacuated by the troops of Gobert, who had been wounded in fighting Reding, went as far as Carolina to rejoin him, thus enabling the enemy to reoccupy Baylen after his passage. The entire corps of Reding established itself here without obstacle. Dupont, hearing of this event, determined, too late, to march on the same point himself, and to open a passage; he made three or four fruitless attempts to accomplish this on the nineteenth; his attacks were repulsed. He flattered himself that Wedel, hearing the sound of his cannon, would return, and that their combined efforts would restore the victory. Vain hope! Instead of learning the return of his lieutenant, he learned that Castaños had taken advantage of his departure from Andujar to get possession of that place and to send in pursuit of him a strong division under General La Pena. Dupont, seeing himself surrounded and repulsed, proposed a treaty of evacuation. Reding referred him to the general-in-chief, Castaños, at Andujar, but consented to a suspension of arms.

I had charged the inspector-general of engineers, Marescot, to follow Dupont to Cadiz, and to examine the fortifications of this place, where I supposed my troops would enter without opposition. This general, being personally acquainted with Castaños, having been engaged with him in marking out the frontier line after the peace of Bale, offered to go and negotiate with him, in



hopes of obtaining better conditions. This was on the twentieth of July.

In the mean time Wedel had returned to Baylen, had attacked Reding and captured some cannon and six hundred prisoners. Reding, now placed between two fires, in the position that he had thought to put Dupont, succeeded in extricating himself by announcing that an armistice had just been concluded. After being assured of the truth of this assertion, Wedel established himself above Baylen and waited for orders. The report of a treaty, or rather of a capitulation, spread among the soldiers who had been so recently victorious, and whose courage had been restrained by the orders of their superiors. These brave men became indignant and mutinied; they wished to renew the attack and pierce even to Dupont and save him at least from the disgrace of a capitulation by securing his retreat. Their assembled officers assented to the project, and one of them was despatched to the general-in-chief for his authorization; but he replied that he could not authorize an attack at the moment when they were treating for an honorable capitulation, and while an armistice still existed.

The division indignantly withdrew to Carolina. The Spaniards demanded that the general-in-chief should make it return to Baylen, threatening to attack him if this was not instantly executed. The position of Dupont was certainly critical; he had just deprived himself, by his refusal, of the coöperation of Wedel; he could no longer hope for that coöperation, except by perfidiously charging the officer who should be sent to direct his return, to concert, on the contrary, an attack with this general. If such a course was repugnant to Dupont, and he preferred trusting himself to Spanish loyalty (which he should have distrusted in these times of revolution, when even their own generals lost their heads for exhibiting the least sign of moderation toward the French), how could he decide to treat for troops who had an open line of retreat on Madrid? Was he ignorant that even among the Turks, the Grand Vizier in such circumstances has a right to treat only for himself? Dupont had but one course to pursue; he should have signified to Reding and Castaños that a general surrounded by an enemy can give no orders to one of his lieutenants who has an open retreat; that if they demanded of him so humiliating a step, it only remained for him to conquer or die, and to immediately give the order for battle. He would, perhaps, in that case, have been made prisoner on the field; but then he would have fallen like a brave man. I

should not have reproached him for his other faults. Instead of this, he had the weakness to obey the injunctions of Castaños, and thought to cover his responsibility by stipulating that his division should be regarded as prisoners and transported to France, but not to serve till regularly exchanged; that the division of Wedel should defile with its arms, and deposit them in stacks, till the moment of their embarkation for France. Fifteen thousand Frenchmen were thus to lay down their arms, when the half of them were free to retreat on Madrid, and only thought of vengeance and battle!\*

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\*We extract the following interesting passages from Thiers' "Consulate and Empire" on this capitulation:

"At length, on the twenty-second, that fatal capitulation was brought from Andujar to Baylen, to General Dupont. He hesitated several times before he signed it. The unhappy chief struck his forehead and flung down the pen; then, urged by those men who had all been so brave under fire, and who were all so weak out of fire, he wrote his name, once so glorious, at the foot of that document, which was destined to be the everlasting torment of his life. Why had he not fallen at Albeck, at Halle, at Friedland, or even at Baylen? How deeply he regretted it subsequently, before judges who inflicted on him a dishonoring condemnation! \* \* \*

"Such was that famous capitulation of Baylen, the name of which, in our boyhood, rang in our ears as frequently as that of Austerlitz or Jena. At this period, the ordinary persecutors of misfortune, judging of that deplorable event without knowledge and without pity, imputed to cowardice and to anxiety to save the wagons laden with the spoils of Cordova the terrible disaster which befel the French army. Thus it is that the baseness of courtiers, ever rancorous against those whom power gives it the signal for immolating, is accustomed to judge! There were many faults, but not a single infraction of honor, in that deplorable campaign of Andalusia. \* \* \*

"A serious error of Napoleon's in regard to Spain, a military position ill-chosen by General Dupont, too great delay in changing it, an ill-planned battle, false movements of General Wedel, demoralization of generals and soldiers—such were the causes of the cruel reverse of Baylen. All that has been said in addition is mere calumny. The long file of baggage, it has often been repeated, brought upon us all our misfortunes. Supposing that a general had been capable of so stupid a calculation as to sacrifice his honor, his military profession, the marshal's baton that was reserved for him, for a few hundred thousand francs, a sum far inferior to what Napoleon gave to the least favored of his lieutenants, eight or ten wagons would have carried all the pretended riches of Cordova in gold and silver-plate, and the question related to several hundred carriages, the extraordinary number of which was evidently occasioned by the moral state of the country, in which not a sick or wounded man could be left behind. At last, as we have seen, those famous baggage-wagons were plundered, and the chest of the army carried off; it contained not more than three or four hundred thousand francs. All that can be said, in short, is, that General Dupont, intelligent, capable, brilliant under fire, had not the indomitable firmness of Masséna at Genoa and Essling. But he was ill, wounded, exhausted by a heat of forty degrees; his soldiers were boys, worn out with fatigue and hunger; disasters followed close upon disasters, accidents upon accidents; and if we sound this tragic event to the bottom, we shall see



It is well known how the Spaniards violated this capitulation, and how, under the pretext of reprisals for my conduct toward them, they threw these unfortunate men into the pontoons, where most of them perished from want and despair.

This sad catastrophe taught Europe that we also might be forced to surrender our arms; it ruined, for a long time, our affairs in the peninsula; it exalted even to frenzy the enthusiasm of our enemies. Dupont and Marescot, who had negotiated this treaty, were arrested on their return to France, and kept as prisoners till my first abdication. I had ordered them to be tried, as an example. This trial lingered along without being brought to a close; it has been said that I feared the issue; there certainly was no reason for this. If Admiral Byng was condemned for not having conquered at Port Mahon, what punishment was not merited by those who signed a treaty which was near causing the destruction of all our troops in Spain?

The desperate position in which Dupont had been placed was certainly a fault; he might have been taken; this would have been a misfortune; but he ought at least to have caused himself to be taken, like Francis I., at Pavia. A general-in-chief, to save

that the Emperor himself, who placed so many men in a false position, was not in this case the most irreproachable. Still we must add, for the interest of military morality, that, in these extreme situations, the resolution to die is the only worthy, the only salutary resolution; for certainly, on General Wedel's arrival, the resolution to die in the attempt to cut a passage through Reding's division would have enabled the two parts of the French army to join, and to get triumphantly out of the scrape, instead of finding themselves humbled and prisoners. By sacrificing on the field of battle one-fourth of the men who afterward died in a cruel captivity, one might have transformed into a triumph the most signal of the reverses of that extraordinary period."

But if Dupont's conduct at Baylen was less blamable than was supposed at the time, and if Napoleon treated him and his officers with undue severity, his course of conduct after the restoration fully justified every thing that had previously been said or written against him. From a pretended friend of Napoleon, to whom he owed all his wealth and position, he became his most bitter enemy and denounced him in terms of unmeasured animosity. Thus it often is, that weak men, unjustly accused of offenses of which they are not guilty, smarting under the accusation, commit the very crime of which they are accused; General Dupont was tried by a high Court of Honor, each of the members giving his separate opinion. Three copies of the proceedings of this court were made and ordered to be deposited, one in the *dépôt* of war, one in the Senate, and one in the High Imperial Court. Smarting under the sentence of this Court of Honor, Dupont procured an ordinance from Louis XVIII., directing the destruction of the three copies of the proceedings. Two were destroyed, but the third could not be found, as the "High Imperial Court" was never organized. Fortunately, this has been preserved, and it furnishes the best defense extant of his conduct at Baylen! If it had rested with him, he would have destroyed his only possible justification in the eyes of posterity.

an entire army, may sign treaties of evacuation, as Melas did at Marengo; he secured the safety of seventy thousand men at the price of some fortresses; but a lieutenant-general, commanding a portion of an army, ought never, under the vain pretexes of humanity, to sign capitulations in an open country, to preserve some battalions more to his country; these capitulations, far from being advantageous, on the contrary, compromise the entire army, and the moral influence acquired by ten years of victory. Dupont tarnished in this operation, in a moment of weakness, a career made illustrious by decided talents and brilliant feats of arms.\*

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\*The violation of the capitulation of Baylen by the Spaniards was one of the many disgraceful acts of that government and people during the Peninsular War. The following is Thiers' description of the march of Dupont's army to Cadiz:

"The French troops were immediately marched off for San Lucar and Rota, where they were to be embarked for France in Spanish vessels. Their route was made to avoid the two great cities of Cordova and Seville, in order to withdraw them from the popular fury, and lay through the less important towns of Brijalance, Ecija, Carmona-Alcala, Utura, and Lebrija. In all these places the conduct of the Spanish populace was atrocious. Those unfortunate French, who had behaved like brave men, who had made war without cruelty, who had suffered, without revenging, the massacre of their sick and wounded, were pelted with stones, and often attacked with knives, by men, women, and children. At Carmona, at Ecija, the women spat in their faces, and children flung mud at them. They trembled with rage, and, though disarmed, were more than once tempted to take a terrible revenge, by seizing such as they could lay hands on and making weapons of them; but their officers restrained them, in order to prevent a general massacre. Care was taken to make them pass the night outside villages and towns, and to collect them in the open field like droves of cattle, to spare them still more cruel treatment. At Lebrija, and in the towns near the coast, they were stopped and doomed to tarry, upon pretext that the Spanish vessels were not ready. But they soon learned the cause of this delay. The junta of Seville, governed by the lowest demagogue passions, had refused to acknowledge the capitulation of Baylen, and declared that the French should be detained prisoners of war, under various pretexts, all illusory, and false even to impudence. One of the reasons alleged by this junta was, that they were not sure of obtaining the consent of the English to the passage by sea—a false reason, for the English, notwithstanding their animosity, manifested a generous pity for our prisoners, and, as we shall see, soon suffered other troops, which they would have been greatly interested in detaining, to pass by sea. Our officers addressed themselves to the captain-general, Thomas de Morla, remonstrating against this unworthy violation of the law of nations, but received from him only the most indecorous answers, to the effect that an army which had violated all laws, divine and human, had forfeited the right of appealing to the justice of the Spanish nation.

"At Lebrija the furious populace broke, in the night, into a prison, in which was one of our regiments of dragoons, and slaughtered seventy-five, of whom twelve were officers. But for the clergy, they would have put all of them to death. Lastly the generals, who had committed the the serious fault of separating themselves from their troops, in order to



**SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA.**—While this was passing in the south, the siege of Saragossa was prepared with all the activity which the nature of the country and the obstacles to be encountered would permit. Lefébvre-Desnouettes was reinforced by Verdier, who took the command. I charged my *aid-de-camp*, Lacoste, with the direction of the siege. But eight or nine thousand men were insufficient to invest a city of seventy thousand on the Ebro; communications were kept up between Saragossa and the surrounding country. All our means were concentrated, on the fourth of August, to batter in breach the convent of Santa Engracia and the gate Del Carmen. The breach being practical, the assault was made, the two posts carried, and our soldiers spread through the city. They already deemed themselves masters of the place, when the defenders, concentrated in the Corso, fell on them, a part in deep column, a part scattered through all the houses, on the terraces of the roofs, the windows, and the balconies, whence they poured on us a shower of balls. Our troops were driven back to the posts which they had carried, with the loss of a thousand men.

travel apart with their baggage, were severely punished for having thus withdrawn themselves. No sooner had they arrived at Port St. Mary, with their wagons exempt from examination, than the people, unable to contain themselves at the sight of those vehicles, crammed, as they said, with all the riches of Cordova, fell upon them, broke them in pieces, and plundered them. Men belonging to the Spanish authorities were not the last to assist in this pillage. But, though these wagons contained the whole of the savings of the officers, and even the chest of the army, no more was found in them than eleven or twelve hundred thousand reals, according to the Spanish newspapers themselves; that is to say, about three hundred thousand francs. That was the whole result of the sacking of Cordova. The French generals had well-nigh been slaughtered, and they escaped the fury of the populace only by throwing themselves into boats."

Allison says that for the "violation of the capitulation no sort of apology can be found." \* \* \* \* \* "Instead of being sent by sea to France, the soldiers and regimental officers were crowded together into the hulks of Cadiz, where, such were the privations and misery to which they were subjected, that very few remained at the conclusion of the war. Dupont, the officers of his staff, and all the generals, were permitted to return to France, but the remainder, nearly eighteen thousand in number, were kept in lingering suffering in their dismal captivity, and with the exception of a few who accepted service under the Spanish government, and took the first opportunity to desert to their beloved eagles, and those contained in one hulk, who overpowered their guards during the night, and contrived to float her across to the lines of their countrymen, three years afterward, during the siege of Cadiz, hardly any ever revisited their native country. This frightful act of injustice was as impolitic as it was disgraceful."

The translator has not found, in the whole course of his military and historical reading, an example, among civilized nations, of conduct so utterly disgraceful as this of the Spanish authorities and the Spanish people toward the French troops who were included in the capitulation of

**RETREAT FROM MADRID.**—The news of the disaster of Baylen rendered these efforts useless. Joseph, having just entered Madrid, was forced to evacuate it, in order to concentrate his forces behind the Ebro, and await reinforcements. Generals Lefévre-Desnouettes and Verdier, constrained to raise the siege of Saragossa, fell back upon Tudela, and united with Moncey, who formed our left.

**ROMANA FLIES FROM DENMARK.**—To cap the climax of this strange war, the half of the corps of Romana, which had been imprudently left on the coasts of Holstein in communication with the English, embarked, unknown to Bernadotte, and landed on the coast of Biscay.

**ERRORS OF THIS CAMPAIGN.**—Three errors were committed in this first period of the expedition to Spain, which compromised its success, if in other respects the success was possible. The first was, in not having sacrificed Godoy to the general hatred, by causing Charles IV. to send him into exile; the second, in having sent into Spain only raw conscripts; the third, in not having paid liberally for the support of my troops, as they were quartered in the country, even in not having required all of them to encamp out. The Spaniard is proud and detests trouble; the quartering

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Baylen. Every obligation imposed by international law, and every obligation of military and national honor, as well as the solemn stipulations of the convention, and the common laws and usages of war, were violated. Alison, while he condemns the acts of the Spanish authorities, seeks to clear the skirts of the British government from all responsibility in this matter, by quoting the opinion of Sir Hew Dalrymple, given at the time, that Spain was bound to carry out in good faith the conditions of the capitulation, by sending the prisoners to France, and the offer to transport them in British ships. But, unfortunately for the reputation of Mr. Alison as an historian, and for his government, there is abundant proof that the English authorities not only connived at, but actually advised the junta of Seville to retain these French prisoners of war in this terrible and infamous captivity. Even as late as 1811, when the commander, Suchet, after the fall of Tarragona, overlooking the violation of the conditions of the convention at Baylen that these French prisoners were to be sent by sea to France, offered to exchange his Catalonian prisoners, the best soldiers in Spain, for those taken at Baylen—men utterly ruined in constitution by their cruel captivity—and when the Spanish general was willing to accept the proposition, the Regency, at the request of Wellesley, the British envoy and brother of Wellington, peremptorily forbade the exchange; and the French prisoners therefore remained, says Napier, “a disgrace to Spain, and to England, for if her envoy interfered to prevent their release, she was bound to insist that thousands of men, whose prolonged captivity was the result of her interference, should not be exposed on a barren rock, naked as they were born, and fighting for each other’s miserable rations to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched.”

It was by such conduct as this that England earned her appellation of *Perfidious Albion!*



of troops on him seems to him insupportable, on account of his pride and his interest; for the Spanish people are penurious and generally poor. Some millions expended *à propos* had probably weakened the discontent. Our troops lived by requisitions which were promised to be paid, but these promises were never worth the ready money. This means alone was, of course, insufficient to insure the success of the enterprise; but order, discipline, and exact distributions would undoubtedly have diminished the hatred and resistance; they would have secured the mass of supplies, and have doubly reacted on the military operations. I had given all the orders necessary for this purpose, as is shown in my instructions to Murat; but the events did not allow us time to establish magazines every where, and, after the insurrection broke out, the thing was impossible.

POSITION OF JUNOT IN PORTUGAL.—There was wanting only one more misfortune to complete the ruin of this expedition; and of all those which befell our arms, the least probable actually occurred; Junot had fallen beneath the blows of the English in Portugal. In fact, this general was ill-suited for a mission so delicate; endowed with much activity, bravery, and energy, he stained these qualities by rudeness of manners and harshness of character. It required an administrator supple, adroit, insinuating; if a man like Suchet had been there, at this epoch, he would have created for himself a party. Undoubtedly the thing was not one of the easiest, or at least it could not have been durable; for here the question was not a simple change of dynasty, but the entire existence of Portugal. Although my projects on this country were suited to my system against England, of course it did not suit the Portuguese that I should threaten the loss of Brazil, the total closing of their ports, and a reunion with Spain. I, therefore, was not deceived with respect to this matter; I did not expect to succeed, except by force.

GENERAL INTERESTS OF PORTUGAL.—We had, in the intelligent class of Portuguese, partisans, who saw, with regret, their country used as a British province, for the profit of the English, and who desired reforms. Portugal, on whom Nature had apparently exhausted her favors, intersected by mountains whose smiling aspects yield in no respect to the most renowned localities of Switzerland and Italy, favored by a superb climate, tempered at different zones by the progressive elevation of these same mountains, possessing the finest ports and the richest colonies of Europe—Portugal, I say, would have been the real El Dorado. had not the monks degraded the people, and the English pre-

vented the development of their industry. We might free her from both these evils, and many people would have rejoiced at it, for they were not indifferent to the dependent situation in which this country had been placed toward England. England purchased her wines and her fruits, but poured in upon her the products of her own manufactures, and thus carried away all the profits and all the specie of the country. Nevertheless, there was no country better able than Portugal to live independent of others. If her people, placed under so fine a sky, had applied themselves to industrial pursuits, the population of their cities would soon have been doubled, and the manufacturing portion of this population would, by furnishing the agriculturists the products of their labor, have consumed the fruits, and the wines of Oporto, without resorting to the British islands and paying so dearly in return. Brazil alone, vivified by an industrial mother-country, would have been sufficient for the consumption of these wines.

**SACRIFICES IMPOSED ON THIS COUNTRY.**—But the introduction of such a system required half a century; and the Portuguese saw, for the moment, in their separation from England, only the closing of their ports, the interruption of all commerce with Brazil, the loss of the only outlet for their territorial produce, and the privation of all objects of manufacture necessary for habitual consumption. Add to this the hatred of the clergy, the fanaticism of the people, the contributions levied in money and supplies, the expense of military quarters to which they were unaccustomed, and, finally, the rumored project of a partition which threatened the existence of a proud nation, and it will appear less astonishing that the public feeling changed so suddenly. The annunciation of the projected partition produced a general fermentation. The taking possession in my name, which was done on the first of February, occasioned an explosion, and it was necessary to resort to force to restore order. Nevertheless, we succeeded in disbanding one half of their army, and in taking the other part under the Marquis of Alorna, into my pay and sending it into France under the title of the allied contingent.

These measures made matters still worse, and the cessation of all exterior commerce completed the despair of the Portuguese. The Spaniards in that country, informed of what was occurring in Spain, added to the elements of the tempest. The divisions of Taranco and of Solano evacuated the provinces which were to have fallen to Spain in the partition, seizing all the French



that they could in the passage. Junot could no longer regard those who remained as auxiliaries, for their soldiers and ours were at war. It was necessary to strike a blow of vigor, and disarm the division of Caraffa, which had been united with our troops.

**GENERAL INSURRECTION IN PORTUGAL.**—The departure of the Spaniards was the signal for insurrection in all the provinces which they left; but they waited for the succors promised by England before organizing open resistance; but as soon as these appeared, the restrained torrent burst forth only the more furiously. Oporto had only waited for this to raise the standard of independence. A junta or regency, established under the presidency of the bishop, hastened to London to demand assistance, by the aid of which they flattered themselves that they would be able to deliver the kingdom. The disbanded regiments were reorganized and the militia called out. Junot, hoping to impose on them, detached General Loison from Almeida on this city; but on ascertaining the certainty that his means were insufficient, this general decided to fall back on Almeida, before being surrounded. He here received the new order to repair to Lisbon, and commenced his march by Guarda and Alcantara on Abrantès.

Junot, justly uneasy at the events which were threatening him on all sides, thought to prepare for the danger. The landing of an English division near Faro, at the extremity of the Algarves, had just occasioned an universal rising. Every where our feeble detachments scattered through the kingdom are assailed; nevertheless, with the exception of a single battalion taken at Faro, all succeed by their good conduct in effecting a passage. Maransin brings away from the Algarves, as by a miracle, a thousand men, and sacks Beja, where the insurgents oppose his march. Even at Lisbon they take up arms; all the banks of the Mondego are in arms; the mountaineers even descend toward Abrantès and Santarem; a Spanish division, debouching from the Guardiania, threatens Kellerman at Elvas, fomenting insurrection even at Evora and Estremoz, and forces the recall of this general on the Tagus.

Under these critical circumstances, Junot decides to assemble all his means and to hold Lisbon as long as possible, then to open a passage by Elvas to rejoin Murat at Madrid or Valladolid. Loison, on his return to Lisbon, is detached on Leyria against the insurgents of Coimbra; but, Kellerman having already attacked them with success, the presence of Loison is deemed more neces-

sary at Evora, where the support of a Spanish division had caused a threatening insurrection. He marches there at the head of four thousand men. The enemy, confident in numbers, ventures to meet him outside the city; he attacks them with impetuosity and defeats them with great loss; they return within the walls. Loison summons them to surrender, but they refuse; he then prepares for an assault. In the midst of the tumult the Spaniards, established near the gate of Elvas, succeed in effecting their escape, but not without sensible loss. The attack continues on both sides; finally our soldiers penetrate into Evora, where a frightful butchery is continued for several hours. The fight goes on from street to street, and from house to house; every one taken in arms is massacred without mercy. The city is completely sacked; and our soldiers, wearied with the carnage, capture some two or three thousand prisoners, the remains of eight thousand militia and armed citizens. This bloody execution secures to General Loison a sad celebrity in these countries; it, for a moment, causes terror throughout Portugal; but not being followed up by farther victories, it eventually becomes a motive of reprisals and vengeance in the irascible heart of the Portuguese.

**LANDING OF WELLESLEY WITH THE ENGLISH ARMY.**—The succors promised by England were not long in making their appearance. The Cabinet of St. James had made great preparations on the first invitation of the Spanish juntas. Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had distinguished himself at Copenhagen and in the Indies, had embarked for Galicia; but difficulties being made in regard to his reception at Coruña, he soon came to Portugal, where he united at first fifteen thousand of the best English troops. He was soon followed by fifteen thousand more under Generals Moore and Dalrymple, the latter taking the command.

Learning the spirit which animated the Portuguese, and certain of a powerful support, Wellesley (whom we shall hereafter designate by the title of Lord Wellington) resolved not to await his chief, but to win for himself the glory of delivering Portugal. Having landed, on the second of August, at the mouth of the Mondego, he passed this river at Coimbra and marched toward Leyria.

**JUNOT DEFEATED AT VIMIERA.**—His calculation was correct. Junot, forced to watch the entire population of Lisbon, to defend the forts and batteries of that city, and to guard the disarmed Spaniards, could oppose him with only ten or twelve



thousand men, and even for this he was obliged to wait for Loison's arrival from Evora. In the mean time General Laborde opposed the English with three thousand men, and even had the audacity to receive battle at Rolica, where he fought with glory against quadruple forces, and retired only after having caused the enemy great losses. Loison having arrived, Junot marched against the English general, who had united sixteen thousand men, exclusive of the Portuguese. But, defeated at Vimiera on the twentieth of August, and surrounded by innumerable enemies, Junot deemed himself fortunate in signing at Cintra a treaty of evacuation more honorable than that of Baylen. At least this was respected. One of the vexatious results of this convention was the loss of the Russian squadron under Admiral Saniavin. It had held the Archipelago since the campaign of 1805, and after the declaration of war by Russia against the English, had taken refuge in the Tagus. Compelled to partake the fate of our arms, it was sequestered till peace; the equipments only were restored to Russia.

Dalrymple, who had just arrived, signed this convention, and incurred the blame of England for having allowed to escape a prey still more secure than that of Baylen. Even Wellesley was recalled to London to render an account of his conduct, and it required all his talents and the credit of his family to save him from disgrace.

On the other hand, Junot incurred from me the reproach of having left too many troops to guard Lisbon and Santarem, and the left bank of the Tagus, and of having attacked Wellesley in parallel order on the center instead of turning his left by a movement at night. Nevertheless, supposing Junot had acted according to my wishes and had driven Wellesley back to the mouth of the Mondego, the arrival of the troops of Moore and Dalrymple, the general rising of the Portuguese, and the state of affairs in Spain, would have cut off all hope of retreat. Under these circumstances I was compelled to regard as fortunate a treaty which restored to me an army whose loss seemed certain.

#### MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH OF EUROPE.

—While these things were occurring in the south, Russia had declared war against Sweden, which still persisted in remaining in the paws of the English leopard. The impetuous descendant of Charles XII. had resisted all our efforts to induce him to declare war against the English. Some say that he pursued with chivalric obstinacy the course which he had imposed on himself after the death of the Duke d'Enghein, which had involved us in

hostilities; others think that the catastrophe of Copenhagen and the hope of gaining Norway retained him in his connection with the Cabinet of St. James. England paid him subsidies; the Swedish flag was allowed to float on the seas, by submitting to the British code. Gustavus deemed this order of things advantageous to his commerce and conformable to his principles. So long as he exposed only Pomerania and Stralsund, this system may be accounted for, but, after the declaration of the Emperor Alexander, it is difficult to conceive how he could venture to contend against the two greatest powers on the continent.

The Cabinet of St. Petersburg had for a century coveted Finland, an important province at the very gates of the imperial capital, and which was more precious to Russia than to Sweden, as the latter was separated from it by the Gulf of Bothnia and the deserts of the polar regions. The ninth of February, 1808, notwithstanding the excessive cold, General Buxhowden entered Finland at the head of twenty thousand Russians. After some insignificant skirmishes, he gained possession of Helsingfors, left a corps of observation before the important place of Sweaborg, and fell back on Tawasthous, in order to anticipate the enemy at Wasa, and to cut him off, if he should attempt to defend Abo and the coast. These dispositions effected a part of the desired success. If the roads and the snows did not permit him to reach Wasa before the enemy, they at least accelerated his retreat and prevented the occupation of all the provinces, by forcing him to retire in disorder on Sweaborg.

Buxhowden had in the mean time reduced the forts of Schwartholm and Kangout, and blockaded Sweaborg on the ice. This Gibraltar of the Baltic, which can give an asylum to the largest fleets in the world, is built on seven rocky islands which close the entrance to the Gulf of Helsingfors. As an anchorage, a fortress, and arsenal, this maritime establishment is inferior to no other. The channels are a little difficult for large squadrons, but for the forces employed in the Gulf of Finland it leaves nothing to be desired. Admiral Cronstadt commanded there about three thousand troops of the line and as many Finland militia. After a blockade executed on the ice of the gulf and a *simulacrum* of bombardment which continued from the eighth to the twenty-fifth of March, he basely surrendered the place at the very moment when the approach of spring gave him reason to expect to be freed by the melting of the ice from the siege on the water side, and when the success of the Swedes at Brahestadt over the division of Touczkof might have changed the state of



affairs on the land. He defiled on the twenty-fourth of April, and surrendered himself a prisoner. This important conquest secured to the Russians two thousand pieces of cannon, and a considerable amount of stores, besides the prisoners and an impregnable fortress. It was now impossible for the Russians, whose numbers were increased to forty thousand men, to be driven from Finland.

My own forces in the north were not inactive; recognizing the difficulties to be encountered by the Russians in turning the Gulf of Bothnia, I resolved to second them by threatening Gustavus in the center of his power, in directing my army to enter Zealand in concert with the Danes. The English fleets could not keep the sound in the winter, and only a few hours were requisite to make a descent on Scania. The bare possibility of such an event would force the Swedes to guard this coast and thus effect a useful diversion for our allies, even if it did not force the obstinate Gustavus to yield to the imperious law of state interest. Bernadotte, who had replaced Brune, entered Zealand at the head of thirty thousand men, including one of the Spanish divisions of Romana;\* the other division had remained in Fionia and Holstein with other French troops. The English, hearing of this event, and fearing that we might treat Sweden and her fleet as they had the Danes, hastened to dispatch General Moore with ten thousand men to Gothenburg (May the 17th). The events in Spain induced the English government to recall this corps in order to employ it more usefully in the peninsula. We have seen that it arrived in time for the deliverance of Portugal, and we shall soon meet it again in the plains of Castile.

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\*Romana (Marquis de la) was born in the island of Majorca. He was of illustrious descent and received a very liberal education. Having early entered the army, he served with distinction in the campaigns of 1793 and 1795. In 1807 he commanded the Spanish division of ten or twelve thousand men in Zealand and Jutland. Learning there the events at Madrid, he entered into negotiations with the commander of the British fleet, and in August, 1808, embarked with most of his forces for Corufia. From this time he took a prominent part in all the operations of the Peninsular War, till his death, which occurred in January, 1811.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## AFFAIRS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN 1808; NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN THE SPANISH PENINSULA.

French Reverses in Spain—Military Preparations of Austria—Difficulties and Chances of Napoleon's Position—Conference of Erfurth—Napoleon goes to Spain—Supreme Junta—Position of the Spanish Forces—Napoleon at Vittoria—Character of the War—Plan of Operations—Affair of Burgos—Defeat of Blake at Espinosa—Battle of Tudela—Battle of Sommo-Sierra—Napoleon enters Madrid—The English advance from Portugal—Napoleon marches against them—Moore retires on Coruña and Romana on Orense—Battle of Coruña, and Embarkation of the English—Lefébvre on the Tagus—Victor defeats Infantado at Ucles—Operations in Catalonia—Saint-Cyr recaptures Rosas and succurs Barcelona—Affair of Cordedeu—Victory of Molino-del-Rey—Victories of Cappelados and Walsch—Second Siege of Saragossa—Soult sent to Portugal—Departure of Napoleon for Paris—Intrigues of Talleyrand.

RESULTS OF THE FRENCH REVERSES IN SPAIN.—At the news of the catastrophe of Baylen, Europe was as much convulsed as though I myself had sustained a complete defeat, and my empire had been shaken to its foundation. Austria and Prussia made no efforts to conceal their joy; all my enemies were in raptures, and there were few countries where I had not a goodly number of them. Austria had been impatient to repair the losses which she had sustained in the last three wars. Count Stadion, who was then prime minister, was a man of talent and one of my most formidable enemies.

MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF AUSTRIA.—As soon as the news of the insurrection of the second of May, and of the rising of the provinces, had proved to him that the occupation of Spain would be attended by an effusion of blood, he ordered (June 9th) the organization of the *landwehr*, which, in a short time, would put the army on a respectable footing. Republican France had given to Europe the example of great national levies, and it is astonishing that Austria, in 1805, did not resort to this means, the only one that can save a state in times of great danger. The Archduke Charles, president of the Council of



War, applied himself with great industry and activity to the reorganization of the army of the line; that of the *landwehr* progressed with no less rapidity. I heard of these military preparations while at Bayonne, and demanded explanations of Count Metternich, then minister at Paris. He replied with commonplace remarks on the necessity of placing the military institutions of Austria on the same footing as their neighbors. Bavaria not only adopted the system of conscription, but she organized her militia on the basis of the national guards of France, which put her in condition to march to the field a hundred thousand men. The alleged motive was specious; I was not duped by it. Affecting, nevertheless, an entire confidence, I invited the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to form an encampment with their contingents.

**DIFFICULTIES OF NAPOLEON'S POSITION.**—But I was not altogether easy about the part that Europe might take; nor was I less embarrassed about the course which I myself ought to pursue. I had arrived at the decisive epoch in my career. My position was a delicate one. I had evidently mistaken the character of the war in Spain; and what immense advantages might not England derive from this error! I could reëstablish my affairs only by going there in person, or by sending there a great part of my army. Whatever course I might pursue, I should risk upon the continent every thing that I had accomplished during the last ten years; I should give to Austria an opportunity to resume the scepter of Germany, and perhaps that of Italy also.

**HIS CHANCES.**—The new interests which I had created in the Confederation of the Rhine formed a powerful counterpoise to the Cabinet of Vienna. A hundred thousand Frenchmen, aided by the Confederates, would be sufficient to oppose all its efforts. But if Prussia, which had much to avenge, should arm against me, she might decide the question. My alliance with Russia was, therefore, my most reliable resource, at least for preventing war by holding Prussia and Germany in check. But could I count on this alliance when its effects would be to ruin the maritime commerce of Russia? Fortunately, at this moment, the open and frank conduct of Alexander and the sagacity of Caulaincourt removed all doubts from my mind as to the course I was to pursue.

We had agreed at Tilsit that I should occupy Portugal; but not that I should dispose of the throne of Spain. Alexander might not agree to what had been done; he had not recognized my brother Joseph as king, and Count Strogonoff, his minister at

the Court of Madrid, had received no instructions on the subject. Caulaincourt seized the fit occasion to ask the Emperor to give me a pledge of his favorable dispositions by recognizing my brother. Alexander felt that a refusal might destroy all that had been done at Tilsit; he unhesitatingly accepted the proposition, and this recognition, which I did not hope to obtain without making some concessions to Russia, proving to Europe the intimacy of our relations, gave me all the advantages of a victory, for it imposed on my enemies.

Nevertheless, it was only a preliminary step toward extricating me from my difficulties; I had now to choose between two chances of final success in my Spanish enterprise. The first consisted in withdrawing the army of Murat to the Pyrenees, and sending back Ferdinand to Madrid, at the same time declaring *that I had only intended the regeneration of the nation by vigorous institutions, but that I would now abandon it to its own fate, inasmuch as it did not desire my assistance*; the second consisted in forcibly carrying out my project of regeneration, and intrusting the peace of the continent and my dearest interests there to my ally, the Emperor Alexander. The first seemed the more prudent course; but the fear of a retrograde step which might destroy the prestige of my invincibility, and more than all, the certainty that Spain would throw herself, *à corps perdu*, into an alliance with England, induced me to prefer the second. I had undertaken this enterprise, not merely through ambition, but because it was necessary to me in sustaining the maritime contest in which I was engaged, and moreover was important in taking from the Bourbons their last support in Europe. This double motive was sufficient to determine my choice. I confess that there was a little temerity in intrusting the fate of my empire to Russia, and the vulgar, who always judge superficially, will blame me for it. But the plausible reasons already cited determined my course; moreover, I thought that eighty thousand men of my old troops would, with the fifty thousand already there, suffice for the subjugation of the peninsula, and the levy of a double conscription would place my army in Germany on the same footing as it was before this great detachment. I said to myself, moreover, if Austria feared to declare against me after Pultusk and Eylau, how could she venture to do so after Russia had joined me? I was not so simple as to suppose that Russia would prefer my interests to her own, or that, should I experience reverses, she would repair them. But I knew that a power having self-respect does not immediately pass from the position of an ally to that of an enemy. It was



sufficient, for the present, that Russia should feign to render me the promised assistance; time and a preliminary success was of great importance to me at this juncture; with time and a nation as active as the French, all things are possible.

Short-sighted politicians, looking only at the result of the enterprise, have found fault with my course, without at all comprehending the chances of my position. Of course it would have been better to recognize Ferdinand as king and give him a princess of my house than to drive him from the throne with an armed force; but, the war once begun, how could I abandon Spain and Spanish America to the English leopard? To judge by the event, I admit that it would have been more prudent to withdraw my army on the Pyrenees and leave Spain under the yoke of its monks; civil war would soon have burst out. But who could have foreseen the difficulties which I encountered? and what statesman could, with *sang-froid*, have seen the commerce of Vera-Cruz, of Lima, and of Cadiz take its way to the Thames—the infallible result of this retreat? To save Spanish America, it was important to resuscitate old Spain, and give her a fleet and an army; and, to accomplish this result, it was necessary that the garb of a monk should no longer rank first in the state; it was indispensable to reform public feeling and remodel national institutions. To accomplish this object it only required a firm hand and strong will.

CONFERENCE OF ERFURTH.—Having decided to go myself to the peninsula, I thought I ought first to confer with my powerful ally on the position of our affairs in Europe. We met at Erfurth about the middle of September. I there exposed to Alexander my intentions with respect to Spain; I explained to him my plan of rescuing America from the English, and of afterward striking, by Turkey and Persia, a mortal blow at their possessions in India. Alexander had views sufficiently extended to appreciate my project; but he also knew that it would require time to execute it, and that I had too many obstacles to encounter in Europe to make any progress if he should make the least opposition. He was willing that I should engage in this peninsular contest, for his empire would profit by any turn which affairs might take. This policy was wise and natural, *for to know how to wait and profit by time and opportunity is every thing in politics*. I proposed to leave him Moldavia, Wallachia, and Finland; he promised to guarantee the state of Europe as had been decided at Tilsit, and our defensive alliance was made more close. Before separating, we resolved to renew offers of peace to Eng-

land, and we addressed in concert a pressing letter to George IV., urging him, for the sake of humanity, to put an end to the war. But the Cabinet of St. James, little pleased with this direct appeal to the feelings of the sovereign, answered evasively. It was evident that the war in Spain and the report of the great Austrian levies had raised too high her hopes of success to expect from her a moderation which she had not shown after the treaty of Tilsit, when her cause had been abandoned by the rest of Europe. Now, however, she might very well prefer the chances of war, for they were all in her favor. Nevertheless, I felt quite confident of a continental peace, for the Emperor of Austria had just contributed to remove my remaining doubts and fears. This prince, after having unsuccessfully attempted to get Metternich admitted into the conferences of Erfurth, wrote me a letter from Presburg, on the eighteenth of September, by Baron Vincent, in which he expressed his desire to maintain peace. I believed him, because I thought Austria not strong enough to contend with France and Russia united; that she had put a good grace upon the recall of Count Stahremberg and the rupture with the English; and especially because I felt capable of defeating her, should she take a fancy to renew the war.

**NAPOLEON SETS OUT FOR SPAIN.**—Having no further uneasiness about the peace of the continent, I directed the dissolution of the camps of the Confederation of the Rhine, and resolved to set out immediately for Spain with my guards, preceded by three corps of my old army, those of Ney, Mortier, and Victor. I had no idea that a city populace who with the militia and a few soldiers of the line had driven away the conscripts of Murat could a long time hold out against soldiers that had defeated the finest armies in Europe. I was far from foreseeing that a sublime despair would pervade all classes of a nation which had been painted to me in unfavorable colors, but which, in its misfortunes, showed itself equal even to the Romans. Such resistances do not belong to our age; and they almost induce us to believe that fanaticism is a stronger motive than patriotism and glory.

**SUPREME JUNTA OF ARANJUEZ.**—The retreat of Joseph from Madrid had given the Spaniards an opportunity to centralize the action of their government, by naming a supreme junta; but instead of sending deputies direct from the provinces, with powers proportional to the dangers to which the country was exposed, the provincial juntas sent two of their members to the central junta, restricting the powers of these members so as to preserve, as much as possible, their own authority. The



supreme junta assembled in the palace of Aranjuez, under the presidency of Count Florida Blanca, a venerable statesman, whose name carried with it the public confidence. The selection was a remarkable one, as Blanca's old attachment to the French alliance ought to have caused him to be suspected. A council of war, in which figured Generals Castaños, Morla, and the Marquis of Castellar, directed all the disposition for the levies and the defense of the kingdom; the repairs and armaments of the fortifications, the disposition of the resources of the kingdom, and the succors sent from England. Tarragona, Tortosa, Gerona, Badajoz, Ciudad-Rodrigo, were put in a state of defense; works were also ordered at Saragossa and at Valencia.

**POSITION OF THE SPANISH FORCES.**—The Spanish forces were formed in four armies. On the left, Blake with the army of Galicia, forty-five thousand strong, had passed Bilbao, and was now marching on Mondragon, with the intention of debouching in rear of Vittoria; in the center, the army of Estramadura, of twenty thousand men, commanded by Count Belvedere, occupied Burgos; on the right, Castaños, with the army of Andalusia, of thirty thousand men, extended along the Ebro from Calahorra to Tudela; and Palafox, at the head of twenty-five thousand men of the army of Aragon, occupied the left bank of the Aragon. Besides, the Spaniards had a corps of reserve of ten thousand men, in advance of Madrid. In Catalonia, General Vives was blockading Duhesme in Barcelona. Finally, an English army of thirty thousand combatants, coming partly from Portugal by Salamanca, and partly from Coruña, was to unite at Valladolid under the orders of Moore.

**NAPOLEON JOINS JOSEPH AT VITTORIA.**—I repaired, in November, 1808, to the head-quarters of my army at Vittoria. The corps of Moncey formed its left wing at Taffala, extending along the Aragon; the corps of Ney was at Vittoria; that of Soult at Miranda and along the Ebro; the corps of Victor was on the march from Vittoria to Orduna; at the extreme right, the corps of Lefévre occupied the heights of Durango; my guard was with me at Vittoria. The corps of Saint-Cyr, which had assembled at Perpignan, penetrated into Catalonia to relieve Duhesme at Barcelona. I still expected the corps of Mortier and that which Junot had brought back from Portugal after the convention of Vimiera; but I felt strong enough already to take the offensive with what troops I had in hand.

**CHARACTER OF THE WAR.**—In forming my plans for subjugating Spain, I had to choose between regular and method-

ical operations and a war of a more irregular character. By the first system, provisions must be carried in the suite of the army, or be regularly purchased and paid for from the inhabitants. No great detachments could be made to regulate the administration of the provinces, or to pursue the insurgent corps to the fastnesses of the mountains. In fine, effecting a military occupation of Spain without its subjugation. By the second, war would be made to support war. To march rapidly against all organized masses, living from day to day, upon the local resources, as we had done in Italy, Austria, and Prussia, sparing our reserves for the occupation and pacification of the conquered provinces—this mode promised more prompt and decisive results. The individual losses rendered still more disastrous by the flight of the civil authorities, caused by this method, made us numerous enemies. Nevertheless, in spite of these unavoidable excesses and the vengeance taken by the insurgents in reprisal, we should finally have succeeded in restoring order and peace, had it not been for the English coöperation, the position of Portugal flanking our line of operations, and the advantages which her maritime ally derived from her eight hundred leagues of coast. By sacrificing three or four hundred millions of money for the subsistence of my troops, and devoting two whole years to overrunning Spain, it is possible that the first method would have succeeded. By maintaining good order and discipline among my troops, and by distributing the money necessary to support them among a people poor and interested, would have gradually made us many partisans. We could then have offered them, with a firm and just hand, the olive or the sword. But, great as were the advantages of this system, it must be confessed that its application was very difficult. The thing had been very easy with an army of fifty thousand men, as was done by Vendôme under Louis XIV.; then three quarters of the nation were for us and for Philip V. But we had now almost the entire nation in arms against us; we could not suppress such an insurrection, and at the same time oppose the Anglo-Portuguese, with less than two hundred thousand men; but how was it possible to make regular provision for this number in a country where there was no means of organizing administrative authorities whose requisitions would be respected? Suchet and Soult partially succeeded with this system for a time, with small forces and in a more favorable part of the country. By the second system I had always succeeded; it led more directly to the destruction of the enemy's armies; and avoided the enormous drafts upon the treasury of France which would have been required,



under the other system, for the armament, clothing, and support of two hundred thousand armed men in a foreign country. It will be said, undoubtedly, that only a year's advance from the French treasury would have been required, as, at the end of that time, regular contributions could have been levied and collected in Spain. Nothing can be more absurd; those who know the difficulties experienced by the Spanish government in collecting sufficient for its ordinary expenses will agree with me, that it would have been impossible for King Joseph to effect with that impoverished nation what Charles III. failed to do in the glorious epoch of his reign, and the golden age of unhappy Spain. To these motives, quite sufficient, we must add, that the war was not popular enough with the French to justify any great sacrifices by France. Besides, the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable means of transport rendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantity of stores in an insurgent country. I therefore determined to adopt the same course that I had already pursued with so much success. It caused great excesses, but this was rather the fault of the chiefs who tolerated them. Had I succeeded, I should have indemnified the mass of the people for their losses, by the sale of the great wealth of the clergy, which would have rendered the Church more dependent on the government, and caused a more just division of the riches of this world; thus the evils of the war would have been forgotten in the happy triumph of public and private interest over that of an ambitious and exclusive clergy.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS.—Having determined to carry on the war of invasion upon the same principles by which I had gained success in former campaigns, I prepared to attack the Spaniards with our accustomed impetuosity. My plan of campaign was marked out by the faulty positions of the hostile forces. Their center, too weak to oppose a serious resistance, would be easily overthrown; then the two wings, separated and turned, would be in a very critical situation. The army of Blake, in particular, having ventured past Bilboa, might be entirely cut off and driven into the sea. Unfortunately, the aged Lefévre, urged forward by the impetuous ardor of youth, did not even wait for my arrival at the army before attacking Blake, whereas he should have maneuvered to retain him in advance of Bilboa. On the thirty-first of October, Blake had been driven from this city, which was now occupied by our troops. The seventh of November, Lefévre attacked him again at Guenes, and obliged him to flight, retreating on Espinosa.

On the other hand, the events of Baylen had given me a higher idea of the resistance to be opposed by the Spanish troops in line, and as the road from Bayonne was my only communication, I did not wish to penetrate too far beyond the Ebro, before having secured this route from the enterprises of Blake. I had sent, for this purpose, the corps of Victor, to reinforce Lefébvre, with directions to push the army of Galicia as soon as Soult and my guard should be in position for piercing the center. The two corps of my right performed their task, but more rapidly than anticipated.

**AFFAIR OF BURGOS.**—Ignorant of this premature success, I did not yet despair of being able to turn Blake. On the tenth of November, Soult marched on Burgos. The army of Estramadura was broken by the first shock of General Mouton's division and a detachment of cavalry. It lost twelve colors, twenty-five cannon and three thousand prisoners. The rest were dispersed. Master of Burgos, where I established my headquarters, I hastened to direct Soult on Reynosa, in hopes of there anticipating the army of Galicia, while the three divisions of cavalry were thrown on Medina-del-Rio-Seco to cut off from Zamora the English, who, it was said, were assembling near Valladolid.

**BLAKE IS DEFEATED AT ESPINOSA.**—Blake directed his march on Espinosa-de-los-Monteras, which lies on the direct road from the Ebro to St. Ander; he flattered himself to thus cover for some time the great road that leads from Burgos to this seaport, the road which runs to Reynosa, where the Spanish army had collected the mass of its material. Reinforced by the corps of Romana, which had just returned from Denmark, Blake established himself before Espinosa, having in rear the ravine of the Trueba. Such a position would of course render an attack difficult, and a defeat disastrous. Victor arrived here on the tenth, and immediately directed an attack. Our troops had not been able to transport their cannon through the mountains, while Blake had brought some pieces from St. Ander; but, in spite of this advantage, the corps of Romana, placed on an advanced plateau, was overthrown by the division of Pactod, driven into the ravines, and partially destroyed. Night put an end to this first combat. The next day Victor resumed the attack. The enemy took position in a bend of the Trueba to the south of Espinosa, having this little village in rear of its left flank; an absurd position, where the slightest check must become disastrous; it was a repetition of the defeat of Friedland, with the difference that, having Spaniards instead of Russians to deal with, the rout and confusion were the more complete.



Deceived by the attack of the night before, Blake believed that our main efforts would be directed against his right, and therefore concentrated his *élite* at that point. Victor, on the contrary, threw General Maison against the left; he routed this wing, and pursued it pell-mell upon the bridge of Reynosa, which was the only one in the enemy's possession. The Spaniards of the right and center, formed *en masse* in squares, threw themselves into the Trueba, and the most horrible confusion ensued. A part fled on the St. Ander road; others took that of Vilarcayo, and fell into the hands of General Sebastiani, who had marched in that direction; the greater part fled to Reynosa.

In this battle Blake lost about ten thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners. If the movement of General Maison had been directed upon the right instead of the left, the whole Spanish army, thrown back on St. Ander, would have been forced to lay down its arms. Blake passed Reynosa on the morning of the twelfth, and Romana, finding the wrecks of his army in the most deplorable condition, was obliged to throw himself, by the high mountains at the head-waters of the Ebro, into the kingdom of Leon, in order to collect and recruit his exhausted forces. He reached there with scarcely fifteen thousand men. A single day's delay in Victor's attack, and this army would have been utterly annihilated. Soult, instead of continuing the pursuit through this horrible country, took the road from Reynosa to St. Ander, overran this province, taking a large number of prisoners, the guarding of which he intrusted to the division Bonnet, and then descended upon Leon.

#### CASTAÑOS AND PALAFOX BEATEN AT TUDELA.—

We still had on our hands the armies of Castaños and Palafox, which were united at Tudela. Reinforcing Ney with the division Dessolles, I ordered him to march from Aranda by Soria on Agreda, in order to turn these armies. Lannes, at the same time, was dispatched from my head-quarters, to put himself at the head of Moncey's corps near Logrono, and attack them in front. Ney reached Soria on the twenty-second. Lannes had passed the Ebro the night before, by the bridge of Lodosa, and was now marching by Calahorra on Tudela. On the morning of the twenty-third he arrived in front of the enemy's line. This army, composed of the conquerors of Baylen and the defenders of Valencia and Saragossa, was the hope of Castile; counting in all forty-five thousand combatants, it formed a line of battle about two leagues in extent. Palafox, with the Aragonese, formed the right, the Valencians and the Castilians the center, and Castaños

the left, which rested near Cascante. Lannes had not more than half their numbers; but as soon as he saw, on the morning of the twenty-third, the extent of their line, he commenced the attack by throwing the division of Maurice Mathieu on the center, and that of Lagrange on the left. Sixty pieces of cannon protect these attacks. The Spanish line is pierced; the cavalry of Lefébvre-Desnouettes penetrates the opening, and falls with impetuosity on the infantry of the right wing, fighting as though determined to revenge the affair of Saragossa; the Aragonese, attacked at the same time in flank and in reverse, take to flight. The haughty conquerors of Baylen fall back before Lagrange; assailed in front and rear by Maurice Mathieu, they retreat along the Tarragona road; Palafox had taken the road to Saragossa. Thirty pieces of cannon, three thousand prisoners, and as many enemies *hors-de-combat*, were the fruits of this victory. But I had hoped for still greater results; although the movement of Ney was a little too well understood to be concealed from the Spaniards, still I hoped that the Castilian pride would prompt them to await battle, and that, once engaged with Lannes, Ney might arrive in time in their rear to destroy them. Lannes here committed the same fault as Victor at Espinosa; he attacked a day too soon. It is possible, however, that, had he delayed, the enemy might have retired unharmed, which would have been worse than this incomplete success. But Ney did not accomplish all in his power; he marched too slowly. Arrived, on the twenty-second, at Soria, he halted there to collect his troops and gather news of the enemy. It was proposed to him, at the heights of Almazan, to take by this city the road to Calatayud, a point that he could easily have reached before the enemy. In fact, the position of Ney was a little embarrassing; if he directed his course from Osma by Almazan upon El-Amunia or Calatayud, he would gain more securely the road to Valencia, but, at the same time, would, by increasing the distance between him and Lannes, expose the latter to be defeated without the possibility of succor. If Ney, on the contrary, should march by Soria on Agreda, he could not prevent the enemy from moving directly on Tarragona and Calatayud. Ignorant of what was actually taking place, he remained at Soria, and allowed the enemy time to escape.

Malevolence, which would blast and destroy every thing, has imputed this delay of Ney to his jealousy of his colleague. It is but too true that my marshals were not always free from this passion, so fatal to an army; but Ney was incapable of pushing it so far as to defeat a concerted operation; moreover, in this case,



the half of the honor of success would have belonged to him, as he would have captured all the prisoners and trophies.

Thus the two decisive operations of the campaign, counteracted by fortuitous circumstances which it was impossible to foresee, preventing me from destroying at a single blow the two armies on which Spain placed most reliance. The war, without doubt, would have still continued; but what a difference would there have been in succeeding events, if Castaños and Blake, captured with all the skeleton of good troops, had left the kingdom without any other defense than the local rage of an unbridled populace.

**BATTLE OF SOMMO-SIERRA.**—Having defeated and routed the Spanish armies of the right and left, I could now advance with security on Madrid. I passed the Douro, on the twenty-ninth, at Aranda, with the corps of Victor, my guards, and the cavalry, and the next day reached the foot of the Sommo-Sierra. Ten thousand Spaniards, of the corps of reserve, defended this position, almost impregnable, on the great road from Burgos to Madrid. Closed in by steep rocks on all sides, it could hardly be approached except by the road. Our infantry attacked it in vain, both to the right and left; as the enemy's cannon enfiladed the road, an attack in close column became exceedingly destructive to our troops. I then threw upon these batteries the brave Polish lancers of my guard; the first squadron, suffering severely from the murderous fire, hesitates; others come to their support; galloping up the steep sides of the mountain, and falling upon the cannon, they capture them and put to flight the Spanish infantry, who, astonished at so much valor and audacity, retreat in disorder on the road to Madrid. This feat of arms, one of the most brilliant of all my campaigns, covered the Polish lancers with glory and won for them the title of "the most intrepid."

**NAPOLEON ENTERS MADRID.**—We passed the defile, and on the second of December I established myself on the heights that overlook Madrid. I had with me only thirty thousand men; the capital was defended by more than forty thousand armed forces under General Morla, one of the most intelligent men in Spain. But in truth, one-half of these were peasants just collected together, or the undisciplined inhabitants of Madrid, and I counted much upon the panic produced by my success. In this I was not mistaken. Notwithstanding the noisy boasting of this multitude, a few cannon shot against the old walls of the Retiro led to the capitulation of Madrid; I entered the city on the fourth.

Ney, at first directed on Saragossa, was to be replaced there by Mortier, and, in the mean time, he was to leave that place to the care of Moncey's corps; he now received orders to join me at Madrid with his sixth corps. I passed it in review on the heights of Chánmartín, and made it enter Madrid with great pomp. The superb appearance and martial air of this corps formed a strong contrast to the conscripts of which the first army of Spain was composed. Lefébvre left Biscay and also marched for the capital; Soult marched upon Leon to observe Romana and the English; a new corps, under the orders of Delaborde, formed of the wrecks of the army of Portugal, passed the Pyrenees and directed itself on Burgos.

I had more than once observed the influence which the fall of its capital exercises upon the submission of a state; and I resolved to profit by the fall of Madrid, to influence the minds of the Spaniards.\* I determined to adopt no half measures with

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\*In speaking of the capture of Madrid and the importance of fortifying the capital of a state, Napoleon, in his "Memoirs," dictated at St. Helena, Vol. IX., uses nearly the following language:

If Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the fate of the war. Again, in 1809, if this capital had been fortified, it would have enabled the Archduke Charles, after the disaster of Eckmühl, by a forced retreat on the left of the Danube, to form a junction with the forces of General Hiller and the Archduke John.

If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at Jena would have rallied there and been joined by the Russians. If Madrid had been strongly fortified in 1808, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo-Sierra, would not have marched toward that capital, leaving in rear of Salamanca and Valladolid both the English army of General Moore and the Spanish army of Romana. If Moscow had been fortified in 1812, its conflagration would have been avoided, for, with strong defensive works, and the army of Kutusof encamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been impossible.

Had not Constantinople been well fortified, the empire of Constantine must have terminated in the year 700, whereas the standard of the Prophet was not planted there until 1440. This capital was, therefore, indebted to its walls for eight hundred years of existence. During this period it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one of these sieges was successful. The French and Venetians took it, but not without a very severe contest.

Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 the Normans besieged it for two years without effect. In 1358 the Dauphin besieged it in vain. In 1359 Edward, King of England, encamped at Montrouge, devastated the country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, and retired to Chartres. In 1429 it repulsed the attack of Charles VII. In 1464 the Count of Charlerois surrounded the city, but was unsuccessful in his attacks. In 1472 it repulsed the army of the Duke of Burgundy, who had already ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by Charles V., it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1588 and 1589 it repulsed the armies of Henry III. and Henry IV. In 1636 and several succeeding years the inhabitants of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If this capital had been strongly fortified in 1814 and 1815, the allied armies would not have dared to attempt its investment.



the clergy; I had, during my short sojourn at Madrid, sufficient proof of the part they had taken in the revolution, to remove all doubts on this point, if any had previously existed. Repelled by the Church, I had no hope of gaining the attachment of its implacable ministers—a class of men more disposed than any other in Spain to uphold existing abuses. In spite of their well-known influence, I was persuaded that there existed in Spain a numerous party of men wise enough to second the reforms that could be made, particularly in the monastic orders. I tried to rouse the patriotic desires of this party. I knew that the numerous class of magistrates and notaries, these veritable *ulemas* of the Spanish monarchy, aspired to a more liberal organization. It was through this intermediary class that I hoped to act upon the mass of the nation. I caused to be sent to me a deputation of the notables of Madrid. More than twelve hundred of the most distinguished individuals of the different classes and corporations of the capital, with the corregidor at their head, came to compliment me at my head-quarters at Chanmartin. Never did a more solemn assembly present itself before a conqueror to recognize his power. I profited by the occasion to proclaim my intentions with respect to Spain, and replied to their address in these terms:

“I am pleased with the sentiments of the city of Madrid. I regret the ills that have befallen it, and I am very happy in having been able, under the circumstances, to save it from greater misfortunes. I am impatient to take measures to tranquillize all classes of citizens, knowing the injurious effects of uncertainty upon the people.

“I have preserved the religious orders, limiting the number of monks; there is not a sensible man who will not agree with me that they are too numerous. Those who are called to this vocation by the grace of God will remain in their convents; as to those who have inconsiderately, or from worldly motives, adopted it, I have established them in the order of secular ecclesiastics. With the surplus wealth of the convents I have provided for the wants of curates, the most interesting and useful class of clergy. I have abolished the Inquisition, a tribunal denounced by all Europe, and repugnant to the feelings of the age. Priests should direct the conscience, but can exercise over citizens no exterior and corporal jurisdiction.

“I have obtained satisfaction for myself and for my nation; vengeance is complete; it has fallen on ten of the principal criminals; entire and absolute pardon is granted to all others. I

have abolished the rights usurped by the nobility in times of civil wars, when the kings were too often obliged to surrender their rights in order to purchase their own tranquillity and the repose of the people. I have abolished feudal rights, and every one can now establish inns, bakeries, weirs, and fisheries, and give free scope to their industry, only observing the laws and regulations of the police. The egotism, wealth, and prosperity of a few do more injury to your agriculture than the heats of the dog-days. As there is but one God, there should be in a state but one justice; wherefore all special jurisdictions, being usurped, and contrary to national law, have been abolished. I have also made known to all persons what each has to fear and what each may hope.

"As to the English armies, I will drive them from the peninsula. Saragossa, Valencia, Seville, shall be reduced either by persuasion or by force of arms; there is no obstacle capable of retarding, for any length of time, the execution of my wishes. But what I can not do is, to constitute the Spaniards a nation, under the orders of the King, if they continue to be imbued with the spirit of opposition, and of hatred to France, which English partisans and the enemies of the continent have instilled into their minds. I can not establish a nation, a king, and Spanish independence if that king is not certain of the affection and fidelity of his subjects.

"The Bourbons can never again reign in Europe; the divisions in the royal family were fomented by the English. To drive King Charles and his favorite from the throne was not what the Duke of Infantado, the instrument of England, wished; papers recently taken in his house prove what the real object was; it was British preponderance that they wished to establish in Spain. Insensate project! which could have led to no other result than an endless war and the shedding of oceans of blood. No power under British influence can exist upon the continent; if there are any who desire it, their desire is folly, and will, sooner or later, cause their ruin.

"It would be easy for me, and I may be compelled to govern Spain, by establishing a viceroy in each province. But I will not refuse to concede my rights of conquest to the King, and to establish him at Madrid, when the thirty thousand citizens of this capital, the ecclesiastics, nobles, merchants, lawyers, shall manifest their sentiments and their fidelity, set the example to the provinces, and make known to the people and the entire nation, that the happiness of all depends upon a king and a



liberal constitution, favorable in its provisions to the people, and opposed only to the egotism and haughty passions of the aristocracy.

"If such be the sentiments of the thirty thousand inhabitants of the city of Madrid, let them assemble in the churches and on the Holy Sacrament take an oath, not with the mouth alone, but with the heart, and without any Jesuitical restriction, *to be true to the King, and to love and support him.* Let the priests from the pulpit and in the confessional, the tradesmen in their correspondence, the lawyers in their meetings and discourses, inculcate these sentiments among the people; then I will relinquish my rights of conquest; then I will place the King on the throne, and take pleasure in showing myself the faithful friend of the Spaniard. The present generation may differ in opinions; too many passions have been excited; but your descendants will bless me as the regenerator of the nation; they will mark my sojourn among you as memorable days, and from these days they will date the prosperity of Spain."

These words, promulgated through all Spain, and accompanied by proclamations and decrees reducing two-thirds of the monastic orders, only irritated the resistance of the clergy, without making me a single partisan. The nobility, threatened in their feudal rights and seigneurial jurisdictions, were only the more bitter in their opposition; finally, the *Escribanos*, ill satisfied with the destruction of an order of things which multiplied lawsuits, deemed it their duty to pronounce, for certain vague hopes which they did not appreciate, the vengeance inspired by a sense of insulted national honor. Posterity, more disinterested and impartial, will decide that the views contained in these proclamations were the only ones which could rescue Spain from the gulf into which misfortune had precipitated her; she will some day regret having rejected these wise and salutary measures. But the mass of the nation, incapable of understanding my language, and of appreciating its meaning, docile to obey the impulses it received, repelled them with indignation. Ten years afterward they received with enthusiastic joy, then condemned to death and dragged upon the hurdle, those Spaniards who had ventured to follow in my footsteps, and to proclaim these salutary measures. There is a time for all things!

**THE ENGLISH ADVANCE FROM PORTUGAL.**—During all this time the English army had remained stationary. Its operations had been ill-combined; the faults were attributed to Lord Castlereagh, who directed the department of war in utter

ignorance of the art. Moore was a very distinguished officer, but he committed many errors; he debouched from Portugal by Salamanca, and sent his material by Badajos, as if it could not have followed by Almeida. General Baird was to join him with a corps which was to land at Coruña; but he was delayed some twelve days for permission to disembark his troops—a permission which the Spanish officers were unwilling to give. He, finally effected his landing on the twenty-eighth of November, and directed his march on Astorga, at the time I entered Madrid. Moore, forced to wait at Salamanca for his material and half of his army, finally decided to march on Valladolid. The news of the bloody checks experienced by his allies induced him to decide rather hastily to retreat; but on hearing that the Spaniards had announced their intention to redouble their efforts in the defense of Madrid, he renewed his plan of marching on Valladolid. It is a singular and almost unaccountable circumstance that, although in the midst of a friendly population, he did not learn the surrender of Madrid till the fourteenth, and even then by an intercepted dispatch of ours, containing at the same time information of the position of Soult on the Carion. The Spaniards had concealed this event, either through their national pride, or on account of dissatisfaction. The public voice accused the English general of tardy, irresolute movements; he thought to calm public opinion by forming the project of capturing the corps of Soult. He left Toro on the twenty-second, at the head of thirty thousand English troops, for Sahagun. Romana, with the Spaniards, was to push from Leon to the north of Saldana, and fall on Soult's right, while the English should turn his left, by crossing the Carion. To secure the success of this project, it was necessary that the English should take the road from Palencia on Herrera; but they feared to separate themselves too far from their line of retreat, and preferred to march directly to Sahagun.

NAPOLEON MARCHES AGAINST THEM.—Hearing of this march of the English, I immediately resolved to operate on their rear, in order to cut them off from Portugal and the ports of Galicia. For the security of Madrid, I established on the Tagus the corps of Lefébvre and Victor, the first at Talavera, and the second at Toledo; a part of my cavalry remained at Madrid. I myself, with my guards, the corps of Ney, the division of Dessolles, and the remainder of the cavalry, left the capital on the twenty-second, and marched on Tordesillas, where I crossed the Duero on the twenty-fifth. This direction was good; that of



Toro might perhaps have been preferable. Ney, yielding to good advice, was on the point of taking from Arevalo the road direct to that city; perhaps we might have anticipated the English at Benevento. This was the decisive point of the two lines of retreat on Coruña and Portugal. My positive order to go to Tordesillas dissuaded him. This would have been of no importance, if we had marched from there direct on Benevento, but the fear that Soult might be engaged alone with the English caused me to incline a little too much to the right on Medina-del-Rio-Seco, where I arrived on the twenty-seventh of December. General Laborde, who had just arrived in Castile with the old corps of Junot, received orders to join me by Valladolid; Soult had already called him upon the Carion.

**MOORE RETIRES ON CORUÑA.**—The following days I continued my march to take the English in reverse. Moore was too prudent to fall into the snare. On hearing of my advance with a considerable force from Madrid on Leon, he renounced his projects against Soult; and, on the twenty-fourth, instead of marching from Sahagun to the Carion, he fell back on Benevento, where he took position, on the twenty-sixth, in rear of the Esla, at the junction of the roads to Salamanca, Madrid, Leon, and those leading to Galicia. The vigilance of the English general having defeated my projects, it only remained for me to profit by my superiority in numbers to push the enemy warmly, while Soult sought to turn his left, by moving from Leon on Astorga. This movement completed the separation of the corps of Romana, which took the road to Orense. On the second, Moore left Benevento, and hastened his retreat by Astorga and Lugo on Coruña; a single brigade took the road to Orense. I followed only to Astorga, for I deemed it useless to fatigue all the troops which I had with me by marching them to the extremity of Galicia, and the corps of Soult was sufficient for the pursuit of the English army, already broken and much weakened. Nevertheless, I took the precaution to direct Ney to follow Soult near enough to render him assistance in case of need. With the remainder of my troops I took the road to Valladolid.

**BATTLE OF CORUÑA.**—The English rapidly retreated to Coruña, where they expected to embark. Their fleet was at Vigo; a contrary wind would have caused them the greatest embarrassment. Happily for them, the road to Coruña traverses from Astorga to Lugo a defile of thirty leagues formed by very high mountains. A feeble rear guard was sufficient to protect the road, and the country was such as to preclude all possibility of

maneuvering on the flanks. This prevented Soult from cutting off the enemy's march; and Ney, encumbered in the defile in their rear, could do nothing. This was the more to be regretted as the English army, having nothing prepared on this line, was destitute of every thing, and reduced to a frightful condition by the forced marches which it made without any necessity. They hamstrung the horses of their cavalry and train, and abandoned three or four thousand stragglers and sick, without ever having their line of operations threatened. Whatever may have been said of it, this retreat of Moore was, in reality, nothing less than a flight. It is not easy to conceive why the English were unwilling to defend Coruña. Of course it was not a Gibraltar; but it might have resisted an enemy who had only light artillery; honor required a defense; besides, there was the sea, by which the place could be provisioned, and by which, in case of necessity, the army could retire. This operation, of which the English have boasted, is incomprehensible to me, and without a parallel in history.

Having reached Coruña, the English army, to gain time for the embarkation, put themselves in order of battle in front of the city; this gave us time to overtake them; Soult began the attack on the sixteenth of January; he had twenty thousand men, and the English about the same number. The battle was well contested, but indecisive; General Moore was killed,\* and Baird and

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\*Sir John Moore was born at Glasgow in 1761, and at the age of fifteen entered the army as ensign. In 1790 he was made a lieutenant-colonel, and was wounded at the siege of Colvi. In 1796 he accompanied Sir Ralph Abercrombie to the West Indies, as brigadier-general. In 1799 he was sent to Holland, and subsequently engaged in the expedition to Egypt. In October, 1808, he landed in Spain at the head of the English forces, and fell at Coruña, January 16th, 1809, mortally wounded by a cannon ball.

Napier thus describes his death and character:

"Sir John Moore, while earnestly watching the result of the fight about the village of Elvira, was struck on the left breast by a cannon shot; the shock threw him from his horse with violence, but he rose again in a sitting posture, his countenance unchanged, and his steadfast eye still fixed upon the regiments engaged in his front, no sigh betraying a sensation of pain. In a few moments, when he was satisfied that the troops were gaining ground, his countenance brightened, and he suffered himself to be taken to the rear; then was seen the dreadful nature of his hurt. The shoulder was shattered to pieces, the arm was hanging by a piece of skin, the ribs over the heart were broken, and bared of flesh, and the muscles of the breast torn into long strips, which were interlaced by their recoil from the dragging of the shot. As the soldiers placed him in a blanket his sword got entangled, and the hilt entered the wound; Captain Hardinge, a staff-officer, who was near, attempted to take it off, but the dying man stopped him, saying, '*It is well as it is, I had rather it should go out of the field with me*'; and in that manner, so becoming to a soldier, Moore was borne from the fight. \* \* \*



Paget each lost an arm. The British troops exhibited great firmness, which strongly contrasted with the disorder and precipitation of their retreat, in which their only embarrassment was a want of provisions; an important lesson, which proves the difficulties of carrying on a war in a disorganized country, where it is impossible to live by requisitions. Nevertheless, the English maintained their principal position, and, the night after the combat, effected their embarkation. The Spaniards, discouraged and few in number, did not even attempt to defend the places of Galicia. Coruña capitulated on the twentieth, and some days after, the important place of Ferrol surrendered to Soult without resistance. In the capture of this place we took seven ships of the line and three frigates, besides a considerable number of vessels undergoing repairs. Romana at first retired toward Orense, and afterwards regained the Asturias.

LEFÉBVRE ON THE TAGUS.—The news of my departure from Madrid in pursuit of the English had revived the courage of the wrecks of the army of Andalusia, which were collected at

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"He was carried to the town by a party of soldiers; his blood flowed fast, and the torture of his wound increased, but such was the unshaken firmness of his mind, that those about him, judging from the resolution of his countenance that his hurt was not mortal, expressed a hope of his recovery; hearing this, he looked steadfastly at the injury for a moment, and then said, '*No, I feel that to be impossible.*' Several times he caused his attendants to stop and turn him round, that he might behold the field of battle, and when the firing indicated the advance of the British, he discovered his satisfaction, and permitted the bearers to proceed. Being brought to his lodgings, the surgeons examined his wound, but there was no hope; the pain increased, and he spoke with great difficulty. At intervals he asked if the French were beaten, and addressing his old friend, Colonel Anderson, he said, '*You know that I always wished to die this way.*' Again he asked if the enemy were defeated, and being told they were, observed, '*It is a great satisfaction to me to know we have beaten the French.*' His countenance continued firm and his thoughts clear; once only, when he spoke of his mother, he became agitated, but he often inquired after the safety of his friends, and the officers of his staff, and he did not even in this moment forget to recommend those whose merit had given them claims to promotion. His strength failed fast, and life was just extinct, when, with an unsubdued spirit, as if anticipating the baseness of his posthumous calumniators, he exclaimed, '*I hope the people of England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice!*' In a few minutes afterward he died, and his corpse, wrapped in a military cloak, was interred by the officers of his staff in the citadel of Coruña; the guns of the enemy paid his funeral honors, and Soult, with a noble feeling of respect for his valor, raised a monument to his memory.

"Thus ended the career of Sir John Moore, a man whose uncommon capacity was sustained by the purest virtue, and governed by a disinterested patriotism more in keeping with the primitive than the luxurious age of a great nation. His tall, graceful person, his dark, searching eyes, strongly defined forehead, and singularly expressive mouth, indicated a noble

Cuença, under the orders of the Duke of Infantado, and of the army of the center, which was behind the Tagus, under General Galuzzo. The fourth corps, under Marshal Lefébvre, prepared to repel this latter army. After having surprised the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, Lefébvre drove back upon Merida the enemy, who were much scattered along an immense line. General Galuzzo was forced to collect the fragments of his army behind the Gaudiana.

**VICTOR DEFEATS INFANTADO AT UCLES.**—The Duke of Infantado, expecting to find Madrid defenseless, advanced, at the end of December, from Cuença on that capital. The Duke of Belluna, who was cantoned about Toledo, met him half way. The rencounter took place at Ucles, on the thirteenth of January; the division of Villatte falls on the enemy as soon as it arrives; that of Ruffin, having lost its road, debouches, by unexpected good fortune, behind Ucles, and also falls suddenly on the enemy's rear. The hostile forces are completely routed, more especially the newly levied troops, which form the great mass of their army.

disposition and a refined understanding. The lofty sentiments of honor habitual to his mind, being adorned by a subtle, playful wit, gave him in conversation an ascendancy that he always preserved by the decisive vigor of his actions. He maintained the right with a vehemence bordering upon fierceness, and every important transaction in which he was engaged increased his reputation for talent, and confirmed his character as a stern enemy to vice, a steadfast friend to merit, a just and faithful servant of his country. The honest loved him, the dishonest feared him; for while he lived he did not shun, but scorned and spurned the base, and, with characteristic propriety, they spurned at him when he was dead.

"A soldier from his early youth, Moore thirsted for the honors of his profession, and feeling that he was worthy to lead a British army, hailed the fortune that placed him at the head of the troops destined for Spain. As the stream of time passed, the inspiring hopes of triumph disappeared, but the austere glory of suffering remained, and with a firm heart he accepted that gift of a severe fate. Confiding in the strength of his genius, he disregarded the clamors of presumptuous ignorance, and opposing sound military views to the foolish projects so insolently thrust upon him by the ambassador, he conducted a long and arduous retreat with sagacity, intelligence, and fortitude; no insult disturbed, no falsehood deceived him, no remonstrance shook his determination; fortune frowned without subduing his constancy; death struck, but the spirit of the man remained unbroken, when his shattered body scarcely afforded it a habitation. Having done all that was just toward others, he remembered what was due to himself; neither the shock of the mortal blow, nor the lingering hours of acute pain which preceded his dissolution, could quell the pride of his gallant heart, or lower the dignified feeling with which, conscious of merit, he at the last moment asserted his right to the gratitude of the country he had served so truly. If glory be a distinction, for such a man death is not a leveller!"

This campaign of the English has been most severely criticised, and the general who conducted it was at the time made the subject of the most unmerited and unreasonable abuse. Sir John Moore was not a great



Eight or ten thousand prisoners, and thirty pieces of cannon, are the trophies of this easy triumph. Unfortunately, Latour-Maubourg's division of dragoons, which had followed the first corps, did not arrive in time to take part in the combat; otherwise, not a single battalion of Infanado's army would have escaped! Victor, after pushing the enemy on Cuenca and exploring that province, fell back on Madridegos and Consuegra.

**OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.**—Our affairs in Catalonia took a turn not less brilliant in appearance, but much less fortunate in results. This province, whose inhabitants had immortalized themselves by their resistance to Philip V. in 1709, is the most warlike in Spain. Its steep mountains present great difficulties in military operations, and especially in the supplies of an army, for it produces very little grain, and the cattle, on the first alarm, are driven away by the inhabitants into the mountains. Add to this that its cities occupy sites strong by nature, and made still stronger by the resources of art. Its frontier population, composed of contrabandists and smugglers,

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military genius. This was never claimed by himself, nor by his friends for him. But he was a brave, honest, and sensible man, and withal a great general, far above the majority of those who have commanded armies and conducted campaigns. He did not succeed! A crime which has no pardon and no mitigation in England and the United States. In other countries, a general's character is judged by his plans and the use he makes of the means at his command. Not so in England, at least in Moore's time. He *must* succeed, whether furnished with means or not. In this respect we copy the English pretty closely; success, not merit, is the criterion by which popular opinion at first decides. Defeat, unless of a party favorite, is followed by unmeasured condemnation and abuse.

Perhaps the history of the world scarcely furnishes a parallel to the abuse which was heaped upon Moore for this retreat, which was entirely unavoidable and well conducted. The party press of England seized upon it as a topic for political animadversion and the furtherance of party schemes. Every thing was misunderstood and misrepresented. Personal and party abuse was the order of the day. The opposition thought, by Moore's failure, to weaken and break down the administration, let the consequences to the country be what they might. Many were led even to the very verge of treason. But time, which ultimately separates the true from the false, and vindicates the right, has rescued Moore from his slanderers, and placed his name high on the rolls of fame; while his detractors are utterly forgotten. Napier most ably vindicated his character and military conduct, and the verdict of history has, in the main, supported Napier's opinion. On the contrary, his enemies, who so profusely abused him in the public press of England, have sunk so deep into obscurity that they can only be reached by the resurrectionary trumpet.

It is a singular fact that not one of those who abused Moore and opposed the war ever afterward attained any rank or consideration in England. An important lesson to those who, for interests of party, cease to be patriots and become half-way traitors to their government and their country.

is well suited for war. The news of the success of Baylen, exaggerated, as is usual with the Spaniard, had electrified all Catalonia. The people every where ran to arms. Duhesme, who commanded at Barcelona, feeling the necessity of opening a communication by Gerona, invested that place. After two unsuccessful attacks, executed with more courage than skill, he was reinforced by the division of Reille, and directed his operations more in accordance to rule; but, allowing himself to be surprised, on the tenth of August (1808), by General Caldagues, who succeeded in supplying the place with provisions, he was finally forced to retreat. Reille regained Figueras with four thousand men; Duhesme had great difficulty in reaching Barcelona with seven thousand, where he was besieged by the enemy.

I now assembled three new divisions on this frontier, forming about twenty thousand men, and ordered Saint-Cyr to take the command, directing him to effect a junction, as soon as possible, with Duhesme; but Berthier, who was incapable of doing anything without my special instructions, took no administrative measures for providing this corps with the necessary supplies. It was composed of the Italian division of Pino, the French division of Souham, and of Tuscans, Neapolitans, Valencians, etc.

The retreat of Duhesme had inflamed the ardent Catalans; the supreme junta sent them the troops of Minorca and reinforcements drawn from Valencia and Grenada, under the command of the Swiss General Reding. The ports of Tarragona, Tortosa, Palamos, and Rosas afforded every facility for rendering this province impregnable. They formed there forty battalions of *miguelets*;\* and it was estimated that seventy thousand men, in all, took up arms for the common defense, exclusive of a multitude of peasants, and of women, who, animated by a holy ardor, often bore arms in the defense of their ramparts. General Vives took the command in this province, and the English squadron under Collingwood cruised along the coast to second him.

SAINT-CYR SUCCORS BARCELONA.—In order to succor Barcelona, and supply that place with provisions, it was necessary first to capture Gerona and Hostalrich, the only points by which supplies could be conveyed. This seemed impossible in the face of so many difficulties; nevertheless, Saint-Cyr, judging that it would be dangerous to advance towards Barcelona while Rosas remained in the power of the English and insurgents, who might at any time cut off his communication with our frontier,

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\*Armed mountaineers of the Pyrenees.



determined to lay siege to that place. It is due to this general to say that this decision was contrary to my orders, which, under the circumstances, he was perfectly justifiable in disregarding. The English, under Cochrane, sought in vain to sustain the place, and the Spanish army to effect its rescue. The garrison, numbering three thousand men, abandoned by the squadron of its allies, was obliged to capitulate on the sixth of December.

Saint-Cyr, now yielding to my pressing instances, advanced to the succor of Barcelona. This was a difficult task. The Marquis of Lusun, having retired from Aragon and Cerdafña, assembled under Gerona a corps of ten or twelve thousand men. It was necessary to leave him behind, for, even should we attack him with success, it would be impossible to pursue him on the upper Fluvia without deviating from the object of the expedition. The Marquis of Vives commanded from twenty-five to thirty thousand men around Barcelona, which place he was closely investing. Gerona and Hostalrich obstructed the only road, so that neither cannon nor caissons of munitions could be transported. Saint-Cyr might, therefore, find himself on the Bezos surrounded by twenty-five thousand good troops and a multitude of militia and *miguelets*, without having the means of sustaining two combats. Setting out from the Abispal by Valdreras, he succeeded in turning Hostalrich and getting through the important passage of Tordera and the defile of San Celoni, where one half of the army of Vives might have formed an impenetrable barrier.

**AFFAIR OF CARDEDEU.**—On reaching the plateau between Llinas and Cardedeu, on the sixteenth of December, Saint-Cyr at last encountered Vives, there formed to close the passage. He attacked him with impetuosity, completely routed his troops, captured all his cannon without losing one of our own, and then marched in triumph into Barcelona. This enterprise, which was conducted with rare precision, did great honor to Saint-Cyr.

**VICTORY OF MOLINO-DEL-REY.**—Deeming it necessary to profit, without delay, by this victory to annihilate the regular corps of the enemy's army which had rallied behind the Llobregat, in order to cover Tarragona, Saint-Cyr attacked Vives the twenty-first of December, broke his right wing, and drove it back on the left. All took to flight, throwing away their arms and baggage. If they had held out a little longer, turned and outflanked as they were, they would have been completely destroyed. As it was, they lost only twelve hundred prisoners, but we captured fifty pieces of their artillery. According to strict strategic principles, the attack should have been made on

the left of the Spaniards, so as to drive them back on the sea and the marshes of Gava. It is true that their artillery and best troops were concentrated on this wing, in order to defend the bridge of Molino-del-Rey; but was it not possible to debouch by Pelleja on Moscaro, and, if this operation had succeeded, would there have been a single Spaniard left to carry to Tarragona the news of the destruction of their army? The difficulty of the ground is the only reason that can be given for the attack on the right. I know very well that strategic movements are of little avail against Spanish insurgents; but when there is a considerable corps of regular troops to deal with, and an opportunity occurs to maneuver so as to throw them back upon the sea, it is always well to attempt it.

VICTORIES OF CAPELLADOS AND WALSCH.—So far from allowing itself to be discouraged by these reverses, the junta of Catalonia, established at Tarragona, threw Vives into prison, and supplied his place by Reding, an officer of valor and energy. Exposed to every privation, Saint-Cyr nevertheless maintained himself with tenacity, till the month of February, between Barcelona and Tarragona. At this epoch Saragossa was closely pressed by Lannes. Reding, having received reinforcements from all sides, deemed it the proper time to resume the offensive, hoping to be able, should he succeed in driving Saint-Cyr from Catalonia, to fly to the assistance of Aragon. If Reding had understood strategy as well as he did fighting, he might here have played an important part. A slight success on the right flank of Saint-Cyr would have paralyzed his whole corps; but Reding thought his superiority authorized him to envelop our troops. Forming four columns several leagues apart, he marched to the right with the *élite* of his forces on the direct road to Vendrel, while his left, under Wimpfen, was to descend from Lacuna and Igualda on Villa Franca. This was a double fault; Reding should have allowed Saint-Cyr to move on Vendrel and Tarragona, while he himself was dealing with thirty thousand men on Capellados and Martorel, so as to turn our right and cut us off from Barcelona. Saint-Cyr took the wisest course which could be adopted in such a case; he concentrated his forces on the center at Lacuna, the sixteenth of February, overthrew his adversary's center at Capellados, and drove it back on Cervera and Manresa. To complete his task, Saint-Cyr drew back from the right toward the left (from Igualda on San Magi), so as to repeat on the enemy's right wing the operation he had just executed on the center. Souham was to coöperate by effecting his junction



at Villa Rodona; but the difficulty of sending orders prevented him from obtaining the desired result from this movement. Nevertheless, the junction was effected, and a French corps took possession of Walsch. Reding thought, by an inverse movement, to connect himself by Monblanch with the troops of Wimpfen near Igualda. He thus found himself cut off from the division which he had left in advance of Tarragona, and resolved to attack our troops and reestablish his communication. Saint-Cyr marched to encounter him; the meeting took place on the twenty-fifth of February, near Alcover. The enemy's defeat was complete; Reding, who was himself wounded, regained Tarragona, after losing more than three thousand five hundred men *hors-de-combat*. The handful of braves who gained these brilliant victories were, nevertheless, subjected to great want and its attendant maladies. The enemy repaired his losses by the continually increasing animosities of the population.

**SECOND SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA.**—Success, though much better contested, had also crowned our arms in Aragon; the modern Numantia, half buried in its own ruins, had capitulated. It will be remembered that after the battle of Tudela, Palafox had retired upon Saragossa with thirty thousand men. A multitude of peasants, driven before our columns, had also taken refuge there. An ancient tradition made this city an object of peculiar veneration; it was the sanctuary of the Virgen-del-Pilar, the palladium of Spanish liberty, and all were resolved to save it or to die in the attempt. Priests, monks, citizens, peasants, as well as the military, were enflamed with unbounded enthusiasm. Never were so many different passions directed to the same object. Pride, patriotism, fanaticism, national and military honor—all the most powerful motives of human action were put in play to render the defense a desperate one.

Marshal Moncey had given to Junot the command of the third corps, which first began the investment. Mortier had joined it with the fifth corps after Ney had received orders to move on Madrid. Marshal Lannes was placed in command of this army, and directed to proceed to the siege; General La Coste, my *aid-de-camp*, and Colonel Rogniat\* directed the engineers, and General Dedon commanded the artillery.

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\*Joseph Rogniat was born at Vienne, in 1767, and entered the service at the beginning of the Revolution. He served under Moreau, in 1800, as captain of engineers. He served in the campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1807, and was made a colonel after the siege of Dantzic, in which he rendered valuable aid to General Chasseloup Laubat. In the Peninsular War he directed several important sieges, and was promoted to the grades of

Situated in one of the most fertile plains, with a population of sixty thousand inhabitants, Saragossa is built partly of brick and partly of granite; though not regularly fortified, it is surrounded by a thick wall. Since the first siege, they had strengthened the weak parts of this wall, erected parapets, and constructed barricades across the streets, so that, the wall being forced, a new *enceinte*, as it were, would be formed in each street; the place was well armed with one hundred and eighty pieces of cannon. Moreover, after the first siege, the English general, Doyle, had gone to Saragossa, levied a corps of troops, and furnished a large number of English muskets and military munitions for arming the Aragonese. The houses being principally constructed of masonry without the use of wood rendered the usual incendiary projectiles utterly useless. It would, therefore, be necessary to resort to a bombardment, or to attack the place by mines, should the enemy not be forced by assault to capitulate. Both means were finally employed. Houses were attacked and defended like so many bastions in a regular fortress; and buildings, blown up by the mines, still found defenders who furiously disputed the scattered fragments. It would require the pen of a Homer to describe the heroic scenes of this siege, where art and well-directed courage finally triumphed over the strength and energy of despair. They disputed the possession of their houses, story by story, defending the rooms, the cellars, and the terraces, like so many demilunes, covered ways, and counterscarps. The garrison multiplied its numbers; each point of attack was sustained by peasants and armed citizens who assembled at the sound of the tocsin in the different quarters to serve as a reserve. When an isolated post was not defended in a manner to suit the mob, the unfortunate officer who commanded was either massacred or sentenced to be shot.

At the end of two months, the *enceinte* of the city had been carried in many places, and one-fourth of the houses reduced by sword and torch. The population, half buried in their cellars, had been swept off by a horrible epidemic. Fifteen thousand soldiers and thirty thousand inhabitants had perished by fire, pestilence, and famine; and when the place capitulated, it presented to our brave army, seized with admiration and horror, the aspect of a vast charnel-house. Palafox, who was sick, had given the

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brigadier-general and general-of-division. In 1813 he directed the defenses of the capital of Saxony, and in 1814 commanded at Metz. He was afterward made lieutenant-general, and employed on important works of fortification. He was the author of several valuable books on military and political subjects.



command to a distinguished French emigrant (St. Marc), but the latter soon threw his weighty responsibility on a junta of defense. This junta, yielding to the clamors of the majority, consented to capitulate, notwithstanding the opposition of fanatics who wished still to prolong the defense. My *aid-de-camp*, Lacoste,\* had directed the siege till the moment of his death; Dedon was still spared; Lannes had distinguished himself, as he always did; as also had Mortier, Suchet, and the intrepid Gazan. Our loss did not exceed five thousand men. Manes of so many brave men! Providence had made you friends and allies, but a deplorable political error forced you to slay each other!

SOULT IS SENT TO PORTUGAL.—I had hoped that England would be so disgusted with the catastrophe of Moore that she would make no new efforts in the peninsula; and my first idea was to avenge Junot by placing my eagles anew on the towers of Lisbon. The Portuguese army, a part disbanded and a part sent into France, no longer seemed in condition to dispute our entrance. The return of our victorious troops, announcing a superiority which no force could oppose, seemed calculated to give confidence to our partisans and to induce them to declare boldly for our cause. Although they were not the most numerous party, they nevertheless counted in their ranks men high in public esteem.

The feeble part taken by the Portuguese previous to the defeat of Junot deceived me respecting the state of feeling in the interior of the country, where exasperation was afterwards raised to the highest pitch. The English army, to which alone I had attributed the loss of Portugal, had disappeared at Coruña, and I flattered myself that my chances of success were better than before. My calculations proved erroneous, because my enemies displayed greater resources than I had supposed. The Prince Regent of Portugal had even outdone Barrère and the Committee of Public Safety, in his measures for national defense; he had ordered, by the decree of December 11th (1808), a *levée-en-masse* of all men between the ages of eighteen and sixty years; every individual refusing to march against the enemy was to be shot; every village that did not oppose all possible resistance was to be burnt. There is no parallel to this in the code of 1793.

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\*Count N. Lacoste was an officer of the corps of engineers, and rose to the rank of colonel, in the campaign of 1807. He distinguished himself at the siege of Dantzic, and was made *aid-de-camp* to the Emperor, with the rank of general-of-brigade. San Genis, the chief engineer of the defenses of Saragossa, fell at nearly the same moment as Lacoste.

Beresford,\* who had been made a Portuguese marshal, was entrusted with the general command. He organized twenty-four regiments under English pay, and with English officers for all grades above that of captain. Other regiments, entirely Portuguese, were also organized at the same time. The regular militia, instituted some half-century before, and the reserve, known under the name of *ordonanzas*, were all put under requisition. A regency, composed of the Patriarch of Lisbon, the Marquis de Las Minas y de Monteyre Mor, was invested with unlimited powers, yet subordinate to the English general, who was the true dictator of the monarchy. Moreover, General Craddock, who remained English governor at Lisbon, on the departure of Moore, had received reinforcements, among which was the division of Mackenzie. The English sought to introduce this division into Cadiz, under the charitable pretext of defending that place from our troops, from whom, however, it was not in the slightest danger! But the Spaniards were not to be duped by such a pretext; and Mackenzie, very properly refused admission into a place from which it had been as impossible to eject him as from Gibraltar, resumed his anchorage in the Tagus.

Soult received orders at Ferrol to march on Lisbon with the second and eighth corps, whose effective strength a month before was near forty thousand men, but which had been reduced by sickness and losses during the campaign to about twenty-four thousand. I hoped that these troops, reinforced by ten thousand convalescents and seconded by the corps of Victor, who was to descend the Tagus, and the division of Lapisse, who was to debouch toward Almeida, would suffice for the subjugation of a kingdom which I considered already nearly disarmed.

DEPARTURE OF NAPOLEON FOR PARIS.—I had not yet received any news from this expedition into Portugal, when important matters recalled me to France. Austria was arming in great force; and I inferred that there must be some grand project forming against me in Germany and in the north of Europe. I set out from Valladolid for Paris about the middle of January.

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\*Sir William Beresford served with distinction in the Peninsular War, and was afterwards made a baron of the United Kingdom. For his services in Portugal he received the titles of Duke of Elvas and Marquis of Campo Mayor. The Prince Regent of Portugal made him generalissimo of his armies, but the severity with which he punished a conspiracy of General Freyre, in 1817, against the British domination in Lisbon, rendered him so odious to the Portuguese that the Cortes afterwards dismissed him. In 1826 he again appeared at Lisbon, at the head of the British forces sent to quell the rebellion.



In leaving the peninsula I was greatly embarrassed in selecting a successor. Joseph did not understand the art of war; but his title gave him command over the marshals, who were unwilling to obey the orders of any one of their colleagues. He had remained with his court at Vittoria; and I was undecided about sending him back to Madrid, when a deputation of the grand functionaries of the state came to formally request his return. This request resulted from the fear of the Spaniards, lest they might be conquered and the kingdom dismembered; but the throne of my brother and the constitution of Bayonne would at least be a guarantee of the integrity of their monarchy. This deputation decided me; and my brother made his formal entry into his capital at the very moment when I was entering the gates of Paris, January 22d. I left him in command, giving him Marshal Jourdan for an adviser; the conqueror of Fleurus had a name; he alone had commanded a hundred thousand men; this would necessarily give him influence. I must confess that my choice was not a fortunate one; Jourdan was a good soldier, but his system of military operations was erroneous; he was a good administrator, laborious and methodical, but he was incapable of giving motion to this vast machine. Indeed, the task was exceeding difficult, on account of the contentious spirit of the marshals, the almost utter impossibility of communicating with the different *corps-d'armée*, and the necessity of covering the capital. To ensure success, it was necessary, first of all, to keep constantly united a force sufficient to fall day and night on the English, without being troubled about Madrid; but, with a king at head-quarters, seeking to control a vast kingdom, this was a difficult matter.

Nevertheless, at the time of my departure from France, I left my brother great chances of success, for in three months I had greatly advanced our cause; the destruction of three Castilian armies, the occupation of Madrid, the overthrow of Moore, the fall of Saragossa, the defeat of Vives and Reding, the occupation of Galicia, the assault of Oporto—had struck Spain and Portugal with terror. The English division left at Lisbon under Craddock was already preparing to follow the wreck of Moore's army, as soon as Victor should advance by the valley of the Tagus. It seemed to require but the slightest effort to complete the enterprise. This appearance, however, was deceitful. In a country so vast, where the slightest thing may be converted into a serious obstacle, the absence of a firm and *single* directing mind must necessarily be felt sooner or later; and obstinacy, which forms the distinctive trait of the Spanish and Portuguese character, was

calculated to eventually wear out the unconnected efforts of my lieutenants.\*

INTRIGUES OF TALLEYRAND.—On my return to Paris, I was not a little surprised to find the capital full of rumors on the inconveniences of the Spanish war, and on the pretended counsels of Talleyrand, which would have prevented it, had they been followed! I had good reason to be astonished and indignant at so incorrect a rumor, the object of which was too evident to be misunderstood. I now saw what I had to expect from a man who could lend himself to such an intrigue. I should probably have undertaken the war in Spain without his advice, but certainly his counsel contributed not a little to draw me into it. Deeming it best not to resort to too severe measures against him, I contented myself with reproving him in presence of the deputation of all the great bodies of the state, who had come to welcome my return to the Tuileries, reproaching him with these untrue stories which could have originated only with himself. I had already had occasion to observe his want of principle in pecuniary matters, and especially in the affairs of the princes of Germany and of the House of Orange, but I had not deemed him capable of such an act as this. The rather severe reproof which I here gave him was not the cause of the war which he declared against me, but it was the signal for hostilities.

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\*Napier's account of this campaign and his criticisms on the operations are well worthy the attention of the military student.



## APPENDIX TO VOLUME I.

## THE BONAPARTE FAMILY.

We have already mentioned several members of this family in the foot-notes. But as the extraordinary career of Napoleon, and the recent elevation of his nephew, Louis Napoleon, to the imperial throne of France, has directed public attention to the origin and history of the Bonaparte family, the following sketch has been prepared by the Translator. It is compiled mainly from Appleton's "New American Cyclopædia," the "Encyclopædia Americana," and "Biographie des Contemporains."

Some writers have attempted to trace the origin of the Bonaparte family to Emmanuel II., a Greek Emperor of the House of Comnenus, whose two sons, after the fall of Constantinople, fled to Italy under the name of Bonaparte. It is historical fact that a Bonaparte family was distinguished among the nobles of Italy in the middle ages. The names of Bonapartes appear among the Florentine patricians in the "Golden Book of Bologna," and are also inscribed in the "Golden Book of Venice," in the nobility records of Treviso. When Napoleon's ancestors first settled in Corsica is uncertain, but is supposed to have been during the contests between the Guelphs and Ghibellines.

*Charles Maria Bonaparte*, Napoleon's father, was born in Ajaccio, March 29th, 1746. He called himself a Florentine noble and patrician, and was educated as a lawyer in the university of Pisa. He became one of the most popular advocates in Corsica. He fought with Paoli for the independence of Corsica against the Genoese, and wished to accompany him into exile, but was prevented by the tears of his young wife. On the annexation of Corsica to France, he became assessor of the Royal Court of Justice. Count Marboeuf, the French commissioner, retained his name on the register of nobles, and also procured for his son Joseph a place at the school at Autun, and for Napoleon at Brienne. In 1779 he was the deputy of the Corsican nobility to Paris. On

account of his health, he subsequently retired to Montpellier, where he died February 24th, 1785. He was buried at that place.

*Maria Letitia Ramolino*, his wife, was born at Ajaccio, August 24th, 1750. She was of Italian origin. He fell in love with her at the age of fourteen, but as her parents were of the Genoese party, while he was a Paolist, their marriage did not take place till several years later. She bore him thirteen children, eight of whom survived their father and attained majority. The names of these eight follow in the order of their birth: viz., Joseph, Napoleon, Lucien, Louis, Eliza, Pauline, Caroline, and Jerome. Madame Bonaparte, after the death of her husband, resided with her children in their country-house on the sea-shore near Ajaccio. It was owned by a bachelor uncle, who lived with the family. He was wealthy, but very parsimonious. Anecdotes are told of the means resorted to by Napoleon and his brothers to wring money from the miser. Although the young Bonapartes enjoyed all the necessities of life, their mother's means were not such as to afford them money for the purchase of those thousand little luxuries which every boy covets, but which it is often better he should not have. When the English conquered Corsica in 1793, she fled with her mother and family to Marseilles. After the 18th Brumaire (1799), she went to Paris, but not till after Napoleon's elevation to the imperial dignity was she distinguished as *Madame Mère*. She was appointed general protectress of charitable institutions, and in that capacity maintained a separate household. After the reverses of Napoleon, she went to live with her half-brother, Cardinal Fesch. All her property was confiscated in 1816. During the last years of her life she was blind and bedridden. She died in 1836, in the eighty-sixth year of her age. She is described as a woman of remarkable beauty, and great energy and decision of character. She always retained her original simplicity and dignity of manner, and never seemed elated by the dazzling success of her family. Napoleon, in speaking of his mother, said: "Left without a guide, without support, my mother was obliged to take the direction of affairs upon herself. But the task was not above her strength. She managed everything, and provided for everything with a prudence which could neither have been expected from her sex nor from her age. Ah, what a woman! Where shall we look for her equal? She watched over us with a solicitude unexampled. Every low sentiment, every ungenerous affection, was discouraged and discarded. She permitted nothing but that which was grand and elevated to take root in our youthful understandings. She abhorred falsehood, and would not tolerate the slightest act of dis-



obedience. None of our faults were overlooked. Losses, privations, fatigue, had no effect upon her. She endured all, braved all. She had the energy of a man, combined with the gentleness and delicacy of a woman."

*Joseph Bonaparte* was born at Corte, in Corsica, January 7th, 1768. He was educated at the college of Autun, in France, and at the university of Pisa. Returning to Corsica, he studied law there, and in 1792 became a member of Paoli's administration. But when that patriot declared against the French Convention, he removed, with his mother's family, to Marseilles. There he was married to the daughter of a wealthy banker, whose youngest daughter had also touched the heart of Napoleon, but was afterward married to Bernadotte, the King of Sweden. In 1797 Joseph was elected to the Council of Five Hundred, from one of the departments of his native island. On repairing to Paris, however, he was sent by the Directory as ambassador to the papal court, where the indiscreet zeal of certain Italian republicans soon involved him in difficulties with the government, and he demanded his passports. He resumed his seat in the Council of Five Hundred, while Napoleon was absent in Egypt, and, in connection with his brother Lucien, prepared the way for the 18th Brumaire, which made Napoleon First Consul. The success of the scheme created Joseph Councillor of State, in which capacity he negotiated the treaty of peace and commerce with the United States in 1800. The following year his diplomatic skill was of service in concluding the treaty of Lunéville with the Emperor of Germany, and that of Amiens with England. When Napoleon assumed the imperial crown, Joseph became an imperial prince, and grand elector of the Empire. In 1806 the Emperor gave him the kingdom of Naples, which he hesitated at first to accept, but afterward took, acting as the mere *locum tenens* of his brother.

In 1808 Napoleon transferred him, much to his regret, to the throne of Spain, a position for which he was entirely unsuited from his want of military talent and energy and firmness of character. On the expulsion of the French armies from Spain he returned to Paris. In January, 1814, when Napoleon took command of the army, Joseph was appointed lieutenant-general of the Empire, and the head of the Council of Regency. In this capacity, when the allied army invested Paris, in March, 1814, he authorized Marmont to treat for a suspension of arms, and subsequently consented to a capitulation. When his brother abdicated, he repaired to Switzerland, where he resided, busily engaged in political intrigues for the restoration of the Emperor, until he

again joined Napoleon in Paris, in 1815. During the Hundred Days he occupied a seat in the imperial senate; but on the second reverse of the Emperor, he took solemn leave of him at the Ile d'Aix, and quitted France and politics forever. Assuming the title of Count de Survilliers, he purchased a splendid country-seat at Bordentown, New Jersey, on the banks of the Delaware, and lived in opulent retirement, till 1830. The revolution of that year in France induced him to write to the Chamber of Deputies, in behalf of the claims of his nephew, Louis Napoleon, who is now the Emperor; but, as the letter was not read in the Chamber, he repaired to England in person. He does not appear to have been able to effect anything for his nephew, and, after a brief sojourn in England, he removed to Florence, in Italy, where he died. Joseph was a man of entirely different constitution from his brother; he was not made for camps or councils; his ambition was moderate, and he was fond of books, of pictures, and of society. The correspondence between himself and his brother, which has been published since his death, is one of the most important contributions to history that has been made for a long while; for it reveals the confidential intercourse of the two brothers, and throws a great deal of light upon the details of important transactions.

*Napoleon Bonaparte*, the second son, was born at Ajaccio, August 15th, 1769, and died at St. Helena, May 5th, 1821. The main incidents of his life are narrated by Jomini in the text of this work.

*Lucien Bonaparte* was born at Ajaccio in 1775. He removed to Marseilles in 1793, and in 1795 married Christine Boyer, daughter of an innkeeper. In 1796 he was appointed a commissary of war, and 1797 was elected deputy to the Council of Five Hundred. He soon distinguished himself as a popular orator and advocate of the rights of the people. Not long before the 18th Brumaire he became president of the Council and prepared the proceedings of that day. After the consular government was organized, he became minister of the interior. In 1800 he was sent as minister to Spain, where he soon acquired great influence. His first wife died in 1802, and, in 1803, he married the widow of the banker Joubert, much against the wishes of Napoleon, and the two brothers were never afterwards fully reconciled. In 1804 he retired to Italy and took up his residence in the neighborhood of Rome, where he devoted himself to the arts and sciences. In 1808 the Pope created him Prince of Canino and Musignano. In 1810 he applied to Mr. Hill, the English ambassador at the Sardinian court, for the purpose of going to the United



States, and, having received satisfactory assurances from him, embarked at Civita Vecchia with his family, personal property, and a retinue of thirty-five persons. He, however, was seized on the voyage by a British cruiser, taken to England, and treated as a prisoner of war. While confined in Ludlow castle, he wrote a poem, called *Charlemagne*, which was published at Rome in 1814. After Napoleon returned from Elba, Lucien went to Paris on a mission from the Pope. He tried to take his seat in the Chamber of Peers as an imperial prince, but his pretensions were not admitted, inasmuch as he had never been accredited as such; he therefore only appeared as a common peer. After the battle of Waterloo, he left for Italy, but was imprisoned by the Austrians in the citadel of Turin. After his release in September, 1815, he resided on his estate at Viterbo, in the neighborhood of Rome. In 1817 he solicited passports for himself and son to the United States. They were refused, but finally his son was permitted to go. He died at Viterbo, July 29th, 1840.

Lucien Bonaparte was highly distinguished as an orator, but less so as a writer, and particularly as a poet. In addition to his *Charlemagne* already referred to, he published a poem in twelve cantos, called *La Cynnéide*. He was also the author of several other works: *Réponse aux Mémoires du général Lamarque*; *Muséum Etrusque de Lucien Bonaparte*; *Mémoires sur la Vie de Lucien Bonaparte*, etc. His eldest son, *Charles Bonaparte*, visited the United States, and in 1822 married his cousin, the daughter of Joseph, who then resided at Bordentown. He was highly distinguished for his scientific attainments, and the author of a splendid continuation of Wilson's "American Ornithology."

*Louis Bonaparte* was born at Ajaccio, September 2d, 1778. He went at an early age to France, chose the military career, and was educated at the military school of Châlons. In his "Reply to Sir Walter Scott" he speaks with great affection of the paternal care which Napoleon took of him in his youth. He was with Napoleon in the campaigns of Italy and of Egypt, distinguishing himself particularly at the bridge of Arcole. He was appointed by the First Consul ambassador to St. Petersburg, but he did not go there in consequence of the death of the Emperor Paul. In 1802 he married Hortense Beauharnais, the daughter of Josephine, but the union was not a pleasant one, inasmuch as her love did not go with her hand, and he was obstinate and eccentric. Napoleon, on becoming Emperor, made him governor of Piedmont, and afterward, in 1806, when the republic of Holland was transmuted into a kingdom, King of Holland. He refused subsequently the crown

of Spain, although his wife, instigated by the Emperor, strenuously urged his acceptance of the dignity. From the beginning Napoleon and Louis were not cordially agreed, and this refusal aggravated their estrangement. Napoleon's idea always was, that the countries he conferred on his family should be governed in the interest of himself and of France, while his brothers were apt to feel that they ought to be governed with reference to the domestic policy of each nation. Louis, as a Holland magistrate, favored trade with England, and encouraged the Dutch nobility, and when he commanded a contingent of his own troops on the continent, he did so as King of Holland, whereas Napoleon wished him to command as a mere French general. But this the stubborn temperament of Louis would not brook, and he was subsequently often treated with studied contempt. When the splendid assembly of vassal princes was held in Paris, in 1809, Louis was not invited to be present. At last their disagreements came to an open breach; his wife, who was devoted to the Emperor, left him to reside in Paris, and Napoleon sent Oudinot with a large force to compel him to abdicate, which he did in favor of his son; but the Emperor refused to acknowledge the son, and in July, 1810, annexed Holland to the Empire. Louis removed first to Toplitz in Bohemia, and then to Gratz in Styria, as the Count St. Leu. In 1813 he offered his services to the Emperor, who accepted them, but gave him no employment. When the Bâtavians, on the downfall of the Empire, resumed their independence, he asserted his right to the throne, but they refused to listen to his pretensions. His wife, in the mean time, had obtained, through the interference of Alexander, a grant of the domain of St. Leu, with the title of duchess, and he opened a suit against her for the restitution of his two sons, who were in her keeping; but the return of Napoleon put a stop to the proceedings. Louis then retired to the Papal States, where he devoted himself to literature, publishing *Marie, ou les Hollandaises*, a romance of Holland life; *Documents historiques et reflexions sur le gouvernement de la Hollande*; *Mémoires sur la versification*; a *Réponse à Sir Walter Scott*, and several poetical compositions. He died at Leghorn, July 25th, 1846, but his body was buried at St. Leu, in France.

*Eliza Bonaparte*, eldest sister of Napoleon, was born at Ajaccio, January 3d, 1777 (or, according to some biographers, in 1773 or 1774), and died at the Villa Vincentina, near Trieste, August 7th, 1820. She was educated in a convent at St. Cyr; lived with her mother in Marseilles at the breaking out of the Revolution; married at Paris, in 1797, Felice Pascale Bacciochi, a



Corsican noble; was made Princess of Lucca and Piombino in 1805, and Grand Duchess of Tuscany in 1808. The vigor and state with which she ruled her principality gained her the appellation of the *Semiramis of Lucca*. She protected literature, science, and the industrial arts, and was especially the friend and patron of Châteaubriand and Fontanes. In 1814 she retired to Bologna; thence, the next year, to Austria, where she lived with her sister Caroline, the widow of Murat; thence, with her family, to her estate of Villa Vincentina, where, under the title of Countess of Compignano, she passed the remainder of her life. She left two sons, Jerome and Charles, who died in Rome in 1833; and a daughter, Napoleone Eliza, who married Count Camerata, and whose only son, Napoleon, born in 1827, killed himself March 3d, 1853.

*Pauline Bonaparte* was born at Ajaccio, October 20th, 1780. When the English occupied Corsica, in 1793, she went to Marseilles, where she was on the point of marrying Fréron, a member of the Convention, and son of that critic whom Voltaire made famous, when another lady laid claim to his hand. The beautiful Pauline was then intended for General Duphot, who was afterward murdered at Rome, in December, 1797; but she bestowed her hand, from choice, on General Leclerc, then at Milan, who had been, in 1795, chief of the general staff of a division at Marseilles, and had there fallen in love with her. When Leclerc was sent to San Domingo, with the rank of captain-general, Napoleon ordered her to accompany her husband with her son. She embarked in December, 1801, at Brest, and was called by the poets of the fleets, the *Galatea of the Greeks*, the *Venus Marina*. Her statue, in marble, has since been made by Canova, at Rome—a successful image of the goddess of beauty. She was no less courageous than beautiful, for when the negroes under Christophe stormed Cape François, where she resided, and Leclerc, who could no longer resist the assailants, ordered his lady and child to be carried on ship-board, she yielded only to force. After the death of her husband, November 23d, 1802, she married, at Morfontaine, November 6th, 1803, the Prince Camillo Borghese. Her son died at Rome, soon after. With Napoleon, who loved her tenderly, she had many disputes, and as many reconciliations; for she would not always follow the caprices of his policy. Yet even the proud style in which she demanded what her brothers begged made her the more attractive to the Emperor. Once, however, when she forgot herself towards the Empress, whom she never liked, she was obliged to leave the court. She was yet in disgrace, at Nice, when Napoleon resigned his crown in 1814; upon which occasion she imme-

diately acted as a tender sister. Instead of remaining at her palace in Rome, she set out for Elba, to join her brother, and acted the part of mediatrix between him and the other members of his family. When Napoleon landed in France, she went to Naples to see her sister Caroline, and afterwards returned to Rome. Before the battle of Waterloo, she placed all her diamonds, which were of great value, at the disposal of her brother. They were in his carriage, which was taken in that battle, and were shown publicly at London. He intended to have returned them to her. She lived, afterwards, separated from her husband, at Rome, where she occupied part of the Palace Borghese, and where she possessed, from 1816, the Villa Sciarra. Her house, in which taste and love of the fine arts prevailed, was the center of the most splendid society at Rome. She often saw her mother, her brothers Lucien and Louis, and her uncle Fesch. When she heard of the sickness of her brother Napoleon, she repeatedly requested permission to go to him at St. Helena. She finally obtained her request, but the news of his death arrived immediately after. She died June 9th, 1825, at Florence. She left many legacies, and a donation, by the interest of which two young men of Ajaccio will be enabled to study medicine and surgery.

*Caroline Bonaparte*, youngest sister of Napoleon, was born at Ajaccio, March 26th, 1782, and died in Florence, May 18th, 1839. She came to France in 1793; married Joachim Murat in January, 1800; became Grand Duchess of Berg in 1806, and Queen of Naples in 1808. She gained the affection of the people, patronized letters, restored the Neapolitan Museum of Antiquities, organized the excavation of Pompeii, and established a school for three hundred girls. Made a widow in 1815, she retired to Haimburg in Austria, and took the title of Countess of Lipona, the anagram of Napoli (Naples.) She was permitted to visit Paris in 1830, where she resided three months, to obtain indemnity for the castle of Neuilly, which her husband had purchased, and which had been restored to the family of Orleans. The French Chamber, in 1838, granted her a pension for life of one hundred thousand francs. She left two sons and two daughters.

*Jerome Bonaparte*, the youngest brother of Napoleon, was born at Ajaccio, December 25th, 1784, and died at Paris in 1859. He was educated under Madame Campan, at Paris, and next at Juilly, and was early placed in the naval service, where he remained until 1801, when he was sent as lieutenant, to San Domingo, under General Leclerc, his brother-in-law. Returning soon to France, as a bearer of dispatches, he received an independent



command, and sailed again for Martinique. During the hostilities of 1803 between France and England, he cruised between St. Pierre and Tobago, but, for some reason or other, he was obliged to leave the station, and went to New York. December 24th, 1803, he married Miss Elizabeth Patterson, the daughter of a wealthy and eminent merchant of Baltimore. After the Empire was declared, he returned with his wife to Europe; but, as his marriage had not pleased the imperial will, she was not allowed to land in France. Napoleon had the marriage annulled by a decree of his council of state, but the Pope, to whom politics were not in this case a superior consideration to morals, refused to sanction the divorce. Madame Bonaparte went first to Holland, where, too, she was not permitted to go on shore, and then to England. In that country she gave birth to a son, July, 1805, who was named Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte. The father himself entered France after a while, and was given a captaincy. Subsequently he was created rear-admiral, and in 1807 was transferred to the land service, with the rank of general-of-division. He commanded a body of Würtembergers and Bavarians in the campaign of that year, and was successful in a movement against Silesia. On the twelfth of August, the same year, his brother caused him to be married to Frederica Catherine, daughter of the King of Würtemberg, although his own wife was still living. On the eighteenth, Westphalia was erected into a kingdom, and the youthful, half-educated, and extravagant Jerome made the king. His government, however, though excessively lavish and prodigal, was an improvement upon that of the old *régime*: he was little more than the deputy or viceroy of the Emperor; but that emperor was a greatly superior man to the conservative Germans who before had held sway. In the campaign against Russia, in 1812, he led a corps of Germans, and considerably distinguished himself by his bravery; but, having been guilty of some neglect, which disconcerted the plans of Napoleon, he was severely reprimanded by him, and went home in dudgeon. In the ensuing year, when the French were driven out of Germany, Jerome went with his family to Paris; but in 1814 they were compelled to quit France. His wife was arrested just as they were leaving Paris, by a body of the Allies, but was speedily released. After Napoleon's abdication, he lived alternately at Blois, at Gratz, and at Trieste, and did not get back to Paris till April, 1815. He at once embraced the fortunes of his brother, and fought with him at Ligny and Waterloo. The final downfall of the family sent him wandering through Switzerland, to settle at last near Vienna, as Prince de Montfort.

a title conferred upon him by his father-in-law. In 1852, when Louis Napoleon assumed the supreme control in Paris, he was called back to France, made a marshal of the Empire, president of the Senate, and, in the failure of a direct succession to Louis Napoleon, heir to the throne. By his first wife, Miss Patterson, he had one son; by his second, two sons, Prince Napoleon and one who is not now living, and a daughter.

*Napoleon Bonaparte II.* (Francis Napoleon Charles), son of the first emperor, was born in Paris, March 20th, 1811, and died at Schönbrunn July 22d, 1832. He was the fruit of the marriage between Napoleon and Maria Louisa of Austria, and from his birth was styled the King of Rome. When the Emperor was compelled to abdicate in 1814, he went with his mother to Vienna, and was educated there by his grandfather, the Emperor of Austria. His title there was the Duke of Reichstadt, and he was most carefully instructed, especially in the military art. But he appears to have inherited but little of the ability of his father; his constitution was weak, and early symptoms of consumption unfitted him for the laborious duties of a military career. On Napoleon's return from Elba, in 1815, an attempt was made to remove the young Duke to Paris, but frustrated by the Austrian authorities. He was made a lieutenant-colonel in 1831, and commanded a battalion of Hungarian infantry in the garrison of Vienna, but his death, when he was but twenty-one years old, cut him off before he had reached an age in which he might have displayed any abilities he possessed. During his lifetime he never assumed the title of Napoleon II., inasmuch as the abdication of his father in his favor was never admitted by the Allies, nor was it ever claimed by the French government. But in 1852, when the resumption of the Empire by Louis Napoleon rendered some title necessary, he was considered Napoleon II., and the new emperor took that of Napoleon III. The latter title, however, having been recognized by the several governments of Europe, the recognition of the former is implied.

*Napoleon Bonaparte III.* (Charles Louis Napoleon) is the son of Louis, the King of Holland, and Hortense, daughter of the Empress Josephine, who re-appears on the throne of France, from which she was expelled by Napoleon I. in the person of her grandson. He was born in Paris, April 20th, 1808. The Emperor and Empress were his sponsors at baptism, and he was an early favorite with Napoleon. As his father and mother soon came to live separately, he was chiefly educated by his mother, who resided in Paris under the title of the Queen of Holland. After the battle of



Waterloo, the family retired first to Augsburg, where he learned the German language, and subsequently to Switzerland, where they passed their summers, while in winter they repaired to Rome. The principal tutor of Louis Napoleon was M. Lebas, who, being a stern republican, gave him his first but short-lived inclinations to republican principles. For a time, however, he was at the military college of Thun, where he made some progress in the science of gunnery, but was not distinguished as a scholar. When the Revolution of 1830 broke out, he petitioned Louis Philippe to be allowed to return to France, but that adroit monarch refused the request. Louis and his brother, Napoleon, then repaired to Italy, where they took an active part in the revolutionary movements of 1831. But the interference of France and Austria in behalf of the papal authorities soon put an end to these, and the brothers were banished from the papal territory. The elder brother, Napoleon, died at Pesaro, a victim of his anxieties and fatigues, March 27th of that year; and Louis Napoleon, also prostrated by illness at Ancona, was joined by his mother, and having in vain applied for permission to enter the French army, he spent a short time in England, eventually retiring to his mother's château at Arenenberg, in Thurgau. The Duke of Reichstadt dying in 1832 left him the successor of Napoleon I., not by legitimate descent, but by the imperial edicts of 1804 and 1805, which set aside the usual order of descent and fixed the succession in the line of the fourth brother of Napoleon, Louis, instead of in that of the elder brother, Joseph. This opened a new career to his ambition, and he seems from that time to have set his heart upon the recovery of the imperial position and honors. Nor did he leave any means untried by which he might hope to win over the French people to an approval of his lofty project. He wrote a book called *Réveries Politiques*, in which he endeavored to demonstrate the necessity of an emperor to the true republican organization of France. This was subsequently expanded into a larger work, called *Idées Napoléoniennes*, wherein the policy and plans of the Emperor were magnified and extolled, and earnestly commended to the adoption of France. But he did not limit his efforts to the publication of books; he put himself in communication with Colonel Vaudry, and other military officers of the garrison of Strasbourg; and October 30th, 1836, he proclaimed a revolution. The soldiers of some regiments received him with acclamation, but the other regiments remained true to their duty, and the attempt resulted in a miserable failure. The Prince, however, was taken prisoner, and Louis Philippe, instead of having him executed, consented

at the earnest entreaties of his mother, merely to banish him. He was sent to the United States, where he led a life of idleness for a short time, and then went to South America. The mortal illness of his mother took him back to Arenenberg in time to see her die on October 5th, 1837. As he immediately set to work defending his conduct at Strasbourg, the government of France demanded his extradition from Switzerland, which country at first refused to comply with the request, but afterward was about to assent to it, when Louis Napoleon voluntarily withdrew to England. There he occupied himself in preparing his *Idées Napoléoniennes*, before referred to, and in getting up a second revolutionary expedition. Accompanied by Count Montholon, who had been the companion of his uncle at St. Helena, and a retinue of about fifty persons, he sailed in a steamboat from Margate in August, 1840. He was tried for treason before the House of Peers, was defended by the eloquent Berryer, but was sentenced to perpetual imprisonment in the fortress of Ham. His exclusion from the world gave him leisure for the exercise of his literary abilities, and he passed some of his time in writing "Historical Fragments," among which is a comparison of the French Revolution of 1834 and the English Revolution of 1688; also, an analysis of the sugar question, and an essay on the extinction of pauperism, in the last of which a decidedly socialistic tone is assumed. He published, also, *Considérations Politiques et Militaires sur la Suisse*, and a *Manuel sur l'Artillerie*. After remaining in prison six years, he managed to effect his escape by the assistance of his physician, in the dress of a workman, and went again to England. When the Revolution of 1848 broke out, he repaired to Paris, and was chosen a deputy to the National Assembly, from the department of the Seine and three other departments. Lamartine, opposing the Bonaparte dynasty, endeavored to effect his banishment from France, but, after a stormy debate, Louis Napoleon was admitted to his seat. He professed to be a republican, and as such took the oath of fidelity to the Republic. On December 10th, when the election for President came on, he was found to be the most popular candidate, and was chosen by a large majority of votes. His government as President, nominally republican, was yet steadily directed to the furtherance of his personal schemes. In the beginning of 1851. Changarnier, who commanded the army of Paris, was dismissed, and the Legislative Assembly, which refused to pass several bills urged by him, was denounced as factious and refractory. All through the summer the breach between the Prince President, as he was called, and the representatives of the people was widened.



when suddenly, on the night of the 2d of December, the President declared Paris in a state of siege; a decree was issued dissolving the Assembly, one hundred and eighty of the members were placed in arrest, the leading ones being torn from their beds and sent to prison, and the people who exhibited any disposition to take their part were shot down in the streets by the soldiers. A decree was put forth at the same time, ordering the establishment of universal suffrage, and the election of a President for ten years. Louis Napoleon was of course elected under this decree; and as soon as he found himself firmly reseatd in his place, he began to prepare for the restoration of the Empire. In January, 1852, the national guard was revived, a new constitution adopted, and new orders of notability issued. On November 21st and 22d the people were asked to vote upon a *plebiscitum*, reviving the imperial dignity in the person of Louis Napoleon. The votes were counted largely in his favor, and he was declared Emperor, under the title of Napoleon III. Thus the long and eager pursuit of the resuscitation of the Napoleon dynasty was at last crowned with success. In January, 1853, Louis Napoleon married Eugénie, Countess de Teba, a Spanish lady of remarkable beauty and accomplishments, and the result of the union was the birth of a son, March 16th, 1856.

*Napoleon Bonaparte*, Prince Napoleon (Charles Paul), is the son of Jerome Bonaparte by his second wife, the daughter of the King of Würtemberg. He was born at Trieste, September 9th, 1822. After the revolution of February, 1848, he was elected a member of the Assembly from Corsica, and became a prominent party leader. Although a supporter of the imperial government, he encourages liberal, if not democratic measures. He has held high political and military appointments, and has traveled extensively in Europe and America. He served in the wars of the Crimea and of Italy, but without particular distinction.

*Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte*, of Baltimore, son of Jerome and Miss Patterson, was born July 7th, 1805. This marriage was legal by the laws of the Church, and was never annulled by the Pope; but it was opposed to the decrees and policy of the French Empire. Hence, although the legitimacy of the Baltimore branch of the Bonapartes is indisputable, they are not admitted as members of the imperial dynasty. To have done so would have given Mr. Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte precedence over Prince Napoleon and the Princess Mathilde.

## TITLES OF NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS AND OF HIS MOST PROMINENT GENERALS AND MINISTERS.

As many of Napoleon's marshals and most prominent generals and ministers are frequently mentioned by their titles of nobility, which are less known than their proper names, the reader will find the following lists convenient for reference.

### MARSHALS.

Augereau, appointed	1804,	Duke of Castiglione.
Bernadotte, "	1804,	{ Prince of Ponte Corvo, Crown Prince of Sweden, King of Sweden.
Berthier, "	1804,	{ Duke of Neufchâtel, Prince of Wagram.
Brune, "	1804,	Count Brune.
Bessières, "	1804,	Duke of Istria.
Davoust, "	1804,	{ Duke of Auerstädt, Prince of Eckmühl.
Grouchy, "	1815,	Count Grouchy.
Jourdan, "	1804,	Count Jourdan.
Kellerman, "	1804,	Duke of Valmy.
Lannes, "	1804,	Duke of Montebello.
Lefébvre, "	1804,	Duke of Dantzic.
Macdonald, "	1809,	Duke of Tarentum.
Marmont, "	1809,	Duke of Ragusa.
Masséna, "	1804,	{ Duke of Rivoli, Prince of Essling.
Moncey, "	1804,	Duke of Conegliano.
Mortier, "	1804,	Duke of Treviso.
Murat, "	1804,	Grand Duke of Berg.
Ney, "	1804,	{ Duke of Elchingen, Prince of Moskwa.
Oudinot, "	1809,	Duke of Reggio.
Perignon, "	1804,	Count Perignon.
Poniatowski, "	1813,	Prince of Poland.
Serrurier, "	1804,	Count Serrurier.
Soult, "	1804,	Duke of Dalmatia.
Saint-Cyr, "	1812,	Marquis Gouvion-Saint-Cyr.
Suchet, "	1811,	Duke of Albufera.
Victor, "	1807,	Duke of Belluno.

### MOST PROMINENT GENERALS AND MINISTERS.

Cambacérès,	Prince of Parma.
Caulaincourt,	Duke of Vicenza.
Champagny,	Duke of Cadore.
Clarke,	Duke of Feltre.
Eugene Beauharnais,	Prince of Venice and Viceroy of Italy.
Fouché,	Duke of Otranto.
Junot,	Duke of Abrantès.
Lebrun,	Duke of Placentia.
Maret,	Duke of Bassano.
Mouton,	Count Lobau.
Savary,	Duke of Rovigo.
Talleyrand,	Prince of Benevento.
Vandamme,	Count Unebourg.









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